Mortgage Appraisal Waivers and Prepayment Speeds

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Abstract

This report examines factors affecting the use of appraisal waivers for mortgages guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the effect of appraisal waivers on prepayment speeds. It shows that the alignment of Freddie Mac's eligibility criteria with those of Fannie Mae around the start of the COVID-19 pandemic was associated with an increase in the use of appraisal waivers. Conditional on satisfying the basic eligibility criteria, appraisal waivers are more common for refinance loans, loans serviced by nonbanks, and less risky borrowers. The report also shows that appraisal waivers were associated with higher conditional prepayment rates during 2020 but to a lesser extent in 2021 as refinancing activity slowed down. Much of this association can be explained by correlations between appraisal waivers and other observable determinants of prepayment speeds.


Introduction

In the context of mortgages, an appraisal waiver is an offer by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, which shall be referred to more briefly as "the Enterprises," to a lender and borrower to forgo the requirement of an appraisal, which refers to when the value of the property being purchased using the mortgage is assessed through an inspection.¹ The Enterprise instead assesses the value of the

¹ This report refers to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as "the Enterprises" because they are government-sponsored enterprises. The Enterprises guarantee mortgage-backed securities to support the secondary mortgage market. Mortgages must meet certain requirements to be included in a mortgage-backed security guaranteed by the Enterprises. Typically, one such requirement is an appraisal, which is an assessment of the value of the property that serves as collateral for the mortgage.

house using an automated process.² Appraisal waivers are becoming more common, and exhibit 1 shows that the share of Enterprise loans underwritten using an appraisal waiver increased from less than 10 percent in early 2019 to more than 30 percent by mid-2021.³ One factor that may have contributed to the growing use of appraisal waivers in 2020 was the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, to reduce contact between parties in the mortgage transaction process during the early stages of the pandemic, Freddie Mac encouraged the exercise of appraisal waivers for eligible mortgages and expanded its eligibility criteria to more closely align with that of Fannie Mae (Freddie Mac, 2020).

Exhibit 1



FHLMC = Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). FNMA = Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). m = month. MBS = mortgage-backed securities.

Notes: This exhibit shows the share of appraisal waivers for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It also shows the share for a subsample of loans that were approximately eligible for a waiver. Approximate eligibility is determined by the criteria in exhibit 3 and omitting loans for manufactured housing and co-ops. The dashed line in March 2020 marks the approximate date at which the Enterprises' eligibility criteria were aligned. The date corresponds to the month when a loan's respective MBS pool age is 1 month.

Source: Enterprises' UMBS disclosures accessed via RiskSpan


The increased use of appraisal waivers associated with the pandemic has a number of potential implications for the mortgage market. On the one hand, they could increase the efficiency of

² For Fannie Mae, Desktop Underwriter determines appraisal waiver eligibility based in part on an assessment of the quality of prior appraisals recorded in its Collateral Underwriter data (Fannie Mae, 2020). For Freddie Mac, Automated Collateral Valuation determines appraisal waiver eligibility for loans submitted through Loan Product Advisor using historical data, public records, and models (Freddie Mac, n.d.).

³ Fannie Mae introduced its current appraisal waiver program in December 2016 (Fannie Mae, 2016), and Freddie Mac followed in 2017 (Freddie Mac, 2017b).

mortgage transactions by reducing the time and costs associated with the appraisal process.⁴ On the other hand, these efficiency gains could also be associated with higher prepayment speeds, as exhibit 2 shows that loans that originated with an appraisal waiver exhibited a higher conditional prepayment rate (CPR) throughout 2020.⁵ Prepayment speeds are important for several reasons. First, they affect the value of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Second, market participants have indicated that the alignment of prepayment speeds across cohorts of the Enterprises' uniform MBS (UMBS) is crucial to maintaining their fungibility in the to-be-announced (TBA) market, which is a key goal of the UMBS Rule (Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2019).^{6,7} Third, if the relationship between prepayments and appraisal waivers is persistent and causal, then failing to price the use of an appraisal waiver creates a cross-subsidy in favor of borrowers who use an appraisal waiver.⁸

Exhibit 2




⁴ Appraisal waivers are estimated to reduce loan closing times by about 7 to 10 days and appraisal costs by \$300 to \$700 (FHFA OIG, 2018). Lenders also enjoy relief from representations and warranties on the value, condition, and marketability of the property (Fannie Mae, 2022; Freddie Mac, n.d.), which reduces the risk of being required by the guaranteeing Enterprise to repurchase the loan.

⁵ The conditional prepayment rate is the percentage of a loan's principal that is estimated to be prepaid, or paid before the loan is due.

⁶ A uniform MBS is an MBS with the same structure regardless of which Enterprise issues it. The TBA market is a forward market for mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the Enterprises, in which details about the security—including the issuing Enterprise in the case of UMBS—is revealed only shortly before delivery.

⁷ The incidence of appraisal waivers at the two Enterprises generally became more similar after the alignment of the eligibility criteria, which does not indicate any adverse effects for UMBS.

⁸ Borrowers who use an appraisal waiver are arguably better off because they can satisfy the eligibility criteria (exhibit 3). In addition, section 2 shows that appraisal waivers are more common for borrowers with high credit scores and low debt-to-income ratios.



CPR = conditional prepayment rate. LTV = loan-to-value. m = month.

