

SCATTERED-SITE HOUSING: *Characteristics and Consequences*



U.S. Department of Housing
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Prepared for:

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
Foreword

For more than 25 years, “scattered-site” housing has been widely promoted as an alternative to the large, dense public and assisted housing developments that too often concentrated poor families in socially isolated and profoundly dehumanizing environments. Although many public housing authorities have invested significant resources in scattered-site housing, there has been little systematic information on its characteristics and performance. *Scattered-Site Housing* fills an important vacuum in our understanding of this crucial segment of the HUD-assisted housing stock.

Professor James Hogan of Seattle University has assembled survey, census, and other secondary data to provide a rich analysis of several key locations where scattered-site housing has been employed. His report indicates that scattered-site programs, though sometimes more costly to manage, are highly popular with housing authority managers, residents, and communities at large. Tenants in scattered-site housing feel welcome in their new homes and prefer their new neighborhoods, where they expect their children to benefit from safer surroundings and better access to quality schools. Hogan’s research also offers important insight into factors that contribute to successful scattered-site housing, including careful tenant screening, small-scale development patterns, good design, and attractive buildings that “promote individual pride and care of property.”

Nonetheless, scattered-site units, like other assisted housing, frequently encounter initial community opposition, in part due to fears that their presence will reduce the value of nearby properties. HUD’s Office of Policy Development and Research has recently funded complementary research that will gather and examine empirical evidence on scattered-site housing’s effects (if any) on local property values and communities.

The persistence of concerns over poverty concentration and quality of life that originally led to the wide spread use of scattered-site housing makes it certain that this development model will continue to be of considerable policy interest. It is, for example, a key element of HUD’s broader strategy for transforming America’s public housing system. This excellent report offers policymakers and program administrators alike a new, firmer basis for understanding the evolution, the variety, and the promise of scattered-site housing.



Michael A. Stegman
Assistant Secretary for Policy
Development and Research

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This manuscript was enriched by the assistance of and numerous conversations with directors and staff of dozens of housing authorities as well as the willing participation of scattered-site housing residents in Tucson and Seattle, who shared their views about the program and its impact on their lives and on their children's futures. A great deal of the credit for the success of scattered-site housing belongs to them. Many who provided assistance did so anonymously by releasing documents, making statistical data available, and completing questionnaires. I am grateful to the Housing Authority of Savannah for permitting me to incorporate highlights from Nathan Belzer's 1994 survey of national scattered-site programs. More than a dozen other housing authority staff and directors completed followup surveys and were interviewed during site visits conducted between 1987 and 1991. Their names and affiliations are provided in a directory appendix. Each has agreed to serve as a resource to readers seeking additional information about a specific community's scattered-site program.

I am particularly indebted to two housing professionals: Dorothy L. Lengyel, executive director of HomeSight, a nonprofit community development corporation engaged in affordable housing in Seattle, Washington, and Alex Polikoff, executive director of the Business and Professional People for the Public Interest. Dotti has read sections of the draft, helped collect the data, coauthored "Experiences With Scattered-Site Housing" published in *Urban Resources* (Winter 1985), made research presentations to local audiences with me, and supported my struggles to bring this report to fruition. Alex Polikoff's immersion in issues of housing discrimination and housing mobility programs is extensive and longstanding. His encouragement of my research, along with his reading of early sections of the manuscript and his willingness to provide access to his personal files on the litigation history of Gautreaux, are deeply appreciated. Alex's vision of housing options for the poor, incorporated in both the Gautreaux Demonstration program in Chicago and HUD's Moving to Opportunity demonstration, have influenced my thinking about the role of scattered sites in our national housing policies.

Various parts of the manuscript have been read in one of its several versions by David Wilson of The University of Toledo; Peter Nelson, formerly of the University of Sydney; my beloved wife Susan K. Hogan; and HUD technical representative John Goering, Office of Policy Development and Research.

Each of these individuals bears major responsibility for any readability the present version reflects. The deficiencies and errors of omission are mine alone.

Finally, I am grateful for the continuous, daily support tendered me by my wife, Sue, our two children, and my extended family. The quarter century of my family's patient support, and their being there for me as I fought the fatigue and worry of whether my research would ever bear fruit will never be forgotten.

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Executive Summary

The purpose of this report is to examine the origins and characteristics of scattered-site housing in the United States. While the literature on public housing is voluminous, relatively little has been written about scattered-site housing. Only a few studies have examined the program in detail, and most of those are based on small samples. Neither important questions concerning the effects of size and location of units nor the impacts on both residents and host neighborhoods have been answered. This study attempts to correct some of these deficiencies.

Research Design

This study incorporates a three-part research design. First, a national sample of scattered-site programs was assembled through surveys conducted in 1983 and 1994 of medium and large public housing authorities (PHAs). These surveys (Hogan/Lengyel and Belzer) gathered information on the origins and characteristics of scattered-site housing, and asked local housing directors about program impact. Site visits to 13 PHAs were then conducted between 1987 and 1992 to explore variations in program characteristics and to gain better understanding of the variables that shaped program outcomes. Finally, indepth case studies were conducted in Tucson, Seattle, Chicago, and Yonkers (New York) to address questions about the programs' perceived effects on participating tenants and host neighborhoods.

The Early History of Scattered-Site Housing

The lack of agreement on what constitutes scattered-site housing has made detailing its origins, geographical spread, site characteristics, or tenant composition difficult. Although no universal definition of scattered-site housing applies to all the programs referred to as deconcentration, dispersal, or scattered-site housing, the two generally accepted key dimensions of the program are concentration and density. This study defines scattered-site housing as the construction or acquisition of low-density buildings (generally fewer than 15 units per site) in nonminority concentrated neighborhoods throughout a city or metropolitan area. Table 1 illustrates where the scattered-site approach fits into the universe of public housing programs.

Table 1. Scattered-Site Housing Paradigm

Number of Units per Site	Extent of Deconcentration	
	Concentrated	Dispersed
Few	Some of the early scattered-site programs, and public housing from mid-1950s to late 1960s.	Scattered-site efforts after 1972.
Many	Public housing effort from 1933 through the mid-1950s.	Some public housing from the late 1950s until the early 1970s.

The housing policy changes that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s helped focus attention on new ways to address the housing needs of low-income families, including an effort to build “few and dispersed” units as the preferred form of scattered-site housing. This background is discussed in chapter 1.

Major Program Characteristics

The characteristics of scattered-site housing, presented in chapters 3 through 6, are derived from surveys of medium and large PHA programs gathered in 1983 and 1994 as well as from case study material. (The 1994 inventory of large PHA programs was gathered by Nathan Belzer, senior scattered-site analyst for the Housing Authority of Savannah, Georgia.) The key findings are as follows:

- Scattered-site developments are typically a small part of most PHAs’ housing inventories. Smaller PHAs typically have fewer than 100 scattered-site units, representing 9.5 percent of all family housing. Each site has an average of 4.7 units. Large PHAs reported an average of 268 units, or slightly more than 8 percent of the assisted housing inventory. They have an average of 143 sites, with 6.2 units on average per site.
- PHAs typically screen and counsel prospective clients for scattered-site housing. These procedures are considered necessary to place tenants appropriately. However, because of the dispersion of the dwellings, PHAs are less able to provide onsite services. Referral and counseling are, for example, provided only by approximately half the PHAs.
- Although management and maintenance problems have been associated with scattered-site properties and locations, only 36 percent of the directors of larger authorities felt that scattered-site housing was more difficult to manage. Roughly half (52 percent) said maintenance was more costly, with extra costs attributed to the geographic distribution of the units and the inability of the PHAs to achieve economies of scale. The geographic distribution particularly affects both the response time for maintenance calls and access to and delivery of social services.
- Scattered-site programs appear to be increasingly popular. PHA program directors reported that 90 percent of the public was “favorable” to scattered-site housing, and approximately 75 percent of the directors in smaller PHAs and 90 percent in larger ones favored the program. PHA directors reported that 97 percent of their residents prefer scattered-site units.
- The programs are highly praised by key PHA personnel. Eighty-three of the directors of the 13 PHA sites visited report that the program has been successful—scattered-site living has proven to be an important step toward independent living on the part of residents.
- Overall program success is attributed to tenant screening, the small scale of the developments, their location in stable neighborhoods, good design, and attractive buildings that “promote individual pride and care of property.”

Variation, ‘Concentration,’ and Property Values

The research uncovered evidence of important variations among case study communities about how they distribute or concentrate their scattered units. Five of the nine PHAs that provided information on the location of scattered-site properties had made good faith efforts at fair share allocation, placing the properties in close to 50 percent of each city’s census tracts. The small programs of Yonkers and Alexandria have succeeded in building units in stable neighborhoods occupied by well-educated working households. However, many units are clustered in a handful of tracts, revealing significant variation in how well the nine PHAs avoided areas of minority and poverty concentration.

In San Diego, Rochester, and Tucson, PHAs have placed a large number of scattered-site units in neighborhoods or census tracts with poverty and below average family income. The clustering of scattered-site units is also a prominent feature of the Chicago and Philadelphia programs. The problems that have made dispersal difficult in Chicago—high costs, regulations, and resistance from the real estate market—account for concentration in other communities as well.

In some jurisdictions the relative concentration of units is due to community opposition to proposed scattered-site housing in white neighborhoods. This opposition is often due to long-held fears about the potential loss of property value due to the presence of public housing. Chapter 7 reviews three dozen studies to examine whether property losses occur when subsidized housing or group homes are placed in residential neighborhoods. The results of these studies demonstrate that no causal connection exists between the facilities and the loss of value in neighborhood homes. These findings are not totally surprising because the defining characteristics of scattered-site housing—low density and low concentrations—suggest few negative spillovers onto adjacent properties. In addition, a number of studies and projects have shown that careful attention to design features, including density, number of bedrooms, new construction or acquisition, can help other jurisdictions and PHAs address neighborhood fears and anxieties about the probable effects of scattered-site housing programs.

The Tucson research on attitudes of “host” neighborhoods toward scattered-site housing shows that small-scale developments (5 to 8 units per site) are preferred to higher densities. Neighborhoods found to be more likely to provide better locations for modest numbers of scattered-site homes and apartments include those with well-educated residents, a balance of apartments and homes (homeowners with school-age children are especially anxious about who lives next door), and a range of age of residents. Although these findings provide some suggestions for the siting of scattered-site developments, the sample is small and the data are derived from one location.

Community Opposition and the Courts

The Chicago Gautreaux and Yonkers fair housing litigation cases are illustrations, initially, of how far local communities will go to oppose the placement of public housing in middle-class neighborhoods. Neighborhood residents and local officials initially resisted court-mandated scattered-site housing. Although the courts in both the Gautreaux and Yonkers cases had trouble securing full compliance with their orders, their persistent oversight led to useful results.

In Chicago, for example, the Habitat Company has helped to meet the desegregation requirements of the 1981 Federal Court's consent decree by constructing or rehabilitating approximately 1,600 new scattered-site units. In Yonkers, the last two court-ordered complexes were occupied in March 1994, ending a 7-year effort by the U.S. District Court to provide 200 units of scattered-site public housing. In both instances, local opposition either diminished over time or proved ineffective in the face of determined efforts by the court, HUD, and local agencies to build the housing.

Do Scattered-Site Residents Feel that Their Developments Are Successful?

Prior research and analyses (reviewed in chapter 2) suggest that, when success is measured by tenants, scattered-site housing has been successfully implemented in dozens of communities across the United States. High levels of tenant satisfaction have been reported in Cleveland, Charlotte, and Chicago, and in the Tucson and Seattle programs. With the single exception of the South Park development in Tucson, the studies report the following:

- Tenants living in scattered-site housing feel welcome in their new homes and prefer their new neighborhoods to their former homes and neighborhoods.
- Residents experience few problems because of their moves. In general, they are satisfied with access to shopping and public services. However, significant dissatisfaction with public transportation has been reported by tenants in Cleveland, Charlotte, and Chicago.
- Parents expect the move to benefit their children because of the new housing's association with greater neighborhood safety and security and with better access to good schools.
- Although social mixing between tenants and host neighbors was minimal, the predictions of some researchers that tenants would be socially isolated were not supported in Seattle, Durham, Charlotte, or Cleveland studies.
- Escape from project housing has led to renewed hope among residents of scattered-site housing. This hope is shown in answers to quality-of-life measures in Cleveland, Seattle, and Tucson.

In-depth research in Tucson and Seattle led to questions not addressed elsewhere about whether new scattered-site surroundings have any positive effects on families. The key findings from the two case studies reveal striking differences in outlook of families living in the New Site and South Park developments. Differences in tenant evaluations of these two sites suggest the powerful importance of project location.

South Park's 14 sites were located in a low-income, minority census tract measuring approximately 1/2 mile by 1 mile. The residents were also largely minority, with large families supported under the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. South Park residents were less satisfied in general, less pleased with their neighbors, and less likely to envision a bright future for their children compared with residents of the New Site project, which was built in a less concentrated neighborhood. Surveys done in 1973 and 1975 when the projects were first built revealed that views became

somewhat more moderated, suggesting that the flush of early optimism about scattered-site housing recedes a bit after families become established and accustomed to the neighborhood.

In Seattle, when asked about adjustment problems, moving intentions, the feeling of being at home in the neighborhood, and perceptions of the neighborhood as a good place to rear children, responses reflected few integration or adjustment problems. Eighty-seven percent planned to stay in their dwellings during the next year, and 84 percent considered the neighborhood a good place to rear children. Residents also reported overwhelming approval of their home or apartment design and construction. Research in both Seattle and the New Site development suggests that families' outlook on life becomes more positive after their moves to scattered-site locations.

The Future of Scattered-Site Housing

The future of dispersed housing programs, including the scattered-site model, depends on the acceptance of the following hypothesis: The real city includes the metropolitan area, enveloping both city and suburbs, and that the respective vitalities of these places require that each entity concede its codependence and need for cooperation.

The fragmented metropolis is the result of fear and misperceptions about the nature of poverty and the socially destructive behavior of the underclass. These separate spatial systems must be woven back together if this Nation is to fashion effective remedies to the poverty, inequality and hypersegregation that characterize many U.S. cities today. Continued support for scattered-site housing programs—a demonstrably better housing choice for families than concentrated high-density projects—suggests that suburban towns and city neighborhoods accept some form of fair-share, scattered-site allotment of assisted housing.



Chapter 1

Scattered-Site Public Housing

Providing low-income assisted housing in areas away from economically depressed, minority-concentrated, inner-city neighborhoods has been a central concern of housing specialists, planners, civil rights activists, and other advocates for the inadequately sheltered for the past four decades. It was not until the early 1960s, however, that housing policy began to focus on ways to break up the massive public housing projects of the 1950s and 1960s through deconcentration strategies.

The partial demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe housing complex in St. Louis,¹ memorialized on national television in 1972, ended a 20-year period in which Swiss architect Le Corbusier's "vision of great mega-block cities," coupled with Ludwig Mies van der Rohe's ideology of "bare-bones structure and algebra of square footage" (Miller, 1992, p. 72), had shaped public housing construction within America's largest cities. (Hall, 1988) The apartment tower, regarded then as the most economical solution for housing low- and moderate-income families, was later judged a policy failure. (Newman, 1972) In the interim, however, their combined influence resulted in "monotonous towers, reiterated endlessly in Chicago (and other large cities) on moonscapes created by the bulldozing of whole neighborhoods. No questions asked." (Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 72)

A melange of social problems was attributed to the design, location, and management of tower complexes: crime, drugs, segregation, neighborhood decay, poverty, hopelessness, and isolation. Moreover, the massive tower complexes created the erroneous view that all public housing was big-city "project" housing.² The reality was quite the opposite since the "vast majority of public housing programs [were] in small communities." These generally unsung developments were built at low density and "usually of low-rise type construction." (Genung, 1971, p. 736)

This study is not about the big housing projects of the 1950s and 1960s, although their existence and the public's reaction against them influenced housing policy for more than a quarter of a century. Furthermore, the report does not attempt a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of various forms of public housing, including its relative costs to HUD. Rather, it focuses on scattered-site housing, which is not a unitary concept but includes a variety of approaches taken over the past three decades to create low-density, geographically dispersed assisted housing.³

The literature on public housing is voluminous, but little has been written about scattered-site housing. The program's origins are generally unknown, and why such small-scale developments were undertaken at all, especially in view of the sizable waiting lists of families seeking access to apartments in large Housing Authority developments, has not been systematically addressed. Few studies have examined program characteristics in detail, nor are the available research findings based on large samples. Important questions concerning the effects of the size and location of units on both the residents and the host neighborhoods have not been answered because of the paucity of research and limited cross-sectional data.

An Emerging Critique

Early public housing projects, created under the auspices of the Public Works Administration (PWA) in the 1930s and 1940s, were highly regarded and widely praised. These “way stations on the road to middle-class status” were typically one, two, or three stories high. (Friedman, 1968) PWA staff understood the social functions of physical design and management:

Neither design nor management could serve social functions if every low-income family in public housing was left in isolation; if design did not encourage or assist neighbors to help one another, or if management was responsible only for the fiscal-maintenance duties of property administration. (Wood, 1980, p. 63)

But “[a]lthough some comfortably designed low-rise buildings were built,” a wider variety of developments were undertaken between 1947 and 1970, and “the low-rise integrated projects gave way to high rises and then ‘super blocks’ of high rises began dominating.” (Kellam, 1993, p. 806)

By 1959 the “tower in the park” had become the national norm for housing the poor in large cities. Richard Plunz (1980) writes of the “spatial pathology” of New York City’s public housing high-rise towers:

The geometrical organization of the sites tended to be quite arbitrary, since low coverage removed the constraints of designing for buildings in close proximity. Often the towers were simply lined up . . . or placed on the site without any systematic rationale. . . . Floating randomly in a sea of green with 13.9 percent coverage, the towers lacked connection to the surrounding environment. (Ibid., p. 197)

Scale economies drove architects and builders to produce high-density developments with minimal-sized rooms, projects of “an obsolete and congested mold,” and with “little or no consideration of tenants’ needs.” (Stewart, 1979, p. 480) There were other important reasons for the concentration and isolation of public housing, especially high-rise projects. Siting issues, along with the “passion for income and race segregation, ha[ve] tied public housing . . . to the crowded, wounded core of the city.” (Friedman, 1967, p. 123) As the Nation became more prosperous after the depression and World War II, the open, available land that supported the earlier low-rise projects dried up. The effect, Friedman suggests, was the return of residential sorting by race and income, and “[f]rom that point on, the very suggestion that a low-income ‘project,’ particularly the bulky, high-rise type, might be insinuated into a neighborhood was enough to arouse a storm of protest. The great ghetto gates swung shut.” (Ibid.)

A comprehensive critique of public housing appeared in a series of articles in the April, May, and June 1957 issues of *Architectural Forum*.⁴ Catherine Bauer, former director of research and information for the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), commented that “while everybody who had any choice was moving into a one-story home, the housing authorities were busily erecting high-density, high-rise apartments, with no private outdoor space whatever.” (Bauer, May 1957, p. 141) Why wasn’t the program popular? Bauer’s answer was quite simple: “Life in the usual public housing project just is not the way most American families want to live. Nor does it reflect our accepted values as to the way people should live.” (Ibid.)

The institutional and racially segregated character of public housing, Bauer argued, resulted from two factors: (1) the separation of funding for public housing recipients from funds provided as FHA subsidies for middle- and upper-income households, and (2) prevailing community-planning ideas. The separation of slum housing from other housing policies “insured the segregation of the low-income slum dweller, and fortified his isolation as a special charity case by permitting only public initiative and public landlordship. . . .” (Ibid., p. 219) Bauer considered design standards partly responsible for the dense, high-rise public housing monster.

The public housing project . . . continues to be laid out as a “community unit” as large as possible and entirely divorced from its neighborhood surroundings, even though this only dramatizes the segregation of charity-case families. Standardization is emphasized rather than alleviated in project design, as a glorification of efficient production methods and an expression of the goal of “decent, safe and sanitary” housing for all. But the bleak symbols of productive efficiency and “minimum standards” are hardly an adequate or satisfactory expression of the values associated with American home life. (Ibid., p. 221)

Two articles in *The Exploding Metropolis* (1957) echoed the *Architectural Forum* assessment of high-rise concentrated project housing. Seligman writes of four common indictments of public housing: (1) the “cold, impersonal, cheerless” nature where tenants are reminded of their ward status; (2) their rigid discipline codified in excessive rules for tenant behavior that result in projects “run like an institution, not a residence”; (3) their income ceilings that discourage tenant self-improvement and deprive projects of “tenants who would set higher standards of social behavior”; and (4) the expense of running big projects. (Seligman, 1957, p. 107)

William H. Whyte’s “Are Cities Un-American?” argues that public housing projects not only are ill suited to family needs but antineighborhood. They facilitate the decay of the surrounding neighborhood. Moreover, he writes:

The “self-contained” neighborhood that turns its back on the surrounding streets, far from improving the neighborhood around it, depresses the whole area. The institutional design, with its lack of stores and small amenities, is a design that does not encourage normal neighborhood life, and high-rise buildings are not suited to family needs. Families don’t like to live high up . . . what they want is a yard or a porch or a terrace of their own. (Whyte, 1957, pp. 23–24)

The epicenter of criticism of public housing was the East Coast, especially New York, where in 13 years enormous parts of the city’s skeletal structure were transformed. (Caro, 1974) Two eminent New Yorkers, Harrison Salisbury and Jane Jacobs, have written about the transformation of the city. Salisbury’s observations (1958) were shaped by a combination of personal visits to the project communities of Fort Greene, Red Hook, and Marcy Houses; a knowledge of the history of public housing; and an intense conviction that these “fiendishly contrived institutions for the debasing of family and community life” need not have happened. (Ibid., p. 75)

The “new ghettos, . . . gigantic masses of brick, of concrete, of asphalt,” with their “planned absence of art, beauty, or taste,” not only institutionalized the slum but concentrated “the ill, the halt, and the

crippled, [the] population least capable of caring for itself.” (Ibid.) For Salisbury, the architects of the new ghettos had forgotten the origins of low-rent housing in the late 1930s when “projects had good social components,” and housing specialists knew that “if you simply built barracks for the poor you were only creating a new ghetto.” (Ibid., p. 81)

It is no surprise that Jane Jacobs (1961), associate editor of *Architectural Forum*, could find flaws in the housing projects of the 1950s. Her neighborhood was one of several that “Master Builder” Robert Moses intended to tear down for “renewal.” *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961) is more than a critique of housing projects; it is an attack on city planning and rebuilding as practiced at that time. Jacobs’ discussion of these investments “too large to write off” expands on the litany of ills articulated so well by Bauer, Whyte, Seligman, and Abrams (1955). Projects can be “rewoven back into the fabric” of the city. (Jacobs, op. cit., p. 392) They fail, she suggests, because of their lack of a diverse clientele, and the absence of “mixed primary uses.” For Jacobs, projects must be “unslummed”:

They must be capable of holding their populations through choice. [T]hey must be safe and otherwise workable for city life. They need, among other things, casual public characters, lively, well-watched, continuously used public spaces, easier and more natural supervision of children, and normal city cross-use of their territory by people from outside. In short, in the process of being rejoined into the city fabric . . . projects need to take on the qualities of healthy city fabric themselves. (Ibid., p. 394)

“Outside” and “inside” salvage are necessary to convert projects into “assets to human life” where clients “gladly attach” themselves to their residences. To “unslum,” however, requires three strategies: “grounds reconverted and woven back into [the] surrounding city; safety inside buildings; and removal of maximum income limits. . . .” (Ibid., p. 401)

It was nearly a decade before the “tower in the park” structures of the 1950s were recognized as design failures. Alternatives were discussed, but few incorporated dispersed, low-density features. (Ledbetter, 1967) It was another 10 years before tangible efforts were made to move spatial deconcentration from rhetoric to reality.

By the 1960s housing professionals, journalists, liberal politicians, urban sociologists, and architects were suggesting alternatives to dense, high-rise public housing. (Steiner, 1971, pp. 130–132) President Kennedy appointed Marie McGuire to head the Public Housing Authority (PHA), “symbolically marking Washington’s abandonment of the way station model and inaugurating the delivery of social services to troubled project tenants as public housing’s new mission.” (Bauman, 1994, p. 354) McGuire also believed in the value of good design, and “she initiated a total change in architectural standards and physical design, as reflected in her 1961 annual report.” (Wood, 1980, p. 68) In addition, the Housing Acts of 1961, 1965, and 1968 incorporated new approaches to remedy the deficiencies of 1950s public housing policy. (Stewart, 1979, p. 492)

Evolution of Scattered-Site Housing

It is easier to trace the origin and subsequent diffusion of scattered-site developments than to pinpoint the exact moment when the idea was born and what it initially meant. The late 1950s and early 1960s are recognized as the incubation period for the scattered-site program. The May and June 1957 issues of *Architectural Forum*, discussed earlier, contained seeds of thought about the appropriateness and appearance of scattered-site housing.

Mario Cuomo (1974), in seeking revisions to the controversial Forest Hills project, searched the *Congressional Record* hoping to locate the etiology of the scattered-site concept in the legislative history of the 1949 Housing Act. Cuomo found nothing particularly helpful—rather intentions “painted in broad strokes” of the “need for housing generally, the particular plight of the low-income, the need for Federal subsidy—all now accepted general propositions.” (Ibid., p. 45) What Cuomo sought was the application of those propositions to the Forest Hills controversy, which called for “a study of the scattered-site refinement of the principle.” (Ibid.)

Cuomo never did find a practical guide to scattered-site programming. While exploring revisions to the Forest Hills project, he did develop an understanding about what such a program should look like. Cuomo even chipped away at the “vagueness of the terminology” as reflected in the following portion from his diary:

If scatter site is taken to mean the building of projects that are exclusively or largely low-income in middle-income areas, then I'm not sure that it is a workable concept. It has no real history and there is no firm basis on which to conclude that it will work. On the other hand, if scatter site is taken to mean the dispersal of public assistance so as to permit low-income people to live in nonracially restricted areas, then it is no longer a question of workability but rather a matter of law. (Ibid., p. 95)

1960s Housing Experimentation

Until the 1960s, “several elements of the national housing program tended to be destructive of community,” especially to low-income families concentrated in the ghettos of large cities. (George Schermer Associates, 1968) A number of new programs surfaced in the early 1960s that made it possible to “intersperse low-income families in neighborhoods in which there [was] a wider range of incomes, thus reducing the scale and intensity of colonization of the poor.” (Ibid., p. 52) These programs included scattered-site projects, acquisition programs, leasing programs, and turnkey housing. (Ibid., p. 50)

The 1965 Housing Act authorized major new initiatives to provide good housing for the poor “in other than traditional public housing.” (*Congress and the Nation*, 1965, p. 187) The leased-housing and rent-supplement programs looked promising to supporters of housing dispersal. Ellickson (1967) called the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 “potentially the most important development in Federal housing policy since the advent of urban renewal in 1949.” (Ibid., p. 518) The lease program (Section 23) could be an effective way to integrate public housing tenants into middle-class neighborhoods, because “such tenants would be inconspicuous and therefore unobjectionable to the neighborhood residents.” (Luttrell, 1966) Section 101 of the Act was even more promising as a tool for the integration of

neighborhoods. That HUD “planned to use the rent supplement program to break up the ghettos” was apparent in what Ellickson said could be accomplished:

The program opened up communities which, if left to their own devices, would never make affirmative efforts to provide housing for low-income families. In particular, the rent supplement projects could be located on the comparatively cheap land available at the urban fringe, thus aiding in the deghettoization of the central cities and of their suburbs. (Op. cit., p. 530)

The performance of the rent supplement program was disappointing. Major inhibiting factors were meager funding from Congress and stubborn resistance from the Appropriations Committees. “The underlying motive,” wrote Keith (1973), “appeared to be primarily racial and, especially, a desire to protect white suburban communities from incursions by housing projects to be occupied predominantly by low-income Negro families.” (Ibid., p. 178) The program had “little success in achieving a range of incomes in its projects or in dispersing them throughout the community.” (Taggart, 1970, p. 57) Since the program was forced to serve “an extremely low-income clientele,” very few middle-income families wanted to live in rent-supplemented projects, which, in turn, made the apartments “unattractive to more affluent neighborhoods.” (Ibid., p. 61)

Housing policy of the early and mid-1970s provided “the first significant changes and additions to the national housing program in 16 years.” (Schermer, op. cit., p. 18) The policy stimulated discussions of new programs to address the shelter needs of poor families, including the scattered-site strategy, a not altogether new concept. (Ibid., p. 50)⁵ It was at this time that the housing literature began to report endorsements of scattered sites, suggesting that “few persons argue[d] anymore that subsidized housing . . . should not be scattered.” (Grigsby, et al., 1977) Outside of the more densely populated areas, “several smaller projects, scattered throughout the community, would seem more suitable than the massive high rises required in the big cities.” (Ledbetter, 1967) Supporters wrote, “It has often been proposed that public housing should be built in relatively small, scattered projects which would blend into their surroundings”; (McEntire, 1960, p. 324) and “the emphasis upon small, scattered-site developments” (along with several other new approaches) “constitutes a versatile and practical kit of tools for . . . localities having the imagination and initiative to utilize them.” (Schermer, op. cit., p. 57)

Other political institutions were acting to foster greater choice in the housing market. President Kennedy’s 1962 Executive Order 11063, Equal Opportunity on Housing, was intended to “secure open occupancy in federally assisted housing.” The impact of the order was marginal as only “20 percent of the new housing market, and less than 1 percent of the existing housing stock were covered.” (Sorenson, 1965, p. 482) Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forbade discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in programs that received Federal assistance.⁶ However, these two initiatives did not dismantle the dual housing market, nor did they create “equal access to housing, or achiev[e] housing integration.” (Lief and Goering, 1987, p. 232)

HUD also possessed a mechanism, through its regulatory procedures, to affect the placement of assisted housing. In 1967 HUD undertook a new policy of equal opportunity regulation pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 205.1 of HUD’s Low-Rent Housing Manual cited “efforts of housing authorities to persistently locate public housing in the ghetto.” (*Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems*, 1970, p. 266) The regulation provided that “any proposal to locate housing only in areas of

racial concentration will be *prima facie* unacceptable,” and returned to the Housing Authority for reconsideration. The significance of the section was that it created, “after 30 years, an explicit Federal policy against discriminatory site selection.” (Ibid., p. 267) Evidence of HUD’s utilization of Section 205.1 is sparse, however, and the *Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems* inferred:

Even accepting the contention that the requirement is new and that competing goals exist, it is possible that as a 3-year-old rule living amongst 30-year-old rules, Section 205.1 could conveniently become the family’s foster child. (Ibid., p. 269)

After the urban riots of the late 1960s and passage of the 1968 Housing Act, the Federal Courts also played a key role in the evolutionary history of scattered-site housing. *Jones v. Mayer*,⁷ *Shannon et al. v. HUD*, *James v. Valtierra*, *Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority*, *Hills v. Gautreaux*, and *U.S. v. Yonkers Board of Education* were important in legitimizing open housing, forcing HUD to develop fair procedures for selecting sites, mandating scattered-site housing, and limiting the development of additional public housing in areas of racial concentration.

Post-1970 Housing Programs

Approaches to low-income housing over the next quarter of a century lacked the diversity of the new initiatives in the previous decade of the New Frontier and Great Society. (Kellam, op. cit., p. 806) What the new approaches shared was an acceleration of the “retreat from public housing,” and movement toward greater privatism. (Bauman, 1994, pp. 355–356) Table 1–1 reveals how critical the Nixon era was in moving “away from public housing to programs that relied more heavily on the private sector.” (Connerly, 1991, p. 85)

Table 1–1. Growth in Number of Subsidized Housing Units, 1961–1975 [in thousands]

Period	Public Housing Units	Percent of Total	Nonpublic Housing Units	Percent of Total	Total
1961–65	128	100	0	0	128
1966–70	260	72	102	28	362
1971–76	286	25	873	75	1,159
Total	674	41	975	59	1,649

Source: Connerly, 1991, table 2, p. 85.

The Nixon administration’s January 8, 1973, housing moratorium came on the heels of “mounting troubles in the Federal Government’s housing involvement,” (Listokin, 1991, p. 164) and reflected the “gradual conservative shift within the Nixon administration on domestic policy issues. . . .” (Hays, 1985, p. 134) The administration’s approach to the provision of housing assistance was the Section 8 new subsidy program of the 1974 Housing Act. The Section 8 program was preceded by the Experimental Housing Allowance Program, initially authorized in 1970 “to test the feasibility of subsidizing tenants rather than the builders of low-income rental housing.” (GAO, February 1989, p. 8)

For the next 8 years the Section 8 program “provid[ed] both tenant subsidies to be used to rent existing housing on the private market [Section 8 Existing Program] and owner subsidies to stimulate the

construction of new low-income housing units [the Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation and the Moderate Rehabilitation programs].” (Simons, 1988, pp. 266–267) The new rental assistance program resembled the earlier Section 23 program, and it paid owners or developers “the difference between an approved rent and a proportion of a tenant’s income deemed reasonable as a rental cost” (currently 30 percent). (Schussheim, 1992, p. 19) Under the program the role of the Housing Authority was reduced to “officially certifying both tenants and the dwelling units rented.” Local Housing Authorities “otherwise disappeared, leaving the landlord-tenant relationship untrammelled.” (Bauman, *op. cit.*, p. 357)

Housing vouchers were recommended by President Reagan’s Commission on Housing. Established in 1981, the Commission suggested recommendations addressing the housing problems affecting millions of Americans. The Commission reported that the problem of housing for low-income families was affordability, not availability. Because Federal housing programs usually “relied on new construction, the cost per family [was] higher than if only older housing were used, and thus fewer families receive[d] assistance.” (Milgram, 1984, p. 1) Section 8 supply-side assistance for “production of new or rehabilitated low-income housing virtually ended in 1981.” (Simons, *op. cit.*, p. 267) “The eclipse of all Federal low-income housing programs” [had begun], and the Reagan administration “succeeded in reducing Federal appropriations for new assisted housing by 70 percent between 1981 and 1988.” (Connerly, *op. cit.*, p. 93)

Vouchers were authorized in 1983 in Section 8(o) of the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, “as a demonstration with a small number of vouchers funded.” (Milgram, 1988, p. 5) Unlike the Section 8 certificate program, vouchers allow low-income families to rent units above established fair market rents (FMRs). Congress expected the application of this “shopping incentive feature” of the act to “constrain private landlord rent increases since families would have a monetary incentive to obtain the most favorable rent.” (GAO, February 1989, p. 10) With the addition of the portability provision to the 1987 Housing and Community Development Act, voucher recipients could “exercise that choice by moving beyond the geographic boundaries of the housing authority administering the program.” (Abt Associates Inc., 1987, Foreword)

Even though the housing allowance programs appeared to have triumphed, the Section 8 certificate and voucher programs have been criticized since the passage of the 1970 and 1974 Housing Acts. Earlier studies of the Section 8 program, for example, indicated high failure rates in utilization: more than 50 percent in 1979, and 39 percent and 35 percent, respectively, in 1985 and 1987. A more recent evaluation demonstrated significant improvement with “87 percent of sampled enrollees successfully obtaining housing with their Section 8 rental assistance.” (Abt Associates Inc., 1994, Foreword)

Another early failure of the Section 8 program was its inability to help clients overcome discrimination in the rental housing market. Families receiving certificates did improve their housing, and many households experienced a reduction in their rent burden. On the other hand, [“d]espite the expanded housing options that their enhanced purchasing power would seem to offer, many . . . families continue[d] to live in relatively segregated and economically distressed neighborhoods.” (Goering, et al., 1995, p. ii) In general, however, voucher and certificate families “obtain[ed] housing in areas that are generally less poor and less segregated than the neighborhoods surrounding conventional public housing projects.” (Ibid.)

The Bush administration and the 4-year reign of Jack Kemp as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development signaled the end of 10 years “in which Federal housing programs stagnated or starved.” (*New York Times*, August 7, 1990) The National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 (NAHA) was “the first comprehensive housing act since 1974.” (Milgram, 1993) NAHA contained two programs that generated significant public interest: (1) a “comprehensive and innovative program” called HOPE (Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere), and (2) HOME, a strategy “aimed at getting the Federal Government out of the housing business altogether.” (*Governing*, February 1991, p. 73)

HOPE programs reflected the belief that “homeownership gives low-income families a stake in society, which boosts their morale and provides a basis for improving their skills and employability. . . .” (Milgram, 1993, p. 13) The 1992 NAHA reauthorization arranged three types of subsidized housing for low-income family purchase:

- (1) Public and Indian housing projects in HOPE 1; (2) multifamily projects owned or held by HUD or other Federal agencies or State or local governments, financed with a HUD-insured or HUD-held mortgage, or determined by HUD to have serious financial or physical problems, in HOPE 2; and (3) publicly owned single-family properties in HOPE 3. (Ibid., p. 12)

The second new housing program, HOME Investment Partnerships, was a \$2 billion matching grant that afforded States, cities, and urban counties “the opportunity to choose among tenant-based assistance, rehabilitation, and in some cases, new construction” to provide rental assistance to income-eligible households. (*The President's National Urban Policy Report*, 1991, p. 24) The 1992 Act continued to encourage rehabilitation, but the earlier restrictions on new construction were removed and the appropriation level was reduced for FY 93 to \$1 billion. (Milgram, 1993, p. 15)

Kemp's mission to “empower low-income and working poor families to become homeowners” by selling off the public housing stock did not succeed. An assessment report issued by HUD in April 1990 reported that the sale of units was frustrated because of the “lack of replacement housing.” (Nenno, 1991, p. 89) Research findings, moreover, suggested that “a large proportion of . . . tenants could not afford the costs of homeownership even if the units were given to them at no cost.” (Ibid., p. 90)

Post-election analysis predicted a Clinton administration sympathetic to housing issues. (*The Washington Post*, November 7, 1992) President Clinton's nomination of Henry Cisneros for HUD Secretary suggested his interest in the issues of urban America, but “[u]nder pressure to reduce the deficit the administration handed Mr. Cisneros a budget that [was] essentially flat.” (*The Wall Street Journal*, April 20, 1993)

The Housing Choice and Community Investment Act of 1994 outlined the Clinton administration's housing and community development agenda. The \$60 billion 2-year authorization request intended to “put HUD back in business as a force for positive change in America.” The legislative package contained five central priorities: “(1) reducing homelessness, (2) turning around public housing, (3) expanding and preserving affordable housing and homeownership, (4) ensuring fair housing for all, and (5) empowering communities.” (HUD, *The Housing Choice and Community Investment Act of 1994*, p. 3)

The implementation of HUD's promise of positive change floundered amidst a public whose attitudes “toward the desirability of having social functions performed by the government, especially the

Federal Government” had shifted. (Downs, 1995, p. 135) The increased political vulnerability of HUD was evident when Congress passed rescission bills in the winter of 1995 “renewing on as much as \$7 billion in previously allocated funds.” (Kandell, 1995, p. 10) Pressures on HUD to reshape its mission escalated with the capture of Congress by the Republicans in the elections of 1994. The Clinton administration seriously considered abolishing the agency.

Secretary Cisneros persuaded the administration to retain a “radically transformed” HUD. The reinvented HUD of the 1990s would no longer play the role of “grantor, decisionmaker, and senior partner,” but rather would be “the supporter of local initiatives, catalyst for change, and equal partner in local collaborations.” (Cisneros, 1995, p. 145) The HUD reinvention plan contained three principal components:

- The consolidation of “HUD’s 60 programs into 3 flexible, Performance-Based Funds: Housing Certificates for Families and Individuals, the Affordable Housing Fund, and the Community Opportunity Fund.”
- The transformation of “public housing [by] convert[ing] operating subsidies for public housing agencies to rental assistance for residents, who would be given the choice to stay where they are or move to apartments in the private rental market.”
- The conversion of “the Federal Housing Administration into a Government-owned corporation . . . enhancing the ability of the public and private sectors to expand homeownership opportunities for millions of Americans.” (*Reinvention Blueprint*, December 19, 1994, p. 3)

Thirty years after HUD’s creation, the beleaguered agency found the best way to avoid elimination was by entrepreneurial downsizing. In pursuit of this strategy, HUD confirmed the theory that the housing deficit facing the poor concerns shelter costs and not the inadequate supply of affordable housing. The March 1995 document *HUD Reinvention: From Blueprint to Action* endorses the view that the policy controversy over whether supply-side or demand-side subsidies are the better prescription for housing American citizens has been settled. “[T]he battle,” according to Winnick, “has gone substantially and seemingly permanently in favor of a household-targeted strategy.” (Ibid., p. 95)⁸

Emergence of the Concept

By the 1960s a number of new techniques were being tried “to replace and supplement the traditional housing project approach” (Hartman and Carr, 1969), including scattered-site development. However, in an extensive survey of public housing commissioners, Hartman and Carr found few housing authorities using the new approaches, with enthusiasm “decreas[ing] as one moves down the line to the regional and local levels.” While the scattered-site approach had been used by 24 percent of large authorities with another 28 percent planning to use it, the authors warned against reading too much into the data. The scattered-site approach “is an imprecisely defined concept, which takes on less meaning, where projects will be small in any case, similar to the ‘scattered-site’ projects in larger communities.” (Ibid., p. 15)

There is not a generally accepted definition of scattered-site housing that clearly applies to the programs variously referred to as deconcentration, dispersal, or most currently, scattered-site housing.

The lack of agreement on a definition results partly from the number of dimensions involved in such programs, such as the type of facility (shelters for the homeless, group homes for recovering alcoholics, or public family housing), the program strategy (Section 8, vouchers, or public housing), suburban or city location, the extent of dispersal, the density of development, benefits or losses attributed to dispersal, or the degree of racial and income integration.

The lack of agreement on what constitutes scattered-site housing has made it difficult to detail its origins, geographical spread, site characteristics, or tenant composition, let alone determine the number of units and buildings in the HUD inventory. In the absence of such an agreed-upon definition, the most fruitful approach may be to describe and analyze the development of programs that are generally grouped under the label “scattered-site housing.”

For purposes of this analysis, we propose a two-dimensional definition of the scattered-site concept, which combines the two key features of such programs—the idea of dispersal and the idea of low-density development. Scattered-site housing is thus defined as *the construction or acquisition of low-density buildings (fewer than 15 units per site) in nonminority concentrated neighborhoods throughout the city or metropolitan area*. Table 1–2 illustrates where the scattered-site approach fits into the range of public housing programs. Let us now examine housing programs that fall within that definition.

Table 1–2. Scattered-Site Housing Paradigm

Number of Units per Site	Extent of Deconcentration	
	Concentrated	Dispersed
Few	Some of the early scattered-site programs, and public housing from mid-1950s to late 1960s.	Scattered-site efforts after 1972.
Many	Public housing effort from 1933 through the mid-1950s.	Some public housing from the late 1950s until the early 1970s.

In the early 1950s, the scattered-site concept was unidimensional and emphasized dispersal, not low-density development. During the late 1950s, however, numerous PHAs began to acquire sites or purchase buildings for family housing in working- and middle-class neighborhoods. In 1953 San Antonio, for example, planned to develop rowhouses or duplexes on individual scattered lots in blighted areas of basically sound neighborhoods. (*Journal of Housing*, June 1956, p. 163)

In the spring of 1959 the Federal Public Housing Administration (FPHA) reported that the New York, Atlanta, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and San Antonio metropolitan areas were engaged in efforts to provide assisted family housing on scattered sites. These early developments ranged from duplexes to 200 units per site, representing the “many/dispersed” mode. For example, the Philadelphia Housing Authority acquired 21 sites to accommodate between 20 and 200 units; New York planned 8,000 units where the configuration was “one block, one-half block, a quarter-block, and even one building”; and Chicago proposed public housing on 11 sites ranging from 2 to 30 acres. (*Journal of Housing*, November 1959, p. 359)

Relatively few cities represent the “few/concentrated” pattern. Tucson’s South Park program is one example. The Housing Authority constructed 80 units on 14 sites, all within 1 census tract. Another case

is Philadelphia, where more than 50 percent of its scattered-site units were in eight census tracts in “neighborhoods relatively close to the center of the city, in neighborhoods that have lower real estate values, and in old streetcar suburbs.” (Goldstein and Yancey, 1986)

Pioneer

Cedartown, Georgia, was an exception to public housing patterns of the 1950s, and a forerunner of future preferences on density and location. Because the Housing Authority constructed 20 units that incorporated both dispersal and low-density features, the town is considered the pioneer of scattered-site housing. Cedartown, with a 1990 population of 7,978, is 62 miles northwest of Atlanta in the heart of a rich agricultural and industrial section of Georgia. A colorful history, including Kipling poems about its surroundings and Sherman’s overnight stay before the Union Army left the town square in flames and ruin, does not prepare one for the selection of Cedartown as “the location for the first scattered-site low-rent operation to have been completed in the Nation.” (*Journal of Housing*, 1958, p. 10)

It is hard to imagine a more unlikely pioneer, and scattered-site housing was not Cedartown’s first choice. In October 1955 the Housing Commission applied for 50 units of public housing, and until April 1957 project housing was planned. Two months later, however, the Authority agreed to cooperate with the Administration’s “experimental project.”⁹ Cedartown became PHA Commissioner Charles E. Slusser’s demonstration that housing authorities could produce single- to four-family homes on individual lots. The demonstration was intended to “help smaller communities build public housing that fits

in with neighborhoods,” and to assist larger cities “in the event of a big-site pinch.” (Ibid.)