Prepayment Speeds by the Use of Appraisal Waivers (2 of 2)

Notes: Exhibit 2a shows the average CPR for loans with and without an appraisal waiver. The date corresponds to the month when a loan's respective MBS pool age is 12 months. Exhibit 2b shows the average CPR for loans with and without an appraisal waiver within the set of purchase mortgages in the Freddie Mac 2019 3.0 coupon cohort, with a loan size between \$200,000 and \$400,000, FICO score greater than 720, and LTV less than 80. Source: Enterprises' UMBS disclosures accessed via RiskSpan

This report first examines several factors that have affected the use of appraisal waivers. For a loan to be underwritten with an appraisal waiver, it first must meet the eligibility criteria of the guaranteeing Enterprise, which is typically given by an upper limit of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio depending on the loan purpose and occupancy type (see exhibit 3).⁹ The Enterprise must then determine whether to offer a waiver. Finally, the waiver must be accepted by both the borrower and the lender. Before 2020, Freddie Mac's appraisal waiver eligibility criteria were stricter than Fannie Mae's. On March 29, 2020, Freddie Mac expanded its eligibility criteria for cash-out refinances and rate-term (or "no cash-out") refinances to match the criteria of Fannie Mae more closely.¹⁰ The expansion of Freddie Mac's eligibility criteria seems to have been associated with an increase in appraisal waivers. However, many loans that meet the LTV limits still do not use an appraisal waiver. Among loans satisfying the limits, appraisal waivers are more common for refinance loans, nonbank servicers, and high credit score borrowers.¹¹

⁹ Various additional factors can affect eligibility. See Fannie Mae (2022) and Freddie Mac (2022) for further details.

¹⁰ It specifically extended eligibility to cash-out refinance loans with an LTV up to 70 percent for primary residences or 60 percent for secondary residences, and it raised the LTV limit for rate-term refinance loans from 80 percent to 90 percent for both primary and secondary residences. See Freddie Mac (2020). Note that Freddie Mac's eligibility criteria were not exactly aligned with Fannie Mae's, as they remained stricter for investment properties.

¹¹ The term *nonbanks* refers to financial institutions that do not have deposits.

Appraisal Waiver Eligibility Criteria						
	Fannie Mae	Freddie Mac before March 29, 2020	Freddie Mac after March 29, 2020			
Purchase						
Primary residence	80%	80%	80%			
Second Home	80%	80%	80%			
Investment Property	Ineligible	Ineligible	Ineligible			
No cash-out refinance						
Primary residence	90%	80%	90%			
Second Home	90%	80%	90%			
Investment Property	75%	Ineligible	Ineligible			
Cash-out refinance						
Primary residence	70%	Ineligible	70%			
Second Home	60%	Ineligible	60%			
Investment Property	60%	Ineligible	Ineligible			

Notes: This exhibit presents the loan-to-value limits across loan purpose and occupancy types to qualify for an appraisal waiver. See Fannie Mae (2022) and Freddle Mac (2022) for details on other factors affecting eligibility. For announcements regarding updates to Fannie Mae's eligibility criteria, see Fannie Mae (2020) and, particularly, Fannie Mae (2016) for the introduction of appraisal waivers for refinances; and Fannie Mae (2017) for the expansion of appraisal waivers to purchase loans. Fannie Mae (2018) also provides a summary of the eligibility criteria for Fannie Mae. For announcements regarding updates to Freddie Mac's eligibility criteria, see Freddie Mac (2017b) for the introduction of appraisal waivers for rate-term refinances, Freddie Mac (2017a) for the expansion of appraisal waivers to purchase loans, and Freddie Mac (2020) for the expansion of the eligibility criteria for appraisal waivers in March 2020. Sources: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

This report then examines explanations of the association between appraisal waivers and prepayment speeds. During 2020, appraisal waivers were associated with a 6.7-percentage-point increase in CPRs by the time a loan's respective pool is 12 months old. However, about 78 percent of this association can be explained by correlations between appraisal waivers and other observable determinants of prepayment speed. For example, borrowers with higher credit scores or previous refinancing experience are less likely to wait too long to refinance when interest rates are low (Agarwal, Rosen, and Yao, 2015), and loans originated by nonbanks are generally associated with faster prepayments (Buchak et al., 2018; Fuster et al., 2019). After controlling for observable loan, borrower, and servicer characteristics, appraisal waivers were associated with a 1.5-percentagepoint increase in CPRs. The residual association is stronger for purchase loans than refinance loans, consistent with appraisal waivers mitigating inconveniences involved in refinancing. In particular, refinances are more likely to be associated with borrowers who already have a low barrier to refinance and thus less to gain from the efficiency benefits of an appraisal waiver. Finally, the association between appraisal waivers and prepayment speeds diminished around April 2021, simultaneously with a general decrease in refinancing incentives. The observation that appraisal waivers are more strongly associated with prepayment speeds when refinancing incentives are high is consistent with lenders prioritizing loans that are more likely to use an appraisal waiver when faced with capacity constraints.

Prior Research

This report is related to recent research papers on the prevalence and implications of appraisal waivers. For example, Karamon and McManus (2022) find that appraisal waivers are associated with lower default risk among Freddie Mac loans. This report also contributes to a literature on the determinants of mortgage prepayment speeds. Buchak et al. (2018) find that nonbanks are generally associated with faster prepayments. Fuster et al. (2019) additionally show that the subset of nonbank lenders with a fully online application process, also known as fintechs, are associated with higher market-wide local refinancing propensities, possibly due to improving the efficiency of the mortgage transaction process. Agarwal, Rosen, and Yao (2015) find that borrowers who have refinanced before make smaller refinancing errors.

For more general background on research on appraisal waivers, as early as 2018, industry analysts expressed concern about the effects of appraisal waivers on prepayment speeds, speculating that technological changes at the Enterprises focused on streamlining the origination process, including appraisal waivers and digital verification of assets, income, and employment, could increase prepayment speeds much like streamlined refinance options had increased prepayment speeds for Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Veteran's Administration (VA), Rural Housing Service (RHS), and Public and Indian Housing (PIH) loans.

Industry analysts initially used loan-level disclosures associated with the Enterprises' credit risk transfer securities, particularly Fannie Mae's Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS) and Freddie Mac's Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) securities, to draw preliminary conclusions about the prevalence of appraisal waiver loans by acquiring Enterprise, loan purpose, originator type, loan or borrower characteristics, and geography. Questions raised in analysts' research reports and complaints of inadequate disclosures spurred the Enterprises under FHFA coordination to release loan-level data on appraisal waivers in their monthly MBS disclosures in March 2020, with retrospective data going back to January 2017 for Fannie Mae and to June 2017 for Freddie Mac. The data release enabled further analysis to understand the implications of appraisal waivers for prepayment risk and the value of credit risk transfer (CRT) issuances and UMBS.

Appraisal Waiver Prevalence

This section shows that the expansion of Freddie Mac's appraisal waiver eligibility criteria to align with those of Fannie Mae was associated with an increase in the use of appraisal waivers. It also shows that, controlling for eligibility, appraisal waivers are more common for refinances, nonbank servicers, and high credit score borrowers.

Data

This analysis uses the Enterprises' UMBS monthly public disclosures provided by RiskSpan.¹² It focuses on new MBS issuances from January 2019 to July 2021. In particular, each observation corresponds to a loan when its respective MBS pool age is 1 month. This analysis omits Fannie Mae refinance loans before July 2019, as the data do not distinguish between cash-out and rate-term

¹² The data are provided by RiskSpan with the Enterprises' loan-level public disclosure as the original source.

refinances. It uses a 10-percent random sample from the resulting set of loans. Exhibit 4 presents summary statistics for servicer, loan, borrower, and timing characteristics. About 31 percent of loans in the sample used an appraisal waiver.

Graphical Analysis of Appraisal Waiver Prevalence

This section documents several facts about how the use of appraisal waivers has varied over time based on various loan, servicer, and borrower characteristics.

Summary Statistics for Appraisal Waiver Prevalence Analysis						
	N	Mean	SD	P25	P75	
Waiver	1,461,155	0.312	0.463	0.000	1.000	
FHLMC	1,461,155	0.448	0.497	0.000	1.000	
Purchase	1,461,155	0.389	0.487	0.000	1.000	
Rate-term	1,461,155	0.406	0.491	0.000	1.000	
Cash-out	1,461,155	0.205	0.404	0.000	0.000	
Nonbank	1,461,155	0.599	0.490	0.000	1.000	
FICO	1,461,155	754.587	43.180	725.000	790.000	
DTI (%)	1,461,155	34.011	9.743	27.000	42.000	
LTV (%)	1,461,155	72.396	17.381	61.000	84.000	
Amount (\$1,000s)	1,461,155	272.069	132.091	171.000	353.000	
Post	1,461,155	0.711	0.453	0.000	1.000	

Exhibit 4

Notes: Waiver indicates whether a loan used an appraisal waiver. FHLMC indicates whether the loan was acquired by Freddie Mac. Purchase indicates whether the loan was a purchase loan. Rate-term indicates whether the loan was a rate-term refinance. Cash-out indicates whether the loan was a cash-out refinance. FICO is the FICO credit score. DTI is the debt-to-income ratio. LTV is the loan-to-value ratio on origination. Amount is the loan amount in thousands of dollars. Post indicates months after March 2020 when there was an alignment of appraisal waiver eligibility criteria between Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Source: Enterprises' UMBS disclosures accessed via RiskSpan


As noted earlier, exhibit 1 shows that the use of appraisal waivers for both Enterprises increases dramatically from 2019 to 2020. Consistent with the alignment of the Enterprises' eligibility criteria in March 2020, Freddie Mac had a lower rate before the update but then caught up with Fannie Mae afterward.

To further distinguish the role of the Enterprises' eligibility criteria compared with other factors, this analysis restricts to an approximate set of loans satisfying the eligibility criteria. In particular, this sample consists of loans satisfying the LTV limits to be eligible for an appraisal waiver, as described in exhibit 3, and omits loans for manufactured housing and co-ops, which are ineligible based on the additional criteria mentioned in Fannie Mae (2022) and Freddie Mac (2022). This sample may include some ineligible loans because some potential determinants of eligibility are unobserved. Restricting to the set of eligible loans yields additional insights. First, the fact that the gap in appraisal waiver shares between the Enterprises in 2019 largely closed for the set of eligible loans provides additional evidence that Freddie Mac exhibited a lower appraisal waiver share during this time primarily because of its more restrictive eligibility requirements. Second, the

waiver share generally remained below 60 percent, which suggests that factors other than eligibility had a substantial effect on the use of appraisal waivers.¹³


Exhibit 5 compares the prevalence of appraisal waivers for different loan purpose categories. Exhibit 5a indicates that the appraisal waiver share for Freddie Mac loans increased especially dramatically for cash-out refinance loans shortly after Freddie Mac expanded its eligibility criteria, increasing from virtually zero in March 2020 to around 35 percent in November. Exhibit 5b shows that the alignment of the Enterprises' eligibility criteria was also associated with an acceleration in the use of appraisal waivers for rate-term refinance loans, as reflected in the convergence between the appraisal waiver share for purchase loans, which are not affected by the alignment of the eligibility criteria, increased more modestly. By mid-2021, the appraisal waiver share was only around 10 percent for purchase loans compared with around 60 percent for rate-term refinance loans. Differences in the strictness of eligibility within loan purpose groups can explain some differences. In particular, after the alignment of the Enterprises' eligibility criteria, both Enterprises required only a 10-percent down payment for a refinance loan but required a 20-percent down payment for a purchase loan. However, sizable differences remain even when restricting to the set of eligible loans.