Three factors—city size, experience, and public acceptance—explain Slusser’s choice of Cedartown. The town’s former housing director recounts Slusser’s thinking:

Slusser was real anxious to go to scattered sites, although he was not sure how the program would go over. Slusser also didn’t want to stick his neck out as there were a lot of ramifications. Cedartown was encouraged to participate because of its small size, experience, and dependability. The town also favored public housing.¹⁰

Cedartown’s scattered-site program was unique in 2 ways: the first 13 buildings—6 single and 7 duplex units—were prefabricated and then assembled on 7 sites in 3 quadrants of the city. (See figure 1.) The second phase of the experiment was a conventional development. Then, in March




Figure 1. Map of Cedartown, Georgia, showing location of scattered-site housing.

1961, 30 units on 3 sites of the same basic design as the 1957 project were completed. The 50 scattered-site units brought the total number of publicly assisted apartments in Cedartown to 204.

Skeptics of the Cedartown experiment thought the program would create both tenant and building maintenance problems for management. These concerns, and others, were raised by the *Journal of Housing*:

Still to be answered in regard to scattered sites . . . are questions that can be settled only on the basis of experience. Among them: Will such operations prove too much of a management burden? Will scattered units cost too much to operate? (Ibid., p. 11)

Advantages of the experimental program included replacement of the “institutional” appearance of public housing, and “the possibility of savings resulting from the use of existing streets, sewerage, and power lines.” (Ibid.) As the *Journal of Housing* reported, “It looks—and can be lived in—more like private housing than the row-type, low-rent development that has been typical in smaller southern communities.” (Ibid.)

The strongest statement for Cedartown’s program was the testimonial of former Executive Director M.I. “Jack” Frost, who claimed the following advantages for scattered sites:

- There is no appreciable difference in maintenance costs. The costs may even be less because of the added interest of the tenant in keeping the premises in good condition.
- Additional acreage costs of the smaller tracts and lots are offset by the elimination of sewer, water, and gas distribution systems required on project-type developments.
- Scattered sites replace an eyesore with a modern dwelling that upgrades the immediate neighborhood. The stigma of living in a project house is eliminated, and the tenant feels as if he or she is part of the neighborhood.
- Scattered-site units allow residents to have a dog or other pets, and a garden in the rear yard, which were not possible in project apartments.¹¹ Cedartown’s scattered-site units retain their exterior attractiveness. The sites are in neighborhoods close to transportation, shopping, and schools. Although located in only three quadrants of the city, and within walking distance of “project” housing, the program is popular and there is little tenant turnover. The program is moderately integrated and 26 percent of the units are occupied by African-American families.¹²



Figure 2. Scattered-Site: Cedartown, Georgia.

Summary

“Spatial deconcentration” and “scattered sites” slowly became the new language of housing professionals. Projects continued to be built, although scaled back from Chicago’s Cabrini-Green or St. Louis’ Pruitt-Igoe developments. It was not until the 1970s, however, before the “concept of deconcentrating the poor through scattered-site, small-scale public housing [became] popular among reformers” (Hays, 1985) and the preferred option of public housing directors.

The scattered-site model of public housing developed out of the problems and failures of the highly concentrated, massive projects that dominated housing policy from the 1930s to the 1950s. The evolution and implementation of this model proceeded slowly and sporadically for the next several decades. By the 1970s, however, scattered-site housing had emerged as a promising alternative to “project” housing, and had demonstrated the potential to provide cost-competitive, attractive residential units that would expand the opportunities available to the poor.

In the next chapter, we examine the literature, both descriptive and policy oriented, that grew up around this emerging new model as part of the evolving debate about the most effective way to address America’s housing problems.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Three streams of literature associated with the evolution of scattered-site housing are examined in this chapter. At the height of urban unrest in the late 1960s, a spate of writings appeared that argued for ghetto dispersal, spatial deconcentration, or “opening up the suburbs.”¹ With little dissent, these writings typically urged the kind of low-density housing defined in this study as “scattered site.”

After the urban riots of the 1960s, several descriptive studies appeared advocating scattered-site housing. Typically, these were narrowly focused reports of poorly articulated programs, chronicles of community resistance to federally assisted housing, and surveys of residents who lived in scattered-site apartments and homes. Four articles addressed broader themes, and information began to accumulate on scattered-site programs in several cities. Prior to this study, Silver’s *Bulletin on Scattered-Site Housing* was the most comprehensive review of such programs.

The third type of literature was represented by a handful of empirical studies focused on the benefits and satisfactions residents derived from participating in scattered-site programs. The works of Chandler, DeZutter, Perloff et al., Lorig Associates, Lord and Rent, and Burby and Rohe are reviewed because they are comparable to the author’s research in Tucson between 1971 and 1973 and in Seattle between 1981 and 1983. Several questions raised in these studies were similar to those probed in Tucson and Seattle, including how the move affected one’s sense of self and how it affected children; whether the environment was “better” than where families had previously lived; how the neighborhoods were perceived—friendly or hostile; and whether the move was seen as socially beneficial or isolating.

There is still another type of literature that deals with housing mobility programs encompassing both resident-based and unit-based housing strategies.² Because resident-based programs use portable vouchers and the role of the Housing Authority is typically passive (they neither manage the rental properties, select the site, nor construct the units), they are only briefly discussed in this study. On the other hand, scattered-site housing is a unit-based mobility strategy, and the programs, loosely referred to as unit-based mobility programs, are considered the fourth type of literature.

Three of the unit-based programs—Chicago, Yonkers, and Cleveland—will be reviewed. These housing-mobility programs are significant because they generally incorporate the low-density and deconcentration features of scattered-site housing. Furthermore, important program features are incorporated in HUD’s Moving to Opportunity (MTO) for Fair Housing Program.³ HUD Secretary Cisneros has made “promot[ing] the geographic mobility of low-income households” a policy priority for HUD and endorsed a wide-ranging agenda for attaining this objective. (*Housing and Development Brief*, September 1994, p. 5)

Deconcentration Strategies

Spatial deconcentration or “opening up the suburbs” strategies were responses to post-World War II population shifts and demographic changes. The 1960 and 1970 censuses confirmed what academics, journalists, and the media had already noted: Massive population movement within and between metropolitan regions had created white suburbs and a bipolar city. (Harrigan, 1989, p. 156) That these shifts were fostering urban apartheid was recognized, according to Robert Wood, as early as the mid-1950s. (Wood, in Warren, 1969, p. 63)

That transformation and its consequences were highlighted in the Kerner Commission report, which investigated the causes of the dozens of urban riots that erupted between 1964 and 1967. Trends from 1950 to 1966 indicated that nearly all African-American population growth had occurred within metropolitan areas, primarily within central cities. The vast majority of white population growth (77.8 percent) was in the suburban portions of metropolitan areas. Central cities were becoming increasingly African American, with urban fringe areas almost entirely white. (*Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, 1968, p. 243)

Suburbanization, “the peripheral expansion of the metropolis,” not only separated city from suburb, but it created “territorial fragmentation” where hundreds of small local jurisdictions controlled “access to residential, educational, and even recreational opportunities within their borders.” (Danielson, 1976, p. 46) The net effect of the movement and rearrangement of population was “the separation of neighborhoods along socioeconomic lines” and the isolation of “private resources from those most in need of public services.” (Ibid.) The institutionalization of the new urban reality eventually would provide the rationale for the dispersion of low-income households throughout the metropolitan region.

Urban Unrest

The Civil Rights movement in the 1960s brought housing issues, as well as other inner-city problems, to the forefront of national attention. The ghetto riots that began later in the decade “focused attention on housing needs, since poor housing [was] probably the most visible deprivation suffered by low-income groups.” (Wolman, 1971, p. 58) A major cause of rioting in Detroit, for example, was “overcrowded living conditions” and “poor housing.” (Feagin and Hahn, 1973, p. 268) The Kerner Commission’s analysis of grievances in riot-torn cities also found “inadequate housing” an important issue.

Three national commissions were established at the height of the period of urban unrest. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders was created subsequent to the 1967 summer “racial disorders” with the charge to answer three questions: What happened? Why did it happen? What can be done to prevent it from happening again? The National Commission on Urban Problems (Douglas Commission) and the President’s Committee on Urban Housing (Kaiser Committee) were appointed in January 1967 with somewhat overlapping agendas. The Douglas Commission’s charge was twofold: “conduct a penetrating review of zoning, housing and building codes, taxation, and development standards”; and recommend ways “to increase the supply of low-cost decent housing.” (*Building the American City*, 1968, p. ix) The Kaiser Committee’s task, on the other hand, was construction oriented: “Find a way . . . to provide the basic necessities of a decent home and healthy surroundings for every American family now imprisoned in the squalor of the slums. . . .” (*Rice in Fish*, 1979, pp. 352–53)

The Kerner and Douglas reports were notable for their encouragement of scattered-site housing. The Douglas Commission's recommendation emerged from its critique of large public housing projects and a conviction that American cities were "primarily horizontal in form" where "single-family or two-family home[s] of generally no more than two stories predominate." (Ibid., p. 124) The report urged housing authorities to "seek out more and more scattered sites where small public housing developments may be built" and to purchase and rehabilitate single-family and rowhouses. (Ibid.)⁴

The Kerner Commission suggested a "new thrust" for ending the concentration of the "most impoverished and dependent segments of the population" in central-city ghettos. The Commission's strategy was to expand housing choices for racial minorities in suburban jurisdictions by shifting construction from "traditional publicly built, slum-based, high-rise projects to smaller units on scattered sites." (*Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, 1968, p. 478)⁵

The question of what to do about the urban unrest generated intense debate about where to build subsidized housing.⁶ Arguments were often framed in either/or terms—enrich the slums or disperse them. Both strategies were discussed in the Kerner report. To avoid "two increasingly separate Americas," the Commission endorsed integration. Enrichment strategies were seen as "useful adjunct[s] to any integration course." (Ibid., pp. 395–407)

Some housing specialists supported a third way where policy might both enhance the housing stock in existing slum areas and provide assisted housing elsewhere. This alternative put equal weight on both strategies, while the Kerner report gave integration priority. The "third way" option, however, never became a significant part of the debate. (Fried, 1971, p. 208)⁷

Enrichment Strategies

Three perspectives on enrichment—pessimistic, pragmatic, and instrumental—surfaced during the 1960s. Although the rationale for each perspective differed, all three suggested policies to increase low-income housing, job opportunities, and revitalization of inner-city neighborhoods.⁸

For the pessimists, ghetto enrichment was the only game in town. They argued that suburbanites held the cards in the form of knowing how to protect "the character of the community." (Williams, 1979, p. 23) Spatial deconcentration of the poor, especially in areas outside the central city, was simply not going to occur given their belief in the right of communities "to exclude the poor and to live only among their own socioeconomic peers" and their power to impose that belief. (Ibid., p. 18) Furthermore, "the present emphasis on dispersal tactics to achieve racial and economic integration is too often curtailing the provision of housing opportunities and community enrichment for those most in need." (Calmore, 1980, p. 8)

Calmore argues that fair housing efforts, including the dispersal strategy, "have been and continue to be futile in other than tokenistic terms," and when spatial deconcentration does occur, it is often "merely a reconcentration of people in a different space." (Ibid.) He describes HUD site selection and tenant selection criteria as overly rigid, "forcing HUD to approve projects only when they decrease racial concentration. . . ." (Ibid., p. 10)

"Aside from the national policy to provide integrated housing," national housing goals should include "'nonsegregation,' which would enable nonwhites to locate wherever in the city they feel would best meet their needs." (Ibid., p. 12) Not only is it "unclear whether spatial deconcentration bestows on

poor nonwhites substantive economic or sociological benefits,” but there is evidence to suggest that it generates negative outcomes, including fostering “the reinvestment-gentrification-displacement cycle,” (Ibid., p. 13) limiting the movement of assisted households from the inner city to the suburbs, (Ibid., p. 11) and “reconcentrating nonwhite and poor people.” (Ibid., p. 17)

Calmore does not advocate the abandonment of racial and economic integration goals, “but rather to pursue [them] more thoughtfully and carefully.” (Ibid., p. 8) However, “[d]ecent housing and community enrichment for the poor and nonwhite must be viewed as a primary goal, not a secondary result of integration.” (Ibid., p. 18)

Pragmatists, on the other hand, supported enrichment strategies for other reasons. They did not believe that metropolitan dispersal was impossible, but rather contended that dispersal was impractical because of the successes of suburban barriers in preventing the residential mobility of minority households.

Phillips and Agelasto (1975) and Labrie (1970, 1971) are procity in their endorsements of enrichment, but their arguments for rebuilding the city differ markedly. For Phillips and Agelasto, the policy choice was not between “inner-city restoration” or “suburban integration,” but rather “a renewed urban emphasis . . . to redress the imbalance fostered by present policies. . . .” (Ibid., pp. 847–848) Factors that favored a procities strategy included (1) the continuation of cities as places of residence, (2) the persistence of the “socioeconomic causes of deterioration of cities,” (3) the opposition in suburbs to assisted housing and “other penetration pressures,” (4) the possibility of a “reversal of the city-to-suburb trend,” and (5) “the energy crisis [which] may make dependency on the automobile and its accompanying lifestyle costly and unpleasant for the suburban resident.” (Ibid., p. 847)

Rebuilding the central cities would require a “new approach” that combined housing improvement programs and job creation strategies. The “gray areas” (neighborhoods showing signs of deterioration) and older declining sections of many inner-city neighborhoods contained “structurally sound and usable or reclaimable units.” (Ibid., p. 850) The “jobs and training opportunities” created by such housing restoration opportunities “will be as important as or more important than the resulting physical improvements to community residents.” (Ibid., p. 868) For these authors, the urban-suburban polarization can be (and can only be) muted by “restoration of the central cities.” Only “. . . as an urban lifestyle becomes an increasingly viable alternative can true desegregation occur through flows and counterflows between city and suburb prompted by individual choices.” (Ibid., p. 848)

After reviewing the case for ghetto dispersal, Labrie (1970) suggests a different alternative: “a policy emphasis on rebuilding the central-city ghetto without precluding a certain amount of black suburbanization.” (Ibid., p. 6) His critique of the early studies of ghetto dispersal⁹ found “general conceptual limitations” with the authors’ understanding(s) of the “ghetto structure,” racial discrimination, and urban disorganization. To neglect the “voluntary forces” that shape segregation and view “ghetto blacks as merely atomized individuals who are shunted from the economic opportunities offered by the rest of the metropolis” is to ignore the “vital geosocial ties” of the ghetto. (Ibid., pp. 18–19) The advocates of population redistribution, moreover, show “little regard for the attachments which residents have to their communities.”¹⁰ To take this mistaken view “is to neglect the very fabric of black urban life.” (Ibid., p. 18)

Labrie was also unconvinced by Kain's diagnosis of the employment problems of the inner city as "locational imbalances between expanding suburban job opportunities and declining job opportunities for central-city blacks. . . ." (Ibid., p. 10) Labrie claims that in many metropolitan areas, African Americans have taken jobs on the suburban fringe, but they "aren't willing to sacrifice a [familiar] residential environment . . . for reduced transportation costs. . . ." (Ibid., p. 23) Furthermore, the lack of jobs in the inner city does not result from "suburban shifts in metropolitan employment" but is caused by "shortages and imbalances in the national economy." A "full employment" national economy where "opportunities are accessible to black workers" is what is needed, not "achieving integrated residential and employment spatial patterns." (Ibid., p. 25)

In this view the solution to the plight of the African-American central city does not depend on "eliminating barriers to black movement to the suburbs." It is futile to encourage the return of "white middle and upper income families to the city," and "dispersing black families to the suburbs . . . runs counter to historical forces of ecological segregation. . . ." (Labrie, 1971, p. 98) Furthermore, dispersal "would neither relieve the social and economic deprivations of the black population nor renew the city center." (Ibid., p. 98) What Labrie calls for is:

Eliminating the monopolistic control which white groups hold over the ghetto structure and mobilizing unprecedented resource subsidies at national and local levels for resolving the economic imbalances affecting the depressed situation of the black community. (Ibid., pp. 97-98)

To reconstitute the African-American central city "means the achievement of black nationhood, the formation of a black nation-state with its own land base." (Ibid., p. 87) Programs must be "built from the bottom up" and include establishment of a "black municipal authority elected by and responsible to ghetto inhabitants" (Ibid., p. 90); "increase[s] to the ghetto's capital and employment base" through "black control and determination over the ghetto economy" (Ibid., p. 91); comingling of "ghetto rebuilding with central-city renewal" (Ibid., p. 93); and "increased black access to educational resources" through the reinvigoration of African-American institutions of higher learning. (Ibid., p. 95)

A final perspective on enrichment was the instrumental view where "gilding the ghetto" was seen as a way to empower its residents. African-American-power advocates in particular chose enrichment because they believed that the "devastating effects of American racism" could only be overcome by building "countervailing ethnic communit[ies]" based on "black pride, black solidarity, and black power." (Piven and Cloward, 1972, p. 225) Piven and Cloward asserted that efforts to integrate large central cities were politically naive. (Ibid., p. 223)¹¹ White flight from the city, along with court-ordered reapportionment, would soon create a new suburban majority with the capacity to shape "future government programs for the urban community." (Ibid., p. 224) Their reading of "the portents of the future" suggested the following scenario:

In the suburban-dominated constituencies that will shape future governmental policies, the Negro will simply be shunted aside if he insists on integrated housing and education. On the other hand, by consolidating his power within the central city the Negro might have some impact on the environment of the ghetto itself. To exact even these concessions from the white urban coalition,

however, the Negro must organize as a bloc—that is, he must organize separately. And the route to effective separatist power does not begin with proclamations that the ghetto must be dispersed. (Ibid.)

Spatial Deconcentration

“Apart from being objectionable on moral grounds,” enrichment programs are said to impose “very large cost[s] in terms of economic inefficiency, while making the solution of many social problems inordinately difficult.” (Kain and Persky, 1969, p. 80) Economists Kain and Persky support the dispersal option for two reasons: (1) the concentration of minorities in the inner city exacerbated a number of problems, including distance from suburban job markets, inferior education for children, and family dysfunctions associated with life in the ghetto; and (2) efforts to make the ghetto livable were not likely to work. (Ibid.)

Taylor (1971) also compares ghetto enrichment with ghetto dispersal and finds the former defective when used alone, even though it “runs with the tide by aligning its advocates at least for a period of time with those who seek to preserve the existing segregated structure of the city.” (Ibid., p. 234) He identifies a number of defects of the dispersal strategy: (1) the “policy changes required to overcome current demographic trends toward massive segregation” (Ibid., p. 247); (2) the “prospect that there will continue to be a good deal of separation in residential patterns” (Ibid., p. 249); and (3) the status of new African-American entrants to suburban neighborhoods as a “relatively powerless minority.” (Ibid.)

Free choice is the key to an effective strategy where “individuals and families have the economic, political, and psychological resources to be self-sufficient” and to “exercise . . . control over their own lives, to select their own priorities and styles of life.” (Ibid., p. 229) Taylor does not advocate an either/or position. Rather, he sees as “the only practical and sensible strategy” one that embodies “ghetto enrichment and development with a program designed to disperse the ghetto and provide access to jobs, schools, housing, and services on an integrated basis.” (Ibid., p. 252)

The foremost proponent of residential mobility options for poor households was Anthony Downs. *Opening Up the Suburbs* (1973) reveals the author’s strong normative opposition to residential exclusion. According to Downs, “one deeply entrenched division,” the legal and political separation between central city and suburb, has generated three destructive outcomes: (1) the perpetuation of a “host of problems by concentrating the burdens of coping with poverty inside central cities”; (2) the prevention of suburbs from “achieving . . . improvements in their efficiency and quality of life”; and (3) the undermining of suburban efforts to achieve “true equality of opportunity.” (Ibid., p. vii)

Downs’ solutions for residential segregation and central-city deterioration have not lacked for critics. Piven and Cloward (1966), for example, offer two reasons to reject his strategy.¹² First, they argue, integration will not be achieved. White majorities in the “receiving community” will veto any project that “threaten[s] their neighborhood.” (Ibid., p. 20) Second, residential desegregation ignores the importance of the “ethnic community as a staging area for groups to build the communal solidarity and power necessary to compel . . . access to the mainstream of urban life.” (Ibid.) Spatial deconcentration, of course, vitiates such mobilization efforts.

Downs' more recent works focus on programs "that address the worst aspects of urban decline." (Bradbury, Downs, and Small, 1982, p. 296) He and his colleagues prescribe a combination of past and present policies to reduce both "spatial segregation of poor households" and the "institutional arrangements that sustain the socioeconomic hierarchy of neighborhoods within each metropolitan area." He has come to acknowledge, however, that the dispersal option cannot be achieved in all metropolitan areas. (Ibid., p. 289)

In *New Visions for Metropolitan America* (1994), Downs reviews four Federal or State strategies for helping central cities deal with urban decline, including area development (such as ghetto enrichment), and household-mobility strategies (such as dispersal). Inner-city development strategies are based on the assumptions that "existing patterns of segregation by race and income are too powerful to overcome" and that "[t]he only way to improve conditions for current residents is to do so where they live." (Ibid., pp. 101–102) In his view, however, the strategy has shown two major weaknesses: (1) maintaining the "geographical isolation of many minority and low-income people from better neighborhoods, jobs, schools, and other public facilities," and (2) "attracting good jobs to the inner cities and providing better public facilities and services. . . ." (Ibid., p. 102) But, because it is not politically feasible "to help residents get jobs and move out without trying to improve the areas themselves," some elements of inner-city development should be included in any "viable overall strategy." (Ibid., p. 103)

Downs strongly supports the household-mobility strategy because it offers "low-income households greater opportunities for self-improvement by helping them move out of the inner city." (Ibid., p. 106) These opportunities could include "something closer to equality with the opportunities available to nonpoor people; access to private-sector jobs, facilities, and opportunities . . . crucial for rejuvenating the lives of inner-city residents, and exposure to environments that are not dominated by extreme poverty and its attendant conditions." (Ibid.)

Because the mobility strategy is not completely incompatible with area development efforts, "[c]oncentrating on developing inner-city neighborhoods without also encouraging residents to move to better areas would be perpetuating the 'two societies . . . separate and unequal' [status] that the Kerner Commission warned about in 1968." (Ibid., p. 107)

Descriptive Studies

The second type of literature on scattered-site housing is sparse, often dated, narrow in focus, and primarily descriptive. It consists of case studies of poorly articulated programs (Irvine, 1985), reported community resistance to the acquisition of sites (Lazin, 1980; Galster, 1989; Bellush, 1971; Forman, 1971; Cuomo, 1974; Meyerson and Banfield, 1955), or resident perceptions of living in scattered-site apartments and homes (Lord and Rent, 1985; Chandler, 1991; Burby and Rohe, 1989).

Four articles address broader issues and provide data from several cities. William J. Monahan (1977), for example, discusses nine scattered-site programs where housing authorities had purchased or rehabilitated existing housing. He identifies several factors that affected program success, including building design, density, location, preoccupancy counseling, and management plans that encouraged tenant independence. All nine programs, Monahan claims, benefited their communities by providing good uses for available housing, revitalizing the neighborhood, and increasing shelter choices for low-income families.

In February 1985 the American Planning Association (APA) presented three status reports on new approaches to public housing. Ruth Price's "A Cheer for the Agencies" discusses innovative approaches in seven cities, including scattered-site programs in Springfield, Massachusetts; Greensboro, North Carolina; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The Springfield and Pittsburgh programs illustrated how citizen participation, a careful choice of sites, and design features enhanced public housing programs. Greensboro's 3 scattered-site developments of 107, 39, and 11 units incorporated interesting design features, such as staggered roof lines, varied color schemes, and a variety of housing types to "eliminate the monotony" that typically has characterized public housing. Jerry DeMuth in "20 Years After Gautreaux" reviews national trends in housing deconcentration, HUD policies, and the status of housing segregation suits in Chicago and Yonkers, New York.

The final APA report, by J.S. Fuerst, former research director of the Chicago Housing Authority, describes the Authority's efforts to implement the housing integration mandate of the Gautreaux decision. Fuerst criticizes the Chicago program for serious problems with siting, maintenance, and construction; an overriding concern with racial integration; "terribly dull" design features; and little awareness of the number of units required for a successful scattered-site program.¹³

Only two studies discuss the origins, extent, and effectiveness of the scattered-site strategy. Hogan and Lengyel's "Experiences with Scattered-Site Housing" (1985) contains a short history of the concept, briefly outlines program characteristics in 88 communities, and discusses resident perceptions of the program in Seattle, Washington. The second review of such programs was Jennifer P. Silver's *Bulletin on Scattered-Site Housing* (1980), in which the origins of the program are traced to the concentration of low-income housing in areas of minority concentration. Silver writes of the policy and operational problems involved in carrying out the scattered-site program. She also examines neighborhood resistance, Federal obstacles, and factors associated with successful programs. A final section of her report illustrates both the range and variety of programs frequently used in the delivery of scattered-site housing.

In summary, few studies have presented evidence on the impact of low-density, scattered-site family housing on participants, neighboring households, property values, crime rates, or community acceptance and awareness. Although based upon sound social goals, this innovative housing program is unproven as a possibly superior alternative to spatially concentrated, high-density public housing (such as project housing).

Empirical Studies

Empirical research to date has generally evaluated the impact of scattered-site housing on resident satisfaction and self-image, and whether deconcentration leads to social isolation or integration into new neighborhoods. A few of these studies are comparable to the study done by Hogan in Tucson between 1971 and 1973, and by Hogan and Lengyel in Seattle in 1981-82. Chandler (1991), DeZutter (1984a, 1984b, 1986), Perloff et al. (1979), Lorig Associates (1980), Burby and Rohe (1989), and Lord and Rent (1985) focus on the characteristics of residential deconcentration and the effects such mobility programs have had on "pioneer" families. Many of the questions raised in these parallel investigations were asked of residents in the Tucson and Seattle studies: how the move has affected sense of self and children;

whether the neighborhood environment was better than the prior residence; how the neighbors were perceived, friendly or hostile; and whether the move was socially beneficial or isolating.

Chandler's (1991) work is most similar to the Tucson research. Chandler not only interviewed 85 heads of household "to determine what changes the residents sensed in their lives" after moving into the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority's (CMHA's) widely scattered Acquisition Housing Program (AHP), but she conducted 271 telephone interviews with randomly selected neighbors. The intent of the second phase of her research was twofold: "first, to determine whether the neighbors were aware of the CMHA-owned and operated structures; and second, to assess the reactions of neighbors who were aware." (Ibid., p. 3)

DeZutter's Chicago studies examine tenant attitudes toward scattered-site housing, but focus on the nonprofit management of some of the Chicago Housing Authority's controversial scattered-site properties, rather than the overall success of the program. A third study by Perloff (1979) is a HUD evaluation of the impact of the Gautreaux demonstration¹⁴ on participating families. Chapter X of this report describes Gautreaux families' satisfaction with their new housing and residential environments, in contrast to their previous neighborhoods.

The fourth work is an evaluation of Seattle's early scattered-site program. Lorig Associates' (1980) report is a technical evaluation of the Seattle Housing Authority's financing plans, with suggestions on how to better use the city's block grant funds "to achieve the production goals set for the program." (Ibid., p. 5) An addendum to the report, "Results of the Scattered-Site Resident Questionnaire," includes a questionnaire sought "to establish the early reactions of scattered-site residents to their living situation." (Addendum, p. 1)

Burby and Rohe's (1989) comparative study of eight public housing developments examines the nature of the benefits for low-income, single-parent households when the units are located outside of inner-city neighborhoods. The authors trace dispersal strategies to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 1968 and 1974 Housing Acts, court orders such as *Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority* in 1969, and various metropolitan fair-share housing plans. Criticisms of deconcentration are also reviewed, including an unsigned *Yale Law Journal* article that suggests that "large numbers of people prefer to live in an ethnic community we call a ghetto," and that "in order for the opportunity for integration to be effective, the merging parties must be equal in fact as well as in law." (1970)

The final work by Lord and Rent (1985) assesses resident satisfaction and its correlates from a sample of low-income households in scattered-site public housing projects in Charlotte, North Carolina. They sought to determine whether residents had experienced social isolation by moving away from more familiar neighborhoods and to "identify the most important neighborhood characteristics for producing high levels of residential satisfaction." (Ibid., p. 3)

The eight studies vary in terms of when the research was undertaken relative to occupancy, the percentage of the residents sampled, the size of the development, and the sophistication of the research design. Although the Chicago-Gautreaux (Section 8) research and the Durham (dense project housing) study are legitimate examples of housing deconcentration, they are not the primary focus of this evaluation of unit-based, low-density, scattered-site housing. Table 2-1 compares the studies across several characteristics.

Table 2-1. Research Design and Program Characteristics of Eight Programs

City	Program Origin	Time of Study	Resident Survey	Number Interviewed	Percent Interviewed	Control Group	Longitudinal Design	Cross-Sectional
Cleveland	1985	1989	x	85	54		x	x
Seattle	1979	1980		48	80			x
Seattle	1979	1981-83		157	67			x
Chicago	1973	1983	x	46	35			x
Chicago	1976	1979		330	81	x		x
Tucson	1971-73	1973-75	x	156	78		x	x
Durham	1953-71	1986		127	?	x		x
Charlotte	1975	1983		160	49.6			x

All eight studies were cross-sectional, where information was collected from a sample of families living in scattered-site homes and apartments at the same time. Client interviews were generally done in person, although the Cleveland study conducted telephone interviews with randomly selected neighbors and Silver's Seattle research used both telephone and mailout surveys. The Tucson, Seattle, and Cleveland studies incorporated longitudinal elements into their designs, and households were recontacted to determine whether changes had occurred in attitudes and perceptions about their moves. None of the residents of scattered-site housing were interviewed prior to their moves. Most of the surveys were completed 3 to 15 years after the units were constructed and occupied. Only in Tucson and Seattle were families contacted within the first 6 months of their moves, thus establishing the early reactions of scattered-site residents to their new environments.

Although several of the studies acknowledged the importance of comparison and control groups, only the Durham and Chicago (Gautreaux) studies incorporated controls into the research design. The Durham research compared the experiences of low-income households in urban projects with demographically similar households in four suburban neighborhoods. The HUD Gautreaux Housing Demonstration study was more complex, comparing program participants to both eligible nonparticipants of the Gautreaux class and regular Section 8 recipients. Four of the studies employed multiple regression (Durham, Tucson, and Seattle) and tests of statistical significance (Durham, Charlotte, Tucson, and Seattle). In general, the data were typically displayed as frequency distributions, or as cross-classifications or contingency tables where, for example, categories of one variable (resident satisfaction) were compared with another variable (neighborhood amenities).

The following pages will describe in more detail the characteristics of the eight programs.

Cleveland. Cleveland's housing integration efforts grew out of a class action suit filed in 1972 and settled in 1982.¹⁵ Cleveland was found to be one of the most residentially segregated cities in the Nation with 96 percent of its African-American citizens living on the east side of the Cuyahoga River. The composition of the city's public housing estates "mirrored the racial composition of the census tracts in which the estates [were] located," and "62 percent of all public housing units operated by the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA), including elderly units, [were] located in predominantly [African-American] census tracts." (*Banks v. Perk*, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (1972), p. 181) In the context of

such pervasive segregation, Chief Judge Frank J. Battisti maintained that the CMHA had “an affirmative duty to integrate its housing projects and to be instrumental in dispersing urban housing patterns.” (Ibid., p. 1182) Accordingly, he ordered that the CMHA refrain from “planning any future public housing, including scattered-site units” in African-American neighborhoods and to “consider only sites on the West side of the Cuyahoga River” for its scattered-site program. (Ibid., p. 1186)

Although it would be a decade later before any dispersed housing was available to the plaintiff class, the CMHA now operates 2 scattered-site programs: an Acquisition Housing Program (AHP) consisting of 156 renovated 1- and 2-family buildings, and the Scattered-Site Program, “which provides 160 units of new construction with densities ranging from 2 to 25 units per site.” (See figure 3.) The 2 programs’ 316 units represent less than 3 percent of the city’s 11,000-unit public housing inventory, but they are located in areas containing little or no public housing. (Chandler, 1992, p. 524)

Chandler’s study of the CMHA’s AHP examines two program features: its impact on the residents and neighboring households; and the degree of integration. (1991, p. iv) Chandler conducted two surveys in the summer of 1989. The first asked 85 heads of household a battery of questions regarding their satisfaction with AHP units, quality of life, CMHA management and maintenance, upward mobility, and several neighborhood amenities. The second survey consisted of 271 telephone interviews with randomly selected neighbors to determine their level of awareness and their reactions to the AHP program.

Eighty percent of AHP residents rated the neighborhoods as excellent or good, and 76 percent considered the new neighborhoods better than their previous ones. Furthermore, three-fourths of the households believed they had established good relationships with their neighbors. (Ibid., p. 7) When respondents were asked to evaluate shopping, recreation, transportation, and safety and police services in comparison with their prior neighborhoods, all but the quality of transportation were judged better. Residents’ sense of safety was high, with 69 percent ranking it better than in their former neighborhoods. Shopping availability was rated 60 percent better; residents rated the quality of shopping and recreation 56 percent and 50 percent better. Nineteen percent of the households evaluated transportation as worse, 40 percent the same, and approximately one-third as better.




Figure 3. Map: Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority's Acquisition Housing Program, Cleveland, Ohio.

Although nearly four of five heads of household believed the quality of their life had improved following their move, it was not clear whether living in AHP neighborhoods “ha[d] significantly altered the upward mobility prospects” for participant households. (Ibid.) For example, although 31 percent thought employment opportunities were better, and 34 percent had enrolled in training or education programs, “there was little change in the aggregate employment status of the heads of household since identical numbers became employed as became unemployed.” (Ibid.) The impressions of AHP parents concerning the effects of the schools on their children were more positive: 47 percent noticed their children performed better and were interested in the schools. Chandler cautions against inferring too much from the data because the parents’ judgment was not based on actual school performance, and “[i]t is difficult to separate the impact of school change and neighborhood change.” (Ibid., pp. 6–7)

The neighbor survey found few respondents aware of the AHP program, or of the fact that low-income households were part of their neighborhood. Among the 79 families who were aware, 89 percent thought its impact on the neighborhood was positive; 19 percent said they would consider selling their home; and only 11 percent remarked that the presence of assisted households might affect their decisions to repair their homes. More than half with knowledge of the program supported expansion; renters unanimously favored expansion; however, only 60 percent of the 55 homeowners endorsed expansion. (Ibid., table 14)

When neighborhood reactions to the program were broken down by race, the findings indicated that African-American households were more aware of the AHP program, less supportive of its expansion, and “[m]ore significantly, decisions to repair or sell were affected more in these cases.” Chandler offers no reasons for the disparity in responses when controlling for race, but it is interesting that 80 percent of white and 75 percent of Hispanic households support expansion, and that 90 percent of white and 100 percent of Hispanic households who were aware of the program would not sell their homes simply because of the presence of neighbors of a lower socioeconomic class. Chandler does suggest that the neighborhood responses to the CMHA AHP “contradict conventional wisdom about opposition to this type of public housing.” (Ibid., p. 12)

Seattle. Potter and Hogan drafted a 16-item survey that was administered to 60 scattered-site residents by either mail or telephone in 1980.¹⁶ At the time the city commissioned the study, few tenants actually resided in the units, or their tenancies were short (87 percent had been in their units for 6 months or less). Consequently, the survey focused on the convenience of the location and residents’ overall reactions to the scattered-site program. (Lorig Associates, 1980, Addendum, p. 1)

The early impressions of the residents were uniformly favorable. When asked “How does this unit compare to your previous one?,” 92 percent responded that the unit was “better” than where they had previously lived; 91 percent felt welcome in their neighborhoods; 91 percent were enthusiastic about keeping up the appearance of their unit and yard;¹⁷ and 96 percent believed that the extra expense of doing scattered-site development was justified by the benefits. Among the justifications mentioned were that “the program enable[d] residents to escape from ‘project life,’ that it provide[d] benefits for children because of a better neighborhood and family environment, and that it contribute[d] to a sense of pride, hope, self-esteem, and motivation on the part of residents.” (Ibid., p. 11)

Lorig Associates drew the following initial conclusions: “resident satisfaction with the program [was] extremely high; residents view[ed] the program as providing both significantly better housing conditions, and an opportunity to improve their own and their childrens’ lives. . . .” In addition:

- The overwhelming majority of residents believed that the extra costs of the program were justified by both the tangible and intangible benefits, and expressed enthusiasm over keeping up the appearance of their units and yards.
- A high percentage of residents reported feeling welcome in their new neighborhoods.
- (The) apparently widespread level of neighborhood acceptance may have been directly related to the low densities of these initial scattered-site units (half of which were single-family homes), as these types of units are likely to have the least impact on their surroundings and the residents, and therefore are not subject to the negative stereotyping that often develops in response to identifiable public housing projects. (Ibid., p. 14)

Chicago. DeZutter's study of Chicago's scattered-site housing began in 1983, when there were slightly more than 300 occupied units, with another 500 planned. The units he examined—132 on the city's north side—were part of a 2-year experiment by the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), which contracted for the private management of scattered-site public housing.¹⁸

The 132 units were in 29 three- or six-flat buildings, on 20 sites located in 4 northeast Chicago community areas. Although the buildings managed by the Housing Research Center¹⁹ were relatively new, most of them had “institutional looking steel doors, a boxy design, and noticeably bright face-brick exteriors.” (DeZutter, 1984b, p. 23) Fifty-four of the units were in uptown neighborhoods where poverty rates exceeded 28 percent.

The 29 buildings were more racially integrated (only 48 percent African American) than the CHA's South Side projects. On other characteristics, however, residents differed little from other public housing residents: 92 percent earned less than \$13,000 annually; 70 percent received some form of government assistance; 73 percent of the households were headed by women; and only 33 percent of the units had an employed adult.

The north-side, scattered-site properties were well regarded by their residents; 90 percent had no desire to move, and 70 percent considered the buildings the best places they had ever lived. (DeZutter, 1984a, p. 4) Sixty-seven percent of the residents said their neighbors were friendly (DeZutter, 1986, p. 75), and 57 percent believed their children “were getting a better break by living in scattered sites—and not where they once lived”; another 33 percent didn't notice any difference. (DeZutter, 1984b, p. 45) Such popularity produced a stable tenancy with most units occupied by the original residents.

Roughly half the residents interviewed were African American, but “none said they felt socially or racially isolated by scattered-site living.” (DeZutter, 1984a, p. 44) Elsewhere, however, DeZutter reports little neighborly contact among residents of the scattered-site buildings. The survey found little socializing or visiting, at least among the adults: Only 10 of 46 reported visiting the units of a fellow resident in the building, and only 4 percent had ever shared dinner with a coresident. (DeZutter, 1986, p. 76)

DeZutter includes social isolation and “problems of assimilating scattered-site residents into the life and activities of their neighborhoods and communities” (Ibid., p. 86) among several “lingering problems” that confront the private management of scattered-site housing.

DeZutter also talked with neighborhood groups and local aldermen, and interviewed 20 neighbors at 14 of the scattered-site buildings. Overall, opposition to scattered-site public housing had mellowed from the early years, when it was regarded as the unwanted stepchild of the CHA. The major focus of

his inquiries, however, was to gauge community perceptions of performance by private management of the scattered-site buildings. In general, aldermen noted “a dramatic decrease in complaints about the scattered-site units” (Ibid., p. 54), and they believed the properties looked better than they had under CHA management. (Ibid., p. 55) The neighbors generally said the buildings looked better, but more than half of them “knew nothing about their CHA neighbors.” (Ibid., p. 56) DeZutter’s field research uncovered few “outright scattered-site enthusiasts,” and most of those he interviewed strongly opposed “more units in their areas.” However, some also admitted that the units were “beneficial to the community.” (DeZutter, 1984b, p. 47)

Gautreaux Demonstration. Although most of the empirical research on scattered-site housing has assessed programs that are owned by a public authority, the results of the Gautreaux demonstration are relevant to the discussion. Perloff’s HUD evaluation (1979) of that program addresses the impact on participating families when they move to low-density apartments in neighborhoods containing only small numbers of minority households. The rent subsidy is provided through HUD’s Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program, and the landlord is a private or nonprofit entity. These are the only differences between the Gautreaux demonstration and scattered-site programs owned and operated by housing authorities.

As of March 31, 1979, 455 families had been placed in Section 8 rental housing in the Chicago Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). The Gautreaux families consisted largely of very-low-income African-American females under 35 who had children living at home. The Gautreaux heads of household were slightly younger, better educated, more often employed, and with family incomes that exceeded the income for nonparticipating Gautreaux households.

Gautreaux families generally moved to the outer suburbs “on the periphery of the Chicago SMSA with the first half of Gautreaux moves concentrated in eight census tracts which form an arc approximately 20 miles from the city of Chicago.” (Perloff, 1979, p. 82) Later moves were more dispersed. Gautreaux families lived in garden low-rise or in high-rise apartments (66 percent) more frequently than in detached single-family, duplex, or rowhouses (20 percent). Compared with the 30 percent who had formerly lived in Chicago high-rise apartments, the moves resulted in less concentration and lower housing density.

Eighty-one percent of the families expressed satisfaction with their homes or apartments, and more than three-fourths believed they lived in better places than their former dwellings. Eighty-seven percent believed the living space within the units was adequate, and two-thirds of the participants said the space was greater than their earlier Chicago residences. (Ibid., p. 168)

The residential moves involved significant changes in neighborhood conditions. The African-American population went from 60 percent to 5 percent; median years of education increased from 10.6 to 12.6; the neighborhood unemployment rate dropped by more than half; and median income nearly doubled, rising from \$7,813 to \$13,355. (Ibid., table 7-3, p. 97) “[F]rom the perspective of the goal of dispersion” and from the vantage point of participating families, “residential environments were dramatically upgraded and altered.” (Ibid., pp. 93-94)

The HUD evaluation also examined Gautreaux families’ satisfaction with their new neighborhoods, including identification of neighborhood problems, assessments of public services, improvements in the quality of life, satisfaction with the dwelling, and plans to move and location preferences.

Four of five Gautreaux families reported high levels of satisfaction with their new neighborhood. (Ibid., table 10–1, p. 141) Although a handful of families expressed doubts about the move, most said it was better than they had anticipated. (Ibid., p. 132) Important reasons for the favorable evaluation included safety, quality schools, and congenial neighbors. Three-quarters of Gautreaux participants said their neighborhoods were “very” or “reasonably” safe, and close to 60 percent considered the suburbs safer than Chicago’s inner-city areas. (Ibid., tables 10–14, 10–15, p. 151) What Gautreaux families liked best were the “low density, the peace and quiet of the area, the privacy they had, and the amount of open space around them.” (Ibid., p. 133) Few neighborhood amenities were strongly disliked. Inadequate public transportation (29 percent) and distance from work (13 percent) were the exceptions.

Given the high levels of satisfaction with their new locations, it is not surprising that few Gautreaux participants mentioned “big” neighborhood problems. Four conditions were “sometimes viewed as big problems.” (Ibid., p. 134) Lack of interesting things to do was the most frequently mentioned problem (22 percent), followed by trash and litter (13 percent) and street traffic and vandalism (12 percent each). (Ibid.) Apparently, Gautreaux families believed they had escaped the adverse effects of deteriorating inner-city neighborhoods, for approximately “two-thirds of the . . . participants reported almost every problem to be less serious than it was in their old neighborhoods.” (Ibid., p. 135)

With the exception of public transportation, two-thirds of the Gautreaux participants rated public services as fair or very good and, when measured against their prior neighborhoods, more than 75 percent judged them the same or better. Public schools were highly praised, with 60 percent giving them “very good” scores, and 67 percent reporting them better than schools their children had previously attended. Only 15 percent of the households rated public transportation as very good, and 61 percent judged the service “worse” than before the move. Transit deficiencies created service access problems, and “Gautreaux participants mentioned greater difficulties in getting to all services since moving to their neighborhood. . . .” (Ibid.)