Exhibit 5



Appraisal Waiver Share by Loan Purpose (1 of 2)

¹³ Reasons for ineligibility that are not observed may have also limited waiver share.



Appraisal Waiver Share by Loan Purpose (2 of 2)

FHLMC = Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). FNMA = Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). m = month. Notes: This exhibit shows the share of appraisal waivers for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for purchase loans, share-term refinances, and cash-out refinances and for a subsample of loans that were approximately eligible for a waiver within each of these groups. Approximate eligibility is determined by the loan-tovalue limits in exhibit 3 and omitting loans for manufactured housing and co-ops. The dashed line in March 2020 marks the approximate date at which the Enterprises' eligibility criteria were aligned. Note that some series are curtailed because the data for Fannie Mae do not distinguish between cash-out and rate-term refinances before July 2019. The date corresponds to the month when a loan's respective MBS pool age is 1 month. Source: Enterprises' UMBS disclosures accessed via RiskSpan

Exhibit 6 compares the prevalence of appraisal waivers based on whether the servicer is a bank or a nonbank. For both Enterprises, nonbanks generally exhibited higher rates of appraisal waivers.


Nonbank servicers of Freddie Mac loans increased the share of appraisals particularly dramatically after the alignment of the Enterprises' eligibility criteria, although the difference between bank and nonbank servicers diminished starting in late 2020. When restricting to the set of eligible loans, the difference between banks and nonbanks widens, particularly for Freddie Mac.

The larger gap for the set of eligible loans suggests that nonbanks tend to more often underwrite loans that are ineligible, even though they are also more likely to use an appraisal waiver for eligible loans. Consistent with these aggregate results, exhibit 7 shows that the appraisal waiver shares of loans acquired by Freddie Mac for United Wholesale Mortgage and Quicken Loans, the two largest nonbank servicers in the sample, increased abruptly in 2020 and peaked at around 90 percent and 70 percent, respectively. The appraisal waiver share at Wells Fargo, the largest bank servicer, generally increased more gradually and evenly between the two Enterprises.

Exhibit 6

(a) Fannie Mae 100 Bank Nonbank 90 Bank (Eligible) 80 Nonbank (Eligible) 70 Waiver Share (%) 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2019m1 2019m7 2020m1 2020m7 2021m1 2021m7

Appraisal Waiver Share by Servicer Type: Bank vs. Nonbank (1 of 2)




Appraisal Waiver Share by Servicer Type: Bank vs. Nonbank (2 of 2)


FHLMC = Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). FNMA = Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). m = month. Notes: This figure shows the share of appraisal waivers for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for loans serviced by banks and nonbanks and for a subsample of loans that were approximately eligible for a waiver within each of these groups. Approximate eligibility is determined by the loan-to-value limits in exhibit 3 and omitting loans for manufactured housing and co-ops. The dashed line in March 2020 marks the approximate date at which the Enterprises' eligibility criteria were aligned. The date corresponds to the month when a loan's respective MBS pool age is 1 month. Source: Enterprises' UMBS disclosures accessed via RiskSpan

Exhibit 7

Appraisal Waiver Share for United Wholesale Mortgage, Quicken, and Wells Fargo (1 of 2)



Appraisal Waiver Share for United Wholesale Mortgage, Quicken, and Wells Fargo (2 of 2)



FHLMC = Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). FNMA = Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). m = month. Notes: This exhibit shows the share of appraisal waivers for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for United Wholesale Mortgage, Quicken Loans, and Wells Fargo. The dashed line in March 2020 marks the approximate date at which the Enterprises' eligibility criteria were aligned. The date corresponds to the month when a loan's respective MBS pool age is 1 month.


Data source: Enterprises' UMBS disclosures accessed via RiskSpan

Exhibit 8 compares the prevalence of appraisal waivers based on the borrower's credit score. Credit score does not determine eligibility for an appraisal waiver, but it could be correlated with factors that do affect eligibility, such as the LTV ratio, or it could affect the willingness of an Enterprise,

borrower, or lender to all agree to an appraisal waiver conditional on the loan satisfying the eligibility criteria. Whereas both Enterprises have higher appraisal waiver shares for loans with FICO scores above 750, Freddie Mac has a notably higher share for loans with FICO scores below 750. In addition, both Enterprises exhibit little differentiation in appraisal waiver shares between loans with FICO scores below 700 and loans with FICO scores between 700 and 750.

The Appraisal Waiver Prevalence: Additional Results section in the appendix shows the association between appraisal waivers and various additional attributes.

Exhibit 8



FICO = Fair Isaac Corporation. m = month. MBS = mortgage-backed securities.

Notes: This exhibit shows the share of appraisal waivers for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for loans with FICO scores of 700 and lower, 701 through 750, and greater than 750. The dashed line in March 2020 marks the approximate date at which the Enterprises' eligibility criteria were aligned. The date corresponds to the month when a loan's respective MBS pool age is 1 month.

Source: Enterprises' UMBS disclosures accessed via RiskSpan

Regression Analysis

This section implements a regression analysis to assess the joint association between appraisal waivers and many of the characteristics considered in the Graphical Analysis of Appraisal Waiver Prevalence section. For example, that section shows that appraisal waivers are more common for refinance loans and loans serviced by nonbanks, but this association could be driven by correlations with other characteristics that are also associated with the use of appraisal waivers, such as risk, loan amount, or location.

This analysis estimates variations of the following specification:

$$100 * waiver_{it} = \beta_1 FHLMC_{it} + \beta_2 rateterm_{it} + \beta_3 cashout_{it} + \beta_4 nonbank_{it} + \gamma X_{it} + \psi_t + \epsilon_{it}$$
(1)

where *waiver*_{it} indicates whether an appraisal waiver was used for loan *i*, whose respective pool has an age of 1 month at month *t*; *FHLMC*_{it} indicates whether the loan was acquired by Freddie Mac; *rateterm*_{it} indicates whether the loan is a rate-term refinance; *cashout*_{it} indicates whether the loan is a cash-out refinance; *nonbank*_{it} indicates whether the servicer is a nonbank; X_{it} is a set of controls that includes FICO score, debt-to-income ratio, loan-to-value ratio, the logarithm of the loan amount, and indicators for occupancy type and state; ψ_t indicates month fixed effects; and ϵ_{it} is the error term.

Column 1 of exhibit 9 shows the results from estimating a baseline version of equation (1) during the period before the alignment of the Enterprises' eligibility criteria, which corresponds to January 2019 to March 2020. Consistent with the figures in the Graphical Analysis of Appraisal Waiver Prevalence section, refinance loans and loans serviced by nonbanks exhibit a higher appraisal waiver share, whereas loans acquired by Freddie Mac exhibit a lower appraisal waiver share. Column 2 restricts to the set of loans satisfying the basic eligibility criteria, in which case there is a notably stronger association between appraisal waivers and nonbanks. In addition, the association between appraisal waivers and Freddie Mac becomes slightly positive. Column 3 adds the control variables. Appraisal waivers are more likely to be used for loans that appear to be safer in some respects, such as having a higher credit score or lower debt-to-income ratio, although they are also more likely to be used for loans with higher LTV ratios conditional on satisfying the eligibility limits.

They are also associated with higher loan amounts. In terms of magnitudes, appraisal waivers are 30 percent more common for rate-term refinance loans compared with purchase loans, 12 percent more common for cash-out refinance loans compared with purchase loans, 10 percent more common for loans serviced by a nonbank compared with loans that are not, and 3 percent more common for Freddie Mac loans.

Determinants of	Appraisal Wa	iver Prevalenc	e			
	1 Pre	2 Pre	3 Pre	4 Post	5 Post	6 Post
FHLMC	-4.541*** (-46.09)	0.814*** (4.25)	0.317* (1.68)	1.505*** (17.97)	3.020*** (27.76)	2.371*** (22.08)
Rate-term	33.666*** (207.90)	32.657*** (156.92)	31.010*** (143.83)	52.380*** (608.46)	42.921*** (322.26)	40.763*** (290.81)
Cash-out	2.060*** (19.37)	13.796*** (41.29)	13.731*** (38.87)	18.244*** (170.34)	22.389*** (128.52)	20.929*** (111.86)
Nonbank	5.472*** (57.47)	11.315*** (63.11)	9.467*** (52.20)	6.658*** (78.19)	10.077*** (89.43)	9.435*** (83.21)
FICO			0.052*** (26.04)			0.133*** (104.99)
DTI			-0.076*** (-8.52)			-0.128*** (-23.52)
LTV			0.054*** (7.85)			0.006 (1.45)
Log (amount)			3.076*** (16.81)			-0.338*** (-2.73)
Observations	422,545	212,025	212,025	1,038,610	736,082	736,082
R^2	0.196	0.165	0.198	0.248	0.139	0.185
Eligible sample	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Occupancy FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

DTI = debt-to-income. FE = fixed effects.

Notes: This exhibit presents results from estimating variations of the regression equation 100 * waiver_n = β_i FHLMC_n + β_2 rateterm_n + β_3 cashout_n + β_4 nonbank_n + $\gamma X_n + \psi_n + \varepsilon_n$, where waiver_n indicates whether an appraisal waiver was used for loan i, whose respective pool has an age of 1 month at month t; FHLMC_n indicates whether the loan was acquired by Freddie Mac; rateterm_n indicates whether the loan is a rate-term refinance; cashout_n indicates whether the servicer is a nonbank; X_n is a set of controls that includes FICO score, debt-to-income ratio, loan-to-value ratio, the logarithm of the loan amount, and indicators for occupancy type and state; ψ_n indicates month fixed effects; and ε_n is the error term. Column (1) estimates a baseline specification for all loans in the period before the Enterprises' eligibility criteria were aligned (January 2019 to March 2020). Column (2) restricts to the subsample of loans that were approximately eligible for an appraisal waiver. Approximate eligibility is determined by the loan-to-value limits in exhibit 3 and omitting loans for manufactured housing and co-ops. Column (3) adds controls. Columns (4)—(6) are analogous for the period from April 2020 to July 2021. T-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. "Indicates statistical significance at the 1-percent level. **indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and **indicates significance at the 1-percent level.