Forty-three percent of Gautreaux participants had given some thought to moving, but only 22 percent said they definitely would move within the next 2 years. The major reason for thinking about moving involved characteristics of the dwelling: It was either too small (9 percent) or of poor quality (12 percent). Other reasons included location (16 percent cited inconvenience and poor transportation) or poor neighborhood quality (11 percent). (Ibid., table 12–1, p. 178) The frequently expressed intention to move should not be interpreted as an indicator of dissatisfaction with the Gautreaux demonstration. Rather, “the majority of Gautreaux families were content with living in the suburbs (64 percent). While they may have had plans to move, they intended to move within the suburbs.” (Ibid., p. 176)

Approximately two-thirds of the Gautreaux families experienced positive changes in their lives after the move. From participants’ evaluations of neighborhood conditions and public services, the HUD evaluation inferred that:

[T]heir evaluation of life in the new suburban environment reflects a suburban-urban tradeoff. On the positive side, Gautreaux families mentioned better schools, safer neighborhoods, fewer run-down houses, less trash, less traffic, and better recreational facilities. On the negative side, they mentioned inadequate public transportation and locational inconvenience. (Ibid., p. 140)

Durham. Burby and Rohe's (1989) case study of two different housing developments, with units located within and outside the inner city, "differ[s] from most other deconcentration plans" because of the developments' higher density. (Webber and Klammer, 1991, p. 451)²⁰ Their study is relevant to this review because it examines outcomes (resident satisfaction, fear of crime, and social and economic isolation) that are critical to the assessment of residential mobility programs.

Satisfaction and fear of crime by residents of the two developments were measured with indexes: Social isolation was extrapolated from a series of answers to social interaction questions, and economic isolation was determined by whether the heads of household worked full- or part-time. Burby and Rohe employed sophisticated statistical analysis, including multiple regression. Because prior research "clearly established that residential location is only one of a number of factors that can affect satisfaction, fear, and isolation," the authors introduced controls for differences in isolation that might result from demographic or socioeconomic factors, such as household size, sex, education, and age. (Burby and Rohe, p. 121)

Public housing located away from inner-city neighborhoods did produce some positive outcomes. The findings suggested that for residents living in dispersed projects, the "fear of crime [is] significantly lower" and "deconcentration does not contribute significantly to further [social] isolation." (Ibid.) On the other hand, "economic isolation is significantly higher" for the suburban families. The research found no statistically significant differences in residential satisfaction and social isolation between the two groups of housing residents.

The authors were not surprised by the absence of difference in residential satisfaction between inner-city and deconcentrated public housing residents. They suggest two reasons for the lack of greater satisfaction among the latter group. One is that the deconcentrated developments were too large (mean number of dwellings: 140) to shed the stigma associated with living in a "project," and the dwellings were poorly maintained and in need of costly repairs. The second factor "counteracted many of the advantages of living outside the inner-city ghetto and accounts for the moderate differences in overall satisfaction levels between residents living in the inner city and deconcentrated developments. . . ." (Ibid., p. 128)

Charlotte. Lord and Rents' (1985) examination of resident attitudes in eight scattered-site public housing developments in Charlotte, North Carolina, focused exclusively on residential satisfaction. The community's 8 projects provide 332 units for low-income, qualified families. In contrast to the large traditional projects, each of the eight scattered-site developments contained "only multifamily, attached units including a mixture of garden, walk-up and two-story models within the same structure." (Lord and Rent, p. 8) Another difference between the newly constructed scattered-site developments and the older project housing was their location. The large traditional projects "[were] located in predominantly black neighborhoods in the inner city," whereas the eight scattered-site projects were "located in majority white neighborhoods" in middle- to upper-middle-income areas in the east and south sectors of the city. (Ibid.)

The data for the study were collected in 1983. Onsite interviews were completed by a sample of 160 residents, representative of the 322 families living in the 8 facilities. The survey instrument gathered demographic data (such as age, occupation, source of income, education), residential history, and

indicators of social participation. The remainder of the questionnaire consisted of a single general question on how satisfied residents were with their neighborhood and 17 focused questions concerning resident evaluations of the neighborhood, including the site's access to important services and facilities, and ratings of other neighborhood amenities, such as street lighting, sidewalks, police protection, and project size. (Ibid., p. 11)

Lord and Rent found markedly high levels of general neighborhood satisfaction—only 13.7 percent of the respondents were “dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied.” There was greater variance for the 17 focused items. Satisfaction ranged from a low of 50 percent for easy access to public transportation (a result, perhaps, of the fact that only 42 percent of the households owned an automobile) to 97 percent who were either “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the size of the project. Residents were generally highly satisfied with the neighborhood and with their neighbors. For example, 94 percent considered their neighbors “good” people; 56 percent identified the neighborhood as their home, rather than some other neighborhood; 93 percent were satisfied with the apartment unit; and 68 percent appraised the neighborhood as “much better” than where they previously lived.

When indicators of amenities were examined across the eight sites, “access to shopping and public transportation . . . produced the greatest contrast in satisfaction levels. . . .” (Ibid., p. 19) There was an objective base for the difference because two of the projects were not within walking distance of a supermarket or other convenience stores, whereas Sharon Road residents had easy access to neighborhood stores and convenient transit service to a large regional shopping center.

Lord and Rent were also interested in the effect of location and the socioeconomic status of neighbors on the satisfaction expressed by low-income households with their mobility away from inner-city areas. When controlling for the racial mix and income level of the neighborhood area of the project, they found that the most satisfied assisted households were “in the more prestigious areas of the city,” and the “lowest satisfaction occurred in the most racially impacted areas.” (Ibid., p. 18) Thus, the Charlotte, North Carolina, study does “provide support for scattered-site locations in public housing programs.” (Ibid., p. 22) The social isolation inner-city residents are hypothesized to experience when they move to more affluent, predominantly white neighborhoods was “not found, or did not have any significant impact upon their residential satisfaction.” (Ibid., p. 20)




Figure 4. Scattered-Site and large-scale public housing projects, Charlotte, North Carolina.

The high levels of satisfaction reported by Lord and Rent suggest that there are few problems associated with spatial deconcentration strategies, and that “[t]he benefits of this housing, such as the better unit, the better schools and recreation, presence of ‘good’ people, and its location in a more prestigious location of the city apparently outweigh any disadvantages which have been experienced.” (Ibid., p. 22)

Unit-Based Mobility Problems

The Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program is the oldest and “best known attempt to facilitate the movement of low-income African Americans from inner-city neighborhoods to predominantly white suburbs. . . .” (*Housing & Development Brief*, September 1994, p. 3) The Gautreaux demonstration, however, is a resident-based mobility program where families are typically provided Section 8 Existing Housing vouchers or certificates “that can in principle be spent on housing anywhere within a metropolitan region or even the entire country.” (Peterson and Williams, 1994, p. 17)

On the other hand, the subject of this study, scattered-site assisted family housing, is a unit-based mobility strategy wherein affordable housing units are acquired or constructed in stable working- and/or middle-class neighborhoods by public housing authorities (PHAs). The costs to the renter are then “linked to additional, tenant-based subsidies like Section 8 or public housing.” (Ibid., p. 72)²¹

Roisman and Botein (1993) and Peterson and Williams (1994) describe more than a dozen jurisdictions that utilize the unit-based mobility strategy to enhance the housing choices of low-income families. Most of these programs were developed in the past decade, typically as a result of lawsuits. Court-ordered consent decrees have shaped the scattered-site programs in Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Milwaukee, Omaha, New Haven, and Yonkers. Of the mobility programs cited in The Urban Institute’s *Housing Mobility* draft report and in Roisman and Botein’s article, only those in San Antonio and in Montgomery County, Maryland, emerged without the aid of a lawsuit.

Few of these programs have been evaluated; Chicago and Cleveland are exceptions. Some do not fit our definition of scattered-site housing. The Chicago and Yonkers unit-based strategies have special characteristics; they will be discussed later in conjunction with our own observations and data on the two programs. What follows is a brief survey of some of the other existing programs.

The Dallas Housing Authority is currently under a court order that requires the city to establish a \$22.5 million Housing Trust that will fund either new construction or unit acquisition from public agency sellers for “occupancy by very-low-income tenants . . . at rents equivalent to those charged in public housing.” (Ibid., p. 99) Startup negotiations are under way, and Telesis—the nonprofit agency administering the Walker Trust—anticipates “that projects now under discussion could yield 200 to 300 units for public housing families” located primarily in the suburbs. Although the Walker order is potentially far reaching, “no housing has been built or acquired under the trust arrangement since the consent decree was signed in 1987, and no financing arrangements have been finalized.” (Ibid., p. 100)

The Authority also agreed to construct 100 units of public housing in nonimpacted neighborhoods. The housing has been built and is occupied by African-American families. The “project straddles a suburban county and far South Dallas, in a white neighborhood of townhouses and single-family homes.” (Roisman and Botein, 1993, p. 347)²²

The Omaha Housing Authority (OHA) has had a scattered-site program since 1981. The program expanded in the late 1980s to provide relocation housing for families displaced by project demolition.²³ Purchases of existing housing were made to avoid minority concentrations and the oversaturation of neighborhoods (25 units is the largest number in any 1 census tract). Omaha's program avoided court intervention until a lawsuit, *Hawkins v. Kemp*, was filed in 1990, challenging racial segregation in the siting of public housing developments and in the operation of the Section 8 program. The Authority had used special screening rules for selection into the scattered-site program.²⁴ A consent decree was issued in early 1994 that removed the special selection criteria, and "establish[ed] a Section 8 mobility program of 100 certificates modeled on Gautreaux. . . ." (Peterson and Williams, op. cit., p. 102) The program's 330 units are widely distributed with "some purchases made in all seven of Omaha's wards" and in 74 of the city's census tracts. The purchased units are almost equally divided between single-family homes and duplexes and multiple-family units.

Some of the mobility programs discussed by Roisman and Botein use combinations of unit-based and resident-based strategies. Milwaukee's settlement of a school desegregation case included both; the unit-based component required that the Authority develop four projects in nonimpacted areas, completed in the spring of 1993. (Roisman and Botein, op. cit., p. 349) However, because these projects reflect the dispersed/concentrated pattern of public housing development, they will not be reviewed here. Parma, Ohio, also operates a combination program and, like Milwaukee's 4 projects, Parma's 60-unit housing project is too large to include among the scattered-site public housing programs covered in this report.

Other unit-based programs are byproducts of project replacement strategies undertaken by PHAs. New Haven's acquisition of 26 single-family homes in white neighborhoods, for example, resulted from a lawsuit filed against the Authority when it tried to find replacement units in racially impacted neighborhoods. The first 11 single-family homes "were finally occupied, without incident, in May 1993. The tenants were all African American. The homes will be privately managed." (Ibid., p. 348)

The San Antonio Housing Authority (SAHA) has made mobility options available to very-low- (below 50 percent of median income) and low-income households in predominantly middle- or upper-middle-class neighborhoods. Since 1989 the SAHA "has purchased 3,100 Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)-owned apartment units, and [a]t least 500 very-low-income families . . . will be housed in mixed-income developments in middle-income neighborhoods. . . ." (Peterson and Williams, op. cit., p. 103)

Montgomery County, Maryland's, mobility program evolved from the 1974 passage of an inclusionary zoning ordinance that required builders with developments of more than 50 units to set aside 12.5 percent to 15 percent of their units as Moderately Priced Dwelling Units (MPDUs) for occupancy by low- and middle-income households. (Roisman and Botein, op. cit., p. 347)

The Maryland program is one of the most successful examples of developer-linked strategies for expanding the supply of low-income housing. The program is somewhat unusual for embedding affordability "within a comprehensive housing assistance program that uses some of the developer-provided units in middle-income neighborhoods to house the county's poorest families through Section 8 and public housing." (Peterson and Williams, op. cit., p. 75)

One-third of the MPDUs can be purchased by the Housing Opportunities Commission (HOC), such as the Montgomery County Housing Authority, and another 7 percent by nonprofits for sale or rental to very-low-income households. (Ibid., p. 76) Eligibility requirements limit access to residents of the county or those who work there.²⁵ Low-income rental and sales units are typically awarded by lottery. An estimated “80 percent of the households occupying HOC-owned subsidy units are minorities.” (Ibid. p. 77) Slightly more than 12 percent of the 8,842 MPDUs produced by the end of 1993 were owned by the HOC “to operate as Section 8 housing, public housing, or the equivalent.” (Ibid., p. 76)²⁶

Peterson and Williams maintain that “the programs have been generally well accepted by developer and by neighbors.” (Ibid., p. 78) They provide as evidence the continued development of MPDUs by developers. There is no research on the effects on low-income families who live in the HOC units.²⁷ A 1988 study of property values cited by the authors clearly showed “that MPDU units had no negative effects on nearby property values. . . .” (Ibid.)

Summary

The literature discussing deconcentration and residential mobility strategies suggests that scattered-site housing has proven successful for dozens of PHAs across the United States. Of early programs,

Table 2–2. Resident Perceptions of Scattered-Site Housing in Selected Cities

	Seattle N = 48	Cleveland N = 85	Chicago N = 46	Seattle N = 157	Tucson		Charlotte N = 86
					New Site N = 96	South Park N = 60	
Do you feel welcome in your neighborhood? [percent yes]	93	81	—	92	95	60	86
Have you experienced any problems because of location? [percent no]	80	—	—	81	78	63	—
Is your present unit conveniently located for public services/shopping? [percent yes]	85	88	—	82	79	64	75
Because of the move, will your children's future be? [percent better]	—	—	57	66	60	5	—
How does the unit compare to your previous residence? [percent better]	92	77	58	62	64	37	61

Monahan has written: "PHAs report very high tenant satisfaction, lower tenant turnover, less rent delinquency, better care of dwellings and equipment, and a minimum of tenant-management conflict." (Monahan, 1977, p. 2) In *Bulletin on Scattered-Site Housing*, Silver's interviews with representatives of several scattered-site programs reveal that "residents generally experienc[e] high satisfaction with their living situations, take pride in the appearance of their dwellings, and feel that scattered site has enabled them to escape the hopelessness and stigma of large public housing projects." (Silver, 1980, p. 23)

High levels of tenant satisfaction have been uniformly reported in surveys done in Cleveland, Charlotte, and Chicago, and this study's analysis of Tucson and Seattle programs. Five questions were typically asked of tenants in these studies, and the responses are highlighted in table 2-2.

The evidence contained in the studies, with the sole exception of the South Park development in Tucson, supports the following general findings:

- Residents of scattered-site housing feel welcome in their new residential environments, and when asked to compare it with their previous neighborhoods, find them much better.
- Residents experience few problems because of their moves. In general, they are satisfied with locational access to public services and shopping. However, public transportation was an issue for many families, with significant dissatisfaction reported in Cleveland, Charlotte, and Chicago.
- Parents expect the scattered-site move to benefit their children. This is attributed to the move and its association with greater neighborhood safety and security and better access to quality schools.
- Tenants and host neighbors have done minimal mixing socially, although the predictions of some researchers that scattered-site residents would feel socially isolated were not supported in Seattle, Tucson, Durham, Charlotte, and Cleveland studies.
- Residents feel renewed hope for the future in having escaped from the isolation and hopelessness of public housing project environments. This is clearly revealed in answers to the quality of life measures in Cleveland, Seattle, and Tucson. (See chapter 4 for data on Seattle and Tucson.)

The significantly different responses of Tucson families residing in the South Park scattered-site development to the questions in table 2-2 highlight the critical importance of siting decisions on whether residential mobility programs are judged successful by their intended beneficiaries. The 14 sites and 80 units of new construction were all built in an area approximately 1/2 mile by 1 mile, in a deteriorating neighborhood with high levels of poverty and minority concentration.

The salience of neighborhood conditions to successful outcomes was also discussed in DeZutter's evaluation in Chicago, where "the worst cases of tenant neglect and vandalism, the worst garbage areas, and the worst social problems occur[red] in buildings located in downtrodden areas." (DeZutter, 1986, p. 79) Housing Resource Center's Sue Brady commented that public housing residents "need more than a sound physical structure or house," but rather "a supportive, encouraging neighborhood environment." Her prescription for success was to avoid "predominantly low-income neighborhoods that are identifiably segregated by race or class." (Ibid., p. 81)

Lord and Rent's Charlotte study also reported a correlation between neighborhood satisfaction and the location of the scattered-site project. When the eight projects were grouped according to the racial mix and income level of surrounding neighborhood, the authors found that the most satisfied residents lived in "projects located in the more prestigious areas" and the (least) satisfied group was "located in the most racially impacted areas." (Ibid., p. 18)

The following chapter gathers profile information on scattered-site housing for medium-sized and large PHAs in 1982 and 1994. The Hogan/Lengyel and Belzer surveys collected data on the characteristics and impacts of such programs nationally, and the findings add important descriptive detail to the earlier literature and the characterization of the program.

In addition, the earlier literature and the national inventories are augmented by reports on 13 representative programs. Personal visits to the 13 cities and housing authorities between 1987 and 1992 allowed for more detailed exploration of the variations in program characteristics, a more complete enumeration of commonalities shared across the cases, and a better understanding of the variables that shape program success.

Chapter 3

National Scattered-Site Programs

Gathering baseline data from comparable jurisdictions enriches case-study research. Profile information on the universe of scattered-site programs, or a significantly large sample from that universe, provides an important context for interpreting information extracted from the single case study. A portion of that context was drawn from the Hogan/Lengyel 1982 survey and the descriptive information contributed a decade later by the Belzer survey of larger Public Housing Authority (PHA) programs.

Both surveys inquired into the origins and characteristics of scattered-site housing, and each sought the perceptions of housing directors of program impact. The Hogan/Lengyel instrument contained more than twice as many questions as Belzer's survey (36 items to 16), and the 1982 inventory included questions on population characteristics, neighborhood involvement, and identification of problems when communities initiated scattered-site housing.

A sample of 13 jurisdictions was selected from the housing authorities who responded to the 1982 survey. Personal visits to Alexandria, Charleston, Chicago, East St. Louis, El Paso, Lancaster, Philadelphia, Rochester, St. Paul, San Diego, Tucson, and Yonkers were undertaken between 1987 and 1992. Although not a random sample, the programs were diverse in terms of region, size of authority, program size, and time of program origin. In two respects, sample jurisdictions differed from the larger 1982 survey: (1) more than 70 percent of the residents of 11 of the 13 PHAs were nonwhite (a reflection of the large scattered-site programs in Chicago and Philadelphia) and (2) half the families worked, with only 39 percent dependent on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).

Chapter 3 begins with a description of national profile characteristics of scattered-site programs in 1982 and 1994. This is followed by a description of the case-study communities, including their dispersal, demographic characteristics of scattered-site census tracts in 1990, and how the scattered-site program is viewed when compared with project housing. The chapter concludes with summaries of four common elements for nine of the programs: (1) background material on the city, Housing Authority, and assisted housing programs; (2) description of the origins and characteristics of the scattered-site program; (3) program results; and (4) 1994–95 updates of the program subsequent to the first site visit.

Hogan/Lengyel 1982 Survey

Partly because of the lack of information on scattered-site housing, Hogan and Lengyel began an extensive research project in the summer and fall of 1982 to determine the scope and quality of the program nationally. This was an important time to examine the scattered-site model, given the Reagan administration's endorsement of programs like Section 8¹ housing vouchers,² and trial balloons suggesting that the Nation's public housing stock should be privatized.

It was assumed that only large PHAs—those with 500 or more units of family public housing—could support the program. Given this assumption, 333 PHAs qualified as likely providers of scattered-site housing. A solicitation letter, questionnaire, and postcard were mailed to housing directors, with a

routine followup letter sent in mid-November 1982.³ Sixty-seven percent responded by late January 1983, and although completed questionnaires were received from 105 PHAs, only 88 were used in the study.⁴

Profile Characteristics

On average, the 88 authorities were responsible for slightly fewer than 100 scattered-site units, which accounted for 9.5 percent of their family public housing inventory. The number of sites—14.5 per jurisdiction—was not large, and the average number of units assembled on each site was 4.7. The latter figure reflects a commitment by PHAs to low density as a strategy for making subsidized family housing less obtrusive. (See table 3-1.)

Table 3-1. National Sample Characteristics of Scattered-Site Housing, 1983

Characteristic	Sample Total N = 88	West N = 21	South N = 23	North-Central N = 22	North-east N = 22	A Large N = 10	B M/L N = 20	C Medium N = 35	D Small N = 23	E Old N = 50	F New N = 38
Program origin	1972	1972	1972	1970	1974	1969	1969	1974	1972	1968	1978
Units occupied [No.]	98	290	92	132	42	467	166	72	98	162	69
Average sites [No.]	15	55	9	23	12	260	14	10	15	23	11
Average units/site [No.]	5	6	12	3	2	3	6	6	3	6	2
Total subsidized housing scattered [Percent]	9	26	9	10	2	10	7	11	20	13	2
Scattered consisting of <15 units/site [Percent]	96	95	25	96	100	98	85	98	93	90	99
Minority occupancy [Percent]	63	67	77	55	53	86	64	67	45	71	51
Income from employment [Percent]	45	41	56	50	35	36	46	47	45	40	51
Income from AFDC [Percent]	35	36	19	38	46	41	38	30	39	37	32

A Large = 7,500+ subsidized-housing units.

B Med/Large = 3,001-7,499 subsidized-housing units.

C Medium = 1,001-3,000 subsidized-housing units.

D Small = 500-1,000 subsidized-housing units.

E Old = jurisdictions whose scattered-site programs came on-line prior to 1973.

F New = jurisdictions whose scattered-site programs came on-line after 1973.

Note: Figures in table are percentages, means, or averages of the variables.

The public's perception of large housing projects is that they are segregated by race and typically are homes for African-American families. A 1984 survey of 64 of the Nation's 133 largest PHAs found that more than three-quarters of the family units were occupied by minorities, with African-American households accounting for 68 percent. (Citizens Housing and Planning Association, 1985, pp. 22-23) Unlike this pattern of racial concentration, the tenancy characteristics of the Hogan/Lengyel scattered-site

households are diverse: 46 percent are African American, 37 percent are white, and 14 percent are nonwhite Hispanic. The remaining 3 percent are Native American, Asian American, or other.

In addition, most households do not totally subsist on government subsidy: 45 percent derive their income from employment, and only 35 percent from AFDC. The income statistics imply one of two things: Either PHAs recruit clients with some employment history, or the head(s) of household become upwardly mobile as a result of living in scattered-site housing. Our data, partly because it is primarily cross-sectional and descriptive, supports the selective recruitment thesis, not the mobility theory.

Although most PHA directors claimed that scattered-site households were similar to project families,⁵ 25 percent of the PHAs had screened the waiting list for “desirable” families and imposed requirements beyond HUD selection criteria. The special requirements often included indicators of personal stability, higher income, ability to perform routine interior and exterior maintenance, preplacement interviews with the family, and a home visit.

Pre- and Post-1972 Programs

It is important to distinguish pre- and post-1972 scattered-site programs because different factors affected housing policy in the two periods. Programs enacted before 1972 incorporated the scattered-site strategy because many housing authorities had come to believe that dense project developments for families were failures and that a better way had to be found to integrate low-income families into the wider community.

Post-1972 programs, on the other hand, were influenced more by changes in HUD rules, allocations and development packages, and court rulings. The Gautreaux litigation in Chicago, for example, had an important impact on public housing policy. The decision was viewed by some HUD officials as a “draconian solution which may be imposed upon localities which fail to implement sound, balanced policies of site selection of public housing.” (Gang, 1969, p. 16)

As table 3-1 illustrates, most PHAs began their programs in 1972 or later. The reasons given by housing directors for choosing the scattered-site strategy included the desire to provide better living environments for low-income households; prevent undue impacts on any one section of the community; compensate for shortages of safe, sanitary housing in HUD allocations; avoid the stigma of project housing; deliver shelter quickly through acquisition of existing stock; find an alternative to a single, cost-effective site;⁶ and conform with HUD directives.

Regional Variations

Large authorities in the north-central United States generally have been pioneers in the development of scattered-site housing. PHAs in the West have more scattered-site units and units that are more dispersed than other regions. Older programs have twice the number of sites as new programs, but post-1972 programs place fewer units on each site (two per site, compared with six). Interestingly, larger authorities have fewer units per site when compared with other authorities.

Scattered-site housing does not represent a substantial portion of assisted housing except in the West, where it accounts for 26 percent of the inventory. Marked regional deviation is in the South, where the

program is not only modest in scope (92 units occupied on average for the 23 reporting authorities), but the number of units is three times the national average. Moreover, few of the developments comply with our definition of appropriate density (fewer than 15 units per site).

Several variations in the racial and income characteristics of residents are revealed when authorities are examined by size, region, and program age. For example, 71 percent of the clients of scattered-site housing in large PHAs are African American, and only 14 percent are white. On the other hand, small authorities rent 55 percent of their units to white families and 45 percent to African-American and other minority households.

Scattered-site developments appear to be the most racially balanced in the West, but this results from the heavy Latino population (40 percent are Mexican American). The next largest cluster of Latino households (8.3 percent) is in the Northeast region. Southern authorities are not as racially mixed; 70 percent of their scattered-site residents are African American. The next largest concentration of African-American families is in north-central jurisdictions, where 50 percent of the units are occupied by African Americans. Racial composition is associated with program age: Older programs accommodate more African Americans (49 percent compared with 42 percent), and Mexican Americans (20 percent compared with 7 percent), and significantly fewer white families (9 percent compared with 29 percent).

Variations in the sources of client income are not as pronounced, which suggests that authorities with scattered-site developments may support income mixing more than racial integration. More AFDC clients live in large authority scattered-site units than medium-sized authorities (41 percent compared with 30 percent), but nearly as many AFDC families reside in medium-large and small authority developments (38 percent each).

Few income source variations are associated with program age. However, more clients of post-1972 programs derive their primary income from employment than older program residents (51 percent compared with 40 percent). There are two income source differences associated with region. Thirteen percent of Western programs serve a Supplemental Security Income (SSI) clientele, whereas 9 percent, 2 percent, and 4 percent serve SSI beneficiaries in the South, Northeast, and north-central regions, respectively. More striking is the 27-percent difference between Northeastern and Southern programs. Forty-six percent of Northeast clients are AFDC recipients, but only 19 percent of Southern residents derive their incomes from AFDC. Apparently, Southern Housing Authorities screen prospective tenants in order to recruit more economically stable families for the scattered-site program.

Three other characteristics warrant a brief note: type of construction, development method, and source of funding. Seventy-five percent of responding PHAs have developed scattered-site units with new construction funding, while 44 percent and 42 percent used acquisition and rehabilitation strategies. Conventional procedures were the typical development method (72 percent).⁷ Turnkey was used by another 46 percent.⁸ Very few authorities (9 percent) employed "force accounts" (such as construction performed by Housing Authority personnel to construct or renovate the scattered units). Finally, low-rent public housing was the principal funding account for 90 percent of the scattered-site authorities, with another 11 percent using Section 8 and 13 percent using "other" revenue sources, including block grants (figures do not total 100 percent because multiple responses were appropriate).

Program Impact

Little is known about the effects of scattered-site housing, especially on the lives of the residents. Our national survey of large housing authorities suggests a strong positive impact. Such data, however, are derived from asking Housing Authority directors to respond to four questions: (1) What is the overall public impression of the program in your community? (2) How successful do you feel your program has been? (3) What is your position on scattered-site housing? and (4) In the future, if your authority were to acquire or build additional public housing, would you build scattered-site housing?

Housing directors reported a satisfied public. Twenty-six percent and 64 percent, respectively, judged their communities very favorable or favorable, and only 10 percent either unfavorable or very unfavorable to scattered sites. Forty-four percent regarded the program as very successful, 52 percent as successful, and only 3 percent as unsuccessful.

Approximately three-quarters of the executive directors were very favorably or favorably disposed toward the program. Seventeen percent were neutral, 11 percent opposed. The overall high regard for the program was reflected in responses to plans for additional public housing. Eighty percent of the executive directors would like to do more scattered-site housing in the future. Moderate opposition to the expansion of the program centered in the South (28 percent opposed doing more) and among small authorities (25 percent were opposed).

Belzer 1994 Survey

Nathan Belzer, Senior Scattered-Site Analyst for the Housing Authority of Savannah, Georgia, conducted a survey of large Housing Authority scattered-site programs in early 1994. A 15-item questionnaire was mailed to the 181 executive directors of housing authorities with "roughly more" than 1,000 units of public housing in April 23, 1994. At the end of July 1994, 106 directors had responded to the request for information (a 58.6-percent response rate).

Belzer's survey addressed two principal aspects of scattered-site housing: unit composition and program impact. The survey instrument was very similar to the one used by Hogan and Lengyel in their 1982 survey of directors of medium to large housing authorities. Approximately three-quarters of the questions were equivalent.

Unit Composition

The average number of scattered-site units per jurisdiction reported by the housing directors was 268 (the variation in number of units ranged from Stamford, Connecticut's 6 to Baltimore's 2,850), which represented slightly more than 8 percent of the communities' assisted housing inventory (the range was from less than 1 percent to 30 percent). The number of acquired sites varied from Lackawanna County's 2 sites to the city of Baltimore's 2,754 sites in its single-family acquisition program. The average number of sites per authority was 143 and the typical density (average number of units per site) was 6.18.

Slightly more PHAs used an acquisition method (54 percent) than new construction (46 percent) in the development of their scattered-site programs. The data also show that 26 authorities used both methods, 17 employed new construction only, and 22 acquired existing units. Twenty-nine percent of the PHAs with acquisition programs bought properties in need of extensive rehabilitation; the remainder were programs with moderate (27.7 percent) or minor rehabilitation requirements (37.4 percent).

Program Impact

Forty-one percent of the executive directors believed the administrative problems associated with scattered-site properties were no different than management issues for other housing programs. On the other hand, 32 percent judged the program “more” difficult to administer and 4.5 percent “much more” difficult, while 27 percent said they were “much less” difficult to manage and 7.6 percent “less” difficult.

Belzer’s findings indicate that the program is more costly, but units are not necessarily more difficult to maintain than other dwellings. Maintenance was more costly for 52 percent of PHA directors, the same for 27 percent, and less costly for only 21 percent. No clear pattern emerged when directors were asked to evaluate the ease or difficulty of maintaining the scattered-site units. Forty-two percent said the units were less difficult to maintain, 38 percent more difficult, and 19 percent reported no difference between scattered sites and other developments. Further research is needed to determine whether authorities had maintenance problems because of unit age, density, neighborhood location, staff, inadequate budget, or poor housekeeping habits of the residents.

When asked about their community’s overall impressions of the scattered-site program, approximately 9 of 10 PHA directors had “very” favorable (41 percent) or favorable (51 percent) impressions. Self-evaluations of the program were equally laudatory, with ratings of either “very” successful (54 percent) or successful (44 percent).

Finally, Belzer asked directors to estimate the effects of scattered-site housing in new locations, including “What is the impact on the residents that move into the scattered-site units?” and “Do the residents prefer the scattered-site units over project based housing?” The data revealed significant perceived impacts on the residents, with 97 percent of the directors reporting “very” positive or positive impacts. PHA directors believed that 97 percent of the resident families preferred scattered-site units to project-based houses. Only two directors reported either resident indifference or a preference for project housing.

The Hogan/Lengyel and Belzer surveys document the growing popularity of a small but potentially important addition to the HUD inventory of assisted housing. The low-density feature of the scattered-site concept is reflected in Belzer’s data. When Belzer asked authority directors about their communities’ overall impressions of the scattered-site program, approximately 9 of 10 reported favorable impressions. His findings are remarkably similar to Hogan/Lengyel’s data on community perceptions of program success, authority corroboration of community perceptions, and the overwhelming support of directors to do more scattered-site housing in the future.

There are two significant differences between the 1982 and 1994 inventories of scattered-site programs: (1) the larger average number of units per jurisdiction reported by Belzer (268:98) and (2) the tenfold difference in the number of sites reported by Belzer. The differences between the two surveys resulted from:

- Belzer’s focus on larger authorities and his inclusion of programs that exceeded the Hogan/Lengyel definition of scattered-site housing (less than 15 units per site). Belzer included Monroe, Louisiana; Charlotte and Greensboro, North Carolina; and Fairfax County, Virginia, for example, each with program averages above 21 units per site.

- A few large programs—Denver, San Bernardino, Los Angeles, Baltimore, Oklahoma City, and Milwaukee—responded only to Belzer’s solicitation.
- The larger number of sites reported by Belzer arguably resulted from a preference for acquisition (56 percent) over new construction and the size of some acquisition programs (the 2,850 scattered-site units in Baltimore are all acquisitions, for example).

Case-Study Cities

Comparative research and case-study analysis are well-established complements to descriptive surveys. As a supplement to the data provided by our 1982 national census of scattered-site programs in medium and large housing authorities, we selected 13 jurisdictions for site visits. Although the cities were not a random sample of scattered-site developments, they were diverse in terms of size of authority, region, date of origin, and program size. Five of the communities receive more extensive discussion because the city pioneered the concept (Cedartown), residents of the developments were surveyed and compared (Seattle, Tucson), or the program’s history reflected protracted difficulties when implemented (Chicago, Yonkers).

In preparation for site visits beginning in the summer of 1983, we asked each jurisdiction for copies of its Housing Assistance Plan (HAP), Annual Report, and archival data on program origins. Logistical, time, and cost factors prevented the completion of all site visits that year. We were convinced that additional information about the experiences of these 13 authorities would strengthen our analysis of the scattered-site program, however. In April 1984 authority directors were asked to (1) complete a follow-up survey; (2) remit representative photographs of scattered-site units; (3) photocopy newspaper articles on the origins, problems, and/or successes of the scattered-site program; (4) send their current HAP; and (5) supply a map of the city/region indicating the location of the scattered-site units.

Site visits began again in 1987 and continued through 1992, and in addition to a windshield inspection of a sample of scattered-site units, the following information was solicited: (1) characteristics of new developments since the previous contact; (2) description of neighborhoods where scattered-site units are located; (3) accounts of conflicts over sight selection; (4) procedures for screening tenants; (5) whether the program was consciously used as a way to racially balance the schools; and (6) whether sites are proximate to amenities and public services.

Characteristics

Table 3–2 lists the case-study jurisdictions and displays information on 10 features, several of which were reviewed earlier for the national inventory of 88 PHAs with scattered-site programs. The 13 authorities are well distributed geographically. They represent both small PHAs like Lancaster and large authorities such as Chicago and Philadelphia, the second and fourth largest PHAs in the United States. The 13 programs were typical of other jurisdictions in their reasons for undertaking scattered-site housing. Most pre-1972 PHAs sought either an alternative to large public housing projects or they wanted “to promote choice in neighborhoods for low-income families.” East St. Louis, on the other hand, began its

Table 3-2. Characteristics of Case-Study Housing Authorities With Scattered-Site Programs, 1983

	1 Region	2 Size of Authority	Year Program Began	No. of Units Occupied	No. of Sites	Average No. of Units Per Site	3 Construction	4 Program Size	Percent Non-white	Percent Employed
Lancaster	E	664	1972	96	96	1	R	14	90	75
Tucson	W	922	1972	345	76	4.5	NC	29	88	28
Charleston	S	1,085	1979	113	14	8	NC	4	100	81
Alexandria	S	1,254	1980	50	4	12	NC	4	94	86
Yonkers	E	2,565	1992	200	7	28	NC	6	—	—
Rochester	E	2,639	1976	268	—	1.5	R/A	12	97	50
E. St. Louis	NC	3,268	1965	156	65	2.4	NC/A	33	50	50
St. Paul	NC	6,181	1964	408	384	1.4	NC/R/A	10	49	68
El Paso	S	7,000	1987	260	260	1	A	4	—	—
San Diego	W	7,719	1979	346	95	3.6	NC/A	52	70	30
Seattle	W	7,739	1978	649	250	2.6	NC/R/A	15	55	36
Philadelphia	E	23,913	1966	7,081	—	3	A	33	90	5
Chicago	NC	44,605	1969	522	34	15	R/A	1	89	39

1 Region codes are: NC = North-Central, E = East, S = South, and W = West.

2 Information on size of Authority comes from the *NAHRO 1976 Directory*.

Only jurisdictions with 500 units of subsidized housing under LHA control were selected for study.

3 NC = New Construction, R = Rehab, and A = Acquisition.

4 Program size represents what percentage of scattered-site housing is of the Authority's total subsidized housing.

program in 1965 because of the availability of single-family properties, and Philadelphia's developments emerged in the early 1960s to demonstrate feasibility of the "purchase, rehabilitation, and rental of former private housing to low-income families." (Schermer Associates, op. cit., p. 148)

Post-1972 jurisdictions were more varied in motivation. HUD encouragement through requests to acquire foreclosed properties, additional funding, or new programs like Turnkey II were frequently mentioned as stimuli for scattered-site developments. Some reasons were idiosyncratic. For example, Alexandria chose scattered-site construction as replacement housing for units demolished by Metro, Chicago's program resulted from a Federal court order, and Rochester's program was partly a response to riot disturbances in 1964.

More than half of the PHAs manage 200 or more scattered-site properties. However, the scattered-site programs were small in comparison to most of the authorities' total public housing stock. Philadelphia, San Diego, and Tucson were exceptions; more than one-third of their conventional program inventory were scattered-site developments.

The average number of scattered-site units per site fell well below our threshold definition of 15 units per site. Half of the jurisdictions averaged three or fewer units; only Charleston, Alexandria, and Yonkers exceeded an average of seven units per site. The preference for low-density development partly

reflected the availability of HUD funding for acquisition and rehabilitation strategies, but it also documented the movement among housing professionals away from institutional, standardized public housing projects.⁹

Case-study projects do not reflect the racial composition of the larger sample of communities reviewed earlier. More than 70 percent of the residents of 11 of the PHAs were nonwhite. There were also income source differences between the two groups. Fifty percent of the families' main income came from employment, and only 39 percent depended primarily on AFDC. This finding suggests that case-study PHAs "cream" when they rent scattered-site units. However, when we inquired whether scattered-site residents were similar to clients who lived in other subsidized properties, 11 of 12 directors said they were no different. Only three directors used special requirements for scattered-site tenants aside from HUD selection procedures.¹⁰

Whether authorities have priorities for admission to scattered-site units was addressed in the followup survey. We asked if preoccupancy counseling occurred, and if so what it covered. All but one authority did preoccupancy counseling, and meetings with prospective families included discussions of (1) routine yard and premise maintenance (84 percent); (2) "good neighbor behavior" (92 percent); (3) community and social service locations/referrals (61 percent); and (4) minor dwelling repair (46 percent).

PHAs routinely screen and counsel prospective clients for scattered-site housing. The procedures are considered necessary in order to make appropriate placements. The scattered-site strategy frequently relocates families to dramatically upgraded environments that are economically and racially different from their former neighborhoods. However, the authority is less able, because of the dispersion of scattered-site units, to provide onsite services. Table 3-3 indicates the small number of authorities that directly or indirectly provide services to scattered-site households.

Only referral and counseling services are directly provided by approximately half the PHAs we visited. There is some effort to assist families in their requests for social services, but even this limited form of help is not routinized. If living in scattered-site housing is truly an experience that leads toward self-sufficiency, then families may be able to negotiate the social service marketplace on their own.

Table 3-3. Housing Authority Social Service Provision *

Social Service	Direct Provision [Percent]	Indirect Provision [Percent]
Referral	53	30
Counseling	46	46
Medical/dental clinic	7	23
Day care	—	38
Recreation	15	23
Employment assistance	15	23
Visiting nurse/social work service	7	23

*The question read, "What services, if any, does your Authority provide to scattered-site residents? Distinguish between direct and indirect provision."

Program Operations and Effects

Several of the PHAs reported problems managing the scattered-site units. Four common problems have been: (1) an insufficient number of staff to administer the program (62 percent); (2) maintenance problems with the units (46 percent); (3) management/maintenance response time (38 percent); and (4) access to and delivery of social services (30 percent).

Managers of scattered-site properties consider them more costly to administer than dense, concentrated public housing projects.¹¹ The extra costs are usually attributed to the wide dispersion of the units and the inability of the authority to achieve economies of scale credited to concentrated low-rise projects, or mid- and high-rise tower complexes.¹² Several authorities have implemented cost-control strategies, including requesting residents to pay the utilities (69 percent), having tenants perform routine maintenance tasks (38 percent), and establishing satellite maintenance facilities (15 percent).¹³

Five of the authorities thought the program's organization structure or location would make a difference in the operation and effectiveness of scattered-site developments. Seattle officials consider geographically based management better than a program structure, and they contemplate organizational restructuring. Rochester manages its units out of the office in closest proximity "in an effort to increase the efficiency of service delivery and minimize costs, such as travel to and from the units." (Scattered-Site Questionnaire)

Officials in Lancaster think structure matters. When placed in a separate unit or division, "a project is generally thought to be better managed." (Ibid.) The combination of size, dispersion, and age of buildings makes organizational issues extremely important to the viability of the Philadelphia program. Residents depend solely on maintenance by the PHA for even small repairs. Moreover, flexible strategies are necessary to meet the "very different requirements due to geography and residents' demands." (Ibid.) Tucson also argues the importance of structure to program success. Housing officials found that "central management creates less presence in the field," resulting in unnoticed problems, or responses only after a complaint is filed. Tucson has subsequently adopted a geographic zone arrangement to manage the scattered-site properties.

Eleven of 12 housing directors (1 did not answer) believed their programs had been successful; all of them agreed that scattered-site housing was a step toward independent living on the part of residents. When asked to gauge the community's impressions of the scattered-site housing, authorities reported 67 percent favorable or 25-percent very favorable, respectively.

Housing officials attributed the success of the scattered-site program to various factors. Major reasons included tenant screening, the small scale of the projects, good design, and attractive buildings that "promote individual pride and care of property." Other factors were more idiosyncratic. For instance, one authority attributed success to projects not requiring development permits; another believed success was "due to the fact that we d[id] not have to obtain prior city council or neighborhood . . . approval on specific addresses prior to approval." Two jurisdictions credited "residents [who] have maintained the units and [have] become a part of the total neighborhood," as well as "good followup management" by housing staff.¹⁴

In several measurable ways, the scattered-site program was preferred to concentrated project housing. The benefits of scattered-site housing are clearly shown when the two programs are examined on s


evaluative criteria. Table 3-4 displays the replies by executive directors to the following question: "Concerning the factors below, do scattered sites experience the following more than, equal to, or less than project housing?"

Table 3-4. Comparison of Scattered-Site Housing to Project Housing

Criteria	More Than [Percent]	Equal To [Percent]	Less Than [Percent]
Rent delinquency	34	16	50
Vandalism	15	—	85
Resident complaints	8	23	69
Neighborhood complaints about residents	25	25	50
Neighborhood complaints about sites	41	18	41

On four of the five measures, scattered-site housing is evaluated more positively than project housing. Vandalism to property and resident complaints about the units are particularly low when compared with project housing. The neighbors, however, are critical of subsidized housing, whether widely dispersed or concentrated. Rent delinquency was a problem managers faced with both scattered-site and project families. Nevertheless, the authorities experienced less delinquency from scattered-site families. The problem may be associated with tenant distance from the central housing office.

Table 3-5. Total City Census Tracts and Number of Tracts With Scattered-Site Housing, 1990



Locational Characteristics

Three prominent goals of scattered-site housing are to disperse the units widely, avoid areas of undue minority concentration, and select sites in stable working- and middle-class residential environments. Census data were collected for nine of the case-study authorities who provided information on the distribution of scattered-site properties.

Five of the nine authorities have made good-faith efforts to distribute the units widely, placing them in nearly 50 percent of each city's census tracts. However, as columns four and five reveal, most of the

Table 3-6. Clustering Effects of Scattered-Site Housing

City	No. Units	No. CT [Total]	No. CT With Percent of Scattered-Site Housing		No. CT Containing 50 Percent of the Total Units		No. CT Containing 75 Percent of the Total Units	
			No. CT	Percent	No. CT	Percent	No. CT	Percent
Seattle	617	121	72	59.50	14	19.44	28	38.89
San Diego	338	117	32	27.35	8	25.00	15	46.88
Lancaster	92	24	14	58.33	3	21.43	6	42.86
Rochester	312	82	54	65.85	11	20.37	22	40.74
St. Paul	288	82	65	79.27	13	20.00	27	41.54
Alexandria	50	33	4	12.12	2	50.00	3	75.00
Tucson	431	84	38	45.24	5	13.16	12	31.58
Yonkers	200	51	7	13.73	4	57.14	5	71.42
Charleston	152	40	8	20.00	2	25.00	4	50.00

units are clustered in a handful of tracts. (See table 3-6.) Approximately 50 percent of the units in Lancaster, Rochester, St. Paul, San Diego, Seattle, and Tucson are in 20 percent of the census tracts. The skew is even more pronounced for Lancaster, San Diego, and Tucson: 47 percent, 40 percent, and 27 percent, respectively, of each city's units are clustered in only three census tracts.

There is significant variation among case-study communities in how well they have avoided areas of minority concentration and poverty. Table 3-7 displays 1990 census characteristics for four demographic features of nine housing authorities. Rochester, San Diego, and Tucson placed a disproportionate number of scattered-site units in tracts below the citywide average for family income and the poverty rate. Yonkers and Alexandria have done exceedingly well in building units in stable neighborhoods occupied by well-educated, employed households. Both communities have small programs, and the Yonkers' outcome was shaped by the controversial Judge Sand court order. St. Paul's and Seattle's programs are well balanced given the three aforementioned goals of scattered-site housing.