Columns 4–6 estimate an analogous series of regressions except for the period after the alignment of the Enterprises' eligibility criteria, which corresponds to April 2020 to July 2021. The association between appraisal waivers and nonbanks or Freddie Mac is similar compared with the earlier period, and both types of refinance loans become even more strongly associated with appraisal waivers compared with purchase loans. In particular, appraisal waivers became 41 percent more common for rate-term refinance loans than purchase loans and 21 percent more common for cash-out refinance loans. Appraisal waivers also appear to be more strongly associated with safer loans, as the positive correlation with credit score and the negative correlation with the debt-to-income ratio both increased in magnitude and the positive correlation with the LTV ratio diminished. However, the association between appraisal waivers and loan size diminished.¹⁴

¹⁴ Additional unreported results show that larger servicers are positively associated with the use of appraisal waivers both before and after the change of the eligibility criteria.

Appraisal Waivers and Prepayment Speeds

This section first outlines hypotheses for how appraisal waivers could be associated with faster prepayment speeds. It then shows that other determinants of prepayment speeds can explain much but not all of the positive association between appraisal waivers and faster prepayment speeds. Finally, it presents evidence consistent with the efficiency gains of appraisal waivers leading to faster prepayment speeds by showing that the association is stronger for purchase loans and during periods when refinancing activity is high.

Hypotheses

Appraisal waivers could be associated with faster prepayments due to a joint correlation with observables, a joint correlation with unobservables, or a direct causal relationship. Identifying the source of the association is important for public and business policy purposes. In the first case, directly controlling for the appraisal waiver share at each Enterprise is not likely to be important to ensure prepayment alignment, as UMBS investors and the Enterprises can instead assess prepayment risk based on the underlying causes. One argument that appraisal waivers are correlated with, but do not cause, increased prepayment speeds is based on the observation that loans that are eligible for an appraisal waiver are generally less risky, as they must satisfy limits on the LTV ratio that are particularly strict for cash-out refinances, secondary homes, and investment properties. In particular, loans with low LTVs and collateralized by primary residences may be likely to prepay faster because they are subject to less stringent underwriting standards and are more likely to be offered attractive interest rates.¹⁵

If, however, the relationship between appraisal waivers and prepayment speeds cannot be explained by observable characteristics, then a key question is how the use of an appraisal waiver in a previous refinancing could be independently predictive of a loan's prepayment speed. On the one hand, appraisal waivers could be associated with faster prepayment speeds due to a joint correlation with unobservables. For example, a borrower who accepts an appraisal waiver offer may generally be more proactive about financial opportunities. On the other hand, appraisal waiver offer may generally be more proactive about financial opportunities. On the other hand, appraisal waivers could directly cause faster prepayment speeds.¹⁶ For example, a borrower who uses an appraisal waiver for the first time may come to believe that it reduces the hassle of the mortgage transaction process, which could reduce the anticipated inconvenience of future refinances. In addition, servicers may solicit refinances more aggressively to borrowers who used an appraisal waiver on their existing loan, as they might expect such borrowers to be more likely to accept an appraisal waiver in future transactions and therefore yield the associated efficiency benefits.¹⁷

Data

As in the Appraisal Waiver Prevalence section, this analysis uses RiskSpan data for loans included in MBS that were issued from January 2019 to July 2021. It measures prepayment speeds using the

¹⁵ Gerardi, Willen, and Zhang (2020) find that the LTV ratio is negatively associated with prepayment due to refinancing.

¹⁶ The relevance of identifying a direct causal effect may depend on the application. For MBS pricing, the implications are similar as long as appraisal waivers predict repayment speeds independently of observable characteristics.

¹⁷ Aside from efficiency, lenders also benefit from relief from representations and warranties on the value, condition, and marketability of the property.

conditional prepayment rate (CPR), which is an estimate of the portion of a loan's principal that is likely to be repaid early. Because the CPR for newly issued loans shows relatively little variation, the main sample instead focuses on loans in MBS pools with an age of 12 months. This analysis uses a 10-percent random sample from this set of loans. Exhibit 10 presents summary statistics for all these characteristics in the sample used for this analysis.¹⁸ The average CPR at 12 months is about 33 percent.

Exhibit 10

Summary Statistics for Prepayment Speed Analysis							
	N	Mean	SD	P25	P75		
CPR (%)	600,424	32.851	19.086	17.384	50.054		
Waiver	600,424	0.208	0.406	0.000	0.000		
FHLMC	600,424	0.435	0.496	0.000	1.000		
Purchase	600,424	0.467	0.499	0.000	1.000		
Rate-term	600,424	0.334	0.472	0.000	1.000		
Cash-out	600,424	0.199	0.399	0.000	0.000		
Nonbank	600,424	0.551	0.497	0.000	1.000		
FICO	600,424	751.518	43.469	722.000	787.000		
DTI (%)	600,424	34.645	9.654	28.000	43.000		
LTV (%)	600,424	74.630	17.144	65.000	89.000		
Amount (\$1,000s)	600,424	257.216	123.149	164.000	333.000		
Coupon (%)	600,424	3.024	0.645	2.500	3.500		
Post	600,424	0.363	0.481	0.000	1.000		

Notes: CPR is the conditional prepayment rate. Waiver indicates whether a loan uses an appraisal waiver (property inspection waiver). FHLMC indicates whether the loan is a cquired by Freddie Mac. Purchase indicates whether the loan is a purchase loan. Rate-term indicates whether the loan is a rate-term refinance. Cash-out indicates whether the loan is a cash-out refinance. FICO is the FICO credit score. DTI is the debt-to-income ratio. LTV is the loan-to-value ratio on origination. Amount is the loan amount in thousands of dollars. Coupon is the coupon. Post indicates months starting in April 2021. Source: Enterprises' UMBS disclosures accessed via RiskSpan

Graphical Analysis of Prepayment Speeds

Exhibit 2a shows the average CPR for pools with an age of 12 months for loans with or without an appraisal waiver. In 2020, which corresponds to loans issued in 2019, the loans with an appraisal waiver exhibited a CPR of about 3 to 9 percentage points higher. To graphically assess whether using an appraisal waiver causes a loan to prepay faster than other loans with similar credit and borrower characteristics, exhibit 2b shows the prepayment speeds for purchase mortgages included in the Freddie Mac 2019 3.0 coupon cohort with a FICO score greater than 720, LTV less than or equal to 80 percent, and loan size between \$200,000 and \$400,000. Consistent with exhibit 2a, loans with a prior appraisal waiver exhibited a higher CPR throughout 2020, although the difference in 2b is smaller than the one in 2a.¹⁹


¹⁸ Restricting to older loans reduces the sample size compared to that of the Appraisal Waiver Prevalence section.

¹⁹ There is also some variation among servicers. For example, additional unreported results show that appraisal waivers are associated with faster prepayment speeds for United Wholesale Mortgage and Wells Fargo for at least part of the sample period but not as much for Quicken Loans.

The exhibits also show that the average CPR and the increase in CPRs associated with appraisal waivers simultaneously diminished starting around April 2021. One potential explanation is that, during 2020, historically low mortgage interest rates brought about an environment in which lenders and appraisers became so capacity-constrained that loans with appraisal waivers may have been prioritized due to their shorter processing time. In particular, lenders may have anticipated that borrowers who used an appraisal waiver on their existing loan would be more likely to accept an appraisal waiver in future transactions. Beginning in the second quarter of 2021, as refinance applications started to decline, lenders and appraisers became less capacity-constrained, and the efficiency advantages of an appraisal waiver became less urgent.

For additional evidence on the role of capacity constraints, a typical benchmark is the primary/ secondary (P/S) spread, as shown in exhibit 11.²⁰ The long-term historical P/S spread is around 100 basis points (bps). Beginning in the second half of 2019, as mortgage rates started to decline, the P/S spread jumped from 80 bps to as high as 140 bps. Since then, the P/S spread continued moving up and reached a historic high of over 200 bps before settling around 130 bps during the first half of 2021, indicating a relaxation of capacity constraints. This relaxation of capacity constraints is simultaneous with the diminishing association between appraisal waivers and prepayment speeds, which is consistent with the explanation that appraisal waivers have a larger effect on prepayment speeds when lenders face capacity constraints.

Exhibit 11



Mortgage Primary/Secondary Spread

²⁰ Fuster, Lo, and Willen (2017) show that the price of intermediation is positively associated with application volume, consistent with capacity constraints.

Regression Analysis

This section generalizes the approach in exhibit 2b by estimating a regression to assess how appraisal waivers affect prepayment speeds while controlling for a variety of servicer, borrower, and loan characteristics.

This analysis estimates variations of the following specification:

 $CPR_{it} = \beta_1 waiver_{it} + \beta_2 FHLMC_{it} + \beta_3 rateterm_{it} + \beta_4 cashout_{it}$ $+ \beta_5 nonbank_{it} + \gamma X_{it} + \psi_t + \epsilon_{it}$ (2)

Where CPR_{it} indicates the CPR for a loan *i*, whose MBS pool age is 12 months in month *t*; *waiver*_{it} indicates whether the loan used an appraisal waiver; $FHLMC_{it}$ indicates whether the loan was acquired by Freddie Mac; *rateterm*_{it} indicates whether the loan is a rate-term refinance; *cashout*_{it} indicates whether the loan is a cash-out refinance; *nonbank*_{it} indicates whether the servicer is a nonbank; X_{it} is a set of controls that includes FICO score, debt-to-income ratio, loan-to-value ratio, the logarithm of the loan amount, the coupon, and indicators for occupancy type and state; and ψ_t indicates issue month fixed effects.^{21, 22}

Column 1 of exhibit 12 shows the results from estimating a baseline version of equation (2) from January 2020 to March 2021—up to the shift in April 2021. Consistent with exhibit 2a, appraisal waivers were associated with faster prepayment speeds by a margin of about 6.7 percent. When controls are added in Column 2, the association becomes weaker but remains positive and significant, with an appraisal waiver being associated with a 1.5-percent-higher CPR. Column 2 also shows that prepayment speed is positively associated with both types of refinances, nonbanks, and Freddie Mac.²³

Column 3 shows that appraisal waivers have a relatively weaker effect on prepayment speeds for refinances and Freddie Mac loans.

The stronger effect of appraisal waivers on prepayment speeds for purchase loans is consistent with the hypothesis that appraisal waivers mitigate barriers to refinance. In particular, existing refinance loans may tend to prepay faster when interest rates are low because the borrowers already have a relatively low barrier to refinance. An appraisal waiver has relatively little effect on these borrowers because they are more likely to refinance when it is profitable. By contrast, a borrower of a purchase mortgage may be more likely to perceive more hassle associated with applying for refinancing, even if it is profitable. A borrower who uses an appraisal waiver may come to view the

²¹ This analysis focuses on the CPR when the MBS pool age is 12 months because CPRs at shorter durations exhibit less variation and are more concentrated near zero. Additional unreported results show qualitatively similar, albeit somewhat smaller, results when estimating a specification with observations for each loan and month while also including issue month x CPR month fixed effects.

²² Additional unreported results show qualitatively similar, albeit somewhat smaller, results when including servicer fixed effects instead of an indicator for nonbanks.