The clustering and overconcentration of scattered-site units are prominent features of Chicago's and Philadelphia's programs. The problems that have made dispersed scattered-site units difficult in Chicago ("cost considerations, Federal regulations, and the realities of Chicago's real estate market") are factors, on a smaller scale, that account for excessive saturation in other community programs. (*Chicago Tribune*, January 23, 1994) Even though Habitat's construction activities have never "come close to the court-ordered ceiling of 15 [percent] of the homes and apartments in any given census tract," neighborhood fears of "influx" are real. Homeowners and unsubsidized residents are concerned about the reconcentration of projects in their neighborhoods: "Creating horizontal projects to replace the vertical ones in an overload-pattern grossly contrary to the letter and spirit of the consent decree." (*Chicago Sun-Times*, March 25, 1994) On the other side of the ledger are the gains made by former project families. Polikoff writes:

[T]he basic promise of scattered-site housing has been fully realized, since [residents] have moved into new housing not located in the shadows of deeply troubled CHA high rises. This is

Table 3-7. Demographic Characteristics of Scattered-Site Census Tracts, 1990

City	Percent of Units in Tracts With Higher Median Family Income	Percent of Units in Tracts With Lower Poverty Rate	Percent of Units in Tracts With Lower Minority Rate	Percent of Units in Tracts With Higher Minority Rate
Seattle	31	55	47	47
Alexandria	50	80	50	80
San Diego	12	2	38	35
Lancaster	18	33	33	21
Tucson	10	17	43	43
St. Paul	44	55	63	42
Rochester	18	18	12	22
Charleston	0	0	0	25
Yonkers	100	100	100	86

Note: Percents are based on units in tracts above or below citywide means on the variables.

no small matter for struggling families, be they Latino, Asian American, African American, or whatever. Amassing public housing in high-rise clusters was a colossal mistake. Part of the solution is to provide scattered, low-rise housing open to low-income families in communities across the city. (*Chicago Tribune*, February 17, 1994)

Undertaking 13 site visits provided an opportunity to update and extend the descriptive data contained in the 1982 scattered-site housing questionnaire and the followup survey completed by case-study authorities. There is a pattern to the case discussions that follow. The separate cases include four common elements: (1) background material on the city, housing authority, and assisted housing programs; (2) description of the origins and characteristics of the scattered-site program; (3) program results; and (4) 1994-95 updates subsequent to the site visit. The nine case histories are followed by lengthier discussions of the Chicago, Seattle, Tucson, and Yonkers programs in chapters 4-6.

Charleston, South Carolina

Background. Charleston was one of the earliest Southern cities to respond to the "harsh living conditions of the poor." In 1933 the city established a Housing Commission and, in 1935, with State encouragement, the local housing authority was established. (*The Housing Authority of the City of Charleston*, 1985) Most of the city's housing projects were built in the late 1930s. Additional units followed the passage of the 1949 Housing Act. In 1952 and 1953, the Charleston Housing Authority (CHA) added another 1,200 units, and by the mid-1950s Charleston "was one of the 100 largest housing authorities in the United States." (Ibid.)

Charleston's scattered-site program, begun in 1978 "when the city was awarded new construction funds from HUD for the first time in a decade," (Crosbie, 1990, p. 179) represents an infill strategy in which the Authority purchased vacant lots within existing neighborhoods. Under the plan assisted

housing became part of the city's revitalization efforts. The infill strategy grew out of the city's 1978 Land Use and Housing Plan at a time when the CHA managed 10 projects, one-third concentrated in a single northeast-side neighborhood. (*Land Use and Housing Plan*, city of Charleston, 1978, p. 120)¹⁵ The infill idea was an attractive development strategy because it did not require rezoning or demolition, there was little potential for private development, and the sites complemented "neighborhood growth without competing with private efforts." (Cameron, D., Executive Director, letter to the author, June 1, 1984)

Program Description. The scattered-site program represents a remarkable effort to design assisted family housing compatible with "the irreplaceable architectural and cultural flavor of the past despite modern improvements." (*Land Use and Housing Plan* (LUHP), op. cit., p. 31) The program is based on the Charleston Single House concept:

One room wide to catch cool summer breezes, two rooms deep to use less taxable street frontage, the Single House has served every level of Charleston society—from the stately mansions on handsome Meeting Street to the poorest rowhouses on President or Sire Streets. All have the Single House floor plan, and have piazzas and separate street doors; yet each one is very different. Each has its own charm. Together they weave the tapestry of Charleston. (*The Housing Authority of the City of Charleston*, op. cit.)

In 1989 the CHA managed 113 units of scattered-site housing, representing 4 percent of the CHA's public housing inventory. The 14 buildings, which ranged from 2 to 22 per site, were conventionally built new structures funded by HUD's low-rent public housing account.¹⁶ The units were constructed on 14 sites in 6 different neighborhoods, with design features suggested by 2 competing architects. The residents were all African-American families, 81 percent were employed, and 61 percent lived in one- or two-bedroom apartments. There were no separate screening rules for prospective scattered-site residents. Tenants were selected routinely from the Housing Authority's waiting list after income verification, past history checks, and a briefing with management.¹⁷

Program Results. The program was considered "very successful" by David Cameron, director of the CHA, and Mayor Charles Riley. The CHA, moreover, would consider building more units if HUD's "terrible time delays, lengthy review, and waiver process for design alterations" were changed.¹⁸ Charleston's innovative infill housing has won numerous awards, including HUD recognition, a meritorious design award from the National Endowment for the Arts, a 1984 Presidential award for design excellence, and acknowledgment as one of the best architectural plans of the 1980s by the American Institute of Architects. (Crosbie, op. cit., p. 181)



Figure 5. Public housing development: Charleston, South Carolina.

Charleston's program was shaped by the Authority's adoption of seven development guidelines: (1) no demolition of existing housing; (2) land zoned for multifamily or business use; (3) no private development interest in the land; (4) no more than 25 units per acre; (5) a lid of 21 units per site; (6) cluster design for larger unit development; and (7) housing design and density compatibility with the neighborhood.

A number of other factors have contributed to the success of the program, including:

- Problem identification. The decision not to rezone sites or compete with private efforts in neighborhood redevelopment narrowed the range of scattered-site options, and possibly defused opposition.
- HUD waiver. The HUD waiver that allowed the CHA to locate units in "minority-impacted neighborhoods" certainly reduced "not in my back yard" objections that might have developed elsewhere in the city.¹⁹
- Citizen participation. Public hearings, although post hoc, brought suggestions from neighborhood organizations concerning site and design features. Earlier citizen participation efforts did not occur until public hearings were held.²⁰
- Community acceptance. The standards set by an Authority that wanted to "break the image and mold of what they did and who they served" resulted in citizens proud of the program, the awards the CHA won, and the excellence of the CHA's services. (Cameron correspondence, op. cit.)
- Neighborhood integration. The CHA created an environment in scattered-site neighborhoods where the social attitudes of the residents are said to be similar to the elderly who live independently. To facilitate the "feeling of belonging to a larger entity," the CHA provided scattered-site families a 1-year free membership in the neighborhood organization. In this way "assimilation into the fabric of the neighborhood" would begin almost immediately. (Brochure, "149 Coming Street")
- Design features. Scattered-site units are compatible with the neighborhood. Porches—a common aspect of Charleston's architectural history—have been incorporated into the single-house configuration of the CHA program. Porches give residents the choice of participation in street life or retreat within the house for a more passive observation of street activity.
- Political support. Finally, the program has consistently received political support from city hall. Four-term Mayor Joseph P. Riley, Jr., has been a strong supporter of the program, and he has been tough enough to suggest that the "poor can live in neighborhoods even if residents want to retain homeownership status." (city of Charleston, *Housing Assistance Plan*)

Prospects for the Future. Prospects for affordable housing for Charleston's poor are not encouraging. (Ibid., p. 2) Although growth in housing has occurred in most areas of the city, it has not happened on the Peninsula, where housing losses more than offset gains. Unfortunately, 87 percent of the losses have been in eastside neighborhoods where Charleston's low-income households reside.

Housing assistance and new construction are targeted for the east and west sides “to further the revitalization of these neighborhoods by encouraging infill housing on predominantly vacant lots.” (LUAP, op. cit., p. 8) However, the net impact of this effort is diminished by land and housing costs that put most of these units out of the reach of low-income families.

The city and the CHA have done little to promote assisted housing in growth areas (West Ashley, James and Johns Islands accounted for all of Charleston’s population increase between 1987 and 1988).²¹ The rationale for these limited deconcentration efforts has been the unavailability of public services in West Ashley and Island locations, and the contention that families who need assisted housing need to “live on the Peninsula, close to jobs, and public services.” (Cameron, D., Executive Director, personal interview, October 25, 1989)

Update. Charleston has not added to its scattered-site inventory since the original 113 units were constructed in the early 1980s. This is about to change, however, as the CHA is planning an additional 36 to 46 units in 1995 and will submit a proposal to HUD by December 1994. The conventional new construction project will be replacement housing located outside Charleston, in growth areas that have not been sites for assisted family housing.

The site plans and design features are not complete, but construction will be guided by the seven development criteria noted earlier. Because the units will not be in the city’s historic district, they will not incorporate the Charleston “single-house” plan. The construction will likely reflect a “garden-style” pattern, with an orientation to the street, but with lower densities than for Peninsula units. (Cameron, D., telephone interview, November 23, 1994)

St. Paul, Minnesota

Background. The Housing and Redevelopment Authority of the City of St. Paul, Minnesota, was established in 1947. In 1988 it managed 4,220 conventional units that provided assisted housing to 2,901 elderly households and 7,134 family members. Two-thirds of these units accommodated fixed-income elderly individuals and couples in 16 high rises located throughout the city. (Salisbury, J., Assistant to the Resident Services Director, letter to author, April 15, 1988)

There have been three significant periods of public housing development in St. Paul: the 1950s, when 3 scattered projects with 1,245 units were constructed on 142 acres; the 1960s, which added another 1,183 units, 88 percent of those for elderly households; and the 1970s, when another 1,343 elderly units were constructed on 8 sites and 60 family homes were purchased for the Authority’s scattered-site program.

Public housing has been in high demand in St. Paul, with an overall vacancy rate in 1988 of 1.6 percent.²² The tightening of the market occurred in the mid-1980s. In June 1988, 1,316 households were on the Authority’s waiting list, and families typically had to wait from 5 to 10 years to acquire an apartment.

Program Description. At the time of the site visit, the Authority was managing 281 units of scattered-site housing, which represented 10 percent of St. Paul’s assisted housing stock. The program began in 1964 to provide alternatives to large, concentrated developments and to promote choice in neighborhoods for low-income families. In June 1988 the Authority had undertaken a modest expansion of the

program, breaking ground for 26 units of new construction on 18 sites and acquiring 45 single-family houses without rehabilitation.²³

Although the St. Paul PHA claimed that scattered-site residents were similar to those who lived in other authority units and that “special” requirements were not used to select tenants, the demographic data on households suggest some important differences. Fifty-one percent of the families who lived in scattered-site units were white,²⁴ and 68 percent of the families derived their income from employment. Asian immigrant families, on the other hand, made up 72 percent of the nonelderly conventional units in 1983, and only 14 percent lived in scattered-site apartments or homes.²⁵ The fact that more than two-thirds of the scattered-site households included an employed member suggests that the Authority screens residents and uses employment status as an indicator of suitability for scattered-site openings.²⁶

Program Results. Housing Authority officials claim that the overall public impression of the program is “favorable,” and term the program itself “very successful.” They attribute success largely to the fact that “prior city council or neighborhood group approval on specific addresses prior to acquisition” has not been mandated. (Scattered-Site Questionnaire) The Authority, moreover, is interested in developing additional scattered-site units for families in the future.

The program has encountered occasional neighborhood opposition. A recent example was the May 1988 protest of 50 Highland residents over the purchase of a single-family home. Neighbors voiced the familiar complaint that the PHA-purchased home would depress property values. A neighborhood newspaper reported: “The purchase will add one more rental unit to a block that already has two . . . and rental units just aren’t maintained as well as owner-occupied homes . . . especially rental units owned by the government.”

The PHA has been sensitive to citizens who want the city to “maintain its middle-class and upper middle-class property tax base.” (Gutzman, J., Executive Director, personal interview, June 6, 1988) This sensitivity is reflected in the development and acquisition process, which requires the Authority to obtain both city council approval for the number of units and the planning department’s prior approval on specific locations.²⁷ The PHA also imposes an eight-point “noneconomic” screening policy. The criteria are used to determine whether applicants “would have a detrimental effect on other tenants or on the project environment, can live independently, [can] manage a household and comply with the lease, and can pass eligibility screens.”²⁸

The Authority has tried in several ways to protect its housing investments and to mollify the fears of St. Paul homeowners over the consequences that low-income assisted units might have for their own property and neighborhoods. Authority policies include:

- Tenant responsibility for the “day-to-day maintenance of the home and grounds.” (Salisbury letter, *op. cit.*)
- Decentralization of program management and oversight. Professionally certified managers are assigned supervision of scattered-site units in four geographically bounded areas where “at least once yearly [they] conduct thorough interior and exterior inspections.” (Ibid.)
- The purchase of existing single-family homes. The scattered-site units are primarily single-family detached dwellings “located inconspicuously in neighborhoods throughout the city,” and “so typical

of the age and style of construction in a given neighborhood as to be unremarkable when compared to other homes in that same neighborhood.” (Rettig, R., PHA Management Supervisor, correspondence with author, April 20, 1984)

- Forceful screening of tenants and counseling of “problem tenants,” which generally has resulted in good neighbors living in trouble-free neighborhoods.

Update. The 71 scattered-site units available in 1988 were fully occupied, and the Authority has continued to add to its scattered-site inventory incrementally. Another 50 single-family two-, three-, and four-bedroom homes were acquired and occupied by June 1990 to serve large families. Sixteen more homes were purchased in 1991 and occupied in January 1992. A final acquisition project was completed in May 1993, consisting of 27 three-, four-, five- and six-bedroom units. A number of the homes were HUD foreclosure properties, and none of the units required rehabilitation.

The St. Paul PHA currently manages 445 units of scattered-site family housing. The single-family homes are widely distributed in neighborhoods throughout the city. Compared with the pre-1988 units, the current inventory of 164 homes is more “widely scattered” due to HUD’s lifting of the Total Development Cap and the opening up of more neighborhoods for property acquisition. (Hester, F. A., Special Project Supervisor, telephone interview, December 2, 1994)

The St. Paul PHA’s current acquisition program—a city council-approved development named “Homeward”—is different in three ways from prior projects. First, the 37 single-family homes will be rented initially to income-eligible families, but then made available for purchase; second, the units all require major rehabilitation, and the costs will be borne by local money; and third, although the homes will be on dispersed lots, “several of the properties will be in low-income areas where the Authority has not placed units before.” Approximately 50 percent of the units will be HUD foreclosures, and currently only one of the homes is occupied. (Hester, op. cit.)

Rochester, New York

Background. The Rochester Housing Authority (RHA) has operated as an independent agency under the Public Housing Law of the State of New York since 1955. Originally created to manage the 392 units comprising Hanover Houses, a State-aided family project, the Authority only became involved in federally assisted programs in the late 1960s. In less than 30 years, however, the RHA had “increased in size of units owned by approximately 550 percent. . . .” (*State of Authority Message*, 1982)

The Authority operates in a 5-county area, and, at the time of the site visit— March 1989—it was responsible for 3,000 units of assisted housing in the Rochester metropolitan area. The phenomenal growth in public housing assistance was triggered by 2 days of violence in the city of Rochester after “a riot broke out . . . when police tried to arrest an intoxicated Negro youth at a street dance.” (*Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, 1968, p. 36)

The city was badly shaken by the 1964 disturbance, and in its aftermath the Authority aggressively pursued Federal support for additional decent, affordable housing for low-income families. Over the next several years, the RHA built several mid-size family projects (100–130 units per estate), a number of townhouse developments (35–75 units), and several smaller apartments and courtlike facilities (14–45 units). The Authority also constructed or acquired 1,321 units for the elderly.

Program Description. The scattered-site program began in the late 1960s, when the Authority responded to a HUD request to acquire some of its foreclosed properties. The first 66 units were completed in 1970. Another 246 units were acquired and rehabilitated between 1974 and 1985. All of the units underwent major rehabilitation through either the initial development programs or the modernization programs.

Rochester's 312 scattered-site units represent 14.7 percent of the Authority's total assisted housing and approximately 28 percent of family housing. Most of the units are single-family homes or duplexes. The RHA also owns 9 small projects (4- to 8-unit apartments) that are not counted as part of the scattered-site inventory, although they fit our definition of scattered-site housing (1-15 units per site).

Ninety-five percent of the residents are African American, 50 percent are employed, and 83 percent live in units with three or more bedrooms.²⁹ It is apparent that the Authority has tried to address the shelter needs of large families whose heads of household work. There was little turnover in the units, and at the time of our visit the average length of occupancy was 6 years.

There are no significant differences in the treatment of scattered-site tenants compared with families living in other authority projects. All families sign a common lease and unit assignment and transfer policy are standard. When applying to any of the family units, prospective tenants receive the same orientation to Authority policy. Management expectations are discussed, including tenant responsibility for minor repairs, adherence to RHA rules, and timely payment of rent. Scattered-site residents, however, "are responsible for snow removal, grass mowing, and general upkeep of the property. Maintenance services [repairs] are delivered by the Authority." (Schmidt, P., Housing Manager Coordinator, letter to author, June, 27, 1983)

Program Results. Authority officials appraise the public's impression of the program as "very favorable." Their own judgment is that the program has been "very successful." The success of the program has been a product of "major rehabilitation work done on the units, good screening of tenants, and good followup management." (Scattered-Site Questionnaire) However, whether the RHA would employ the scattered-site strategy in the future would depend on the number of units available and on the choice of new or acquired housing. (Scattered-Site Questionnaire)³⁰

The RHA has embraced change in its efforts to provide quality housing to income-assisted households. It competed with more than 60 housing authorities and was selected as 1 of 6 to participate in a national demonstration program to test whether tenant-based management could improve and upgrade "the day-to-day operations of public housing and provide opportunities for employment of residents." (*Homes for People*, Rochester Housing Authority, n.d., p. 6) In June 1977 the RHA entered into an agreement with the Ashanti Tenant Management Corporation to manage 5 sites consisting of 211 units. Tenant involvement was encouraged, and in 1982, 22 tenant associations were funded minimally by the Authority. (Ibid., p. 14)

The Authority has pursued an aggressive maintenance program. Maintenance services, including repairs, are carried out by RHA staff in conjunction with the operations of the project sites. In partial answer to logistical and cost problems, the Authority merged the management and central maintenance/special services divisions into a new Housing Operations Department. Furthermore, the city was divided into four Management Areas in June 1982. Roughly equal numbers of RHA properties were assigned

to each of the four zones to minimize travel time and distance between sites. The scattered sites were assigned only to two of the areas according to geographic proximity to the area office. Even though the reorganization brought about greater efficiencies, the program, on balance, has been more difficult to administer and manage than project sites:

The primary reason is the geographic dispersion of the units, which causes additional consumption of time and money. The greatest impact is in the delivery of maintenance services. Furthermore, there is generally a lack of standardization in many of the unit components, which often results in the maintenance crews having to "chase down" parts. (Schmidt letter, op. cit.)

On the positive side, the scattered-site housing does blend in with the surrounding neighborhoods, and "consequently avoids the stigma often associated with public housing." This partly results from the fact that the program relied upon acquisition of existing stock, and the RHA maintained the "units . . . in as good, if not better, condition than many surrounding units." (Schmidt letter, op. cit.)³¹ Management also reports very low turnover among residents and almost nonexistent rent arrears. (Hanrady, M., Deputy Director, telephone interview, October 1989)

Update. Since mid-1991 the RHA has added to its scattered-site inventory. The first phase involved the acquisition and rehabilitation of 45 units of HUD-foreclosed properties. Twenty-five of the units are occupied, and the remainder will be rented by summer 1995. The properties are singles and doubles located throughout the city of Rochester. Although the 357 units of scattered-site housing are significantly less concentrated than project units, they nonetheless are clustered in the northeast and southeast quadrants of the city.

In spring 1994 the Authority began two more projects. Twenty-five HUD-foreclosed properties were to be acquired and rehabilitated over the next several months (1 was occupied by fall 1994), and 25 units of new construction were to be developed within the next 2 years, bringing the Authority's total inventory to 407 by 1996. The new construction project will follow an infill strategy, with vacant land parcels acquired where assisted units can best be developed using the scattered-site approach. The mostly single and duplex structures will be completed either by the RHA or by a developer under turnkey arrangements. (Schmidt, telephone interview, November 22, 1994)

East St. Louis, Illinois

Background. East St. Louis has been described as an "urban wasteland" (*Wall Street Journal*, June 22, 1988) and "a city bereft of hope, unable to persuade either the Federal or State government to lend a helping hand." (Moore, 1989, p. 84) A General Accounting Office fact sheet³² prepared for Senator Paul Simon in 1985 identified the following demographic changes between 1960 and 1980, when the city became "quite possibly the worst-off urban center in America." (*Time*, June 12, 1989, p. 10)

- Population decline: The city's population was 82,000 in 1950, but only slightly more than 50,000 in 1980. White flight accelerated in the 1970s, with a 21-percent population loss during the decade.

- **Racial change:** The city experienced a dramatic shift in racial composition. While 55 percent of the population was white in 1960, that figure had declined to 5 percent in 1980.
- **Family income:** Annual family income fell from \$15,927 in 1959 to \$12,117 in 1979. Nationally, family income increased from \$18,486 to \$27,183 during that period.
- **Poverty:** Thirty-nine percent of the families had incomes below the poverty line in 1979 compared with a national average of 10.3 percent.
- **Unemployment level:** Unemployment increased from 10.5 percent in 1960 to 21 percent in 1980. Nationally, the unemployment level moved from 5.5 percent to 7.1 percent.
- **Housing stock:** Seven thousand housing units were lost (abandoned or demolished) between 1960 and 1980. At the same time, the vacancy rate nearly tripled, rising from 4 percent to 11 percent.

A decade later conditions were even more disturbing, with two-thirds of the city's residents on welfare and one-fourth in public housing, and with household incomes averaging less than \$8,000 a year. (Moore, *op. cit.*) These dramatic changes mirrored the collapse of the local economy and created a financial crisis for the city. John Moore in "Hitting Bottom" writes:

With \$5 million in annual revenues, the Mississippi River town of 57,000 has debts of \$35 million. In April the city . . . had \$884 in its bank account and needed \$230,000 to meet its payroll. In May it laid off 80 of its 300 employees as a money-saving measure. And it must still trim \$144,000 a month from its budget just to keep from going bankrupt. What that debt means is that garbage goes uncollected, police cars have no radios, [and] checks to city employees bounce. Its citizens pay three times the taxes of residents in other towns in the same county. (*Ibid.*)

The difficulties of the East St. Louis Housing Authority (ESLHA), and the failure of the scattered-site program to foster stable residential environments and to bring hope to low-income families, resulted partly from the aforementioned conditions. The deterioration of public housing was also affected by a patronage-based city political system and an incompetent, corruption-ridden Housing Authority.³³

Program Description. ESLHA was established in 1954 as an offshoot of the St. Clair County Housing Authority. At the time of the site visit in the summer of 1989, the Authority had approximately 3,000 rental and homeownership units, one-third of which were constructed during the 1940s and 1950s. The last units developed were 35 predominantly three-bedroom, southend scattered-site units completed in 1981. The Authority has nine high-rise buildings, but only seven—those housing the elderly and handicapped—are occupied. Families generally live in two-story apartments, and the majority of the buildings are clustered together in projects.

ESLHA owned 181 scattered-site units located on 47 sites, with an average of 4 units per site. Only 1 site—a 24-unit site—exceeded our limit of 15 or fewer units per site. This figure represented approximately 6 percent of the Authority's housing stock. Ninety-nine percent of the families were

African American, and 51 percent were AFDC recipients. Although the vacancy rate was high at the time of our visit, the average occupancy exceeded 6 years. This anomaly reflected more the lack of affordable housing alternatives in other parts of the city than the quality of the scattered-site program.

Program Results. It is difficult to discuss comprehensively the East St. Louis scattered-site program. Records have been lost, year-end reports were rarely produced, and personnel with the institutional memory to piece together the historical record have departed. Current staff say, however, that the public's impression of the program has been "unfavorable," and the program is considered a failure. Properties adjacent to the sites are reported to have declined in value "due to severe deterioration of the units" and the "depressed economy of the city." (Scattered-Site Questionnaire)

In 1985 the Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation filed a class-action suit against HUD and the Authority. The complaint charged the ESLHA with mismanagement and "failure to maintain its rental units in a decent, safe, and sanitary condition." (Mary A., amended and supplemental complaint, No. 85-5517, p. 1) HUD was alleged to have "failed and refused to enforce the Federal statutes, regulations, and contracts governing" the agency's funds for "the construction, operation, and modernization of the Housing Authority's units." (Ibid., pp. 2-3)

Three problems were at the heart of the complaint. First, tenants were unable to obtain maintenance for their apartments. Second, financial controls were lax: records and books were not kept, and there were no audits for 1977 through 1983.³⁴ Finally, vacancies increased from 6 percent to 16 percent between 1979 and 1982, and by 1985 the vacancy rate hit 33 percent. (Ibid., p. 22)

Mismanagement was pervasive, and the Authority repeatedly violated requirements of the Annual Contributions Contract (ACC). At HUD's urging, in July 1984 the Board of the Housing Commissioners hired Thacker Associates to manage the properties. (Ibid., p. 34)³⁵ The Board, however, "continued to control day-to-day operations, including making all personnel decisions."³⁶

On October 21, 1985, HUD declared the Authority in substantial default and breach of the ACC,³⁷ and for the next 11 months HUD administered the programs.³⁸ This dramatic intervention, "the first involuntary takeover of a local Housing Authority by HUD," resulted in few improvements in the living conditions for the city's 6,200 public housing tenants. (*Chicago Tribune*, August 23, 1987) Eleven months, however, was not enough time to solve at least 15 years' worth of problems. (O'Sullivan, R., Director of Housing Services, letter to author, March 8, 1990)

Prospects for the Future. Quadel Consulting Corporation of Washington, D.C., has managed the ESLHA since September 15, 1986. Quadel staff worked closely with John Mooring, HUD liaison and Special Assistant to former Secretary Samuel R. Pierce, Jr.³⁹ Mooring acted for the Secretary on all matters that related to the breach of contract, including the oversight of Quadel's management, the coordination of quarterly meetings of the principal parties, and the exercise of authority in lieu of a Board of Commissioners. (Mooring, J., telephone interview, July 21, 1988)

Mooring was not eager for HUD to relinquish oversight. Control, he thought, "should not be returned for a long time in order to force the city to shape up."⁴⁰ Local control required that the city satisfy two conditions. First, it had to demonstrate the capacity to coordinate and effectively deliver Community Development Block Grant funds. If this did not happen, the funds would return to the city only after the program had passed three successive audits. Second, the city had to prove it could run a housing

program. Mooring believed the Authority needed professional management at the top and more capable staff at the operational level. In addition, new rules had to be established with respect to procurement policy and tenant selection, personnel positions had to be clarified, and evaluation had to be upgraded.

Several improvements have been made under Quadel management. In its first year, Quadel rehabilitated 355 public housing units. Modernization funds, moreover, were being used to rehabilitate the remaining “viable units.” In 1988–89, 2 developments with 374 units were updated, and plans were underway to rehabilitate 190 more. In 1989 accounts receivable were at 6 percent, compared with 50 percent when Quadel took over. Finally, proactive strategies had been introduced, including annual inspections, new eviction policies, building captains in elderly and high-rise buildings, new tenant organizations and preventive maintenance programs, and the completion of all emergency and urgent maintenance work orders. (Stafford, S., Acting Director of Operations, personal interview, June 13, 1988)

Quadel hoped to impress upon tenants the importance of an “our development, our home mentality.” The company has provided group orientations and one-on-one counseling where tenant and Authority expectations are explored. Whether public housing ever becomes successful again in East St. Louis, according to Acting Director of Operations Stephanie Stafford, “gets down to human relations: the key to success is open, honest community.” (Ibid.)

Update. Although Quadel is no longer responsible for the management of the program, HUD has not returned power to the Housing Authority. For the past 3 years, the Executive Director has been Stevens Gregory; oversight and authority remain with HUD. The exercise of that authority is held by HUD-Washington representative Sherone Ivy.

The Authority has continued to rehabilitate some properties and to demolish others. Two high rises with 668 units have been demolished, and the Authority has been replacing lost units with new construction one-for-one. Sites have been approved for 2 developments of 168 units: 95 rowhouses on an original high-rise site and 73 single-family and duplex units on a 12-acre site. A third project consists of 66 units with 4 different site configurations: (1) 7 single-family homes, (2) 4 duplex units and 27 rowhouses, (3) 12 rowhouses, and (4) 16 duplex units.

Since 1990 an additional 60 scattered-site units have been demolished. These units were originally in four projects. (See table 3–8 below.)

Table 3–8. Effect of Demolition on East St. Louis Scattered-Site Program

Illinois Project No.	Pre-Demolition		Post-Demolition	
	No. Units	Sites	No. Units	Sites
III-11	76	8	44	5
III-12	24	1	16	1
III-13	46	3	26	2
III-25	35	35	35	35
Total	181	47	121	43

In the past 2 years, most of the units in projects 11, 12, and 13 have been renovated, at a cost of approximately \$2.5 million. During 1994, 90 homeownership units were converted to conventional public housing. Twenty-one of these single-family homes are now part of the Authority's scattered-site inventory. (Lovell, C., Director of Modernization, telephone interview, February 1, 1995)

The Authority would like to expand the scattered-site program, but an acquisition strategy is unlikely because many of the city's single-family homes are deteriorated. Furthermore, new single-family construction on dispersed lots would be expensive and, given the budget picture in Washington, D.C., unrealistic. Future replacement units, then, will be built at higher densities, reflecting the earlier efforts of PHAs to develop sites away from areas of central-city concentration.

Alexandria, Virginia

Background. The Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority (ARHA) was created in 1939 under the Virginia Housing Authorities Law of 1938 to "build and operate decent, safe, and sanitary public housing in the City of Alexandria." (ARHA, *Annual Report: September 1980–December 1981*, p. 1) The Authority is committed by ARHA-City Resolution 830 (signed in June 1982) to maintain a total publicly assisted housing inventory of 1,150 units.

The Authority's first two projects—John Roberts Homes (130 units) and George Parker Homes (111 units)—were completed in 1942. At the same time, the Federal Government relinquished responsibility for three defense-related housing projects.⁴¹ Four more projects for families were constructed between 1954 and 1968, containing 166, 148, 46, and 90 units, respectively. The year 1968 brought an end to the concentration of family housing projects in central-city locations. A downtown site was chosen, however, for the Ladrey Highrise, a 170-unit facility for the elderly, completed in 1978.

Program Description. Alexandria's scattered-site program consisted of replacement housing for 40 apartments demolished at the John Roberts project site to make way for the construction of the Washington, D.C., Metro rapid transit system in 1977. Negotiations with property owners and HUD began in 1975, and the 4 sites and 50 family townhouses were completed between April and August 1981. (*Annual Report, 1980–1981*, p. 4) At the time of the site visit in August 1988, all units were occupied.

The typical configuration for each site was 12 units of attached two-, three-, and four-bedroom townhouses. The 50 apartments represent only 4 percent of the ARHA's public housing inventory. Ninety-four percent of the residents were African American, and 86 percent of the families were headed by a working adult. Although Authority officials claim that prospective scattered-site tenants were not subject to "special requirements," the Authority attributes program success to a "very strict screening process." Scattered-site households




Figure 6. Oasis in Alexandria, Virginia.

The final 41 replacement units were located in areas of the city “with little or no affordable housing” and were designed “to be architecturally interesting and compatible with surrounding neighborhood standards.” (Ibid.) With the completion of the redevelopment of Cameron Valley, the ARHA has approximately 300 units of scattered-site housing located on 16 different sites geographically spread throughout the city and away from the central city.⁴³ (See figure 7 for site locations of scattered sites.)

El Paso, Texas

Background. The Housing Authority of El Paso (EPHA) currently owns approximately 6,400 public housing units, with a ratio of 5 family units for every 1 elderly unit. Among the total are 197 units of scattered-site housing. When El Paso completed our 1982 survey, they urged us to study their program; between 1966 and 1982, 35 of 38 developments were scattered. None of the 38 projects, however, reflected our definition of scattered-site housing (less than 15 units per site). Instead, El Paso’s program represented what several large cities did in the 1960s when they moved away from high-rise projects, building moderate- to high-density scattered projects in economically viable neighborhoods.

The EPHA was established on February 17, 1938, and, although project planning began in 1938 and 1939, the first two projects were not completed until 1941. By 1952 the Authority had constructed 4 family projects with 1,320 units.⁴⁴ Although the need for public housing was intense during the post-war years, the El Paso real estate lobby opposed all construction during the “life and death struggle with communism” and urged that money allocated to the Authority be used “in building up our Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.”⁴⁵

The lull in public housing construction continued into the 1950s and 1960s. The only development activity was a modest extension to the Tays project, the construction of the 324-unit Sherman Place in 1953, and the opening of Sun Place, the Authority’s first high-rise elderly complex in 1966.

The 1970s was the growth decade for El Paso public housing. The Authority proudly reported: “As an infant develops into a child and thence a teenager in twelve brief years . . . the EPHA developed . . . from 1,650 units in [5] complexes in 1970 to 5,727 units in [33] complexes in 1977. . . .”⁴⁶ Of the 4,597 units completed between 1971 and 1979, 14 percent were large elderly units. During the decade, only 3 family projects, with a combined 300 units, were added to EPHA’s family housing inventory. Elderly and family projects were located away from the original four developments, which formed a crescent around the downtown and central business district.

Program Description. The EPHA did not begin its modest scattered-site program until the late 1980s. In 1985 the Authority had hoped to construct 50 to 100 low-density units (10–20 units) on 5 different sites. However, because of strong neighborhood opposition, the Authority dropped the new construction strategy and sought HUD funds for an acquisition program.

The first two scattered-site developments occurred in 1987 and 1989. At the time, HUD was providing funding for acquisition without rehabilitation, and the Authority submitted a request to purchase 62 units. Except for a handful of duplex units, the properties acquired were three- and four-bedroom single-family homes. In 1989 the EPHA purchased a combination of 14 duplex units on 3 sites and 4 single-family homes. The 18 properties were two- and three-bedroom replacement units, also purchased under acquisition without rehabilitation auspices.

The Authority began two new developments in 1993 and 1994. Both programs are acquisition with minor rehabilitation. The first 57 units were purchased in April 1993; by December 1993, 42 were occupied. Fifteen dwellings are pending and require rehabilitation. Another 50 units were acquired in February 1994, and 31 were occupied by May 1994. The three- and four-bedroom homes are located throughout the city. When the rehabilitation is complete and the units are occupied, the scattered-site program will serve approximately 3 percent of EPHA's families.

Program Results. The scattered-site program is considered successful by Authority officials and, if funding were available, EPHA would do more in the future. The need for additional decent, sanitary, and affordable housing is evident. The city's 1988–91 HAP reported that "much of the housing occupied by very low-income households consist[ed] of two-room tenement units with no indoor plumbing or kitchen facilities." (City of El Paso, *Housing Assistance Plan, 1988–1991*, pp. 1–2) The need for affordable, standard housing was "so great" that the city was willing to "approve construction of new housing in all areas of town except for two." (Ibid., p. 9)⁴⁷

Compared with the family projects, scattered-sites have less turnover, fewer complaints, and minimal vandalism. The success of the program may result partly from tenant placement. The Authority does not routinely take families off the waiting list for scattered sites. Rather, residents who already live in the projects who request transfers because of mobility problems (they have difficulty going up and down stairs) or the need for a larger unit are screened for scattered-site occupancy. This procedure allows the selection of residents known to the Authority. They are "families with good records of tenancy," commented an eligibility officer.⁴⁸

Another helpful feature of the program is the decentralized maintenance system instituted by EPHA in 1985. By having three different warehouses at three decentralized locations, the Authority maintains better control over materials and can respond more quickly to maintenance calls from project managers or residents. The Authority plans to move to a 4-quadrant zone system shortly with 4 area managers responsible for overseeing 10–15 complexes, along with scattered-site properties.

The Future. Whether the EPHA expands its scattered-site program depends on HUD funding for demolition of the 352-unit Paisano project. The 43-year old project is unsafe. A soil study determined it was sinking, and there is no cost-effective way to ensure future habitability. In September 1994 the Authority applied for demolition funds.⁴⁹ Currently a consultant is studying one-to-one replacement strategies, including acquisition of single-family homes. There is potential, then, for the scattered-site inventory to triple if the single-family home strategy is recommended and funded.

Lancaster, Pennsylvania

Background. The Lancaster Housing Authority (LHA) was established in 1949. However, the Authority did not develop family housing until the mid-1960s. The 75-unit Susquehannah project was built in 1965, and in 1967 the 124 low-rise Almanac project was completed. Two high-rise, 9-story elderly complexes were constructed in 1968 and 1977, accommodating 97 and 169 occupants, respectively. The LHA currently owns and manages 552 conventional units of public housing. The Authority has also allocated 814 certificates and/or vouchers.⁵⁰

Program Description. At the time of our 1982 national survey, Lancaster had fewer than 600 conventional housing units; however, it did operate a scattered-site program. Because we wanted our

case-study communities to be representative, we selected Lancaster to illustrate how a smaller jurisdiction manages such a program.

In October 1970 the Authority asked HUD for \$6 million to complete a 3-part public housing plan, including a 100-unit elderly high-rise apartment, 101 new units of public housing for families in the city's southwest quadrant, and acquisition of 110 single-family homes. Neighborhood residents in southwest Lancaster protested the family housing project and the Authority backed down. The LHA reconfigured the plan to incorporate 59 family units and a 90-unit high-rise apartment for the elderly.

A disagreement between HUD and the Authority stalled timely approval of the grant application. HUD required the LHA to draft "some new housing proposals to balance the units in the city's southeast area." (*Intell*, June 15, 1971) In mid-June 1971, the Authority announced it had been awarded \$2 million to "buy and refurbish 112 existing homes throughout the city for use as public housing. . . ." (*Ibid.*)

Acquisition of the first 10 rehabilitated homes began in March 1972. When completed, the rental units were equipped with modern kitchens, including refrigerator and stove, low-maintenance floors and wall coverings, and exterior repairs, including sidewalks and curbs. (*Sunday News*, December 19, 1971) The reconditioned homes were to be rented to the poor on the same terms as other public housing projects. The Authority hoped the homes would be sold eventually to the tenants under the Turnkey III Homeownership Program for Low-Income Families (HOPLIF). (*Intell*, June 24, 1971)⁵¹

The Authority intended to purchase equal numbers of homes in each quadrant of the city. In addition to meeting the growing demand for more assisted housing, Executive Director Robert Kochel saw the program accomplishing two other goals: the creation of better living environments for tenants and a better blending into the neighborhood. "Obviously, having isolated public housing units scattered throughout [the city] is better than having huge concentrations in one area or another," he said. Second, the reconditioned single-family homes would upgrade whole neighborhoods, "some of which obviously suffer [economically] from the presence of sore thumb dwellings. . . ." (*Sunday News*, December 19, 1971)

In 1982 the scattered-site program represented approximately 14 percent of the LHA's conventional public housing inventory. Ninety-two of the units were then occupied, and 70 percent of the single-family homes had three bedrooms. Although reporting that no special requirements were used when making scattered-site placements, 75 percent of the residents derived their income from work. This was in the early 1970s, however, when there were more employment prospects for unskilled working parents. Currently, the opportunity to live in a scattered-site home is based on availability, the number of bedrooms in relation to the size of the family and the family's position on the waiting list. The Authority does preoccupancy counseling. Discussions include requirements about routine yard and premise maintenance, minor dwelling repairs, and the obligation of being a good neighbor.

Program Results. LHA officials believe the public has a favorable impression of the program, and they personally view it as successful. The tenants who live in the units are said to favor them over the two family projects. The desirability of scattered site is twofold: (1) they are homes, not apartments, and (2) the neighborhoods are generally better than project environments.⁵² Housing staff are unaware of the program's effect on crime rates, or whether property values have been affected negatively. However, when the program began, officials were certain scattered-site developments would revitalize some neighborhoods. For the employed resident or tenant seeking work, the program was viewed as movement toward self-sufficiency.

Update. In January 1995 only one-third of the scattered-site homes were occupied. The LHA applied for modernization funds in the late 1980s after it had determined that several of the homes needed rehabilitation, and all the units required lead-paint removal. HUD funds, however, only covered repairs to 30 units. Each year the Authority asked for money to complete the necessary repairs, but it wasn't until 1991 that HUD provided Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program (CIAP) funds to complete the work. By April 1995 the LHA expected to reopen 66 rehabilitated homes that had been vacant approximately 6 years.

San Diego, California

Background. The city of San Diego established its Housing Authority on October 3, 1961, pursuant to Housing Authority law of the State of California. To consolidate the city's housing programs and to improve their effectiveness, a seven-member commission⁵³ was established on December 5, 1978. The Authority and the Housing Commission have as their mission: "To develop low- and moderate-income housing opportunities in the City of San Diego in the most cost-effective and socially beneficial way utilizing the private sector to the maximum extent feasible." (*City of San Diego Housing Assistance Plan, 1983–1985*, p. 8)

Over the years, the city has developed a number of legislative guidelines governing local housing actions, including:

- To "support . . . efforts to enhance the balanced community policy, support . . . State and Federal housing programs to provide low-income housing throughout the community . . . and [oppose] State-mandated referendum requirements for local housing and community development projects." (Council Policy 000–19, February, 11, 1980)
- "To effect the development of economically and racially balanced communities in newly developing areas of the city and in all city-sponsored or -approved redevelopment projects, and do what is reasonably and practically possible in all parts of the city." (Council Policy 600–19, December 23, 1972)
- "To increase substantially the number of minority families residing in neighborhoods outside areas of predominant minority concentration and establish racially balanced communities through advertising and other methods intended to inform minority and majority families in the San Diego area that all housing . . . is available to them on an equal opportunity basis." (Council Policy 600–20, January 15, 1974)

Article 34. The conventional, or publicly owned, portion of the Authority's housing inventory has been shaped by Article 34 of the California State Constitution. That article places significant power in the hands of California voters to affect local authorities' decisions to seek Federal aid for public housing projects. The application of the referenda to questions of housing policy was not the intent of California Progressives when it was inserted into the Constitution as Article IV, Section 1. In 1950, however, the voters used the referendum (Proposition 10) to shape housing policy through what became Article 34.⁵⁴ It states, in relevant part:

No low-rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by any State public body until a majority of the qualified electors of the city, town, or county . . . in which it is proposed to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue, approve such project by voting in favor therefore at an election to be held for that purpose, or any general or special election.

In 1971 the U.S. Supreme Court validated the constitutionality of State referenda that permit a majority of the voters in a community to block construction of low-rent housing for the poor. (*James v. Valtierra*, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)) *James v. Valtierra* was a class action suit brought by 41 welfare families in San Jose after that city's voters voided a city council authorization to develop up to 1,000 low-rent housing units.

In a 5–3 decision, the Court concluded that Article 34 did not rest on “distinctions based on race.” (Ibid., p. 682) California’s long referenda history was taken by the Court as evidence of “devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice.” (Ibid., pp. 682–683) The referendum simply ensured “that all the people of a community will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures . . . for increased public service and to lower tax revenues.” (Ibid.) Article 34 represented democratic decisionmaking at its best, a fair process that did not violate the constitutional command that “no State shall deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.”⁵⁵

Article 34, however, has affected the housing industry’s ability to meet the demand for low-income housing. As reported in 1978, even though 8 percent of the poor lived in California, the State supplied only 4 percent of the Nation’s subsidized housing. The pernicious effects of the Article are obvious in referenda outcomes from 1951 through 1971, when 48 percent of assisted family housing projects were rejected. (Bryant et al., 1978, pp. 3–36)⁵⁶ When Article 34 referenda are examined more carefully and for a longer period of time, 1951 through 1984, the damage done to subsidized housing is less. During these 33 years, 58 percent of California’s 43 counties held Article 34 referenda; of the 461 referenda, 76 percent were approved.⁵⁷

In comparison with elderly, disabled, or moderate-income housing, family or low-income housing elicits less response at the ballot box. Table 3–9 shows outcomes when subsidized housing is packaged (family and elderly together) or when the proposal represents a single housing request. The popularity of

Table 3–9. Article 34 Referenda Outcomes

Type of Public Housing	Pass		Fail	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Elderly	35	100	—	—
Family	6	67	3	33
Low-income	14	51	13	49
Family/low-income + elderly	107	90	11	10
Elderly/other [*]	38	88	5	12
Family/low-income/other [**]	81	87	14	13

* Other includes moderate-income and disabled housing; does not include family or low-income housing.

** Other includes moderate-income and disabled housing; does not include elderly.

elderly housing is apparent, and low-income/family housing benefits appreciably when riding the coat-tails of the more popular elderly or moderate-income package. When they appear alone on the ballot, family or low-income proposals have only slightly better than a 50-percent chance of success.

Program Description. In the late 1960s, when the city and Authority began to consider seriously the development of publicly assisted housing, the program's shape and location were not hotly debated. Public officials were aware of the problems associated with "project" housing, and they did not intend to build dense, concentrated housing. (Scattered-Site Questionnaire) The city council's concerns over concentration of low-income housing were reflected in the promulgation of a comprehensive, balanced community-development policy for the city of San Diego (Council Policy 600-19, December 26, 1972, pp. 1-3)

Article 34 referenda for the acquisition and development of public housing on scattered sites were brought before the voters for approval in November of 1972, 1976, and 1981. Each ballot measure passed, although the November 1981 outcome was close. Only 54 percent approved the development of 2,500 units of low-rent housing on scattered sites for families, including the elderly and disabled. The earlier 1972 referenda called for 500 units of elderly housing, and the 1976 ballot provided for 2,500 units of scattered-site housing for families, the elderly, and the disabled.

At the time of our 1982 census of scattered-site programs nationally, the San Diego Housing Commission administered and managed low-income housing programs serving close to 6,000 households. Most of the households, approximately 4,500, were served by the Section 8 Existing Housing Program. (Montijo, B., Executive Director, personal correspondence with author, November 2, 1982) The Commission reported 346 scattered sites had 15 or fewer units.⁵⁸

From July 1979, when development activities commenced, the Housing Commission's actions have resulted in the production of 620 new units and the acquisition of 381 units. There were 2,368 additional units in some stage of planning and development, for a total of 3,423 units.⁵⁹ Two-thirds of the 3,423 would be family housing, but of the 1,001 occupied units only 31 percent were for families. As of July 1, 1983, the 332 units of family housing were acquired or constructed on 82 scattered sites throughout the city.

The 1986 *Annual Report* detailed a variety of assistance programs, including more than 4,000 low-income families in private housing through State and Federal programs such as Section 8 certificates and vouchers. Another 750 families resided in housing owned and managed by the CUC. On July 15, 1986, and again on March 17, 1987, the Housing Authority authorized the Housing Commission to apply to HUD for 50 and 100 units of public housing for large families. The city's HAP included a request for 154 dwelling units for larger families, and the public housing and Section 8 waiting lists for three- and four-bedroom units had approximately 4,000 names on them.


The Housing Commission was anxious to meet the HUD timeline for submitting site design/schematic drawings; this was the first HUD authorization for public housing since 1980. Furthermore, to "avoid the repeat possibility of a Community Development Block Grant freeze such as occurred in 1983,"⁶⁰ the Commission sought "the widest possible recruitment of sites," which would "offer the greatest geographic dispersion possible, given constraints of site availability and cost." (San Diego Housing Commission Report 87-001, "Selection of Public Housing Development Sites," January 16, 1987, p. 2)

To avoid project cancellations and to “minimize time spent in the local site approval process,” the executive director of the Housing Commission recommended in November 1986 that criteria be created in advance to “guide [the] staff’s search for vacant land.” (San Diego Housing Authority Report, “Locational Selection for Proposed Public Housing Development,” November 18, 1986, p. 2) The following eight criteria were created:

- Fewer than 100 assisted low-income family housing units within an elementary school attendance area.
- Census tract median income exceeding 80 percent of regional median.
- Site accommodating up to 20 units with space for onsite play area.
- No density bonus needed.
- Current zoning accommodating development.
- Community plan designation consistent with proposed development.
- Raw land cost up to \$20,000 per unit.
- Development that would not exacerbate existing neighborhood problems, such as traffic or school impaction. (Ibid., p. 3)

Program Results. Despite efforts to disperse public housing throughout San Diego, the siting of new construction projects in particular has proven to be a controversial community issue. Some geographic areas of the city have received “disproportionate shares of assisted housing . . . notably South Bay.” (San Diego Housing Commission Report 87-015, “Selection of Public Housing Development Sites,” February 2, 1987, p. 2) In terms of the city’s eight council districts, the third, fifth, and eighth districts contained 87 percent of the 1,068 units of HUD-financed housing developments as of 1985. (See figure 8.)

For management purposes the Housing Commission divided the city into central, north, and south areas. Each area office is responsible for slightly more than 400 properties. The offices are well staffed, including case managers, housing service coordinators, maintenance coordinators, accountant clerks, and maintenance workers.



Source: San Diego Housing Commission, February 26, 1985.

Figure 8. Map of public housing units by council district: San Diego, California.

Resident managers live at the larger family developments, and caretakers work at each site having 16 or more units. A number of units in each of the three areas exceeds our 15-unit-per-site lid for scattered-site housing. Housing officials are well aware that smaller, less dense units are easier to manage, maintenance is efficient, and "the developments are small enough for social problems to be kept under control." (Johnson, J., Director, Housing Programs, San Diego Housing Commission, personal interview, July 18, 1987)

Area managers take a hard line in managing the properties. Orientation and counseling occur before tenants are placed in scattered-site apartments.⁶¹ Tenants of scattered sites are said to be similar to residents living in other Authority properties. Data from 1982 indicate that 30 percent of the residents derived their income from employment, and only 30 percent from AFDC. Residents were racially diverse: 40 percent African American; 30 percent white; 20 percent Hispanic; and 10 percent Asian American. House rules are explained to the tenant during the walkthrough inspection of the unit. Residents are informed of the importance of maintaining the common areas and premises, of what to do if there is need for minor dwelling repairs, and of the importance of being a good neighbor. Residents pay their own utilities, and there is a higher damage deposit for scattered sites (minimum \$100). The area managers see each one of the properties at least three times a month.

The Housing Authority and Commission stated that they would acquire or build additional scattered-site housing in the future, and their sense of the public's impression of the program was that it was "favorable." Why then, in 1982, when asked to rate the success of the program, did officials judge it to be "very unsuccessful"? What accounted for the negative evaluation was the difficulty of finding sites in suitable neighborhoods, managing highly deconcentrated properties, and persuading community groups that scattered-site units were not "tenement type construction" and that their neighborhoods would not witness "a rise in the crime rate." (Scattered-Site Questionnaire)

A recent inquiry into the program's status found that it has worked "absolutely," and it has been "very successful." The Housing Commission was selected to receive a Sustained Performance Award, the highest award under HUD's 1994 Performance Award Program. Of the many reasons why the Commission has been successful, Community Relations Specialist Pamela Gray says:

In the years since the Housing Commission's inception, focus has changed from simply implementing programs to assist very-low and low-income San Diegans. Today, in addition to providing affordable housing opportunities, the Housing Commission also provides clients with essential supportive services. The San Diego Housing Commission is committed to meeting the changing needs of our clientele. (Gray, P., letter to author, March 16, 1995)

Housing officials consider the scattered-site housing experience to be a step toward independent living on the part of the resident. In comparison to more dense "project" housing, scattered sites experience fewer instances of vandalism, rent delinquency, and resident and neighborhood complaints about the sites or tenants. Opposition and hostility to low-income housing remains strong, however. In cases where discretionary permits were required, the Commission "worked with community planning groups to inform them about the project in the early stages." (Scattered-Site Questionnaire) Neighborhoods where the scattered-site developments have been successful result from any one of the following three factors: (1) the projects are small and are not perceived as threatening to the community; (2) the

community is unaware of the project when it is an acquisition or it is a construction project not requiring development permits; or (3) the units are well designed and attractive. (Scattered-Site Questionnaire)

Update. The Housing Commission currently owns and manages more than 1,600 public housing units on 149 sites scattered throughout the city. The majority of the units are developments with 15 or more units. Approximately 496 of the units are headed by elderly persons or individuals with disabilities. In addition, the Housing Commission administers 8,615 Section 8 certificates and vouchers.

From 1988 through 1990, there was no acquisition or new construction activity by the San Diego County Housing Authority. However, between 1991 and 1993, the Authority acquired 184 units, and in 1991 it built 11 projects. During 1994–95 the Commission had 136 housing complexes under construction or scheduled to begin construction in the near future. The new construction sites range from 7 to 45 units and feature garden-style designs. In addition, the Commission is negotiating the purchase of several existing apartment complexes on various sites throughout the city.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Background. The Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA), the Nation's fourth largest Authority, has operated since 1937. By 1994 the PHA housed more than 48,000 residents, and the public housing inventory in the city totaled more than 23,000 units. (PHA, *Year-End Report, 1994*, p. 8) Approximately 15,000 of the units were conventional developments, either high-rise or low-rise "projects;" of the 43 separate developments, 27 were family, 7 others were family developments with seniors-only buildings, and 9 were designated specifically for the elderly. (*Trends in Housing*, October–November, 1989, p. 3) The remaining 7,559 units were "single row units or duplexes or triplexes" located "in blocks and in neighborhoods throughout much of the City." (Ibid., p. 3). The Authority also served 8,700 Section 8 certificates, vouchers, or moderate rehab recipients. Another 200 units in 2 developments represented the city's turnkey homeownership program.

The three pre-World War II housing projects were low-rise two-, three-, and four-story row and apartment houses arranged in "communitarian fashion—facing a grassy court or commons area where they hoped neighbors would gather." (Bauman, 1987, p. 49) The Authority's "strict code of austerity branded the large superblock complexes as islands of poverty." (Ibid., p. 51) Because the Authority followed the neighborhood composition rule, the three projects were segregated; Tasker Homes (1,077 units) was more than 90-percent white, and Johnson (589 units) and Richard Allen Homes (1,324) were more than 90-percent African American. Four other developments built and occupied in 1942, ranging from 200 to 994 units, were more than 90-percent white.

Postwar developments in Philadelphia occurred in two historical periods: (1) before 1950, 8 low-rise projects were constructed and located in 7 census tracts and (2) between 1950 and 1969 the PHA built another 24 housing projects, 14 of which were high-rise tower complexes. (Goldstein and Yancey, 1986, p. 269) Since 1954 Philadelphia's housing projects have been constructed in approximately two dozen different neighborhoods or census tracts. "While the black percentage of these tract populations was greater than the average for the city," the projects were sited in predominantly white neighborhoods. (Ibid., p. 265) However, over a 20-year span (1955–75), the city lost "three out of every four industrial jobs." (Adams et al., 1991, p. 81) Along with the decentralization of work was a "wholesale exodus from the city." More than 200,000 whites, but only 20,000 African Americans, left the city between 1960 and

1977. (Ibid., pp. 83–84) Many of the predominantly white inner-ring neighborhoods that hosted white projects in the 1950s were African-American projects a decade later.

The public housing stock doubled between 1950 and 1960, when the PHA took over management of 15 new projects. Eleven of the projects were built in north Philadelphia, west Philadelphia, and south-central Philadelphia, the three areas of the city with heavy African-American concentrations; the other four were all-white projects built in white neighborhoods of the city.⁶² Another 12 projects were built in the 1960s, with two-thirds of them in “overwhelmingly black neighborhoods.” Construction slowed in the 1970s, partly because of the Nixon administration’s moratorium on housing development and public opposition to more projects in white neighborhoods. As of June 1974, the Authority operated 50 public housing projects in the city. Forty of the projects were more than 75-percent African-American occupied, six were more than 90-percent white-occupied, and two of the remaining four projects were elderly units built in racially mixed neighborhoods. (*Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo*, 425 F.Supp. 987 (1976), p. 1008) The 7 projects built as of November 1976 were smaller—adding only 270 units—and were located in predominantly African-American census tracts or in racially mixed areas. It was obvious to the Federal District Court that the “public housing system operated by PHA [was] predominantly black. It further found 77 [percent] of the PHA projects . . . located in racially impacted areas of Philadelphia. . . .” (Ibid., p. 1017) Thirteen years later Authority properties remained segregated, with 21 of the 31 family sites being predominantly African American and 3 developments predominantly white. (*Trends in Housing*, October–November 1989, p. 4)

Program Description. Philadelphia has the largest and one of the oldest scattered-site programs in the Nation. The program originally embodied three goals: (1) to expand the Authority’s existing housing stock, (2) to accommodate large families, and (3) to provide opportunity and experience in home management and maintenance for future home owners. (Scattered-Site Questionnaire)

In January 1958 the PHA was empowered by the city council and the Public Housing Administration to rehabilitate 200 dwelling units in the Pine Grove area of East Frankelstown⁶³ for use as housing for people of low income. The PHA intended to negotiate with owners or purchase through tax sales single-family or rowhouses in older areas of the city. Mayor Dilworth noted two advantages in the acquisition strategy: “By using scattered private homes, either old or new, we will be able to integrate public housing into our neighborhoods and, in many cases, actually help [those] neighborhoods.” (*Journal of Housing*, January 1958, p. 12)

From 1958 until 1963, the program was halted by a lawsuit testing the validity of the program. Following a 1963 favorable court ruling the program was resumed, and by late 1967 the total authorizations for the “used-house” program “had reached 5,000; 1,326 units were under management; and 1,475 applications had been received.” (Schermer Associates, p. 149) In 1968 the Authority managed one of the largest used-house programs in the country and it was “demonstrating the feasibility as well as the limitations of an operation which provides for the purchase, rehabilitation, and rental of dwelling units.” (Ibid., p. 148) At the time of Schermer’s evaluation, the 1,326 units under management were located in “five predominantly nonwhite slum and near-slum areas.” (Ibid.) Schermer attributed the site-selection decisions of the PHA to (1) “existence of a high concentration of vacant houses suitable for rehabilitation and (2) an apparent desire on the part of the city council to avoid the opposition that might arise if low-income, nonwhite residents were introduced into more stable neighborhoods.” (Ibid., p. 149)

Neighborhood Opposition. In their discussion of the historical ecology of public housing in Philadelphia, Goldstein and Yancey (1986) see parallels between the site selection policies of the Chicago city council and strong neighborhood opposition to public housing and those same practices in Philadelphia, if “on a somewhat smaller scale.” (Ibid., p. 265)

McEntire (1960) discussed how strenuous neighborhood opposition defeated the PHA’s 1956 plans to build small projects “mostly of less than a hundred units each, on vacant plots scattered throughout the city.” (Ibid., p. 327) The plan had strong support from the mayor. Because of their small size and architecture, similar to the two- and three-story rowhouses prevalent in Philadelphia, “the projects would not significantly alter the composition of the . . . surrounding neighborhoods, nor burden their schools, playgrounds, or other facilities.” (Ibid.) The attractive features did little to relieve residents’ fears. In the end, the city council reduced the number of sites from 21 to 14; “all of the sites which had generated controversy were eliminated, and some alternative locations . . . were substituted.” (Ibid., p. 328)

The PHA generally avoided white neighborhoods in the northeast, Roxborough, and Olney. “Chastened by the intensity of the neighborhood opposition,” writes Bauman, “it also cautiously avoided sites in sections displaying a heavy concentration of homeownership, and in areas where vacant sites appeared suitable for industrial or private residential development.” (Bauman, 1987, p. 169)

Throughout the late 1950s and 1960s, the PHA encountered stiff resistance to all forms of assisted housing in white areas on the borders of expanding African-American neighborhoods. Bauman reports that “[a]ll of the projects planned and built from 1956 to 1967 were sited in ghetto or transitional neighborhoods.” (Ibid.) Between 1967 and 1972, several projects were proposed for white areas of the city, but because of neighborhood opposition either the builder abandoned the project, the required zoning change was denied, or the developer changed the plan to higher density unsubsidized housing. (*Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo*, op. cit., pp. 1009–1010) Also affecting the density and location of family housing during this period was the 1970 *Shannon* litigation. (*Shannon v. United States Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev.*, 436 F. 2d 809 (1970)) In *Shannon*, Philadelphia plaintiffs sought an injunction against HUD’s change of an urban renewal plan “without following official agency procedure for making such changes.” (Vernarelli, op. cit., p. 219) The court held that HUD “must utilize some institutional method” so that its judgment is an “informed one” when assessing proposed assisted housing sites. (*Shannon*, op. cit., p. 821) The court directed HUD to develop standards for sites and neighborhoods with respect to racial and economic concentration, recognizing that “there may be instances where a pressing case may be made for rebuilding a racial ghetto.” (Ibid., p. 822) HUD’s immediate response to the *Shannon* judgment was “expedited publication of project selection criteria in 1972.” (Vernarelli, op. cit.) For Philadelphia and the Authority, *Shannon* effectively brought an end to high-rise construction in areas of racial concentration.

Opposition to low-density, deconcentrated housing during this period was also abetted by Mayor Frank Rizzo, who “stated that he did not intend to allow the PHA to ruin nice neighborhoods.” (*Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo*, op. cit., p. 1002) During the controversy over the Whitman Park Turnkey III project, Rizzo even wrote John Whitaker, Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs in the House, asking for help in preventing HUD from forcing the Whitman Park development on the city.⁶⁴ Construction of the 120-unit townhouse development began in March 1980, and the homeownership program was opened in 1982, thus marking the end of nearly a decade of litigation, “including two trips

to the United States Supreme Court, and the renewal of informal, but no less virulent, neighborhood resistance.” (McGrew, 1981, p. 375)

Program Results. As of January 1995, the PHA had approximately 7,000 units of scattered-site housing throughout the geographic boundaries of Philadelphia. The PHA practices decentralized management. The city is broken into three geographical zones with area managers and their technical and administrative staff reporting to the director of scattered sites at central headquarters. The Authority is in the process of exploring the viability of private management alternatives for these particular properties. (Everett, K., Public Affairs Manager, PHA, letter to author, January 20, 1994) Some of the units were originally built with homeownership in mind, but this outcome did not materialize. The inventory includes approximately 1,000 duplex units, 1,000 triplexes, and 5,000 single-family homes. The program caters to larger families; 64 percent of the units in the 1982 inventory were four- and five-bedroom homes. (Scattered-Site Questionnaire)

A significant number of the 1,200 vacant units of public housing are scattered-site properties in north-central and west Philadelphia neighborhoods. Close to 70 percent of the units are concentrated “within the broad definition of north Philadelphia,” and another 20 percent are in west Philadelphia. (*Trends in Housing*, op. cit., p. 4)

The Authority has never had “an effective strategy for maintenance and prevention and inspection” of the properties, and some of them “should never have [been] taken because of their condition—the foundations and the structural integrity of some of the properties [was questionable].” (*The Philadelphia Architect*, September 1994, p. 1) Early in the program, a Philadelphia grand jury found irregularities in the used-house program, including payoffs of inspectors, approval of unqualified developers, and a general “poor quality” of rehabilitated houses. (*Wall Street Journal*, March 17, 1970)

The Authority was engaged in rehabilitation and renovation work on several scattered-site properties during our site visit in June 1989. One of the projects was renovation of 16 historic houses containing 44 apartments on Diamond Street in north Philadelphia. Originally single-family homes, the houses had been converted to apartments when the PHA acquired them in 1968 and 1969 as part of the “used-house program.” When completed, the renovated apartments were to be occupied by families from the PHA’s transfer waiting list.

Scattered-site families are similar to residents who live in concentrated low- and high-rise developments: 80 percent are AFDC recipients and 90 percent are nonwhite.⁶⁵ Assignments are made to scattered sites from four areawide waiting lists,⁶⁶ or families can request transfers from other PHA developments. Prospective residents are screened and families meet with Authority staff and tenant council members. An effort is made to assess the tenant’s ability to live independently. The orientation sessions include discussions about “good neighbor” behavior and routine yard and premise maintenance.

Housing officials consider the public’s overall impression of the scattered-site program as favorable; their own judgment of the program is that it has been successful. Authority personnel also believe the scattered-site experience is a step toward independent living for all family members. Management problems are acknowledged, including general maintenance, timely response to resident requests for assistance, and lack of an adequate number of trained staff.⁶⁷ If given the opportunity, the Authority would develop more scattered-site housing. Greater success of the program might have occurred if HUD had provided funds for preventive maintenance programs. Moreover, “because 80 percent of the stock

was more than 10 years old, and is reused and abused, more maintenance subsidies should have been provided.” (Scattered-Site Questionnaire)

Update. Flagrant mismanagement and the lackluster performance of 627 maintenance workers who “were able to make basic repairs to only 25 apartments a year” were partial justification for HUD’s takeover of the PHA in 1992. (*New York Times*, June 9, 1993) However, after 12 months of Federal management, the vacancy rate had increased, “[m]aintenance work had slowed, the amount of unpaid rent . . . increased, construction projects [were] postponed, and the agency’s cash reserve [had] fallen from \$6 million to \$1 million.” (Ibid.) In May 1993 the Clinton administration returned management responsibility to the local Authority.

John F. White, Jr., former Philadelphia City Councilman and Secretary of Health and Public Welfare for the State of Pennsylvania, was appointed Executive Director of the Authority in October 1993. When White was appointed at the urging of Mayor Edward Rendell, “the PHA [had] been targeted by HUD as a special project to improve the quality of public housing . . . because it was one of the worst-run housing authorities in the [N]ation.” (*The Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 14, 1994) White’s tenure is tied to his ability to “bring about positive change” in PHA programs in “an unprecedented partnership between the Authority, HUD, and the City’s elected officials. . . .” (*Year-End Report, 1994*, op. cit., p. 9)

The 2-year “road map for change,” launched in November 1993, is contained in a “visionary document” entitled *PHA: 24-Month Operational Improvement Plan*. The Authority was given “an additional \$450 million over the next [5] years to rehabilitate PHA’s crumbling [housing] inventory.” (*Philadelphia Architect*, op. cit., p. 1)⁶⁸ In addition to bolstering modernization activities, the plan calls for improving day-to-day operations, enhancing the PHA’s Police Department, and providing better services to residents, including “a policy of resident inclusion in the Authority’s decision-making processes.” (*Year-End Report, 1994*, op. cit., p. 19)

The second 12 months will certainly be a test of White’s management and leadership skills as he attempts to bring the Authority back to a healthy state. The resources are there to undertake a “comprehensive modernization program that [could] yield true results,” and improve the “living conditions for many public housing residents.” (*The Philadelphia Architect*, op. cit., p. 1)

At the time of his interview with *The Philadelphia Architect*, White indicated there were no plans for the construction of new scattered-site units. The Authority would rehabilitate hundreds of vacant scattered-site properties and spend \$40 to \$50 million on scattered-site maintenance.⁶⁹ Most of HUD’s \$450 million and “the projected costs for some of the work [already exceeds] what has been budgeted.” Modernization efforts are planned or underway for 23 percent of the PHA’s 43 conventional properties, including 3 developments built in the early 1940s.⁷⁰

Major modernization projects are planned for the Rosen, Blumberg, and Fairhill Apartments, Allen Homes, Wilson Park, Bartram Village, Emlen Arms, and Parkview. Efforts are also well underway to rehabilitate 1,139 PHA units “at a cost of \$42 million by April 1995. Thus far 800 units have been rehabilitated.” (*Year-End Report, 1994*, op. cit., p. 23)⁷¹ Major demolition is planned for the Raymond Rosen project. Built in 1954, the 8 high-rise, 1,122-unit structures came to “symbolize the decline of the city’s public housing stock.” In early 1995, 510 units in 5 high-rise buildings were demolished. The \$42 million demolition and replacement plan called for a 44-unit mid-rise elderly building, 206 multifamily

dwellings, and 304 townhouse units. (Ibid., p. 26)⁷² Wilson Park Place, a 744-unit family and senior development built in 1954, will undergo \$25 million in comprehensive modernization of 460 low-rise units. The 1,324-unit Richard Allen Homes, opened in 1941 as one of the oldest projects in the United States, also received \$62 million in combined Federal funding for a “long-awaited reconstruction.”

What to do with the Southwark Plaza—an 886-unit collection of 3 high-rises, 2 currently empty—is still being debated. The PHA has some development funds, and the proposal currently under study involves an estimated \$80 million mixed-income community along the lines of what Vince Lane accomplished in Lake Park Place in Chicago.⁷³ Because the south Philadelphia community is “otherwise solid,” the hope is to “integrate Southwark into the total community and . . . offer homeownership as well as rental opportunities for people of varying incomes.” (*The Philadelphia Architect*, op. cit., p. 11)

Summary

The data collected by the Hogan/Lengyel and Belzer surveys, along with followup surveys and site visits to 13 jurisdictions included in the Hogan/Lengyel research undertaken between 1982 and 1995, document a remarkably positive record for scattered-site housing strategies in communities where the concept has been tested. The high praise for the program, however, comes from the directors and the professional staff who manage the scattered-site properties.

Assessment material has also been gleaned from Authority records, including information on tenant turnover, rent arrearage, maintenance problems, vandalism, and complaints made by residents and neighbors of scattered-site properties and their occupants. The data also report favorably on the scattered-site strategy, especially when the program is compared with the PHAs’ generally larger, more concentrated family projects.

The literature reviewed earlier, and the cases discussed in this and subsequent chapters, identify a handful of troubled programs. Chicago, East St. Louis, Philadelphia, and Tucson’s South Park program provide vivid examples of the critical importance of location and neighborhood characteristics to successful outcomes. Furthermore, several of the case-study communities illustrate in their siting of scattered-site developments the difficulties of acquiring suitable properties or vacant lots in stable working- or middle-class neighborhoods. In all nine case studies, at least one neighborhood experienced some form of organized “not-in-my-back-yard” efforts. Acquisition costs, of course, were part of the problem. Racial and class antipathy were also strong barriers to the extension of choice in residency to low-income minority households.

The Belzer survey supported the hypothesis that scattered-site programs would generate higher administrative costs. In his sample, 32 percent and 38 percent of large authorities reported scattered sites as more difficult to administer and maintain, and 52 percent estimated that maintenance costs were higher than for conventional units. In contrast, Chandler’s study of Cleveland’s Acquisition Housing Program (AHP) suggests the opposite. In reference to such claims, she contends, “Rent delinquencies, average charges for damages, and the number of service calls have been consistently less in the AHP units than in the conventional developments.” (Ibid., p. 9) A 1985 HUD report of 26 PHAs—14 with scattered-site projects—determined that such programs were not inherently inefficient, as an Inspector General report had earlier claimed. Rather, the HUD paper concluded:

Compared with nonscattered projects of the same bedroom distribution, scattered-site projects averaged similar maintenance and nonutility operating costs per unit, significantly lower operating deficits, and much lower past and present modernization costs. . . . [Moreover i]f past capital debts are treated as sunk costs, the ongoing costs to retain scattered-site projects in standard condition are typically much less than Section 8 certificate costs. (Office of Policy Development and Research, HUD, *The Financial Status of Scattered-Site Public Housing*, October 1985, p. 1)

Several of the case-study communities also mentioned administrative and maintenance problems in the management of their scattered-site developments. Managers considered them more costly to administer; the extra costs were blamed on wide dispersion of the units and an inability of the PHA to achieve the economies of scale associated with conventional units. To minimize travel time and distance between sites and to make the Authority more accessible to the residents, Chicago, El Paso, Philadelphia, Rochester, San Diego, Seattle, and Tucson have adopted quadrant- or zone-management practices with the housing inventory geographically balanced. Chicago has also turned to nonprofit and private management as a way to capture cost efficiencies and to compensate for the management problems of the Chicago Housing Authority.

The success of scattered sites was alluded to in the Hogan/Lengyel 1982 survey, in which 80 percent of the housing directors indicated their strong preference for scattered-site developments in the future. The case-study updates also attest to the program's popularity, because eight of them made additions to their scattered-site inventories between 1988 and 1995. The strong endorsement of the program is also shown when we compare program size in 1982 and 1995 for the 22 PHAs who responded to both the Hogan/Lengyel and Belzer surveys. Eighteen of the 22 PHAs expanded their programs through a combination of new construction, acquisition, and rehabilitation. Over the 13-year period, the number of units increased by 79 percent, the number of sites increased by 38 percent, and site densities declined by 23 percent (the average number of units per site dropped from 10.5 to 8).

This chapter has assembled a large amount of information describing the characteristics of scattered-site housing, and the data have been used to argue the success of the program when compared with place-fixed project housing. Much of the survey data reporting on the success of such programs, however, come from the perceptions of housing directors and professional staff who manage such developments and who arguably may be biased.

The following chapter compensates for this potential bias by closely examining how such programs operate at the neighborhood level in Seattle and Tucson. Chapter 4 looks at how the residents of scattered-site housing adjust to their new neighborhoods in Seattle and to two rather different residential-mobility programs in Tucson. The client perspective on the program is critical to an understanding of program impact. The longitudinal design of the Tucson study, moreover, permits testing for whether early impressions of the program are sustained. Chapter 4 also examines the reactions and attitudes of host neighborhoods in Tucson to the scattered-site developments and their occupants.

Chapter 4

Tucson and Seattle: Successful Experiences With Scattered-Site Housing

The impact and consequences of scattered-site housing are examined in the next three chapters. Questions about impact, both from the program's perceived effects on participating tenants and also from the viewpoint of host neighborhoods, are important foci of the case studies reviewed in chapter 4. In the previous two chapters, we have shown that a wide range of communities across the United States have successfully undertaken the scattered-site model, and that the directors of the programs and their resident families regard them highly. The Tucson and Seattle case studies confirm many of the earlier findings about the characteristics and consequences of scattered-site development.

Procuring suitable sites, overcoming neighborhood opposition, and finding the right match between the needs of client families and the characteristics of host neighborhoods were major obstacles to implementation in several of the communities (Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland, and East St. Louis, for example), as discussed in chapters 2 and 3. We also find evidence of such barriers in the Tucson and Seattle experience.

A number of questions about placement of scattered-site housing in areas away from chronic poverty and minority concentration shaped the construction of the Tucson and Seattle surveys. Because housing professionals had been arguing for years that dense low-income projects damage residents and neighborhoods alike, we sought evidence on whether new surroundings generate positive effects on households.

This chapter's case studies build upon the previous discussions of the scattered-site model by tracing the origins, characteristics, and general consequences of the program for tenants and host neighborhoods. What is distinctive about the Tucson and Seattle studies, when compared with the cases discussed earlier, is the comparability of the questions raised and hypotheses tested in both cases, the longitudinal design of the Tucson research, the Tucson survey of "host" neighborhood attitudes and reactions about the program (the Cleveland research incorporates this feature as well), and updates in each city on the current status of the program.

Tucson and Seattle are neither pioneers nor newcomers to scattered-site development. Rather, both embraced the strategy in the 1970s at a time when "[v]arious devices were employed to break away from the old patterns of large, high-rise projects" (Stewart, 1979, p. 492) and HUD was beginning to require "that localities provide subsidized housing [in] an effort to disperse racial minorities geographically. . . ." (Weaver, 1965, p. 466)

Research Methodology

The Tucson study began in late spring 1973 and extended through the fall of 1973. During that time the heads of household of Tucson's two scattered-site developments—South Park and “New Site”—were interviewed about their attitudes concerning the move, their new apartments, and the quality of neighborhood life, especially in contrast with their prior residences.¹ The same families were resurveyed in 1975 to determine the changes that had occurred in their lives and whether their attitudes had shifted from the responses they had given in 1973.

Tucson's program represented two significantly different dispersal strategies. South Park contained 80 units placed on 14 sites with 2 to 17 units per site. All sites were squeezed into an area approximately 1/2 mile by 1 mile in a census tract that was poor and minority concentrated. The New Site development on the other hand, consisted of 120 units on 12 sites with 2 to 20 units per site. These sites were broadly distributed among 12 census tracts with median 1970 annual income ranges of \$6,769 to \$21,472.²

Because the Tucson study did not begin until after the units were constructed and most of them occupied, experimental research methodologies could not be used; instead, an *ex post facto* design was chosen. With this design we studied the intervention (scattered-site housing) in retrospect, looking for its “possible relations to and effects on the dependent variable or variables.” (Kerlinger, 1964, p. 360) The study also incorporated a longitudinal framework, and residents of both New Site and South Park were reinterviewed in 1975. In this manner we could determine the way(s) in which attitudes changed. In addition a neighborhood survey was conducted of families who lived in close proximity to the scattered-site apartments in New Site locations. The purpose of the 60 interviews (5 neighbors from each of the 12 site neighborhoods) was to assess the reactions of neighbors to the Tucson Housing Authority's program and gauge the strength of their support or opposition.

The response rates for both the 1973 and 1975 resident surveys were impressive. In 1973, 80 percent of the 120 families in New Site apartments and 75 percent of South Park households completed face-to-face interviews. In the 1975 followup study, 63 percent of the 60 heads of household interviewed in 1973 and still living in South Park units were reinterviewed. Fifty-two percent of the 96 New Site residents were recontacted, and also agreed to be reinterviewed. Although a significant number of the same subjects were interviewed on both occasions, the design cannot be considered a panel study because we were unable to match the identification numbers of the earlier interviews with the 1975 surveys.

The Seattle research commenced in the spring of 1981 and involved interviews with 157 adult heads of household, accounting for 67 percent of the 235 scattered-site occupancies as of fall 1983. The racial composition of the scattered-site household sample was representative of Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) family housing occupancies. The sample figures were 49.6 percent white (compared with 44.7 percent of total), 38.9 percent African American (compared with 38.3 percent of total), 6.1 percent Asian American (compared with 10.2 percent), and 4.7 percent other (compared with 6.4 percent). Those interviewed were first-time residents of scattered sites who had lived in the units for at least 6 months. According to the SHA, most families had previously lived in dense, subsidized projects.

The research methodology used in the Seattle study was basically the same as that used for Tucson. The replication strategy was chosen to enhance the comparability of the two cases. Evidence extracted

from multiple case studies is often “more compelling,” and the “overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust.” (Yin, 1984, p. 48)

While the design methodologies of the two cases were similar, there were two notable differences. First, there were no followup interviews of Seattle scattered-site families. Second, time constraints and lack of funding prevented the examination of neighborhood reactions to the placement of scattered-site units in Seattle.

Tucson Scattered-Site Programs

The Housing Authority of the City of Tucson (THA) was created in February 1941, pursuant to State enabling legislation, the same year Seattle’s Yesler Terrace opened. The THA’s first assisted housing development was the La Reforma project, built in 1944 at Main Avenue and 22nd Street, in the west-central portion of the city. In 1968 the Authority completed construction of a second large project located adjacent to La Reforma. The 2 projects contained approximately 360 units, and they shared a common park and community center. A third large project was proposed in 1968 for the Grant Road/Fourth Avenue area, but it was dropped after residents of the area strongly opposed the plan.

Tucson first considered scattered-site housing in the summer of 1969. At that time the density of projects, their demographic composition, and concentrated locations were being scrutinized by the courts. In addition, Federal housing acts, civil rights statutes, and HUD regulations were beginning to limit the size and neighborhood location of assisted housing. Furthermore, on July 18, 1969, the Arizona Court of Appeals had informed the Housing Authority that “the placement of public housing projects in a Negro community creates strong doubts as to its acceptability.” (*El Cortez Hts. Res. & P.O. Ass’n v. Tucson Hous. Auth.* (457 P. 2d 294), p. 297) Judge J. Krucker also instructed the THA to meet the mandates contained in Federal statutes and regulations and “find criteria which will work to deisolate racial and minority groups.” (Ibid., p. 296)

The Authority’s scattered-site strategy was embodied in a July 7, 1969, policy declaration that informed the city of Tucson mayor and council that its “emphasis was being switched from high-density housing to low-density, scattered units.” (Minutes of the mayor and council study session) Housing developments were expected to match HUD guidelines of the time:

[Housing] should be so designed that it will attract and retain families comprising the spectrum of low-income families . . . and the design should be such that families can make the dwellings they occupy their homes and the project their neighborhood. (HUD pamphlet 5082, 1968, p. 2)

In pursuit of HUD and council policy, the THA signed a turnkey agreement with a private developer to construct 80 units of low-density family housing on 12 sites in the South Park neighborhood. Beginning in January 1972, another 120 units were constructed; by fall of 1973 they were fully occupied.

South Park/New Site Programs

The Tucson research on scattered-site housing incorporated a complex design, including descriptions of 2 separate developments, callback interviews with residents of both programs, and surveys of

60 neighbors—5 from each of the 12 blocks selected for the New Site program. Three sections follow: (1) comparison of South Park and New Site residents with respect to neighborhood adaptation, perceptions of welcome from residents already in the neighborhood, evaluations of the scattered-site unit, and the effects of the move on their families and self-image; (2) longitudinal examination of changes in the perception and attitude of South Park and New Site residents about the program after 2 years; and (3) evaluation of the program and the assisted families by homeowners and renters living at New Site locations.

South Park and New Site represent two significantly different scattered-site developments. The distinctions are reflected in the greater socioeconomic diversity of New Site neighborhoods compared with South Park sites and the strong contrast in the demographic characteristics of the two programs' participants. (See table 4-1.)

Table 4-1. Demographic Characteristics of Scattered-Site Residents

Characteristic	New Site N = 120	South Park N = 80
Mean age	31	37
Average family size	4	5
Mean income	\$3,904	\$2,747
On welfare (percent)	28	67
Female-headed (percent)	53	70
Unemployed (percent)	37	75
Non-Hispanic white (percent)	26	5
African American (percent)	34	63
Hispanic (percent)	37	32

The differences between the two groups of families are striking. The profile of South Park residents is similar to high-rise project families, including welfare dependence and large families headed by African-American women. New Site families, on the other hand, have a more balanced social composition. This difference in social characteristics alone could make New Site families less visible and less unique.³ Unfortunately, the research does not contain a control group. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether the variations in attitudes and perceptions reported below follow from demographic differences or location/environmental contrasts.

Neighborhood/Home Effects. Social science data on the effects of housing on behavior and attitudes are equivocal. Although Wolman does not endorse the argument that improvements in housing can end the social pathologies of slum neighborhoods, he does suggest “the cumulative effect of poverty can be lightened by improved housing.” (1971, p. 18) Schorr argues that “poor housing helps to cause and to maintain poverty.” (1968, p. 204)⁴ A more skeptical view on the effects housing can have on behavior is Dean’s summary that “[b]eyond a few expected relationships between slum dwellings and health, the effect of poor housing becomes quite difficult to determine where social behavior is involved.” (Note 2, in Bellush and Hausknecht, 1967, p. 28)

Several questions included in this study were designed to measure social and behavioral outcomes that Schorr and others found associated with shelter and neighborhood characteristics. Cynicism, alienation, present-oriented attitudes, and concerns about status are suggested in the responses of New Site and South Park families. Levels of personal satisfaction or pessimism were revealed in response to the personal striving question: "Where do you think you will be one year from now?" Approximately 59 percent of New Site residents had ladder positions of 8–10, but only 33 percent of South Park residents were as positive (mean position 5.09). South Park residents were three times more fatalistic (34 percent to 12 percent) and twice as distrustful (34 percent to 17 percent) as New Site families.⁵

There were differences between the residents of the two developments in how they felt about their status and their belief in the importance of the work ethic. More than twice as many New Site families (40 percent) as South Park residents (15 percent) considered themselves middle class, and when asked about the statement, "In America today anybody willing to work hard can get ahead," 10 percent fewer South Park residents agreed with the statement than New Site respondents.

Neighbors and Neighborhood Amenities. The quality of the neighborhood and access to amenities are important factors when people make decisions about housing. Kasl and Harburg (1972, pp. 324 and 319) report that "[d]islike of neighborhood is the more important determinant of wish to move," but "social characteristics of the neighborhood and its level of maintenance appear to be the chief determinants of satisfaction with neighborhood."

The residents were asked several questions about their adjustment to the move: their feelings about the neighborhood, the quality and proximity to amenities, and their interaction with neighbors. Table 4–2 displays the level of satisfaction families have with their new residential locations.

Table 4–2. Satisfaction With New Neighborhood

Satisfaction Level (percent)	New Site N = 93	South Park N = 60
A great deal	57	22
A fair amount	37	38
Not very much	4	12
Not at all	1	28

Forty percent of South Park residents were dissatisfied with their neighborhoods, whereas 95 percent of New Site families either were satisfied "a great deal" (57 percent) or "a fair amount" (37 percent). The strong dissatisfaction of South Park residents shows up in a number of ways. Thirty-seven percent of the families have had adjustment problems; 45 percent miss things about their former neighborhood; and only 23 percent liked their neighbors "a lot," or "quite a bit." On the other hand, only 22 percent of New Site families were troubled by the move, 36 percent missed their old neighborhood, and 50 percent enjoyed their new neighbors.

The likelihood of social integration was higher for New Site families than for South Park residents. Table 4–3 shows how differently the two groups of families evaluated their neighbors when compared with acquaintances from the old neighborhood. Sixty-three percent of New Site respondents rated their new neighbors as "friendly" or "more friendly," but only 37 percent of the families residing in South

Park felt as good about the neighbors when compared with former friends and neighbors. South Park residents also saw little hope that current neighbors would be better models for their families (7 percent), while 27 percent of the New Site respondents felt the neighbors were positive role models.

Table 4–3. Comparison of Neighbors: New Versus Old Location

Neighbors Ranked (percent)	New Site N = 93	South Park N = 60
More friendly	10	5
Just as friendly	54	32
Less friendly	11	15
Very unfriendly	3	15
No contact	22	33

One of the primary intentions of scattered-site housing is to create a desirable living environment where families have improved opportunities to achieve upward mobility and escape the stigma of living in a “project.” We asked the parents to tell us whether they thought an improved residential environment might hold positive benefits for their children. The results are displayed in table 4–4. The table clearly shows the optimism of New Site residents in contrast to South Park parents. Approximately two-thirds of New Site families visualize a significantly brighter future for their children, but only 5 percent of South Park parents are as hopeful, and 51 percent sense a worsening future for their children.

Table 4–4. Effect on Children’s Future

Children’s Future (percent)	New Site N = 93	South Park N = 60
Much better	28	—
Better	32	5
Worse	7	31
Much worse	1	13
No difference	32	42

The quality of a neighborhood is more than decent shelter and good neighbors. Positive assessments of the neighborhood depend equally on easy access to that bundle of amenities families consider necessary to daily existence. Table 4–5 reports how New Site and South Park residents judge quality and access for nine common amenities.

Families from both scattered-site developments ranked the quality and accessibility of Tucson’s public transportation and school system highly. Other amenities that were judged very accessible and of high quality by families from both areas (75-percent positive response) were shopping, medical facilities, and churches. On the other hand, the quality and accessibility of recreation places and community centers were ranked much lower by South Park and New Site households.

Table 4-5. Access and Quality of Neighborhood Amenities

	New Site N = 96		South Park N = 60	
	Access (percent)	Quality (percent)	Access (percent)	Quality (percent)
Shopping	79	90	64	30
Recreation places	49	55	59	48
Public transportation	91	89	90	93
Medical facilities	64	69	78	79
Public schools	80	89	95	88
Church	65	73	81	87
Job opportunities	61	66	22	22
Community center	41	44	64	37
Relatives/friends	53	66	53	56

The questions read: "Are you as close as you would like to be to . . . ?" "yes" or "no." (Only percent "yes" responses reported.) "How good do you feel your neighborhood is for . . . ?" ("Very good" and "fairly good" responses combined.)

Other characteristics of the scattered-site experience were measured with a "self-anchoring" ladder methodology. Respondents defined their own scales of values from "best" to "worst" (ladder steps 10 to 0) with respect to self, neighborhood, public services, and other items of interest to the researcher.⁶ Table 4-6 reports ladder rankings for South Park and New Site families on self, neighbors, home, and city services at three points: 1 year before the move, the present, and 1 year later.

Families who lived in New Site neighborhoods reported significant change in each item measured across time, but for South Park residents there were only two small positive changes: self-image (5.1 to 6.5) and home improvement (5.0 to 6.2). In fact, South Park residents expected city services to diminish in quality (5.2 to 4.8), and the neighbors' personal situation to worsen in the future (5.4 to 3.7). For New Site families, the scattered-site alternative to "project" living was strikingly better. Not only does each ladder item show improvement, but families imagine an especially bright future for their homes (+3.6 past/future) and themselves (+3.6 past/future).

Table 4-6. Mean Ladder Rank on Selected Characteristics

	New Site [N = 96]			South Park [N = 60]		
	Past	Present	Future	Past	Present	Future
Personal	3.9	5.5	7.5	5.1	5.2	6.5
People	4.7	6.0	6.9	5.4	4.2	3.7
Home	4.2	7.4	7.8	5.0	6.0	6.2
Services	6.2	7.4	7.8	5.2	4.4	4.8

Neighborhood Responses

Evaluating the consequences of “social mixing” formed the basis for investigating the reactions of households in neighborhoods chosen for scattered-site housing in Tucson in 1973.⁷ The author hoped that the Tucson experience with the program could help housing policymakers in two ways. First, Hartman’s claim (1973), that the success of scattered-site developments depended not only on scale but location of units in viable neighborhoods, could be tested. Second, because the Authority attempted to integrate neighborhoods by race and class, the research might provide answers about which characteristic was more important to program success and neighborhood stability.