²³ The positive association between refinance loans and prepayments during a low-interest-rate environment is consistent with Agarwal, Rosen, and Yao (2015), who find that borrowers with previous refinancing experience are less likely to wait too long to refinance. The positive association between nonbanks and refinance loans is similar to the findings in Buchak et al. (2018), who use the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Single Family Loan Performance Data, and Fuster et al. (2019), who use Equifax's Credit Risk Insight Servicing McDash data.

mortgage transaction process as less of a hassle, which could increase the propensity to refinance when it is profitable.

Columns 4 to 6 estimate an analogous series of regressions except for the period from April 2021 to July 2021. The association between appraisal waivers and prepayment is much weaker, although it is still positive and statistically significant. The effect of appraisal waivers on prepayment speeds continues to be strongest for purchase loans.

Exhibit 12

Determinants of Prepayment Speed						
	1 Pre	2 Pre	3 Pre	4 Post	5 Post	6 Post
Waiver	6.708*** (79.55)	1.501*** (20.90)	2.259*** (12.79)	0.864*** (15.88)	0.544*** (9.61)	1.365*** (8.00)
FHLMC		1.048*** (22.14)	1.166*** (22.73)		0.542*** (10.75)	0.511*** (7.73)
Rate-term		1.522*** (23.85)	1.730*** (24.56)		1.499*** (22.55)	1.631*** (22.03)
Cash-out		1.943*** (27.69)	1.962*** (27.02)		2.314*** (26.96)	2.311*** (24.68)
Nonbank		5.253*** (105.77)	5.157*** (96.98)		3.768*** (69.95)	3.951*** (58.61)
Waiver \times HLMC			-1.114*** (-8.30)			0.143 (1.46)
Waiver × Rate-term			-1.347*** (-8.19)			-0.668*** (-4.03)
Waiver × Cash-out			-0.955*** (-3.95)			-0.228 (-1.10)
Waiver × Nonbank			0.922*** (6.64)			-0.591*** (-5.80)
Observations	382,195	382,195	382,195	218,228	218,228	218,228
R^2	0.037	0.452	0.453	0.258	0.429	0.429
Issue Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Occupancy FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Conclusion

This report shows that the use of appraisal waivers is affected by not only the Enterprises' eligibility criteria but also various loan, servicer, and borrower characteristics, such as loan purpose, nonbank

status, and credit score. These characteristics can explain much but not all of the association between appraisal waivers and prepayment speeds. This analysis also presents evidence that the efficiency advantages of appraisal waivers could also contribute to prepayment speeds, as the association with prepayment speeds is weaker for refinancing loans, which are more likely to be made by borrowers who already have low barriers to refinance, and stronger when refinancing incentives are high, in which case lenders are more likely to face capacity constraints. These hypotheses regarding the effect of appraisal waivers on prepayment speeds could be further tested using more detailed data distinguishing the decisions of borrowers and lenders to accept or reject an appraisal waiver offer, which is left for future research. Another consideration for future research is to further examine the relative speeds at which different lenders adapted to the change in the appraisal waiver eligibility conditions, perhaps with a specific focus on the agility of fintechs or the needs of lenders specializing in rural housing.

Appendix

Appraisal Waiver Prevalence: Additional Results

This section extends the graphical analysis of appraisal waiver prevalence from the Graphical Analysis of Appraisal Waiver Prevalence section to an additional set of attributes.

Exhibit A-1 shows that appraisal waivers are more common for borrowers with lower debt-toincome (DTI) ratios, particularly less than 35 percent, even though DTI does not directly affect appraisal waiver eligibility.

Exhibit A-1

Appraisal Waiver Share by Debt-to-Income Ratio (1 of 2)





Exhibit A-1



Appraisal Waiver Share by Debt-to-Income Ratio (2 of 2)

DTI = debt-to-income. m = month.


Notes: This figure shows the share of appraisal waivers for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for loans with DTI of 35 and lower, 36 through 45, and greater than 45. The dashed line in March 2020 marks the approximate date at which the Enterprises' eligibility criteria were aligned. The date corresponds to the month when a loan's respective MBS pool age is 1 month.

Source: Enterprises' UMBS disclosures accessed via RiskSpan

Exhibit A-2 shows that medium-sized loans from \$200K through \$400K exhibit the highest appraisal waiver shares for both Enterprises, whereas loans for less than \$200K have the lowest shares.

Finally, exhibit A-3 shows that, among California, Texas, and Florida, the three largest states in the sample, California has the highest appraisal waiver share, reaching 50 to 60 percent by mid-2020 compared with less than 40 percent for the other two states.

Exhibit A-2




Appraisal Waiver Share by Loan Size

m = month.

Notes: This exhibit shows the share of appraisal waivers for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for loans with less than \$200,000, between \$200,000 and \$400,000, and greater than \$400,000. The dashed line in March 2020 marks the approximate date at which the Enterprises' eligibility criteria were aligned. The date corresponds to the month when a loan's respective MBS pool age is 1 month. Source: Enterprises' UMBS disclosures accessed via RiskSpan

Exhibit A-3



Appraisal Waiver Share for Selected Large States

m = month.

Notes: This exhibit shows the share of appraisal waivers for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for loans in California, Texas, and Florida. The dashed line in March 2020 marks the approximate date at which the Enterprises' eligibility criteria were aligned. The date corresponds to the month when a loan's respective MBS pool age is 1 month.

Source: Enterprises' UMBS disclosures accessed via RiskSpan

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