Several assumptions, most without searching analysis, have been made about scattered-site housing, class and racial mixing, and what dispersal might hold for cities and suburbs.⁸ This phase of the Tucson research examined some of these assumptions by testing them among a sample of 60 adults who lived in the 12 neighborhoods comprising the New Site development.

A number of questions about placement of scattered-site housing in areas away from chronic poverty and minority concentration shaped the construction of the survey. The author was interested in learning what factors lessened neighborhood opposition, which has generally accompanied housing deconcentration strategies. The questions raised included: Are homeowners or renters more opposed to the entry of assisted families? Does length of residence in the neighborhood matter? Are social background factors—age, income, and education—important in explaining attitudes toward scattered-site families? Do racial or status factors affect stereotyping? Are intact households with a breadwinner and few children less objectionable than welfare recipients with large families? Does size of site make a difference in program acceptance? These are just a few of the questions the research attempted to answer.

“Scattered-site housing” and “tenant neighbor” were the two concepts chosen for examination. Evaluation scales were constructed from ratings given by respondents to seven adjective pairs used to tap the underlying nature of the concepts. Table 4–7 shows the distribution of responses for both concepts.

To compare semantic differential scales, adjective pairs were the same for both concepts even though some pairs appeared inappropriate to the concept (honest/dishonest and strong/weak do not seem to tap into “scattered site” because there are large midpoint ratings). For further comments on adjective pair relevance, see Kerlinger. (1964, p. 570)

In the discussion that follows, the scales were used as both independent and dependent variables. Because the sample was limited to 60 respondents, variables were dichotomized at the median; low scores reflect high evaluations. Other independent variables used in the analysis included age, income, education, family size, length of residence and tenancy (owner or renter) of the respondent, site size (number of units per site), and class distance.⁹

The “tenant” and “housing” scales were also treated as independent variables. It was hypothesized that the way neighbors evaluated scattered-site housing and its occupants would influence whether they approved of the program or, to the contrary, believed its presence in their neighborhoods would depress property values, trigger flight, and increase crime.

Table 4-7. Housing and Tenant Evaluation Scales in Percent
Housing Evaluation Scale [N = 55]

Successful	25	24	27	11	13	Unsuccessful
Clean*	47	27	16	4	5	Dirty
Fair	22	24	32	8	14	Unfair
Good*	25	20	33	14	7	Bad
Quiet	25	22	20	20	13	Noisy
Honest	17	15	60	6	2	Dishonest
Strong*	9	9	72	6	4	Weak

*Indicates that adjectives were reversed to counteract response bias.

Tenant Evaluation Scale [N = 55]

Successful	19	31	36	6	8	Unsuccessful
Clean*	38	24	22	9	7	Dirty
Fair	31	23	29	6	11	Unfair
Good*	38	24	27	5	6	Bad
Quiet	36	20	20	9	14	Noisy
Honest	30	16	42	6	6	Dishonest
Strong*	12	21	44	15	8	Weak

*Indicates that adjectives were reversed to counteract response bias.

Public opinion polls and academic research attest to the importance of socioeconomic factors in social mixing. Gallup polls, for example, reported that "the higher a person's socioeconomic status . . . the higher [the] score on the Pro-Integration Scale."¹⁰ Harris polls in the late 1960s and early 1970s also found the under-\$5,000 income group resistant to change, and individuals with incomes over \$15,000 more supportive, an illustration of "Karl Marx upside down." (1973, p. 35)

In reference to housing, Bradburn and associates reported that "variations in attitudes toward integration [were] associated with education." (1971, p. 32)¹¹ Research also indicated that age correlated with tolerance and willingness to extend equality to other groups. As Ladd and Hadley noted:

Age and socioeconomic status sharply differentiate the public on the entire range of social and cultural value change. The young and those of higher status provide general endorsement of change in life styles and value postures, while those older and of lower status tend to resist. (1975, p. 216)

Table 4–8 reveals the considerable effects of the presence of subsidized housing and low-income families on neighborhood beliefs and perceptions. Differences between respondents with “high” or “low” scores on the housing and tenant scales ranged from 5 percent to 42 percent. Unfortunately, this study cannot determine whether the evaluations of “host” neighbors were caused by the placement of scattered-site units or whether such perceptions existed in the absence of low-income households. Future research calls for the inclusion of residents from neighborhoods that do not include any scattered-site housing to determine whether these families have more favorable views.

Both evaluation scales show moderate to very strong gamma correlations with the five neighborhood effects. Two of the correlations were statistically significant for the housing and tenant scales. Low scores were associated with intensely negative beliefs that property values would decrease and strong objections to having scattered-site units in the neighborhood. Living next door to poor families evoked equally strong reactions; 42 percent intended to move.

Tenancy, length of residence, site size, and class distance are variables that warrant close examination when shaping housing strategies. Alone or in combination, the four characteristics affect either positively or negatively the reception neighborhoods grant public facility siting decisions and the emotional strains poor families experience as they adapt to new residential environments. Information on how these characteristics play out in ongoing scattered-site programs is crucial to the design and location of publicly supported housing.

Table 4–8. Relationship Between Housing/Tenant Evaluations and Perceived Neighborhood Effects

Neighborhood Effects	Housing Scale	Tenant Scale
Object to SSH in neighborhood	-0.72*	-0.61**
See neighborhood as unsuitable	0.09	0.38
See SSH as cause for moving	-0.48	-0.88*
Perceive property value decline	-0.72*	-0.63**
Feel neighbors will not welcome residents	-0.59	-0.29

*Chi square significant at 0.01 level.

**Chi square significant at 0.05 level.

SSH = scattered-site housing.

Several studies have discussed the four variables and portray each as important to integration or social mixing. Bradburn’s work found greater tolerance from renters than homeowners for integrated neighborhoods. The theoretical underpinnings for the finding were clearly stated:

. . . [W]hite renters are not as sensitive as white owners to the presence of a low proportion of Negroes in the neighborhood. Renters are less likely to come in close contact with their neighbors, and many white renters are probably unaware that there are Negroes in the neighborhood. Renters, moreover, do not have any particular fears about property values declining. (1971, p. 109)

The same association was made by Pascal (1970, p. 419) and Wolf and Lebeaux (1967, p. 104), who averred that renting “permits a trial, without a more permanent commitment, and does not require that the entrants make a prediction about the area’s future. . . .”¹² Evidence on the effects of tenancy was contradictory, however. Varady’s research (1974) on the moving plans of white households in a racially changing neighborhood, for example, showed a statistically significant association between tenancy and moving. The difference in homeowner and renter behavior was only 13 percent, however. Bradburn’s research also contained data that ran counter to the belief that renters are highly tolerant of racial mixing. “In all neighborhoods,” he wrote, “renters were more concerned about their neighborhoods changing than homeowners were.” (1971, p. 17)

There was less evidence on the effect that length of residence had on attitudes toward social integration. Nathanson (1974) and Varady (1974) discussed both tenancy and length of residence in their studies of moving plans, while Hunt (1970) tested the association between several factors, including length of residence and approval for racially mixed neighborhoods. Nathanson’s data showed that ownership and length of residence (more than 10 years) correlated with preferences to stay in the neighborhood. Varady’s data, on the other hand, reported statistically significant relations between moving plans and residence, and Hunt found individuals with longer neighborhood stays more tolerant of integration.

The importance of scale in scattered-site development, especially site size and density, was mentioned by several scholars, including Hartman (1973), Glazer (1973), and Bellush (1971), but there are few empirical studies on the effects of density, site size, and location on neighborhood stability.¹³

Two features of small-scale developments encourage program success. First, because the units are of single-family, duplex, or triplex construction, and frequently part of existing housing stock, they “blend in with the larger community.” (Rainwater, 1973, p. 157) Second, the low-density features of scattered-site housing lessen the stigma often associated with the project-style stereotype of public housing. The small-scale design of scattered-site housing should facilitate the adaptation of both homeowners and tenants because “small . . . increments [are] less apt to be seen as neighborhood invasion.” (Haigh and Kitchell, 1974, p. 372)

Prejudice and racism are believed to influence the long-run viability of residential neighborhoods. Prejudice was rarely directly measured in the housing literature; education, or other proxies for race bias, were used.¹⁴ It is probably the case that race and class prejudice are correlated. Treating them as separate was supported by data from public opinion polls at the time. Watts and Free (1973, p. 102) reported that socioeconomic status, not race, was more important in shaping opposition to integration. In support of such poll results, Wattenberg commented: “There is still racism left in America, but classism is an even tougher hurdle to leap. Americans would far rather have a Massive Majority Middle Class black as a neighbor than a white who hasn’t made it yet.” (1974, p. 245)

Sociological writing also found support for the importance of class and status concerns when families chose their housing and residential neighborhoods. Rossi said that residence “[was] often the spatial expression of vertical social mobility.” (1955, p. 184) Along similar lines, Wolf and Lebeaux contended that “racial heterogeneity is easily handled when people have similar incomes and lifestyles. In short, racial differences in behavior are imaginary, but social class differences are real.” (1967, p. 109) The

Gruens' research, on the other hand, found 64 percent and 67 percent of married low- and moderate-income white families opposed to racially integrated environments. (1972, table 7, p. 35)

In general, the literature that probed relationships between demographic characteristics and attitudes about social mixing suggests that variations in age, education, income, tenancy, size of family, and length of residence should explain some of the variance in the "tenant" and "housing" scales when considering dependent variables. Table 4-9 reports gamma coefficients between resident characteristics and site size and the housing and tenant evaluation scales. Although only 3 of the 16 correlations are statistically significant, half of them display moderate to very strong gamma coefficients. The differences in the strength of the gammas for the housing and tenant scales suggest that from the residents' perspective the two concepts measure different psychological phenomena.

There are interesting differences in how residents evaluate the scattered-site units in contrast to the judgments they make about the tenants. Younger households, renters, and "host" neighbors who are not highly status conscious (as measured by the class distance variable) hold more positive views about tenants and assisted housing than status-conscious residents, well-established homeowners, and those with large families.

Tenant evaluations are strongly associated with the "host" household size (80 percent of large families, but only 31 percent of smaller families, have low evaluation scores); income differences (67-percent to 38-percent difference between high/low income families and low scores); class distance (58-percent to 22-percent difference between high/nonjudgmental respondents and low scores); and site size (67-percent to 33-percent difference between families living proximate to large- or small-density developments).

Table 4-9. Correlation Between Resident Characteristics and Site Size and Evaluations of Tenants and Scattered-Site Housing Units

Resident Characteristic*	Housing Evaluation	Tenant Evaluation
Renter/owner	0.55	0.72**
Education	0.48	0.08
Age	-0.21	0.15**
Income	0.08	-0.52
Length of residence	-0.26	0.12
Class distance	-0.22	-0.49
Site size	-0.03	-0.41
Family size	-0.03	-0.80**

*The evaluation scales and tenancy, education, income, and family size were dichotomous variables. Age, site size, residence, and class distance were trichotomized.

**Statistically significant χ^2 .

Income, family size, and site size are not strongly associated with how scattered-site units are evaluated, nor are education or length of residence strongly correlated with views about tenants. Age of the head of household does strongly connect with how respondents judge tenants: 75 percent and 68 percent of younger and older household heads have high evaluation scores for tenants, but only 31 percent of the

residents between 35 and 64 years of age feel positively. The difference results from family size: 80 percent of large family households have low-regard scores.

The findings suggest that different meanings and images are called up when “host” residents think about the physical characteristics of dwellings and their occupants. The data urge caution when siting more than 5 to 8 units in a neighborhood. Homeowners with school-age children are anxious about the tenants who will occupy the scattered-site apartments. On the other hand, neighborhoods with well-educated residents, a balance of apartments and homes, and a diverse age structure appear to be hospitable environments for modest numbers of scattered-site homes and apartments.

Planners and developers should consider these differences when planning future scattered-site developments. Supporters of the program should anticipate strong resistance from some neighborhood residents and consider utilizing a number of the mitigation strategies discussed in chapter 7.

Although the findings are suggestive, the conclusions should be examined with care. The ability to generalize the findings is limited because the data come from a single case; the sample is small, with only 60 “host” neighbors interviewed at a single point in time, and the cross-tab analysis generates cells with very few numbers. Obviously, further research is called for in the examination of the long-term effects of scattered-site housing on both neighborhoods and tenants.

Two Years Later: Are There Differences?

The 1975 followup survey of scattered-site residents incorporated a time series design but, because we were unable to match 1973 responses one for one with 1975 responses, it lacks the rigor of a panel study design. Nonetheless, we did reinterview approximately two-thirds of the South Park and New Site families. The panel design can trace shifts in attitude, and the 2-year interval between first and second investigations should correct for factors responsible for the negative attitudes expressed by South Park residents, and the halo-like answers given by New Site families about the scattered-site experience.

Table 4–10 displays responses of New Site and South Park families to nine questions asked in both 1973 and 1975 concerning characteristics of the neighborhood, their new neighbors, their children’s well-being, the significance of the move, and whether they missed anything about their former homes. Although respondents from both developments report nearly identical 9-percent shifts in answers to the nine questions, the directions (more or less favorable response) and magnitudes of the shifts differ for the two groups.

Overall, there are several differences between South Park and New Site resident evaluations, with New Site families more satisfied than residents of South Park neighborhoods. Two years after the move, New Site residents were more measured in their evaluations of the program, or its effects on their families. In 1975 only 36 percent, not 50 percent, thought they would like their neighbors “a lot” or “quite a bit,” and significantly fewer (23 percent compared with 63 percent), when asked to compare their neighbors to families from the old neighborhood, found them “more friendly” or “just as friendly.” More respondents than before acknowledged adjustment problems, and 42 percent expressed missing things about the old neighborhood. The neighbors were viewed more positively as role models for the family (11-percent change), but only half, not the earlier 60 percent, assumed their children’s futures would be better.

Table 4-10. Comparison of Changes in Perception of Neighbor and Neighborhoods Effects: South Park and New Site, 1973 and 1975, in Percent

Item	South Park		New Site	
	1973 [N = 60]	1975 [N = 38]	1973 [N = 96]	1975 [N = 50]
How satisfied are you living in this neighborhood? [great deal/fair amount]	60	60	95	93
Are there things you miss about the old neighborhood? [yes]	45	63	36	42
Do you think you will like the people who live around here? [quite a bit]	23	37	50	36
Have you had difficulties adjusting to this neighborhood? [yes]	37	21	22	28
Compare the people in this neighborhood with those from the old neighborhood/ [more friendly/as friendly]	37	47	63	40
Do you think of this neighborhood as your real home? [yes]	41	39	44	40
Do you think the new neighbors will be pleased to welcome you, or somewhat pleased to welcome you? [yes]	36	27	32	30
Do you think your neighbors are better models for your family than neighbors from your former neighborhood? [yes]	7	18	27	38
Will your children's future be better because of where you now live? [much better/better]	5	16	60	50

The before and after data in table 4-10 show that South Park families viewed the scattered-site program differently 2 years later. In several ways the program and neighborhood were evaluated more positively. Although more families missed their old homes and neighborhoods, 37 percent liked their neighbors “a lot” or “quite a bit,” and 16 percent fewer had adjustment problems in 1975. More family heads thought the neighbors were good models for their families, and 16 percent felt their children’s futures were better. On the other hand, fewer families thought the neighbors were pleased with their presence. Another way to gauge the quality of change experienced by scattered-site families 2 years after their exposure to the program is to look at responses to the ladder questions for self-image, neighborhood, and home.

Three generalizations can be drawn from table 4-11: (1) New Site evaluations of self, neighborhood, and home continue to be more positive than South Park ratings; (2) with one exception, South Park evaluations are lower than in 1973; and (3) two-thirds of the New Site ladder scores are lower than before. The largest shifts relate to the family head's sense of what the future holds for the neighborhood, the home, and the family's own self-image, with an average decline in ladder rankings of 2.2. Apparently, the flush of early optimism—at least for New Site residents—recedes after families become established and accustomed to the modalities of neighborhood life.

Table 4-11. Comparison of Past, Present, and Future Evaluations of Self, Neighborhood, and Home: New Site and South Park, 1973 and 1975

Personal [Self-Image]	South Park		New Site	
	1973 N = 60	1975 N = 38	1973 N = 96	1975 N = 50
Past	5.13	3.8	3.8	4.4
Present	5.08	4.8	5.4	5.1
Future	6.65	5.5	8.3	6.2

Neighborhood	South Park		New Site	
	1973 N = 60	1975 N = 38	1973 N = 96	1975 N = 50
Past	5.33	4.1	5.0	5.1
Present	4.35	4.0	6.7	5.3
Future	4.25	5.0	8.1	5.8

Home	South Park		New Site	
	1973 N = 60	1975 N = 38	1973 N = 96	1975 N = 50
Past	5.0	4.2	3.9	5.5
Present	5.4	4.7	8.4	6.0
Future	6.2	5.3	8.8	6.5

Seattle's Scattered-Site Program

With a 1990 population of 516,259, Seattle is the largest city in the Pacific Northwest. The city is adjacent to the Puget Sound and is bounded by water to the east and west. As a result, development has occurred to the north and south; neighborhoods and housing are best described as predominantly low density and single family.

The SHA marked its 50th anniversary in 1989. The 1941 Yesler Terrace project was not only the Authority's first development, but the first low-income family housing project in the Northwest. Yesler Terrace contained 878 units on 43 acres and was notable because of its unique design, which provided

a city view for each unit, and for its landscaping, which included more than 200 species of trees and shrubbery.¹⁵

From the day it opened, Yesler Terrace was racially integrated, and it remains so.¹⁶ This commitment to integrated projects continued to shape the city's approach to dispersed housing development in the late 1970s. "Some of the qualities of the Yesler Terrace project [different exterior colors, open spaces, vertical battens, varied roof lines] reappear . . . in more recent and innovative public-housing solutions. . . ." (Kreisman, 1989)

Early Scattered-Site History

The SHA contemplated a scattered-site program in 1971 of approximately 100 units, leading to low-income families eventually owning their units. These units would have been in the Yesler Atlantic urban renewal area. However, the Nixon administration moratorium on subsidized housing development put the idea on hold. Then, in 1977, HUD offered additional block grant funds to 10 jurisdictions under a demonstration Areawide Housing Opportunities Program (AHOP). The purpose of AHOP was to develop housing opportunities for low-income households in areas where few such opportunities existed.¹⁷

A serious shortage of rental housing for families had existed in Seattle for several years. The city's Housing Assistance Plan estimated there were 35,000 households needing shelter assistance; 6 years had passed since the SHA had built any low-income housing for families. Seattle received \$150,000 in Bonus Block Grant funds to start the AHOP Scattered-Site Program in September 1978. The city contracted with the SHA to act as developer. The city received another \$12 million HUD allocation in 1979 to help the SHA meet its 269-unit goal, which included building 70 units and acquiring another 199 in neighborhoods north of Mercer Street. (*Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, April 8, 1979)¹⁸

Mayor Charles Royer set a goal for Seattle to develop up to 1,500 family-housing units over 5 years, contingent upon the availability of Federal dollars. The objectives were (1) to develop housing opportunities for families in the north end of the city where there were few low-income units, (2) to construct low-density projects visually compatible with Seattle's neighborhoods, and (3) to rehabilitate housing to prevent neighborhood decline or stimulate improvement in areas where such decline had already occurred.

The preferred density for the units was 4 to a site, with an acceptable range of 1 to 15. Neighborhoods would not be chosen as sites if large concentrations of assisted housing already existed. The Authority offered three reasons for developing assisted family housing at such low densities and on scattered sites:

- Neighborhood houses needing upgrading would be fully rehabilitated, thus improving the neighborhood in which they were located.
- Neighborhood residents would have more opportunity to express their concerns regarding design density, and related development issues than was typically the case with privately developed projects.
- Lower density scattered-site housing would provide the low-income resident with an opportunity to escape the stigma of residing in a "project," and achieve upward mobility. (SHA, Scattered-Site Program, *Fact Sheet #1*, p. 3)

Neighborhood Response

Opposition to Seattle's scattered-site program was limited to west Seattle's Genesee Hills and Fautleroy neighborhoods, the Fairview district around Greenlake and Lake City Way in the north end, and Ballard. In other neighborhoods—the University District and Montlake, for example—neighborhood residents went out of their way to help the Authority find suitable land for purchase.

In west Seattle, large crowds attended two community meetings in October 1979 to protest the SHA's purchase of two land parcels without consulting the community. Signs of racial and class prejudices were detectable in such accusations as

“low-income minorities will ruin the neighborhood and depress property values,” or that economically disadvantaged families would not keep their homes and yards well maintained. (*News-Herald*, October, 17, 1979) The 2 west Seattle neighborhoods wanted the SHA to reduce the number of



Figure 9. Two-bedroom townhouses at 1133 19th Avenue, Seattle, Washington.

units from 15 to 6 on a site. Residents complained that the area was oversaturated with assisted housing,¹⁹ creating an unfair burden given the absence of sites in other Seattle neighborhoods. (*Seattle Times*, January 28, 1979)

In Ballard, a predominantly Scandinavian community, the opposition was also intense and racially motivated. The neighborhood reacted “violently negatively” to use Robert Mattson’s words. Mattson, director of Ballard’s Little City Hall, suggested two reasons for the community’s antagonism toward scattered-site housing. First, federally subsidized housing was “unsightly, uncontrolled, and attracted people who took little pride in maintaining their property.”²⁰ Ballard, he continued, was a safe, secure, and close-knit community with a typically Nordic or Scandinavian cultural background that residents were not prepared to lose. Second, Mattson bluntly admitted that racism played a role. Ballard residents, he said, “[were] not at all ready yet to accept racial minorities in their neighborhood.” Although the community strongly opposed the SHA’s developments, 20 properties were already under development; all but 4 were single-family units and duplexes. (*Ballard News-Tribune*, February 20, 1980)

The Fairview protest differed from that of west Seattle and Ballard. Resentment stemmed from past issues, including the neighborhood’s close proximity to the freeway with its noise and depressing effects on property values, the location of an unsightly power station, and the closing of the Fairview school, which was purchased by the SHA for the building of scattered-site apartments. Recycling the school to accommodate the SHA’s low-income housing needs was the final insult. The community quickly

organized, circulated petitions protesting the mixed use at the former elementary school, hired an attorney, and formed a community council. (*Seattle Sun*, August 22, 1979)

The city and the Authority staff sought neighborhood acceptance for converting the Fairview school to scattered-site housing and planned neighborhood meetings in December 1978 and early January 1979. The meetings were well attended as homeowners continued to protest being asked again to be “good neighbors” and the unfairness of the policy for their neighborhood. The protesters persevered, and the SHA aborted further planning for scattered-site apartments at the closed-school site. The loss of the site was a disappointment to the Authority because of the time and energy spent on planning, but the SHA learned that “using such a site is not workable: zoning [was] a nightmare, and the issues of using existing facilities and of ‘community dealings’ required reassessment.” (*Seattle Times*, April 22, 1981)

The aftermath of the neighborhood controversies taught Mayor Charles Royer a few lessons, including (1) 15 units at 1 site was too many for the community; (2) the city had to find better ways to buy land and construct units without “neighbors getting mad”; and (3) “although we have worked like crazy, the housing is not cost effective—the land and the cost [of construction] is a problem.” (*Seattle Times*, October 19, 1980)

The city confronted a myriad of implementation problems as it tried to meet Mayor Royer’s goal of 300 units a year. Two years after the mayor’s announcement, only 75 apartments or single-family homes had been provided and occupied. (*Seattle Post Intelligencer*, October 17, 1980) It wasn’t until March 1981 that any of the new units were completed. The inability to meet the yearly numerical goals of the program,²¹ the HUD bureaucratic delays and excessive red tape,²² and the time lapses associated with accommodating neighborhood concerns over sites and density issues resulted in several program changes: (1) a reduction in the annual production target from 300 to 130 units²³; (2) plans to limit newly constructed units to the 6 to 8 per site range²⁴; and (3) development of a formal policy on community participation when providing scattered-site housing through new construction.

There was some hyperbole in Seattle’s claims about its “pilot” program, as illustrated in a *Seattle Post Intelligencer* story line, “The Nation Will Watch as Seattle Houses Its Poor.” (April 8, 1979) The model program was said to be the first to build new homes for families; its success or failure would have national impact. SHA officials believed its program was unusual in that “it [was] in small complexes, tucked into neighborhoods all over town.” (*Seattle Times*, February 13, 1983) The program was “in effect, a policy of desegregation by housing.” (*Seattle Post Intelligencer*, October 17, 1980) David Moberly, superintendent of Seattle Public Schools, predicted that decentralized low-cost housing would mean “fewer kids bused for school desegregation.” (*Seattle Post Intelligencer*, August 26, 1977)²⁵ Mike Marshall, planner and administrator of the scattered-site program, saw it as a pilot project for the Nation in its size and coverage. “We will be able to write the book on scattered-site housing when this is finished,” he said. (*Seattle Times*, April 22, 1981)

Post-1985 Development

After 5 years of operation, the program had produced only 630 units, largely because of limited Federal development funds. Even this number would not have been possible without the strong commitment of city officials, particularly Mayor Royer, who allocated more than \$7 million in development subsidies or writedown to scattered sites. This support guaranteed the completion of units when

cost-containment measures initiated by HUD in 1981 terminated most low-income housing development nationally.

The 630 scattered-site units are situated on 260 sites, widely dispersed and located in 90 census tracts. The Seattle program has been successful in fulfilling an important program objective, locating most units in neighborhoods with little assisted housing. Table 4–12 compares the racial composition and median income for these neighborhoods to those of the scattered-site residents, demonstrating that Seattle’s scattered-site program does integrate neighborhoods both racially and economically.

Table 4–12. Racial Composition and Median Income, 1981

Area	White	Non-White	Median Income
City of Seattle (percent)	80	20	\$22,096
Scattered-site tracts	92	8	23,968
Scattered-site residents	42	58	5,874

Source: City of Seattle and neighborhood data from 1980 U.S. Census. Scattered-site resident information from Seattle Housing Authority, Annual Population Report, December 1981.

Seattle Resident Research

To determine the success of dispersed housing, we measured the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of scattered-site residents throughout Seattle. Interviews were conducted by seniors and graduate students trained in interviewing protocol and techniques.²⁶ Responses to the 19-item survey are grouped into 4 categories: neighborhood characteristics, neighbor reactions/attitudes, effects of the move/experience on self or family, and perceptions of the scattered-site unit. Tables are not displayed for all questions, and some data are rearranged for greater clarity.

An important goal of scattered-site housing was to widen housing choices for the poor so that areas of concentrated poverty could be reduced and their social pathologies ameliorated. The assumption was that new neighborhoods would provide a more supportive environment for personal growth and satisfaction.

Neighborhood Characteristics. The survey asked several questions about what happens to families when they move from poor neighborhoods to more “enriched” residential environments. For example, 56 percent of scattered-site residents expressed a great deal of satisfaction living in their new neighborhood (92 percent a “great deal” or a “fair” amount); 65 percent believed that because of the move their children’s future would be “much better” or “better”; 77 percent considered it easy to feel at home in the neighborhood; 56 percent agreed that the area was a better place to live than most others in Seattle; and only 13 percent reported they intended to move within the year.

Neighborhood amenities are a strong magnet that attracts and keeps people attached to a place. Providing low-income families with access to amenities such as good schools, churches, shopping, parks, and playgrounds is part of the intent of the scattered-site strategy. The evaluation of neighborhood amenities is displayed in table 4–13. The question posed for the 12 amenities was, “How good do you feel your neighborhood is?”

Approximately two-thirds or more of our respondents evaluated their neighborhoods as “very” or “fairly” good for 8 of the 12 amenities. For only two items—relatives/friends and job opportunities—did as many as 30 percent find the neighborhood lacking. Three other amenities generated a 30-percent response of “don’t know,” reflecting either the absence of the amenity or, more likely, unawareness of its availability because of the recent move into the neighborhood.

Table 4–13. Neighborhood Services [N = 157]

Amenities	Good (percent)	Not Good (percent)	Don't Know (percent)
Bus service	91	7	2
Personal safety	86	11	3
Shopping	82	17	1
Parks/playgrounds	78	15	7
Other city services	73	8	19
Public schools	71	12	17
Church	62	10	28
Health care	61	15	24
Relatives/friends	53	38	8
Neighborhood center	39	19	43
Day care	32	13	55
Job opportunities	28	35	37

The categories “very” and “fairly” have been collapsed for “good” and “not very” and “not at all” for “not good.”

Attitude Toward Neighbors. Scattered-site families have generally positive feelings about their neighbors. For example, 21 percent and 41 percent compared the neighbors as “more” or “just as” friendly as families from the old neighborhood, and only 12 percent judged their current neighbors “less” or “very” unfriendly. Fifty-three percent said their neighbors “are pleased” or “somewhat welcome[d]” them; only 12 percent thought the neighbors objected to them. Another 46 percent of scattered-site families believed the neighbors would set better examples for their family than residents from their prior neighborhoods (42 percent reported no difference). Fifty-two percent also thought neighbors would help them out if they were in trouble (35 percent didn’t know and 13 percent disagreed).

One set of questions explored the degree to which residents of scattered-site housing were socially integrated into their neighborhoods. Residents were asked about adjustment problems, moving intentions, the feeling of being “at home” in the neighborhood, and perceptions of the neighborhood as a good place to raise children. Responses to these questions reflected few integration or adjustment traumas: only 19 percent admitted to adjustment problems, 87 percent planned to stay in their dwelling during the next year, 82 percent felt at home in the neighborhood, and 84 percent judged their neighborhood as a good place to raise children.

Another question, “In the past few months, have you done any of the following things with neighbors?” was also intended to measure neighborhood social integration. (See table 4–14.) Responses suggest that while fewer than 20 percent were involved in planned social activities, a significantly larger number socialized on an informal basis.

We have no comparable data on social integration among residents in unsubsidized housing. However, the work of Norman Bradburn and associates (1971, p. 165) suggests that social interaction would not be radically changed by greater economic equality because it remains very low in interracial neighborhoods that he studied.²⁷

Perceptions of Units. Clients were also asked several questions about the scattered-site units—their construction, design, size, overall appearance, and management, as well as the importance of the housing to them. Eighty percent of the residents believed that living in scattered-site housing had either a “great” or “some” effect on them; 27 percent said the home was more important than the neighborhood; but 65 percent considered home and neighborhood equally important.

The semantic differential methodology²⁸ was used to examine tenant evaluations of several characteristics of the dwelling. Table 4–15 displays mean scores for each of seven adjective pairs that attempted to extract what “my home or apartment” meant to the respondent.

The mean on all items was below 2.00, which reflects a very positive assessment of the program. The units were highly praised as “good,” “pretty,” “clean,” and “successful.” On the other hand, 35 percent and 28 percent of the families considered their homes “very” or “somewhat” small and noisy.

Residents were also asked to judge other characteristics of their home and the management of the properties by the SHA. Scattered-site families were satisfied with the design and construction of their dwellings, and with the management of the units by the SHA. For only two items were there modest dissatisfaction: 17 percent found fault with maintenance response and service, and 20 percent criticized unit construction.

Table 4–14. Social Interaction With Neighbors [N = 157] (Percent)

Stopped and talked when we met	76
Had an informal chat in their/our home	47
Got together on other occasions	30
Attended a meeting or social gathering	18
Had dinner or a party together in their home or our home	13
Went out together to dinner or a movie	12

Table 4–15. Tenant Evaluations of Scattered-Site Dwelling or Apartment by Percent [N = 157]

Good	65	22	7	4	1	Bad
Ugly	2	1	21	26	48	Pretty
Small	9	19	15	22	35	Big
Dirty	12	4	8	17	59	Clean
Successful	49	28	11	6	6	Unsuccessful
Safe	47	24	5	13	11	Unsafe
Noisy	18	16	14	20	32	Quiet

Other Effects of Move. The data thus far suggest satisfied, well-adjusted residents pleased with their neighborhoods, homes, new neighbors, and the Housing Authority. But does the scattered-site experience affect feelings of self-worth as well? Does self-image improve when residential conditions change? These are important questions. For several years housing professionals had argued about the negative impact on families of residing in concentrated project housing located in impoverished neighborhoods.

We asked residents to report how they felt about themselves before living in the scattered-site unit and after moving, and where they thought they would be 1 year from now. A simple thermometer was used, measuring “Where do you see yourself?” on a scale of 0 (“very unfavorable feeling”) to 100 (“very favorable feeling”).²⁹

The median temperature reported by residents before moving to scattered sites was 50 (“no feelings”), while the move itself shifted the scale to 80 (“very good feelings”). The trend upward in positive feelings was also reflected by our third question, asking where residents thought they would be 1 year from now: the median temperature was 88 (“excellent feelings”).


The scores from these three questions indicate that Seattle scattered-site residents tend to become more optimistic about themselves and their alternatives after moving to dispersed housing. Embracing the strategy to break away from old patterns yields positive results.

Site size, personal deprivation, and income characteristics of the neighborhood had measurable effects on the attitudes and perceptions of families living in scattered-site housing. For example, families who lived in lower socioeconomic neighborhoods or in larger sites had more adjustment problems (71 percent and 68 percent, respectively) than families who lived in single-family homes or more “enriched” neighborhoods (45 percent and 50 percent, respectively). There were also statistically significant relationships between site size and social integration (-0.29, sig. 06) and regard for the neighborhood (-0.38, sig. 008). Higher income census tracts showed moderate correlations with self-image now and in the future (0.28 and 0.26), fewer adjustment problems (-0.27), and more regard for the neighborhood (0.28, sig. 0.09).

Tucson and Seattle Programs Compared

Seattle’s and Tucson’s scattered-site programs were selected for comparison because they contained different features that could be useful to communities planning assisted-housing developments. Important differences between the two programs include: (1) Tucson’s earlier program origin; (2) Seattle’s single-family rehab program; (3) Tucson’s slightly higher density of units; (4) Seattle’s slightly larger, more dispersed program; and (5) Tucson’s construction of units within a single, low-income census tract

Table 4-16. Temperature Readings on Self-Feelings in Seattle



With the exception of the Tucson South Park development, the experiences scattered-site families had while in the program were remarkably similar and very positive. (See table 4-17)

Approximately 20 percent of New Site and Seattle scattered-site residents experienced some adjustment problems, and 24 percent and 11 percent, respectively, of Tucson and Seattle families intended to move during the next year. However, these responses are in marked contrast to the Tucson South Park development, where approximately one-third of the families planned to move and 37 percent admitted to having problems adapting to their new apartments and neighborhoods. Table 4-17 brings together responses to nine questions that reflect the high satisfaction of Tucson and Seattle families with the scattered-site program and the strong deviation of South Park households.

Table 4-17. Comparison of the Scattered-Site Experience for Seattle and Tucson Families (Percent Yes)


Experience	Seattle [N = 157]	New Site [N = 96]	South Park [N = 60]
Satisfaction living in neighborhood	92	95	60
Things missed about old neighborhood	—	36	45
Like people around here	47	50	23
Perception of neighbors welcoming	55	32	37
Neighbors friendlier	62	63	37
Neighborhood adjustment problems	19	22	37
Neighbors better models for families	46	27	7
Children's future better	66	60	5
Plans to move within next year	11	24	32

Excepting South Park residents, the data suggest satisfied, well-adjusted participants. But does the scattered-site experience shape self-images as well? Whether improvements in residential surroundings have positive long-term effects on individuals is a critical question. For many years housing professionals have argued that dense low-income projects damage residents and neighborhoods alike. That the ghetto poor bear enormous psychological costs living in areas of concentrated poverty is well documented. “[E]mpirical evidence,” Schill writes

... supports the proposition that geographically concentrated poverty generates social problems among the poor that are both different in kind and of greater magnitude than would occur in a more dispersed setting. In addition to the enormous costs borne by ghetto residents attributable to high rates of teenage pregnancy, school dropouts, crime and drug abuse, these concentration effects also impose costs on the entire metropolis and the Nation. (1991, p. 815)

We asked residents to report how they felt about themselves before living in the scattered-site unit and after moving, and where they thought they would be 1 year later. A simple thermometer in Seattle and ladder in Tucson were used to measure “Where do you see yourself?”

Table 4-18. Temperature Readings on Self-Feelings in the Past, Present, and Future



The median temperature or ranking reported by Seattle and Tucson residents for the period before moving into scattered-site homes was 50 (“no feeling at all”) or 39 (“slightly unfavorable feelings”). The move itself had varying effects on self-perceptions, with Seattle residents shifting from a median temperature of 50 to 89 (“quite favorable feeling”), New Site residents from 39 to 55, and South Park heads of household basically not changing (51 to 52).

With the exception of South Park, the trend upward in positive feelings was also reflected in the third thermometer question, indexing where residents thought they would be 1 year from now. The median temperature for this question was 88 for Seattle, 75 for New Site, and 65 (midway between “slightly” and “fairly favorable feelings”) for South Park families.

The temperature readings indicate that scattered-site residents become more optimistic about themselves and their alternatives after moving to dispersed, low-density housing. Apparently by changing the living environments of poor families, we encourage a different sense of self, one that is hopeful about the future, is satisfied, and is relatively adjusted to change.

Current Status of Seattle and Tucson Programs

Seattle and Tucson slowly added to their scattered-site inventories in the 1980s and early 1990s. The SHA’s 1993 Population Report³⁰ documented that 22,206 persons in 10,939 households lived in public housing or Section 8 assisted units, or were part of the Senior Housing Program. Of the conventional public housing units, 752 were scattered-site dwellings.

Seattle increased its scattered-site program after 1987. A housing levy, approved by Seattle voters in September 1986, provided \$12 million for the development of scattered-site housing for large families. The primary goal of the program was to produce approximately 150 units through a combination of purchase and rehabilitation or through new construction techniques. At the time of the levy, the SHA had 632 units of scattered-site housing; one-third were suitable for large families (units containing 3, 4, or 5 bedrooms).³¹ As of September 30, 1988, the SHA had purchased 8 sites for the construction of 26 units

and received funds for purchase and rehabilitation of 54 units. At year end 26 houses had been purchased and rehabilitation completed on 20. (SHA, *Annual Report*, 1986–88, p. 6) By the end of 1992, 128 large family units had been completed. (SHA, *Annual Report*, 1992, p. 9)

In 1992 a \$150 million countywide housing levy was promoted but failed. Had the levy passed, approximately 77,000 households with emergency, temporary permanent housing problems would have been assisted over 30 years. Approximately one-third of the 2,520 new units would have assisted Seattle residents through extensions to the scattered-site program. (*Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, February 26, 1992)

In 1995 the city discussed a levy with a housing component. Few details are available, although a citizens' committee is being formed and cost estimates for a low-income general housing levy, including affordable housing, range from \$38 million to \$94 million. (*Seattle Weekly*, December 28, 1994, p. 12) More promising for the development of additional scattered-site units is HUD support for the proposed Holly Park demolition.

In May 1993 the SHA submitted a \$500,000 planning grant application to develop a master plan for the revitalization of Holly Park. In September 1993 the Authority was notified it had received the grant. Sixteen months later, on January 10, 1995, the SHA faxed a request for a \$50 million Urban Revitalization Demonstration (URD) grant. A \$47.1 million Federal grant "that promises the rebirth of Holly Park" was approved on January 19, 1995. (*Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, January 20, 1995)

Holly Park is one of Seattle's "garden communities," a low-scale, dense public housing project with "more than 2,200 tenants living in 893 units which first opened in 1942 as temporary wartime housing." (*The Seattle Times*, May 25, 1994) Although not typical of deteriorating high-rise public housing elsewhere, by local standards Holly Park had "the highest concentration of very-low-income tenants," and the "most serious incidence of crime and the most serious physical deterioration," said the SHA's Ron Oldham. (*The Seattle Times*, August 28, 1993)

Preliminary program goals in March 1994 called for the development of a "mixed income residential community, similar to other urban neighborhoods, characterized by diversity, stability, and choice of housing options."³² The target mix would be one-third very low income (less than 50 percent of median), one-third low/moderate (50–80 percent of median), and one-third market rate.³³ The plan also called for site-based private management and, to promote greater stability in the revitalized Holly Park neighborhood, a waiver from using the SHA's citywide list.³⁴

The \$50 million URD grant was intended to provide the SHA with "the opportunity to significantly change the face of public housing in Seattle, to affect the entire economic development of southeast Seattle, and to set a tone for neighborhood revitalization across the city."³⁵ Seattle officials and the Holly Park community hope the demolition and rebuilding effort over the next several years will facilitate upward mobility among Holly Park tenants and their families. The Holly Park proposal calls for 295 new certificates or vouchers, and the development or acquisition of 500 units of offsite housing. Both of these features could enlarge choice in residence by providing supplements to the SHA's scattered-site inventory.

Tucson expanded its scattered-site program in the early 1980s with a combination of acquisition and new construction developments, partly driven by the demolition of the 162-unit La Reforma project. As of July 1989, the city's housing division owned and managed 1,279 conventional units located on 130 sites. Three new projects were undertaken in the early 1990s. Each project (two 100-unit packages, and

one 25-unit package) was acquired without rehabilitation. The single-family homes were purchased on the open market, and several properties were HUD foreclosures. The first 100-unit package was fully occupied in 1991; there are a handful of unoccupied homes in the last two acquisition programs.

As of January 1995, the Tucson Housing Management Division of the Community Services Department was responsible for 3,500 units of assisted housing. This figure includes both conventional public housing units and Section 8 vouchers/rental certificates. Approximately two-thirds of the conventional units are for families, with elderly households living in four separate projects. Forty-seven percent of the families live in scattered-site developments with fewer than eight units on a site. Excluding Connie Chambers (a 200-unit project site), scattered-site developments break down as follows: 291 single-family homes, 30 duplex units, 107 units in the 3–8 range, and 277 apartments in 8–20 unit buildings.³⁶

When Tucson and Seattle housing officials were asked in 1983 to evaluate their programs, they judged them successful and believed the public's impression of the program was favorable. Both jurisdictions also attributed program success to good design and low density. Small size made the units, according to Tucson, "compatible with the surrounding neighborhood." When asked if they would do more scattered-site housing in the future, each replied affirmatively. Seattle's response, however, was conditioned on HUD making funds available to decrease the development costs. Reflecting on what they might change about the program, Tucson indicated a strong preference for using the acquisition method more extensively. Seattle, on the other hand, asked for two changes in HUD policy: (1) the reduction of HUD development regulations and (2) larger operation subsidies for dispersed units.

More than a decade later, both programs continue to be regarded as successful by officials responsible for management and oversight. Although Tucson pays no attention to the ethnic code on the application form, and selects families for scattered-site units directly from the public housing waiting list, they do conduct preoccupancy counseling and impose higher charges for maintenance services. In addition, in 1982 the THA began to require security deposits.³⁷ Orientation is a two-phase process: (1) when the lease is signed, and before families move into the units, landlord-tenant policy is discussed, including good neighbor behavior and responsible property maintenance; and (2) after 3–6 months, expectations are reinforced when the lease is reexamined during a field visit.

Tucson's zone concept of managing scattered-site units was tried in the early 1980s to reduce response times in handling maintenance problems and to symbolize to tenants and neighbors the THA's concern for the program through "presence in the field." At the time the staff was too small to execute zone management effectively, and the practice languished. However, in 1989, the administration established 5 zones, each responsible for 200 units of conventional public housing. The decentralized management system is working well, and a sixth zone was recently added. Each zone has a three-person staff consisting of a manager, an assistant manager, and a qualified maintenance person.

The SHA screens families for scattered-site placement. Instituted in 1989, the Resident Incentive Transfer Program moved families from the "garden communities" to single-family and multifamily homes throughout the city of Seattle. Residents must satisfy several criteria to qualify, including living in a "garden community" for 3 years and the absence of "rent delinquencies, housekeeping problems, or any proven major complaints against them for the last [2] years."³⁸ Tenants who clear the hurdles are rewarded with a scattered-site placement.³⁹ "We want our best tenants moving into neighborhoods," said

Program Manager Mark Gropper. "And we want to give a goal to people in the garden communities." (*Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, February 26, 1992)

Although the SHA manages the scattered-site program from one location in the north end of Seattle, it adopted a decentralized structure in mid-February, 1995. All public housing properties—elderly, "garden communities," and scattered sites—are managed by staff reassigned to four zones: north end,⁴⁰ central, west, and south Seattle. Realigning the management improved the program in terms of (1) faster response time to client requests for assistance; (2) quicker and better mediation in disputes between tenants and neighbors; (3) closer collaboration and information sharing between the SHA and city law enforcement officials because precincts are geographically decentralized; and (4) more informed and timely utilization and referral of tenants to social service providers who are also spread throughout the city.

The only foreseeable drawback to the zone concept is that in bringing all public housing programs and their diverse clienteles together, staff may have difficulty giving each group fair treatment. Staff must work together to ensure that program integration and collaboration do not result in ignoring the special needs of each client group.

Summary

The Tucson and Seattle case studies provide confirmation that the scattered-site housing model is regarded positively by the residents. High levels of satisfaction are maximized when the units are located in stable, middle-class neighborhoods, and during the first several months of the family's residence in the neighborhood and surrounding community. On neighborhood social integration, overall satisfaction, and feelings about self, the research suggests that in changing the residential environments of low- and moderate-income groups, we engender in them a different self-image, one more satisfied, hopeful about the future, and relatively well adjusted to change. (Hogan and Lengyel, 1985, p. 12)

The time-series data from the Tucson study urge care when making generalizations from the cross-sectional findings of the 1983 Seattle and 1973 Tucson findings. When we juxtapose the earlier responses from the Tucson study, which emphasized positive evaluations by tenants, especially New Site residents, with judgments made 2 years later, we find South Park and New Site residents less enchanted with the opportunity enhancements of scattered-site housing.

Additional research is needed to determine whether the erosion of the rosy glow of resident evaluations captured by the time-series study design is true for other programs. Furthermore, we cannot explain whether the generally negative evaluations of the South Park program resulted from the selection of different tenants (see table 4-1), or were influenced by the placement of the South Park units in neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty. That unsuccessful programs, or parts of scattered-site developments, are associated with deteriorating neighborhood conditions was pointed to in DeZutter's research on sites on the north side of Chicago, and the East St. Louis mini-case study discussed in chapter 3.

Fuerst and Decker (1977, p. 17) claim that the key to community acceptance of subsidized housing revolves around the issues of site selection and land choice, but "the key to a successful development over the years is good management." The truth of the first claim is evident in this chapter's indepth

report on Tucson and Seattle scattered-site programs. The second key—good management—has been hinted at in earlier parts of this study, but the critical need for quality management is illuminated in the discussion of the evolution of scattered-site housing in Chicago in the context of the management foibles of the Chicago Housing Authority. The following two chapters illustrate the importance of a third key to the successful implementation of scattered-site developments: the response of the local political system.

Chapter 5

Chicago, Illinois

Chicago and Yonkers are the two most contentious and highly publicized attempts to provide scattered-site housing. They are also the two situations in which the courts have been most extensively and controversially involved in the public housing process. These two cases thus deserve special attention, because they shed light on a number of issues pertinent to this analysis. The cases also demonstrate the strength and validity of the main arguments advanced by this study:

- Scattered-site housing is a promising and potentially effective means of addressing the housing problems of communities with long histories of racial and economic segregation.
- Such programs inevitably encounter stiff local resistance.
- Successful implementation of the scattered-site model requires the development of a forceful, multifaceted strategy to overcome community apprehension and opposition.
- Such strategies must also include effective ways to downplay the emerging mythology that the intrusions of courts into the policy process are always mistaken ventures that lack fruitful outcomes.

More specifically, this extended discussion of the Chicago and Yonkers cases will attempt to answer the following questions: (1) How did the scattered-site program develop in these two cities and how and why was it adopted as the best way to resolve the housing problems in these two communities? (2) What were the source and nature of the opposition that arose in each city to the scattered-site concept? (3) How and why did the courts become so deeply involved in the conflict over public housing in these two jurisdictions? (4) What were the consequences, both positive and negative, of this pattern of judicial intervention? And, finally, (5) What are the lessons of Chicago and Yonkers for both housing policy analysts and housing policymakers?

In the mid-1960s Chicago was the focus of twin lawsuits that came to reveal both the promise and problems of government-supported housing policy. Chicago's "Gautreaux" cases also raised two important questions about the role of the court in shaping public policy: "The first concerns the appropriateness of the court's role; the second concerns its effectiveness." (Silverman, *op. cit.*, p. 237). The second suit, *Gautreaux II*, was filed against HUD on October 31, 1969, alleging that the Federal agency was equally responsible for the established discrimination found in Chicago's public housing system. The remedial story of *Gautreaux II* was significantly different from the outcome of the suit filed against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) on August 9, 1966. (*Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority*, CA No. 66 C 1459 (N.D. Ill.))

The *Gautreaux I* case was a complex piece of litigation, with roots that stretched back to Martin Luther King's 1966 open-housing marches in the city. Support for this radically different way to site and package public housing emerged from a coalition composed of the Chicago Urban League, the

West Side Federation, and the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council. These three organizations vigorously objected, in the spring of 1965, to the CHA's location of nine housing projects in minority neighborhoods. (Polikoff, 1978, pp. 147–159, and Silverman, 1972, pp. 236–240)

The case study reviews important events of Gautreaux history from 1966 through 1995. The primary concern, however, was not to chronicle the constitutional issues of the case, but rather to discuss the difficulties faced when hypersegregated Chicago was faced with providing housing opportunities to low-income African-American families in ethnic, working-class and middle-class white neighborhoods. The Gautreaux litigation demonstrated how a “well-functioning, pervasive system [of] institutional racism” can sustain the status quo. (Baron, 1972, p. 7) Furthermore, the case arose in a city where it was said that “the most salient characteristic of the spatial structure . . . is the rigid separation of blacks from whites that has earned Chicago the title of America's most segregated city.” (Squires, 1987, p. 94)

The city's reaction to the court order requires a historical grasp of how the “black belt” emerged in Chicago and how African-American families came to be geographically isolated in this racist, highly segregated city. A brief history of the CHA's construction and site selection policies from 1937–46, when the CHA's occupancy policy followed Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes' “neighborhood composition rule,” is provided as background to Gautreaux. The remainder of the case study focuses on two topics: (1) an evaluation of the scattered-site program and (2) the future of public housing in Chicago.

Origins of Public Housing

The CHA was incorporated in 1937. It is the Nation's second largest public housing agency, with an estimated 137 projects, 1,300 residential buildings, and 41,000 apartments. (GAO, June 1989, p. 11) Approximately 85 percent of the buildings are family projects; nearly all of the units are more than 30 years old. (Ibid., p. 15)

Chicago's first four housing developments were constructed by the Public Works Administration and turned over to the CHA in 1938. (*The Report of the Advisory Commission on the Chicago Housing Authority*, June 1988, p. 7) Most of the projects were racially segregated three- and four-story apartment buildings. The exclusively African-American project was the 1,662-unit Ida B. Wells Homes. White projects included Lathrop Homes and Trumbull Park Homes. The only “mixed” development was the Jane Addams Homes, which employed a racial quota. (Hirsch, 1983, p. 14) These projects set the tone for Chicago public housing for the next 30 years.

The precedent they set . . . was that public housing was to be stark, each building like the one next door, except for some variations in height, and each project clearly isolated from the surrounding community. The decision was made from the beginning that emphasis would be placed on housing that was well constructed, easy to maintain, but architecturally undistinguished. (Bowly, 1978, p. 33)

Substantial public housing construction occurred during the war years through 1947. The number of buildings per site varied from the 55-unit two- and three-story Cabrini Homes¹ to the 1,500-unit Altgeld Gardens, described as “the most self-contained and comprehensive public housing project ever

constructed in Chicago.” (Bowly, 1978, p. 44) Most of the project, however, consisted of small-scale, low-rise rowhouses, with fewer than 200 units per site.

Era of the High Rise

During the 1950s and 1960s, partly because costs were to be kept low, high-rise construction became the CHA development model. Bowly reports that in 12 short years (1957–68), the CHA completed 15,591 family units, all but 696 in high-rise buildings. He writes of this period:

This was the great era of construction of public housing in Chicago, and the source of the current popular image of public housing as being long rows of sterile tall buildings. . . . The rationale [for high-rise development] was the standard one [of] keeping construction costs low, and leaving a large proportion of each site open for recreation space. (Ibid., p. 12)

Table 5–1 shows the massive scale of the CHA’s “high-rise” years, when seven new developments and five project extensions accounted for 92 percent of the family units in Chicago built between 1957 and 1966.

Table 5–1. CHA High-Rise Construction, 1957–66

New Developments	Year	No. Apts.	No. Bldgs.	Height
Horner Homes	1957	920	9	7–9
Stateway Gardens	1958	1,684	8	10–17
Rockwell Gardens	1961	1,115	8	10–12
Darrow Homes 1	1961	479	4	14
Taylor Homes	1961–62	4,425	28	16
Washington Park	1962	1,065	7	16
Hilliard Center Extensions	1966	346	2	22
Cabrini Green	1958	1,925	15	7–19
Prairie Courts	1958	203	1	13
Brooks Homes	1961	449	3	16
Horner Homes	1961	736	7	7–14
Cabrini Green	1962	1,096	8	15–16

Source: From Bowly's data, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–135.

Three features of the “great era” of CHA public housing construction stand out: half the projects contained more than 1,000 apartments, building heights usually exceeded 10 stories, and the developments were segregated. The Stateway Gardens and Robert Taylor Homes projects, for example, extended the CHA’s “State Street public housing row” where five projects “stretch[ed] for thirty-four blocks . . . compris[ing] more than 20 percent of all CHA units, and hous[ing] almost 30 percent of CHA residents.” (Ibid., p. 130)

Public housing production slowed appreciably between 1968 and 1987. Of the 175 buildings added to the CHA's inventory, only 46 percent were for families, and from 1978–87 all 25 buildings were either housing for the elderly or scattered-site construction. (GAO, p. 60) The slowdown was not because of a drop in demand for subsidized housing; it was Judge Richard Austin's ruling in the Gautreaux case that curtailed new projects in Chicago for the next two decades.

Waiting for Gautreaux

For the first 9 years of public housing construction (1937–46), the CHA's occupancy policy followed Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes' "neighborhood composition rule," which prevented "government projects from altering the racial composition of their host neighborhoods." (Hirsch, op. cit., p. 14) Baron comments on the impact of the rule:

While this ruling effectively barred black public housing tenants from white areas, it did meet a prior need in guaranteeing that black families would not be excluded altogether from these dwellings for which there was such a great demand during the depression. Biracial projects would come into being only where there had previously been biracial slums. (Baron, op. cit., p. 9)²

The practical effect of the neighborhood composition rule was to increase segregation within the projects. Table 5–2 indicates the racial composition of early CHA properties.

Table 5–2. Racial Composition of Public Housing, 1938–43

Name	Opened	Neighbors	No. of Units	African American (percent)
Jane Addams	1938	White	1,927	60
Julia Lathrop	1938	White	923	—
Trumbull Park	1938	White	462	—
Ida B. Wells	1941	African American	1,662	100
Francis Cabrini	1942	Mixed	260	20
Robert Brooks	1942	Mixed	334	80
Lawndale Gardens	1942	White	128	—
Bridgeport Homes	1943	White	141	—

Source: Lazin, 1980.

When the Federal Government rescinded the neighborhood composition rule, and the CHA initiated strategies to integrate its larger projects, white neighborhoods reacted with violence, protest, and petitions to city officials, calling for the end of CHA independence, the dismissal of Executive Director Elizabeth Wood,³ and the departmentalization of the Authority.⁴

Although the CHA's legal status was not compromised by these challenges, it clearly suffered a loss of decisionmaking authority when the Illinois State legislature granted the Chicago city council power to veto housing sites selected by the Authority. The council's power was extended in 1955 when CHA Executive Director General Kean and Alderman W.T. Murphy, Chairman of the council's Housing and

Planning Committee, reached an agreement wherein the “CHA would informally submit any proposed housing sites for clearance by the committee and by the alderman in whose ward it was located. If either one vetoed this site, CHA would withdraw the proposal.” (Baron, op. cit., p. 21)

The Kean-Murphy agreement furthered housing segregation in Chicago by concentrating new housing projects in inner-city census tracts.⁵ For example, of 10,256 family apartments either completed or under construction between 1955 and 1968, 99.4 percent were placed in African-American neighborhoods. Hirsch reports that only 7 of 33 projects constructed during this period were in tracts with an African-American population of less than 75 percent. Moreover, by the time the projects were completed, only one was in an area less than 84-percent African American. (Hirsch, op. cit., pp. 242–243)

The Gautreaux Decision

The civil rights implications of the city’s neighborhood segregation policy, the core element of the Kean-Murphy agreement, became the basis for the Chicago chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union’s 1966 suit against the CHA. (Polikoff, op. cit., p. 149) Three years later, on February 10, 1969, Judge Richard Austin issued the long-awaited *Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority* (296 F. Supp. 907 (1969)) decision. Austin ruled that the “CHA intentionally chose sites for family public housing and employed numerical quotas” to “control” tenant characteristics in order to “preserve existing patterns of residential segregation in violation of plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”⁶

The court issued a comprehensive remedial order on July 1, 1969, that required the CHA to increase the supply of low-income housing; divide the city into Limited Public Housing Areas (LPHAs) (more than 30-percent nonwhite) and General Public Housing Areas (GPHAs); not build in the LPHA until it had constructed 700 units in the GPHA; limit the development to projects housing no more than 120 persons;⁷ forbid discrimination in tenant assignment; set aside 50 percent of the units for neighborhood residents;⁸ prohibit the housing of families in units above the third floor; and avoid the overconcentration of scattered-site buildings in any one neighborhood.

Although Judge Austin urged the CHA to use its best efforts to increase the supply of family units “as rapidly as possible,” the outcome of the order was, as Mayor Richard Daley had predicted, a halt or delay in construction.⁹ The CHA built no public housing, ostensibly because of the scarcity of land and high construction costs. Over the next 5 years, only 17 new public housing apartments were provided under the court’s 1969 order. (Polikoff, 1989, p. 459) The real reason for nonproduction, however, was political: the council and mayor wanted to control “the competition for living space” and thus constrain and direct the racial transition of Chicago’s ethnic neighborhoods. (Wilson, 1960, pp. 102–103)

Judge Austin employed a number of strategies—enjoining HUD from funding Chicago’s Model Cities program, ordering the CHA to bypass the council in the site selection process, and appointing a Special Master—to counter CHA procrastination and the city’s refusal to integrate Chicago neighborhoods. The court, however, was “outmaneuvered at almost every turn” (Silverman, op. cit., p. 237), and after a decade of frustration Austin’s order was altered, partly to remove restrictions on CHA development plans.

Judge John Powers Crowley's May 18, 1979, modification of the Austin order contained the following five provisions: (1) no housing in the LPHA without concurrent production in the GPHA; (2) removal of the CHA's obligation to build 700 units in the GPHA; (3) change in the ratio of new construction and rehabilitation in white and African-American neighborhoods; (4) inclusion of elderly housing; and (5) rehabilitation of 300 units for every 100 units of new construction. (*Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority*, 66 C 1459 and C 1460 (consolidated) U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Ill. (May 18, 1979)) Crowley's order did little to accelerate the scattered-site program, however. Even with Mayor Jane Byrne's support, "little was accomplished." Polikoff writes that

During the next 5 years, thanks to continuing neighborhood opposition, a surreptitious mayoral go-slow policy, and incompetence at the CHA . . . purchase of new sites proceeded with agonizing slowness. When buildings earmarked for rehabilitation were acquired, the rehabilitation began slowly and was performed incompetently. (1989, p. 460)

In 1983 newly elected Mayor Harold Washington promised no more "business as usual" at city hall (*Chicago Sun-Times*, June 19, 1983) and asserted that scattered-site housing would "be built more readily" under his administration. (*Chicago Sun-Times*, April 15, 1983) For the first time it seemed that the CHA would adhere to Judge Austin's 1969 mandate that it "use its best efforts to increase the supply of dwelling units as rapidly as possible. . . ." (*Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority*, 304 F. Supp. 736 (1969), p. 741)

Although it purchased or acquired options on several *hundred* units, by January 13, 1984, the CHA still had to construct or rehabilitate 832 more units to satisfy the court. Such construction or rehabilitation was rarely started. The CHA instead stockpiled residential buildings. (CHA Advisory Committee, *The Final Report*, December 12, 1985, p. 1) Table 5-3 documents CHA nonperformance from 1983 through 1985.

Table 5-3. CHA Scattered-Site Performance, 1983-85

Program Stage	New	Rehabilitated	Total
Completed units	126	73	199
Program in construction/rehabilitation	45	6	51
Program began/stopped	—	37	37
Program promised/not started	31	691	712
Totals	202	797	999

Source: Plaintiff's Motion for Further Relief, *Gautreaux v. Pierce*, No. 66 C 1459. (March 28, 1985), p. 6.

Without adequate financial assistance from HUD to cover the enormous costs of rehabilitation, the CHA returned to court in May 1987 to "plead for permission to suspend the scattered-site work lest it bankrupt the agency." (Polikoff, 1989, p. 416) Although Judge Marvin E. Aspen was reluctant initially to appoint a receiver, his "bottom line" was that "what has got to be done has not been done." The CHA's "bumbling" and "incompetence in the basic rudiments of administering the program"¹⁰ led Judge Aspen

on August 14, 1987, to appoint a receiver for further development of the CHA's scattered-site program. (*Gautreaux v. Pierce*. 66C 1459 and 66C 1460 (consolidated) U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Ill. E.D.)¹¹

The Scattered-Site Program Under Receivership

On August 14, 1987, Judge Aspen appointed The Habitat Company and Daniel Levin, a prominent Chicago real estate developer, as receiver of the CHA's nearly bankrupt scattered-site program. The Habitat Company was to develop and administer the CHA's uncompleted units and all nonelderly future projects. The agreement was signed November 27, 1987.

As part of the arrangements among HUD, the receiver, and the CHA, the Authority was to be bypassed in the development phase of the program. Habitat also requested that HUD waive a number of regulations to provide it with "sufficient flexibility to deal with the uniqueness of the [scattered-site] program, . . . overcome past difficulties, and achieve the goals set for it." (Agreement, p. 4)

The problem is that the scattered-site housing program is very unique, its history is troubled and far behind schedule, and its implementation in Chicago will be difficult under the best of circumstances. Proceeding with all the traditional operational constraints proposed by HUD, let alone budget constraints, will make it much more expensive and time consuming to accomplish . . . program objectives. (Correspondence Levin, and Zale, HUD, Chicago, September 8, 1987, p. 1)

As development manager, Habitat was given control of 79 buildings, 385 apartments, and 36 vacant lots. In 1988-89 it hoped to deliver 1,200 apartments through a combination of new construction, acquisition with substantial rehabilitation, and acquisition without rehabilitation. Habitat also planned to rehabilitate 41 of the buildings in 2 phases, sell 30, and demolish the remainder. Construction was expected to take at least 12 months, and the 2 projects would add 246 units to Chicago's scattered-site inventory. Two-thirds of the buildings were two-bedroom walkups with six or fewer apartments on a site. (Hickman, P., Director of Scattered-Site Program, Habitat Co., personal interview, June 10, 1988)

Approximately 2 years later, Habitat had rehabilitated 18 buildings with 98 apartments, sold 37 properties for \$749,105, and designed 4 new construction programs containing 451 apartments. In addition, another five programs were in the development application stage, with proposals planned for the first half of 1990. (*CHA Scattered-Site Housing Program Quarterly Report*, January 20, 1990)

Although progress fell short of the 1989 target of 365 units, the overall achievements of the receiver were impressive given the problems encountered over the first 24 months. The following are a few examples of delays in the timelines set by The Habitat Company as reported to the court: legal work, including court hearings, for the sale of surplus property; negotiations with aldermen and neighborhood groups over the acquisition of sites and plans for new construction; requests for revisions to plans and specifications; contractor-caused delays; bargaining over requests for waivers and the removal of "limiting rules and bureaucratic" red tape;¹² processing time, including appeals, for rezones and variances to the city's land use plan; multiple approval requirements to change orders for building construction or rehabilitation, and HUD approval of construction contracts and/or revisions; and the untimely receipt of title to purchased properties and the need to "repair and replace items due to vandalism." (*Ibid.*, p. 8)

Current Status

Chicago's scattered-site program—its scope, density, location, development mode (new construction or rehabilitation), management, and resident demography—has been shaped by the politics surrounding the implementation of the Gautreaux decision.¹³ This section discusses the scope and location of scattered-site units, updates the CHA's experiment with decentralized management, and reports upon the success of the program.

The production of scattered-site housing in Chicago predated the Gautreaux decision. The program actually began in 1967 when the CHA completed two developments—312 apartments on 14 sites and 12 units on 2 other sites. From 1967 through 1970, the Authority completed a total of 6 projects with 528 units on 35 sites. (Scattered-Site Questionnaire, December 1, 1982) Table 5-4 displays features of the program prior to the Austin ruling.

Table 5-4. CHA Scattered-Site Program Prior to Austin Ruling

Year Completed	No. of Development Projects	Sites	Units	Units Per Site
1967	2	14	312	25
1968	1	6	1	6
1969	2	19	204	13
1970	1	6	6	6
Totals	6	35	528	15

Source: Scattered-Site Questionnaire, December 1, 1982.

There is no lid on the CHA's obligation to provide scattered-site housing for Gautreaux litigants. Judge Austin's remedial order stated only that "[the] CHA . . . use its best efforts to increase the supply of dwelling units as rapidly as possible. . . ." (*Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority*, 1969) Whether the city remains the primary location for further Gautreaux relief, however, "will depend upon the availability of sites, the cost of construction or rehabilitation, the intensity of neighborhood opposition, and racial change in Chicago's neighborhoods." (Polikoff, interview, August 16, 1990)

Development Activity

Habitat's early rehabilitation program is now complete. By July 24, 1990, 31 buildings with 179 apartments had been finished and another 12 buildings with 64 units were under construction. (*2d Quarterly Report*, July 24, 1990, p. 1) In mid-August 1990, only seven or eight buildings remained as part of the original inventory of properties turned over to the receiver by the CHA in 1987. (Sasamoto L., Development Coordinator, Habitat, personal interview, August 17, 1990) Thus, as of August 1990, there were approximately 1,400 to 1,500 scattered-site units in the CHA's inventory.

Since the completion of the rehabilitation phase of the receivership contract, the main thrust of Habitat's efforts has been new construction, with more than 1,600 units planned over the next few years. (*Chicago Tribune*, April 23, 1989) The first of Habitat's new construction programs got underway in June 1990, and 98 of the 101 units were occupied by December 31, 1991. The predominantly three-bedroom family townhouses were scattered throughout the city in 11 census tracts and 10 wards. During

the third quarter of 1991, construction commenced on 2 more projects of 80 and 101 units, with another 375 units in the development pipeline. Projecting forward, and including FY 1991 HUD allocations of \$16.1 million, Habitat's production record could reach 1,377 units of new construction and 231 rehab units by the mid-1990s.

Property development and new construction continued during the third quarter of 1995, with 553 units either under construction or in the development pipeline. Construction is expected to start on the remaining eight turnkey programs (175 total units), with construction and transfer of the last units to occur in 1996. (*Quarterly Report: 3d Quarter, 1995*, p. 3) Construction targets were delayed for several months in late 1991 through early spring 1992, when the receiver could not persuade HUD to approve administrative budgets at "sufficient levels necessary to operate the program," or to sanction its acquisition of additional property in Hispanic neighborhoods.¹⁴ In its July 1991 site review of 12 units of new construction, the Chicago Regional Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity claimed the units increased concentration "inside the area of minority concentration to something over 34.9 percent" and that approval to date would place approximately 95 percent of the units in such areas.¹⁵

In lifting the Total Development Cost (TDC) cap¹⁶ and allowing Habitat to build in Hispanic neighborhoods—areas that contained a high proportion of low-income households—HUD ensured that the receiver would reach its production target of 1,608 units of scattered-site housing.¹⁷ The units Habitat produced since 1993 are located in "mixed" or predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods where lots are available and affordable.¹⁸ Furthermore, Habitat must continue to work with the Chicago HUD office, where unit costs in excess of \$100,000 are not supported, and the definition of "greater choice of housing opportunities" for "large families" is a three-bedroom apartment. (Hickman, personal interview, July 2, 1992)

Location

Among the criticisms leveled against the CHA's scattered-site program have been that buildings are not evenly distributed within or across the zones established by the court. What the CHA did was "cluster" the units, placing buildings in relatively few of the city's neighborhoods.¹⁹ Units were often "located in neighborhoods where resistance was not expected to be significant." (*Chicago Tribune*, November 1, 1981) The Logan Square neighborhood, for example, became an "island of low-income and subsidized housing" because of the number of scattered-site and Section 8 developments. (*The Logan Square Free Press*, March 8, 1984, p. 2)




Figure 10. Three newly constructed units on West Augusta, Chicago, Illinois.

The Chicago Lawyer published a list in 1983 of 132 buildings the CHA had acquired for the scattered-site program that confirmed the perceptions of neighborhood residents that “the process [was] chaotic and unfair.” (Ibid., July 1983, pp. 12–19) Johnson’s analysis documented that 40 percent of Chicago neighborhoods had some scattered-site housing, 67 percent of the units were in 10 neighborhoods, 17 of the city’s 50 councilmanic wards had no units, 9 wards contained 54 percent of the units, and the buildings were typically in “moderately” poor or “high” poverty neighborhoods. (Ibid., p. 13)

The skew in siting was affected by many factors, including high real estate prices in some neighborhoods, strong opposition from the confederation of neighborhoods and community councils (Suttles, 1990, pp. 85–120), the political clout of wards represented by influential city politicians (*Chicago Tribune*, January 29, 1984), the amount of attention Polikoff was paying to the selection process, and the CHA’s practice of using neighborhood real estate brokers to identify buildings for purchase. Erwin France, the CHA’s interim executive director in 1984, said of the latter practice: “You end up using local brokers who, like aldermen and ward committeemen, are responsive to local pressures.” (*Chicago Sun-Times*, March 14, 1984)

The “clustering” of scattered sites in a limited number of Chicago neighborhood areas continued under Habitat’s auspices. It was estimated that “nearly two-thirds of the units being built aren’t really scattered,” but rather “concentrated in a handful of neighborhoods.” (*Chicago Tribune*, January 23, 1994) Table 5–5 suggests the overconcentration in 31 community areas with significant percentages of African-American and Hispanic households.²⁰

Table 5–5. Neighborhood Mix of Habitat New Construction Sites

	Family Units [N = 672] (percent)	Family Sites [N = 171] (percent)
Mixed areas*	10.7	11.7
More than 30-percent African American	25.2	21.6
More than 30-percent white	9.7	6.4
More than 50-percent Hispanic	54.5	60.0

*Mixed areas: Census tracts where no group represents 50 percent or more of the population.

Source: *Quarterly Report*, February 4, 1992, p. 2.

According to *The Chicago Reporter*, nearly two-thirds of the scattered-site units developed by the CHA were located in African-American neighborhoods. Since 1987, however, 43 percent of the units “are in census tracts where at least half the residents are Latino.” Moreover, these areas of Latino concentration are said to account “for 84 percent of the remaining 777 properties purchased for the scattered-site program.” (Burnham, 1994, p. 3)

The failure of Habitat to more widely deconcentrate Gautreaux-eligible families resulted partly from a May 1990 modification of the HUD Consent Decree, wherein there are “no longer any census tracts designated as being in Revitalizing Areas,” and the receiver was henceforth required “to develop all units in the pipeline in the general areas as quickly as possible.” Further confusing the issue was the different definition of “area of minority concentration” used by HUD and the District Court. For the

Table 5-6. Mean Characteristics of Census Tracts Containing Scattered-Site Public Housing and Concentrated Public Housing

Characteristic	Scattered-Site*	Highly Concentrated**
Percent non-Hispanic white	18.3	15.0
Percent non-Hispanic African American	26.6	83.0
Percent Hispanic	51.5	1.3
Poverty rate	34.7	67.1
Median family income	\$19,817	\$11,948
Unemployment rate	16.7	34.4
Percent population 25+ with college degree	9.9	9.2

* Scattered-site public housing is located in 121 census tracts. Tract characteristics weighted by the number of units per tract.

** Mean for 11 census tracts where the Robert Taylor, Cabrini Green, ABLA, and Henry Horner public housing projects are located. Although families who participate in the Gautreaux Demonstration Program live in primarily suburban locations with "much higher income levels, far lower unemployment rates, and much higher educational levels," Chicago's scattered-site families have taken a "significant step up" from the city's "biggest concentrations of public housing."

Source: Peterson and Williams, 1994, p. 96, table 15.1.

court, the terms "minority" and "nonwhite" referred to African-American persons, whereas HUD considered areas of minority concentration to include African Americans and "all other minorities living in the area. . . ." ²¹ Thus, the acquisition and development of housing in Hispanic neighborhoods in the general area, even though "areas of minority concentration" within the meaning of HUD's site and neighborhood regulations, were sanctioned by the court, but not allowed by HUD.

The receiver asked for HUD's permission to develop units in areas of minority concentration after the Chicago/HUD regional office had issued a moratorium on future acquisitions in Hispanic census tracts in early October 1991. Approximately 6 months later, after Habitat had thoroughly evaluated the "land values and property suitable for development" in 36 community areas, and HUD had been assured that "rehabilitation was at least as expensive as new construction," HUD/Washington determined that there was an "overriding" need and lifted the moratorium on acquisitions in Hispanic areas.

Although most of the scattered sites are in the Chicago general areas, their distribution does demonstrate "clustering," and a handful of community areas have received disproportionate shares of assisted housing. Furthermore, as table 5-6 indicates, 78 percent of the households are either African American or Hispanic, the unemployment rate is 16.7 percent, and "the average unit has been built in a census tract having a 34.7-percent poverty rate." (Peterson and Williams, 1994, p. 96)

Program Evaluation

Whether Chicago's scattered-site program is judged to be successful or not depends partly on what period in the evolution of the program is examined. A balanced review of the program is made difficult because very few members of the Gautreaux client class were given the opportunity to move into new apartments in nonsegregated Chicago neighborhoods. Because no appreciable number of scattered-site units materialized until the mid-1980s, when "more than 500 such units had been provided by the Authority" (Warren, 1988, p. 59), early reviews of the program focused on the complexities and

overreach of the court order, the intransigence of the CHA, city council and mayoral politicking, and neighborhood fears of the possible relocation of the ghetto into their backyards.

Early Years

Although Judge Austin's July 1969 order was far reaching, three of its requirements should have made it easy to implement: (1) placing a 15-percent lid on the amount of family public housing in any census tract, (2) stating that projects could not contain more than 120 persons, and (3) requiring half the eligible families to be neighborhood residents.²² Each feature aimed to make the program palatable to Chicago's white neighborhoods as they emphasized low-density projects, avoided overconcentration, and served the neighborhoods "own" poor as well as families from the city's infamous projects.

It was Polikoff's other recommendation—that no public housing be constructed until 700 units were built in white outlying neighborhoods of Chicago and Cook County—that undermined any possibility of early success, given "the powerful combination at work in Chicago where public housing was concerned: Mayor Daley, Charles Swibel, the Chairman of the CHA, and HUD." (Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 39) McKay (1973) suggests that the court's attempt to enforce the Constitution and civil rights laws, "far from resulting in more integrated housing, produced a return to the status quo ante by halting the construction of all public housing." (Ibid., p. 18) What should have been useful features of the order, such as those mentioned above, he writes:

By severely restricting the size of future projects, the court hoped to avoid the social problems which had previously characterized public housing in Chicago. However, the size of projects was irrelevant to most white Chicagoans; public housing was public housing, and the decree aroused considerable opposition among Chicago's white community and among leaders of the Democratic machine. The reaction of the machine-controlled CHA was to procrastinate." (Ibid., p. 6)

In the formative years after Judge Austin's 1969 ruling, when precious few units of new construction were developed, the program was considered by many to be a failure. "In the 3 years since Austin first spoke," writes Seth King, Chicago correspondent for the *New York Times*, "the city council and the CHA, with Mayor Daley's concurrence, have slipped and slid and stalled on approving housing sites." (King, 1972, p. 12)

When the CHA made public proposals—2,000 units on 600 sites by 1972—many white communities engineered "hostile reactions" to the sites, and initiated "a massive letter writing campaign . . . with individual aldermen holding local hearings." (Baron, 1972, p. 25) The extreme position of some whites is captured in the language of a lawsuit filed by the Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Association (No-CHA), under the National Environmental Policy Act. King (1972) claims the neighborhood group believed the CHA "would pollute middle-class white neighborhoods if it brought poor black families into their midst." In one of the suit's "more forthright explanations" of why African Americans should be denied residential entry, it states:

As a statistical whole, low-income families of the kind that reside in housing provided by the CHA possess certain social class characteristics which will be, and have been, inimical and harmful to the legitimate interests of the plaintiffs. (Ibid., p. 15)

There is some evidence that even in the early years the program worked, at least for some former “project” families who moved into an “Austin-type” six-flat in Lincoln Park on the north side and townhouses in Hyde Park. (Roberts, August 1972, pp. 3–4) Most of the neighbors at both locations were white and either did not know or did not care that Ms. Johnson’s apartment was owned and maintained by the CHA. The subsidized units blended well with the neighborhood housing, and unlike living in the projects—three African-American families had moved from Cabrini Green—the families “do not feel their problems are insurmountable.” Although a few families experienced white hostility in the beginning, within a few months the resentment had faded. The scattered-site families helped each other, and in times of crisis “they rally ‘round.” Little things apparently made the building a nice place to live.

The kids did not have to worry about leaving a prized possession out in the hall and it being stolen overnight. The families, white and black, sometimes sat outside, drank beer, and socialized on hot summer evenings. (Ibid., p. 4)

The success of the Lincoln Park six-flat and the Hyde Park townhouses “did not happen by itself.” The tenants were carefully screened, some of the families were headed by working husbands, and “[d]ue to the CHA secrecy, the tenants were able to become an integral part of a now-expensive, integrated neighborhood.” (Ibid.)

Nearly a decade later, another survey of area residents and CHA tenants in the north and northwest sides reported that “almost everybody seems to be living calmly ever after.” (*Chicago Sun-Times*, September 9, 1983) Initially there was strong resistance from neighbors, and the new CHA tenants were fearful of whether they would be met with hostility or tolerance. “I was worried because I’d heard how hostile the neighborhood had been to another public housing building nearby,” one recalled. The tenants have adjusted, made friends, and feel part of the neighborhood. Acknowledging that her original fears were unfounded, Jackie Kranz now finds the neighborhood “a lot nicer than I thought it would be.” She attributes the program’s success to “the intensive background, credit, and housekeeping scrutiny that all prospective scattered-site tenants must undergo.” (Ibid.)

Sun-Times reporter Jimenez’s conversations with seven neighbors revealed nearly universal agreement that the scattered-site experience did not bring the expected troubles of crime, property destruction, and the eventual decline of the neighborhood. In general, the “newcomers” were seen as good neighbors; CHA residents “do a hell of a job keeping the buildings and grounds up. . . .” Typical responses sounded like “not been bad at all,” the “neighborhood is no different than before,” “integration is better for kids and for everyone,” “it’s just young people with families, . . . there’s nothing wrong with that,” and “you’d hardly know it was there. They’re just people living like anybody else.”

Warren (1988), Polikoff (1978, 1989), and Hirsch (1983) provide excellent short histories of the impact of the Austin decision. Polikoff provides a succinct summary of the early years:

The next 15 years, from 1969–84, provided a classic example of the frustration of court orders, or perhaps of the inability of a court to compel what amounted to political action. From 1969–74, [the] CHA built no new public housing at all. After dutifully choosing potential sites in white as well as black neighborhoods as Judge Austin had directed, [the] CHA declined to submit the sites to the City Council for fear of the political consequences in the upcoming 1971 mayoral election. Judge Austin had to order [the] CHA to deliver its selected sites to the Council. (p. 459)

New Mayors

There was hope of movement when cracks in the Daley Machine led to Jane Byrne's "stunning political upset" (Rivlin, 1992, p. 62) of incumbent mayor Michael Bilandic in the 1979 primary and victory over her Republican opponent with 87 percent of the vote. The beleaguered scattered-site policy could look forward to a new philosophy and management style at city hall, strong support from the African-American community, promises to "take full advantage of any available Federal housing dollars off limits because the city refused to build scattered-site housing in non-black areas of the city," and a significant modification in Austin's original order. (Ibid., p. 67)

Byrne agreed to build the units, and implementation began when she announced in 1979 that each area (referring then to the white "general" and minority "limited" districts) "would receive 100 units of new housing and 300 units of rehabilitated housing." (*Chicago Sun-Times*, September 9, 1993) Such housing was eventually built under Mayor Byrne, but the "units tended to be few in number and concentrated either in black neighborhoods or the few "revitalizing" communities that were open to racially mixed populations." (Squires, 1987, p. 115) Despite Byrne's "nominal support" of the scattered-site program, few units were acquired in white neighborhoods. The "general-area communities renewed their efforts to keep the CHA out," and Polikoff "sought to have a receivership imposed upon the scattered-site program. . . ." (Polikoff, 1989, p. 460)

On June 17, 1981, Judge Crowley signed an agreement that added "revitalizing" districts, "racially mixed areas undergoing gentrification,"²³ to the two white and African-American areas. (Hirsch, op. cit., p. 265) The agreement was seen as a retreat from the earlier Austin order. It represented an acknowledgment of the pervasive power of racism in the city, and "the plaintiffs eventually agreed, in effect, to reduce the pressure for integration and take what they could get." (Ibid., p. 266) The agreement, however, "did not affect public housing," but rather "concerned itself with subsidized private housing and [HUD] allocations." And, only "the prospect of further legal action [receivership] prompted the housing authority to embark on a new, scattered site, low-income housing program." (Ibid.)

Harold Washington, the city's first African-American mayor, held office from May 1983 until his untimely death in November 1987. Mayor Washington supported the scattered-site strategy, and under his leadership the "CHA began for the first time to try in earnest to develop scattered-site housing." (Polikoff, 1989, p. 461) His "reaffirmation of Gautreaux," as a *Chicago Tribune* editorial predicted, did not jump start the rehabilitation of the Authority's stockpiled inventory of acquired properties. (*Chicago Tribune*, May 2, 1983) The task "proved tougher than Washington or his housing chiefs thought: few of the buildings were developed, and most of them eventually became dilapidated beyond repair." (*Chicago Reader*, June 12, 1992)

Politics continued to shape the site acquisitions of the CHA. Interim director Erwin France, for example, "avoided sites in wards that previously had none," when he supervised the CHA's acquisition of 72 buildings and 406 apartments for which the CHA acquired options to meet a court deadline. (*Chicago Tribune*, January 29, 1984) France rationalized his unwillingness to break into the wards of influential politicians because of his late hire in November and the January 13 court deadline. "I therefore took what I could get," he said. (Ibid.)

The *Chicago Tribune's* analysis of the 1,066 apartments' locations found them unequally distributed, with some wards having 4 times the average—21 per councilmanic ward—and 14 wards with none.

(Ibid.) The absence of units in certain areas of the city reinforced for many Chicago residents a sense of unfairness, creating “much of the controversy surrounding the scattered-site program.” (Ibid.) The neighborhood was not opposed to scattered-site housing per se, as Darryl Burrows, president of the Logan Square Neighborhood Association, remarked:

We’ve always said ‘Yes, we’ll take our fair share,’ but the CHA has taken advantage of our socially responsible position. . . . They give us more and more units when other areas like the 10th Ward haven’t got a single one. (Ibid.)

The CHA Advisory Committee²⁴ examined the scattered-site program for 18 months before issuing a final report on December 12, 1985. It found the “concept of scattered-site public housing . . . a sound and humane program,” but it was “not popular with communities, with political leaders, with property owners, and apparently even with the CHA officialdom.” (CHA Advisory Committee, *The Final Report*, December 12, 1985, p. 1) The program had become even more unpopular than it was in the late 1970s.

Although the Advisory Committee acknowledged that “race remains an issue in some communities,” opposition to the scattered-site program had been aggravated by the CHA’s “delays and incompetence,” such as:

- Completing the rehabilitation and renting of several hundred buildings which are now boarded up and seen by the community as eyesores and blight.
- Persuading the CHA to take seriously the rule that 50 percent of the tenants of a scattered-housing site come from the local community.
- Ending inhumane displacement of families. (Ibid., p.3)

The promising start of the program in the early 1980s “was frustrated . . . by the dilatory tactics of the CHA itself: the “stockpiling of residential buildings,” the evictions of low- and moderate-income tenants,” (Ibid., p. 1) and a “fixation to meet court-ordered deadlines for the acquisition of sites,” thus “abandon[ing] the development of vacant sites and the construction and rehabilitation of properties . . . it already owns.” (Ibid., p. 7)

In short, [“b]y its delays and incompetence” the Authority “played into the hands of the opponents.” The opposition can now “point to the disastrous experience of neighborhoods which, having approved public housing as a neighborhood improvement, soon found themselves fighting unoccupied, slum-like properties owned by a government body. Today several hundred CHA-owned units, neighborhood eyesores, are scattered across the city.” (Ibid., p. 1)

Receivership

The CHA’s “bankrupt scattered-site program” began to receive more favorable evaluations after Judge Marvin E. Aspen ordered the program into receivership on May 14, 1987, and appointed The Habitat Company and Daniel Levin as receiver in December 1987. A more supportive press was partly because of the court’s endorsement of arrangements whereby neither HUD nor the receiver had to obtain CHA approval of their actions or decisions. Habitat, moreover, had a solid reputation in

the development community and, once the receiver overcame a number of HUD regulatory barriers (see earlier discussion on p. 112), began to focus on production targets.

The future of public housing in Chicago was favorably reviewed in the spring of 1989 by the *Chicago Tribune's* John McCarron (April 23, 1989), who reported that the scattered-site program, "once the symbol of bureaucratic folly—[it] seems on the verge of taking off." McCarron attributed the program's improved position, especially when "the reputation of the CHA's scattered sites wasn't much better than that of its high-rise . . . homes," to two changes: (1) private or community-based management of the program, and (2) competent rehabilitation and quality construction of new low-scale units by Habitat that blended with the neighborhood. (Ibid.) The effects of these two changes are illustrated by the private management of a number of the CHA's north-side scattered-site apartments by the Human Resource Center (HRC), and the incorporation of clusters of elderly housing into Habitat's new construction plans.

Management Experiment

A court-appointed receiver was one way to move implementation along. The CHA's ability to meet scattered-site production timetables, however, was not likely to overcome neighborhood resistance. What was needed was a strategy to encourage community support. One option was to remove the CHA from the landlord-tenant relationship and to share management responsibility with community-based groups.

This shared responsibility to decentralize management of public housing as an alternative to CHA control was "the brainchild of Alex Polikoff." (*Neighborhood News*, July 22, 1983) In 1980, Polikoff persuaded the CHA to explore ways to turn portions of the scattered-site program over to locally based nonprofit or for-profit housing agencies. He argued that:

Good, locally based, locally sensitive management . . . could defuse much of the protest by neighborhood groups against scattered-site units. If neighborhood organizations could see scattered-site public housing as housing in and for their community—not merely an outpost of the dreaded and widely despised CHA—they might more readily accept it, and in so doing, make it work better. (DeZutter, November 19, 1984, p. 14)

In August 1983 negotiations among the CHA, HUD, Sue Brady of the HRC,²⁵ and Polikoff led to a 2-year CHA experiment in decentralized management of the troubled, politically controversial scattered-site properties. The HRC had some early problems managing the north-side scattered-site properties. Tenant screening was considered "soft," and CHA-acquired buildings were badly in need of repair and located in unsafe deteriorating neighborhoods.

Client demography was a particular concern to the HRC. The "preponderance, or imbalance of low-income, single-parent families on Aid to Families with Dependent Children [created] 'insurmountable difficulties' for a workable scattered-site program." (DeZutter, November 1984, p. 29) The HRC subsequently instituted a "rigorous screening and selection process" (DeZutter, January 1986, p. 48) to control the effects of the imbalance. Evictions were used to "improve the properties, boost morale, win trust and cooperation," and demonstrate to the tenants that "HRC was willing to act tough." (Ibid., p. 46)

The HRC's tenant selection policy was more restrictive than HUD criteria or Gautreaux guidelines. To qualify for an apartment, families had to pass an initial screening that included visiting homes; contacting former landlords, employers, and creditors; and talking to the teachers of children who live in the household.²⁶ Residents also had to pay their rent on time, report changes in their income, keep the apartment roach free, remove household garbage daily, care for the common area, and provide 15-day notification before moving.²⁷

The "tough love" policy of Sue Brady, director of the HRC's management experiment, was reflected not only in the eviction of problem tenants, but in finding ways to involve residents in creating a safe environment for their families.²⁸ The Tenant Selection Committee, for example, interviewed and provided orientation for all families who passed initial screening. The HRC also encouraged the Tenant Grievance Committee to issue citations to residents who violated the lease or building regulations.²⁹

Brady was a firm believer in bottom-up, tenant-based management. For her, "the best management is self-management." Her strategy incorporated the following four goals: (1) create a tenant advisory council to set policy and spending priorities; (2) integrate residents into block clubs and community organizations where they can serve their neighborhoods; (3) hire tenants to assist management in monitoring building problems and conditions to enforce maintenance regulations; and (4) train tenants to perform routine maintenance and repair work. (DeZutter, November 1983, p. 18)

The first-year evaluation of the HRC's performance in the decentralized management experiment was positive. DeZutter noted several year-end accomplishments: management was "more visible, more accountable, more personal, and more personable"; the HRC stayed within budget; tenants were involved in building operations; rent collections improved;³⁰ problem tenants were more effectively evicted; communication with tenants was enhanced;³¹ and the care of the properties improved markedly. (Ibid., pp. 31–38) The most important indicator of success, however, was that residents liked the program. DeZutter's 1985 survey of 46 HRC residents found them highly satisfied with their scattered-site homes, the management by the HRC, and the north-end neighborhood. (DeZutter, January 1986, pp. 74–75)

The Cluster Plan

Habitat asked HUD in 1988 to revise the receivership agreement to incorporate clusters of elderly housing into the scattered-site plan.³² This configuration would be placed only in the "revitalizing" or "general" housing areas. Each site might contain 50 to 75 family units and 50 to 100 elderly apartments. (Habitat, *A Cluster Plan for Elderly Housing in Chicago, Ill.*, May 16, 1988)

The cluster plan was envisioned as a way to "re-establish the accountability of public housing in Chicago, and enhance the community's commitment to responsible development of low-income housing." (Hickman, correspondence with author, August 4, 1988) Benefits of mixing elderly households with families included:

- Onsite management. Low-density cluster settings of 100–150 units per site "will make it possible for residents to receive personalized services," including "onsite management and full-time maintenance personnel." (*Cluster Plan*, op. cit., p. 4)

- Security. Clusters “allow for limited access to the property, and fencing of the perimeter.” Defensible space is arranged to provide room for the “outdoor use by families, playground areas for the children, and recreational areas for the elderly.” (Ibid., p. 5)
- Neighborhood identity. Clusters of elderly and family housing should “lead to an improved quality of life.” People living in these small-scale residential environments “will have an opportunity to get to know one another and to develop a sense of neighborhood.” (Ibid.)
- Intergenerational contact. The cluster concept encourages ongoing relationships between the young and the old. According to Hickman, the benefits are several: Positive personal benefits may be possible because onsite management will [facilitate] informal contacts, some of which may take place in the play areas. The programming, moreover, could work both ways. For example, the seniors might assist with Girl or Boy Scout clubs, children could adopt a surrogate grandparent, or an elder might reciprocate by adopting a child, or the kids may put on activities and shows for the adults. (Hickman, correspondence with author, August 4, 1988)

The cluster prototype, part of that “initial campus of low-income housing that can be used as a sales tool,” (*Chicago Tribune*, April 23, 1989) was showcased at the January 6, 1994, opening of a scattered-site cluster in the South Shore neighborhood. The 51-unit senior citizens’ building, along with 41 townhomes for low-income families, straddles a site that was home to vacant lots and an unoccupied building. Patrick T. Reardon, *Chicago Tribune* urban affairs writer, says the clustered development doesn’t “fit the stereotype of public housing. They look like any privately developed new housing and feature such architectural niceties as pitched roofs.” (*Chicago Tribune*, January 7, 1994)

By the late 1980s and early 1990s scattered-site public housing “may have found a niche,” (*Chicago Tribune*, April 23, 1989) thus bringing to an end a quarter century during which the court-ordered dispersal strategy “was one of the most divisive issues in the city.” (*Chicago Tribune*, January 7, 1994) The program is now being touted by Mayor Richard Daley (the first Mayor Daley’s son), aldermen, and community leaders “as a key to rebuilding city neighborhoods—and Chicago itself.” (Ibid.) Finally,

the “Gautreaux housing decision is beginning to bear fruit.” (*Chicago Reader*, June 12, 1992)

Even with the program winding down, neighborhood groups continued to mobilize residents around the issues of scattered-site placement and the unfairness of overburdening a handful of Chicago neighborhoods with assisted housing units. Opposition to




Figure 11. Housing designed for senior citizens, Chicago, Illinois.

Habitat's "new construction" program was highlighted in the summer of 1990, when the Edgewater Community Council filed an injunction to block new construction at 5466 North Winthrop.³³

A total of 101 new townhouses were planned for 11 sites in 11 different census tracts, and both elected officials and residents of "these diverse neighborhoods . . . expressed various degrees of concern and anxiety regarding the planned new construction." (Habitat, *Quarterly Report, 2d Quarter*, 1990, p. 2)

Further opposition followed HUD permission "to develop 500 units in [Habitat's] pipeline" in general areas "which are minority concentrated areas under HUD's site and neighborhood regulations, primarily because they contain large Hispanic populations." (Memorandum from Michael B. Janis, General Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing, to Gertrude Jordan, Regional Administrator/Chicago, June 1, 1992) A *Chicago Tribune* editorial pointed out that two-thirds of the 1,608 townhouses being built for the CHA "are sited in just 6 of the city's 77 official community areas," and that the "Gautreaux" housing program "tends not to scatter but to move along the path of least resistance." (*Chicago Tribune*, July 31, 1994)

Mary Jo Janezic, Magnolia-Molden Neighborhood Association member, expressed the concerns of many residents of Chicago neighborhoods. She claimed that while most Sheridan Park residents supported scattered site in their community, the units in Sheridan Park—"verging on 108 today"—"increase the very problem of overconcentration of low-income residents, one that scattered-site housing was supposed to rectify." (*Chicago Tribune*, July 23, 1994)

The program has received mixed reviews in West Town and Humboldt Park neighborhoods. Both communities have census tracts with heavy concentrations of assisted units: 1 of every 10 in West Town and 1 in 25 in Humboldt Park are scattered-site houses. CHA-assisted residents who have moved into the units are pleased with their new homes, and some neighbors, like Virginia Marrero, wish they could get one for their kids so "they wouldn't have to live in a rathole. . . . If God granted one of those [referring to a group of clean brick townhouses a few doors from her home], I'd start going to church again." (*Chicago Tribune*, May 27, 1994)

Although certain neighborhood associations strongly oppose further "clustering,"³⁴ it is a myth to assume that "Hispanics in Chicago do not need or want public housing, or housing subsidies."³⁵ (*Chicago Tribune*, March 9, 1994) The myth was reinforced in the unsuccessful primary challenge by Juan Soli to unseat incumbent Congressman Luis Gutierrez. The popular Gutierrez was accused of helping the CHA "shoehorn" too many scattered-site townhouses into the Hispanic Humboldt Park neighborhood. In 1990 Gutierrez had, as alderman for the area, "helped Habitat obtain 86 city-owned vacant lots in several wards, including his own, for \$1 each." (*Chicago Tribune*, January 30, 1994)

The overconcentration of assisted units in one census tract led the CHA and Habitat to negotiate a reduction in the number to be built in the neighborhood. Habitat agreed to cut the project by 110 units, further lowering densities by substituting two-unit buildings for three-flats. (Burnham, op. cit., p. 5) The revised West Town/Humboldt Park plan also would "set aside space for gardens, playlots, and even a laundry," Gutierrez said. (*Chicago Tribune*, May 27, 1994) In addition, Habitat would provide more management and better maintenance. From Habitat's perspective the "clustering" of units is unavoidable, and to prevent paralysis and doing nothing, they have bought land in "Latino neighborhoods where prices are lower and political opposition is subdued." (Burnham, 1994, p. 3)

In comparison to the “heightened racial tensions” it inspired, “pit[ting] neighborhood against neighborhood and fuel[ing] white flight from the city,” Reardon saw few benefits to the 17-year, court-mandated scattered-site program. (*Chicago Tribune*, December 4, 1986) The negatives, in fact, were substantial.

- “It brought to a virtual halt all other construction of new public housing for Chicago’s low-income families because it required CHA officials to spend most of their energy—and money—on producing scattered-site units.
- It fed racial and economic discrimination throughout the city and placed public housing in the role of an enemy of white, ethnic neighborhoods.
- It added to the decay of some economically borderline city neighborhoods when hundreds of CHA-purchased properties, left vacant for years for no apparent reason, were heavily vandalized and became local eyesores.
- And . . . it distracted Chicago’s officials and citizenry from the severe and still-growing need of the city’s low-income people, both black and white, for decent, affordable housing.” (Ibid.)

The most persistent critic of the Gautreaux mandate of low-density, scattered-site housing is J.S. Fuerst, professor of social work at Loyola University and former CHA employee. Fuerst has brought at least five charges against the Gautreaux case and the court’s remedial order. First, the buildings and density are too small. It is “economically and politically very difficult,” he argues, “to build any sizable amount of subsidized housing six units at a crack.”³⁶ (*Chicago Tribune*, May 25, 1979) Decent-sized structures, on the other hand, could not only increase housing volume but create a critical mass of “poor black families” who will not be branded as the “Gautreaux kids, or worse.” (Ibid.)

Second, the program has oversaturated already deteriorated areas. The CHA’s only goal was to “find buildings that were available for sale which would not affect the community by being too numerous in any one block or area.” (*Chicago Tribune*, September 19, 1984) Third, many of the purchased units were occupied and in neighborhoods undergoing transition. The net effect of this policy was neither to upgrade nor help develop the city, but to destabilize “the community by forcing out hundreds of moderate-income, working minority families.” (*Chicago Tribune*, September 2, 1984, and *Planning*, 1985, pp. 21–22)

Fourth, the buildings purchased in the 1980s were clearly identifiable as CHA properties. Architecturally, “the units suggest what the Robert Taylor Homes might be like reduced to two- or three-unit buildings.” (*Chicago Tribune*, September 19, 1984) Finally, Fuerst claims in a field study of 630 Gautreaux units that the three- to six-bedroom flats, “whether rehabilitated or new, are hardly in tip-top shape. The condition of the mail boxes, vestibules, stairwells, and landscaping is notably poor since CHA provides no janitorial help.” (Ibid., and *Planning*, op. cit., p. 23)

Although the Gautreaux case has received extensive press attention for over a quarter of a century, there is remarkably little research examining the effects of the program on income-eligible tenants or the neighborhoods chosen for placement of scattered-site apartments. Fuerst’s field survey of 630 units “either built, acquired, or proposed by the CHA” is an exception (*Planning*, op. cit., pp. 21–23). His findings are limited, however, because the characterizations of the neighborhoods chosen for the

apartments, and the author's criticisms of CHA maintenance and the poor "appearance of most of the scattered-site units," were probably gleaned from driveby windshield inspections. Moreover, his data did little more than confirm what was already known.³⁶ Reardon comments on that earlier period of CHA scattered-site development:

The few hundred scattered-site units that were built between 1969 and 1987 looked bare and ugly, like small versions of the looming public housing high rises. Officials made sure that the buildings appeared as plain as possible so they wouldn't be accused of pampering the poor. (*Chicago Tribune*, January 7, 1994)

DeZutter's evaluation of the CHA's pilot program to "localize the management" of nearly 200 scattered-site units discussed earlier includes what little data we have on resident and neighborhood perceptions of scattered-site housing. DeZutter's documentation of street locations strongly suggests the importance that both development method and locational factors play on the appearance of the property.

DeZutter found the CHA newly constructed buildings "stark," and when touring uptown found the scattered-site units easy to spot "because they [were] the newest buildings on their blocks, looking brutally stark and almost too new, surrounded as they [were] by dumpy vacant lots and makeshift parking." (*Chicago Reader*, July 22, 1983) In contrast was a rehabilitated building, nearly "impossible for someone to pick out or stigmatize" as a CHA property, with "[i]ts new triple track windows [making] the building look even better than its neighbors." (*Ibid.*) Summarizing the importance of neighborhood effects, he writes:

From the looks of the buildings, the best idea would appear to be to locate the units in stable, nice-looking neighborhoods where it might be hard to place them—not the rough-and-tumble 'hoods where it would merely be convenient to do so. (*Ibid.*, p. 3)

Wright's study (1992) of the CHA's "Community Area Waiting Lists Outreach Procedures" contains important information on how any community, not just the city of Chicago, might increase public awareness, and thereby cultivate greater acceptance of scattered-site housing. In his investigation into why, after a year of CHA outreach effort, different neighborhoods revealed "different rates of applications and a lack of racial diversity in applicants," Wright surveyed 350 residents in Albany Park, Uptown, Austin, Humboldt Park, and the Lower West Side. Relevant to this report are his queries about subsidized housing, especially questions concerning the CHA's scattered-site program. (*Ibid.*, Executive Summary)

Although nearly 60 percent of the community respondents knew about the CHA's high-rise public housing, only 35 percent were aware of the scattered-site program. The five communities were "relatively equal in their . . . lack of knowledge of scattered-site units." Interestingly, 62 percent of white respondents knew of the program. (*Ibid.*, p. 30) More than two-thirds (68.5 percent) of the "eligible" respondents³⁷ did not know anyone who lived in subsidized housing, and only 20 percent were aware of assisted housing in the neighborhood.

Another important question Wright asked respondents was whether they thought "it would be a good or bad idea for your neighborhood if eight units of subsidized low-income housing were built so families of lower paid workers could live there." Seventy-nine percent thought it was a good idea, with only a

10-percent difference separating African-American (84 percent) from white views (74 percent). Unfortunately, the question was not open ended; it specified working-class poor households, not poor single mothers with children.

Wright's data suggest that "the overall public image of subsidized housing" is shaped by images of "high-rise housing projects," and "where there is some knowledge . . . it is very negative." (Ibid., p. 35) Wright also found that the CHA's community meetings "helped break down popular misconceptions of public housing," but the Authority's "inability or unwillingness to point to the location and design of new scattered-site units . . . contributed to a public perception of secrecy surrounding . . . the units, and raising the public's suspicion of the program's viability." (Ibid., p. 19)

Of the report's 16 recommendations to address "the lack of diversity and low applicant rate" for community areas, 1 is generic and potentially useful to many communities hoping to operate successful programs and to obviate community opposition. Recommendation 7 contains the following charge to any PHA's External Affairs Department:

Educate the community leaders as to the nature of the program so they can carry the information back to their communities. Conduct an open citywide education campaign about the different types of public housing with particular emphasis on the appearance of the scattered-site units and their difference from the projects. This would help to break down public prejudice against CHA housing and to increase the number of applicants. (Ibid., p. 37)

Spring 1995 was the estimated target date for the end of the "scattered" housing saga in Chicago. Edwin Eisendrath, regional chief for HUD, said Habitat will have constructed or rehabilitated 1,608 new scattered-site units, which, combined with an earlier CHA inventory and the Gautreaux demonstration participants, should meet the "specific numerical anti-discrimination targets of the 1981 consent decree. . . . That order required that 7,100 people "be offered housing options beyond the CHA ghettos." (*Chicago Sun-Times*, March 27, 1994)

At this point it is appropriate to ask of Alex Polikoff what Raymond Coffey asked Eisendrath: "After all the years, what do we have in the way of results? Did it work? Was it worth it? What do we do next?" As lead counsel in the Gautreaux case, Polikoff has had nearly 30 years to ponder the results of Judge Austin's decision mandating the disestablishment of Chicago's segregated public housing system.

In a talk before colleagues and friends at the Business and Professional People for the Public Interests (BPI) annual observance of Law Day, May 1, 1986, Polikoff revealed his disappointment when he said, on a scale of 1 to 10, "the scattered-site part of the Gautreaux remedy would have to be judged as falling somewhere below zero."

As "chief accountant of Gautreaux's perplexing ledger of racial percentages, building heights, and census tract quotas" (*Chicago Tribune*, May 2, 1983), Polikoff has recorded a number of obstacles to the implementation of scattered-site housing within Chicago, including (1) the open defiance of Chicago mayors and occasional chairmen of the CHA; (2) HUD delays in Chicago by the regional office and in Washington over development costs, site approvals, and the granting of waivers to HUD regulations; (3) the reluctance of the Federal District Court to appoint a receiver; (4) the absence of administrative leadership because of chronic turnover in the CHA executive directorship; (5) intense neighborhood

opposition and racism; and (6) the failure of the court to provide relief to the plaintiff class partly because of inadequate control of the means of enforcement.³⁸

Although Polikoff has been frustrated by these barriers to the timely and effective implementation of the court's remedial order, he is convinced that Gautreaux represents sound public policy and that scattered-site public housing "sure beats by a country mile the concentrated high rises it has replaced." (*North Shore*, June 1984, and *Chicago Lawyer*, op. cit., p. 19)

Whether there will be more scattered-site housing for Chicago in the last half of the 1990s depends on two factors: whether the parties to the original suit against the CHA agree to an order of dismissal, or whether the court itself relinquishes jurisdiction. Or, Polikoff could return to the court and ask for further relief, as he did in August 1991. That motion, had it been granted, would have required the CHA to amend its planning documents and "undertake all future planning, taking into account [the] CHA's court-ordered duty to affirmatively administer its public housing system to the end of disestablishing segregation." (Plaintiff's Motion For Further Relief, August 5, 1991, p. 1)

The motion for further relief highlights the contrasting visions that Alex Polikoff and Vince Lane have for public housing in Chicago. Polikoff clearly has been the stronger advocate for scattered-site housing. Although granting that the program is not a social panacea, his June 1984 letter to the *North Shore* magazine suggests its superiority to the high-rise alternative.

If we are to have public housing, it does not make sense to build high-rise monoliths of social disaster. Nor does it make sense to put public housing of whatever sort in the same old disadvantaged, poverty-stricken neighborhoods that housed virtually all of it before the scattered-site program came along. Either course would be an ostrich-like failure to learn from history. (*North Shore*, op. cit.)

The Future of Public Housing in Chicago

On June 8, 1988, Vincent Lane became the 14th director of the CHA. He came to the job committed to turning the CHA around, bringing with him 15 years of experience in low- and moderate-income housing, including the management of more than 3,000 apartments. (Testimony of Vincent Lane before the Chicago City Council, June 7, 1988, pp. 1-2.) At this time the CHA's scattered-site program was not a priority.³⁹ What Lane wanted was to achieve financial solvency and administrative stability for the CHA, improvement of onsite maintenance and management, resident involvement in planning and implementing improvements at the Authority, the development and maintenance of good relations with HUD, and the rehabilitation of deteriorated buildings and vacant units in the CHA's huge public housing inventory. (Ibid., p. 4)

Over the past half-dozen years, the CHA has focused almost exclusively on this agenda.⁴⁰ Of particular importance to Lane has been the renovation of Chicago's poorly maintained and aging public housing stock. In a "bold experiment" to retrofit thousands of family units, the CHA hopes to return to an earlier era when public housing provided "transitional residences for families pulling themselves out of poverty." (*The Washington Post*, August 5, 1991) Property managers screened prospective tenants "to make sure they would contribute to the hoped-for atmosphere of uplift." (Lemann, 1991)

Whether the CHA projects should be refurbished and occupied once again by tenants from the same poor neighborhoods that sparked the original Gautreaux litigation has “rekindled an old debate about the merits of high-rise public housing projects.” (*The Washington Post*, August 5, 1991) Lane’s rebuilding program pits the CHA against longtime adversary Alex Polikoff, executive director of BPI and Gautreaux attorney. *Washington Post* writer Michael Abramowitz has defined what is at issue:

Is rehabilitation the most realistic approach for improving the lives of thousands of the impoverished families, many headed by single mothers, who reside in the 167 family high-rise buildings operated by [the] CHA? Or should the high rises be scrapped, with the families being relocated into townhouses and smaller apartment complexes in more integrated neighborhoods around the city? (Ibid.)

Lake Parc Place

The test case for Lane’s new strategy was the renovation of six high-rise apartment buildings that formed the core of the Washington Park Project.⁴¹ The project’s location on highly valued lakeside property, just south of the central business district with ample views of the Chicago skyline,⁴² provided the CHA with an opportunity to revitalize the surrounding neighborhood and reweave, in the Jane Jacobs sense, the project “into the city fabric.” There is skepticism about whether middle-income residents “will take a chance on living in a CHA high rise.” Some community leaders and fourth ward Alderman Toni Preckwinkle argue that “the community would have a better chance if Lane would tear down the other lakefront buildings and replace them with scattered low-rise units, which they say remove the stigma of poverty.” (Berry, 1991, p. 14)

The second leg of Lane’s plan was to entice a private developer to build another 141 low-income units in a 564 low-rise, mixed-income townhouse apartment complex in the surrounding neighborhood on city-owned land. (*Chicago Business*, July 1, 1991)⁴³ This venture would create a foundation for the rebirth of a stable community, and with it a lessening of behavioral stereotypes of the poor, racism, and class fears that have long separated project families from the adjacent community.

The CHA’s Disestablishment Duty

Plaintiff filed a motion on November 21, 1990, requesting that the CHA be enjoined from rebuilding four high-rise buildings along South Lakeshore Drive (part of the Lakefront Properties that included the renovated Lake Parc Place). Polikoff argued that the CHA had violated the community planning process and that the rehab may be illegal: “By rebuilding in the middle of an all-black neighborhood, the CHA would be duplicating the core wrong in Gautreaux.” (Berry, op. cit., p. 14) The court ruled in favor of Lane, holding that rebuilding would not begin for another year, and there was “ample time for ‘alternatives’ and ‘choices’ to be fully explored.” Lane insisted that the rehab, or demolition of existing buildings, and the “development of scattered-site housing, as mandated by the Gautreaux ruling, [we]ren’t mutually exclusive.” (*Chicago Business*, July 1, 1991, p. 10)

Subsequently, Polikoff filed another Motion for Further Relief. On August 5, 1991, after having weighed the implications of the CHA’s Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Plan (CIAP) for fiscal year 1991, and the massive 5-year half-billion dollar funding request in its Comprehensive Plan for

Modernization (CPM 1992–96), Polikoff “asked the court to direct CHA to take into account its desegregation duties in all its current and future rebuilding plans.” (Blair-Loy, 1994, p. 1541)⁴⁴

As plaintiff’s attorney, Polikoff asked the court to require the CHA to amend both its CIAP and CPM requests in continuation of its obligation to “affirmatively administer its public housing system to the end of disestablishing segregation. . . .” (Plaintiff’s Motion For Further Relief, August 5, 1991, p. 1) Polikoff contended that the CHA was at a planning crossroads with much of its public housing stock “in need of significant physical improvement in order to be habitable.” (Ibid., p. 2)⁴⁵ Furthermore, the CHA was bound to “consider its Gautreaux duty to disestablish segregation as it makes its plans.” (Ibid.) “To mindlessly rebuild the same buildings on the same sites would be to redo the same wrong, and to reestablish segregation for generations of public housing tenants to come.” (Ibid., p. 1)

Lane’s vision of mixed-income communities and plans to de-densify the city’s high-rise projects faced a new challenge from this Motion for Further Relief. For Polikoff, however, the CHA was presented with a choice “to rebuild those buildings in their existing segregated locations, or to plan to phase them out and replace them with constitutionally located, non-segregated housing.” (Ibid.) Both the original Austin order and the current decree against HUD satisfied “but a small fraction of the remedial obligations” of the CHA. High-rise projects, many comprising “the core of the original constitutional wrong, still stand in their still segregated neighborhoods,” attesting to the fact that the CHA’s “segregated housing system has not been disestablish[ed]” (Ibid., p. 5) In summary, his motion argued for the complete remedy of the constitutional violation:

Given the grossly inadequate relief plaintiffs have so far received, and in light of the fact that [the] CHA is now developing long-term ‘modernization’ plans for projects [including many high rises] whose location formed the core of the original Gautreaux constitutional violation, . . . plaintiffs are entitled to an order from this Court requiring [the] CHA to include Gautreaux considerations in its planning. (Ibid.)

The dilemma the CHA confronted in the spring of 1991 when it “filed two applications for several hundred million dollars in Federal funds to rebuild thousands of units of public housing” was solved by Congress in 1992, when the amended Housing and Community Development Act specified that in “certain circumstances housing authorities could relocate tenants to existing private housing with rent vouchers instead of building new replacement housing.” (Blair-Loy, Op. cit., p. 1540) The CHA could now choose from a mix of strategies—rebuilding, demolition, new construction, and rent vouchers—to replace “its physically obsolete and illegally segregated public housing system.” (Ibid.)

New Development Ventures

Since the Lake Parc Place development, Lane has continued to promote ways to undo Chicago’s high-rise “concrete reservations, and to win converts to his vision of low-density mixed-class projects.” (Gurwitt, 1994, p. 38)⁴⁶ One of his efforts to “de-densify” the Housing Authority’s “vertical slums” was to take place at Cabrini Green, a 6,935-unit project located just a few blocks “from the glitter of the Magnificent Mile shopping district.” (*The New York Times*, February 15, 1994) Some aspects of the plan were shared with residents at a closed-door meeting at the complex on February 3, 1993. (*Chicago Sun-Times*, February 5, 1993) Four closed buildings were likely candidates for demolition.

Lane “envisi[on]ed 10 private developments interspersed in Cabrini’s confines,” offering up to 300 units for working families. (Ibid.) Some of the cleared land would be leased to private developers to build groups of low-rise buildings for middle-class (75 percent) and poor (25 percent) families. Eight months later 6 high-rise buildings were to be razed, with more than half the 690 replacement units at scattered-site locations throughout the city and in metropolitan suburbs. Lane’s plan for Cabrini Green “[was] expected to serve as a model for public housing elsewhere” and would eventually cost an estimated \$350 million. (*Chicago Tribune*, October 27, 1993)

The Lane/Cisneros Marriage

Some of Vince Lane’s dreams—mixed-income housing, de-densifying the high-rise projects, and rebuilding viable communities—even his desire to “take public housing back 40 years to what it was, a place where people got a helping hand to move up and out” (Berry, op. cit., p. 12), are shared by HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros. Cisneros also had a mission, writes David Broder, and part of it was “to remake the face of urban America starting . . . in Chicago, where the extremes are as great as anywhere in America.” (*The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, June 13–19, 1994, p. 4)

In the January 12, 1993, confirmation hearings, Secretary-Designee Cisneros articulated a three-part mission for HUD: “[D]eveloping an urban strategy, focusing on the mission of housing, and overhauling the management systems and continuing the reforms of the Department.” (Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 103d Congress, First Session, January 12, 1993, p. 64) Equally important was the way he saw himself carrying out the assignment: “I come . . . as an advocate of the city, a skeptic of the status quo, and a believer in experimentation, federalism, and the need to provide people with hope.” (Ibid., p. 17)

Fifteen months later, elements of the early mission statement became part of the administration’s proposed Housing Choice and Community Investment Act of 1994. Two fundamental principles shaped the legislation: choice for people and investment in communities (Cisneros, Opening Statement, April 28, 1994, p. 5). Also, two key provisions of the housing reauthorization—turning around public housing and enforcing fair housing—were critically important to Vince Lane’s own dreams for Chicago.

The Cisneros proposal that modernization funds be used to finance loans for cities “to demolish and replace blighted housing” (Katz, 1993, p. 1008) grew out of his April visits to Chicago. (*The Chicago Sun-Times*, May 3, 1994) The Secretary first came to the city on April 10 to work out a strategy to improve safety at the high-rise projects, spending one night sleeping over at Robert Taylor Homes, which he called “the end of the line in urban America; the dead end where racial, spatial separation and isolation ultimately lead us.” (Cisneros, Address, Notre Dame Club of Chicago Hesburgh Forum, April 15, 1994, p. 4)

Cisneros returned to Chicago on April 15 to announce that the city would receive \$29 million for a wide range of law enforcement enhancements to public housing safety, a downpayment on the president’s crime bill. (*Chicago Tribune*, April 16, 1994) The important crime initiative, however, was upstaged when Cisneros announced that HUD would propose that the CHA, and possibly other Housing Authorities, be allowed to “redirect funds currently allocated for the repair and rehabilitation of public housing buildings, to replace outdated public housing units.” (Ibid.) On April 20 the initiative

was reported as “pathbreaking,” and “aimed at leading thousands of Americans out of crime and poverty in titanic public-housing projects.” (*The Christian Science Monitor*, April 20, 1994)

The sudden prospect of being able to “unstack poor people” (*The Dallas Morning News*, April 10, 1994) by shifting HUD incentives away from keeping the ghetto alive, to helping poor people escape “hell in a high rise” (*The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, November 30–December 6, 1994, p. 25) prompted “much political posturing and not enough thoughtful discussion about how the promise might become reality.” (*Chicago Tribune*, April 24, 1994) Over the next few days, first Mayor Richard Daley, and then Vince Lane, talked of relocating some CHA residents to northwest and southwest suburbs where the jobs are. “If you’re going to do away with that type of [high-rise public] housing, you have to do it metropolitanwide,” Daley said. (*Chicago Sun-Times*, April 19, 1994) By Tuesday, April 19, two politicians with mayoral ambitions were criticizing the mayor’s selection of the northwest and southwest suburbs as residential neighborhoods for soon-to-be-displaced project families.

Because HUD appeared to share his vision of how to attack concentrated poverty, crime-ridden high-rise projects, and the social pathologies of the “underclass,” Lane carefully crafted his strategies to ensure a successful outcome. The catchword had now become “metropolitan solutions,” with “much heated speculation over where the high-rise tenants would be relocated.” (*Chicago Tribune*, April 24, 1994)

Over the next several days, Lane tried to ease suburban concerns by suggesting limits to the number of CHA families—three families on a block—relocated to any one suburb. (*Chicago Sun-Times*, April 20, 1994) The CHA chairman assumed that his “cap” system would be challenged legally, but he was determined to persuade suburban residents, including African-American and Latino middle- and upper-income families, “that you can integrate low-income families in housing that is compatible with those neighborhoods and in a proportion that will not threaten the economic stability of those communities.” (*Chicago Tribune*, April 20, 1994)

By mid-June, Lane was admitting that traditional racial opposition was well represented in the suburbs, and that the CHA plan was being strongly “resisted by politicians and bureaucrats intent on keeping their power. . . .” (*Chicago Tribune*, June 15, 1994) Possible locations for CHA residents who chose to move to the suburbs included Will, Lake, DuPage, Kane, and McHenry Counties. Lane had met with the mayors’ and managers’ associations of DuPage and Will Counties, and he intended to meet with other officials to “reassure them about the even-handedness of his plan; [w]e’re not interested in creating mini Cabrini Greens out in the suburbs.” (*Ibid.*)

On August 11 Lane made his third trip to the suburbs and received prolonged applause when he spoke on scattered-site housing before the Northwest Suburban Association of Commerce and Industry. Lane conceded that the history of public housing in the city gave “suburbanites a legitimate reason to be concerned,” but families would be screened and evaluated “to make sure they [had] jobs,” and strong measures would be taken “to prevent crime from following CHA residents to their new homes.” (*Chicago Tribune*, August 12, 1994)

In April the *Sun-Times* had successfully contacted 108 of the 263 suburban mayors, presidents, and managers in the 6-county Chicago area. The survey found “a large plurality of officials” opposed to “scattered-site public housing in their backyards. . . .” (*Chicago Sun-Times*, April 24, 1994) Nearly one-third said they might accept some assisted housing “with conditions,” and 37 percent declined to take a

position. Noncommittal officials thought scattered-site housing “might be the best solution in theory,” but feared it would not be fairly administered “with each town assuming a share of the risk.” (Ibid.)

Typical negative reactions included: (1) fears of leveling—“people resent it when government tries to make somebody their economic equivalent by subsidizing them” (*Chicago Sun-Times*, June 4, 1994); (2) resistance to “imposing subsidized housing on a town” (*Chicago Sun-Times*, April 24, 1994); (3) concerns for the CHA tenant—“they would stand out if they moved to the suburbs,” and “just to move the problem around is not the answer” (Ibid.); (4) prejudice—[project families] are “not the kind of people we want in our community” (Ibid.); and (5) antiurban sentiments—“Chicago should be in Chicago.” (Ibid.)

The difficulties that Lane and other advocates of “metropolitanwide” dispersal faced were exemplified by the mercurial position of Mayor Al Larson. On April 18, Larson claimed Schaumburg was an “open community” with housing that can “accommodate a broad spectrum of incomes. Anyone who wants to live and work in Schaumburg can live and work here. . . .” (*Chicago Sun-Times*, April 19, 1994) Three days later Larson came out opposed to the CHA plan “because it would stigmatize public housing residents” and suggested that Lane “concentrate on moving residents within Chicago” and improve public transportation to the suburbs. The reason for the quick switch was apparent when he admitted, “I’ve been getting calls all day from people who are scared stiff that their mayor is going to bring the CHA out to Schaumburg.” (*Chicago Tribune*, April 21, 1994)

As Lane “is changing the face of public housing in Chicago,” (*Governing*, December 1994, p. 38) uncertainty over where the thousands of families displaced from the projects would resettle intensified the fears of many residents of the city, precipitating in some neighborhoods a revival of NIMBYISM (“not in my back yard”). Giving poor families what they needed most—“a chance to escape their neighborhoods—will [certainly] turn out to be political dynamite.” (*Newsweek*, December 28, 1992, p. 55) Chicago’s West Town neighborhood, for example, was worried about gangs and drug dealing, and residents were asking “whether the scattered-site program is simply moving poor people from one dangerous neighborhood to another.” (*Chicago Tribune*, May 27, 1994) Real estate brokers doing business in West Town and Humboldt Park claimed prospective sellers with homes near scattered-site apartments “may have to wait up to 20 percent longer” to sell than “owners of comparable homes in neighborhoods without the units.” (Ibid.)

CHA residents were also hesitant to move to the suburbs where “transportation, schools, stores, and services may be less convenient. . . .” Moreover, many of them preferred “the familiarity of family and friends in the city.” (*Chicago Sun-Times*, April 24, 1994) Beneficiaries of the Gautreaux decision, living in court-designated general areas of the city, opposed more units in their new neighborhoods. These former CHA residents even built alliances with homeowners to challenge the implementation of Gautreaux, which they viewed as “clustering and isolating the poor.” (*Chicago Defender*, July 20, 1994)

Lane accuses middle-class bureaucrats who administer the CHA and other poverty programs as being against his proposals, especially his desire to cut 95 percent of the agency’s staff. “[T]he politicians might feel they stand to lose constituents or get headaches, and the government employees could lose their public paychecks,” Lane said. (*Chicago Sun-Times*, June 15, 1994)

Some African-American Chicago Democrats oppose Lane’s plans of mixed-income development and de-densifying the projects. Certain African-American political leaders “fear scattering inner-city

blacks to new homes could break up black voting blocs and dilute black voting strength.” (*Chicago Tribune*, May 4, 1994) Douglas Massey, coauthor of *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (1993) is not hopeful that Chicago high rises will ever be torn down. African-American politicians, he says, “welcomed the high rises as a way to establish and control small political machines in segregated wards.” Now, they “[drag] their feet because concentrations of black voters create safe wards.” (Burnham, 1994, p. 5)

Four council members could lose “key political support if [the] CHA’s high rises are demolished” and residents make suburban moves or relocate to other parts of the city. (Ibid., p. 3)⁴⁷ Two of the aldermen, Toni Preckwinckle and Madeline Haithcock, favor demolition. Dexter Watson, alderman from the 27th ward, and Dorothy Tillman of the 3d ward, are opposed. Alderman Watson favors rehabilitating CHA high rises and privately owned buildings. “I’m interested in people staying in my ward. They want to stay here,” Watson said. Alderman Tillman, a vocal critic of razing the projects, favors rehabilitating “because integrating them with mixed-income residents isn’t going to happen. My motivation for saving the CHA has nothing to do with a political base; [rather] it has to do with a moral obligation I have to protect the poor.” (Ibid., p. 5)

Land costs and the scarcity of buildable lots, as well as the already significant pockets of concentrated assisted housing in many suburban⁴⁸ and city neighborhoods, “make any plans to build new government-owned public housing difficult in the city and almost certain to fail in the suburbs.” (*Chicago Tribune*, May 4, 1994) Nonetheless, by mid-summer of 1994, the fierce resistance that Broder had predicted for the Cisneros “mission to remake the face of urban America had not yet surfaced.”

Chicago in the Post-Lane Era

Approximately 1 year later, after having served 7 years as chairman of the CHA, Vince Lane resigned on May 26, 1995. Lane’s failing while watch officer for the frequently troubled Authority was that “he was long on ideas, and short on execution, a visionary who fumbled the nuts and bolts of daily management.” (*New York Times*, June 7, 1995) In the next few days HUD would announce its takeover of the third largest Housing Authority, and its appointment of Joseph Shuldiner, Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing, “point man in Chicago,” to oversee the transition from local to Federal management. (*New York Times*, May 28, 1995)

Lane cited his belief in “less government” as the answer to many of the problems that plagued Chicago’s deteriorating high-rise projects. One reason he resigned was to devote more time to “de-densifying” such projects through mixed-income strategies arranged under public and private partnerships. (*New York Times*, June 7, 1995) The former chairman had grown tired of the length of time it took to bring to fruition changes he envisioned for the Authority, beginning with Lake Parc Place. Not only was his own agency recalcitrant, but HUD was an obstacle. “We were always fighting the bureaucracy,” he said. “HUD had to sit there and rule on every little thing and it took forever.” (Ibid.)

The takeover was not surprising because the CHA had “been on HUD’s troubled housing list for 15 years,” and in 1987 HUD threatened it with breach of contract. The low performances of troubled Housing Authorities, including the CHA, are because of a combination of factors, “including ineffective management, inability to productively use Federal funding assistance, and deteriorated housing stock.”

(GAO, June 7, 1995, p. 1) Citing a HUD consultant's report, the GAO noted three organizational issues that "impede[d] [the] CHA's ability to effectively manage its total program":

(1) Large and loosely structured middle management that impedes program accountability and causes operational inefficiencies; (2) inability to consistently set and enforce performance standards throughout the agency; and (3) inability, despite extraordinary efforts, to control the general living environment—management rules, security, and physical conditions—at certain housing developments. (Ibid., pp. 3–4)

Although Lane would no longer be at the helm, HUD Secretary Cisneros' plans for Chicago public housing echo the former chairman's vision, and include:

Privatization, the demolition of vacant buildings and the creation of mixed-income developments to replace the soul-numbing concentrations of high-rise poverty that run for miles and make this city stand out as example of how not to design and run public housing. (*New York Times*, June 7, 1995)

The redevelopment of the Henry Horner Homes and the Cabrini Green housing project are top items on HUD's agenda, because the "two projects [are] near neighborhoods that are booming with private development." (*New York Times*, June 7, 1995) Money for both redevelopments is already obligated, and the mixed-income experiments may succeed under HUD guardianship, because Cabrini Green is close to the Loop and "an easy walk to Chicago's richest shopping district" (*New York Times*, June 1, 1995), and the dilapidated Horner Homes project, on the city's near west side, is next door to "the United Center, the site of the 1996 Democratic National Convention." (Ibid.)

Project families are concerned about the displacement effects of deconcentration. They refuse to believe the assurances of their new landlord that their homes will not be sold to the highest bidder, and that "the people who live in Cabrini [and Horner will have] first crack at the opportunities." (*New York Times*, May 28, 1995) Furthermore, there is little evidence, save the Gautreaux Demonstration, that "by changing the circumstances in which tenants live," their lives will be significantly changed. (Gurwitt, 1995, p. 17)

Parallels With Yonkers, New York

The scattered-site program histories of Chicago and Yonkers share interesting parallels. Although originating from protracted lawsuits almost 20 years apart, both cases represent complex litigation; each judge appointed special masters to search for conciliation; each case was appealed a number of times, including to the U.S. Supreme Court; the judges—three in Chicago—confronted strongly entrenched interests opposed to compliance; the courts threatened and sometimes involved sanctions, including fines, contempt citations, curbs on commercial and residential development, and receivership; and precious little scattered-site housing was delivered for long periods of time.

Chapter 6 examines the troubled history of Yonkers, New York, in implementing court-ordered scattered-site housing. The protracted litigation is reviewed from the U.S. Department of Justice filing of the case in 1980 until the issuance of the Housing Remedy in 1987. The city's pattern and practice of segregation is examined, along with insights drawn from Judge Sand's meticulous documentation and opinions of justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals.

Over the next several years, the courts and the city were entangled in the politics of noncompliance. The city administration and a majority faction of the council, supported by an angry citizenry, fought to prevent the implementation of the court order, especially the requirement that the city build 200 units of scattered-site housing in predominantly white neighborhoods.

Chapter 6

Suburban Yonkers

The city of Yonkers, New York, had a 1990 population of 188,082, a median household income of \$36,376, and a median home value of \$228,100. It is the largest city in Westchester County, and the fourth largest municipality in New York State. Yonkers “rises from the east bank of the Hudson River in a series of hills and valleys extending 4 1/4 miles along the river and stretching 3 to 4 miles eastward to the Bronx River, covering 21 square miles.” (*Herald Statesman*, October 10, 1990)

Yonkers is “bounded on the south by New York City, and on the north by the Village of Hastings-on-Hudson and the Town of Greenburg.” (*Ibid.*) Formerly a “railroad suburb,” its closeness to New York made it attractive as a bedroom community to increasing numbers of commuters who continued to work in the city but could afford to live elsewhere. In this respect “its development [was] fairly typical of an entire class of suburbs throughout the United States—small towns that grew into cities precisely because of their proximity to large metropolises. . . .” (Goldston, 1970, p. 33)

A significant portion of Yonkers’ population consists of former residents of New York City who moved to avoid the city’s social problems. What is suggested here is what Goldston’s *Suburbia: Civil Denial* suggested 26 years ago:

[Yonkers’] social problems, which on a small scale, encompass most of the social problems of nearby New York. Here again one encounters the black ghetto, a jumble of rotten tenements trapped in the downtown area; the appallingly high crime rate of the central city; the replacement of juvenile violence by increasing drug addiction; the snarl of urban racial tensions which reaches into the schools. (*Ibid.*, p. 46)

Many of Yonkers’ citizens “live in the city as a suburb of New York [but also] live as suburbanites in relation to Yonkers as well.” (*Ibid.*) Because they chose Yonkers for a “better personal and family environment than that afforded by the New York urban jungle,” the appearance of New York-style civic disintegration in their community has triggered strong resistance from residents intent on maintaining the viability of their neighborhoods.

Spatial proximity to New York City, and especially to the Bronx, along with Yonkers’ ethnic and working-class heritage may account partially for the community’s hostile reception of Judge Leonard B. Sand’s finding of a 30-year “pattern and practice of racial discrimination by city officials” concerning both the placement of subsidized housing and school segregation.

The Case

In 1980 the U.S. Department of Justice sued the city of Yonkers, the Community Development Authority (CDA), and the Yonkers Board of Education, alleging intentional segregation in housing and in the public schools. The case is considered unprecedented by some, because it is the “first case

in which a court held that segregation in a school system was directly related to intentional discrimination in subsidized housing.” (Leahy, 1987, p. 441)¹

The trial on the liability issues consumed a period of 14 months in 1983 and 1984. The trial lasted 90 days, evidence was heard from 84 witnesses, depositions were taken from an additional 38 witnesses, and thousands of documents were received into evidence. The findings of fact and conclusions of law that led the court to its determination “that the plaintiffs [had] sustained their burden of proving that Yonkers’ housing and schools [were] intentionally segregated by race” is chronicled in an approximately 600-page decision (*United States v. Yonkers Board of Education*, 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1985)

In November 1985, in an “exhaustive and well documented opinion” (*U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.*, 837 F. 2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), p. 1185) Judge Sand found the city and the CDA liable for housing segregation, and the city and the school board responsible for school segregation.

To determine whether the city’s placement of subsidized housing reflected the intent to racially segregate, Judge Sand sought evidence of city practices to confine housing projects to areas of minority concentration. He meticulously sifted through the historical record, documenting the number of units and site locations of all proposed and developed housing projects during four distinctive time periods between 1948 and 1982.² Because this study is about scattered-site housing, the following review concerns mainly the period between 1948 and 1967, when the city and the Municipal Housing Authority (MHA) were constructing conventional public housing for families.

Housing Decisions: 1948–58

Prior to 1949 the city had erected two housing projects, both in southwest Yonkers. The 550-unit Mulford Gardens Project, built “upon a section famed in local history as ‘The Hill,’ opened in 1940. To “solve the problem of inadequate housing within the city,” especially for African Americans, the MHA immediately made plans for a second project, financed with State funds. The war years interceded, and the 250-unit Cottage Place Gardens apartments were not opened until December 1, 1948. (MHA, *A Reflection on 50 Years of Public Housing in Yonkers*, 1985)

Shortly after passage of the 1949 National Housing Act, the MHA applied for a reservation of 1,000 units of public housing to meet the “serious need for decent low-cost housing” in Yonkers and to qualify for urban renewal assistance under Title 1 of the Act.³ The city received a 750-unit allocation and had until August 1950 to submit sites. The Authority’s first site, a vacant parcel in a white northwest Yonkers neighborhood, triggered immediate and strong opposition from area residents and civic associations and was subsequently rejected by the planning board. The MHA next proposed two sites, both supported by councilmen from the wards selected, in “heavily white areas of southwest Yonkers.” Residents from each neighborhood quickly organized to orchestrate petition drives and to appear at planning board and council meetings to object to the housing projects. The two sites were disapproved by the planning board, and the site was abandoned by the MHA.

It took the city 15 months to put into development the first site for family housing. Located in a minority-impacted neighborhood in southwest Yonkers, the Palisade Avenue site “prompted no public opposition,” and was approved for 274 units of public housing. (*U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.*, 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1985, p. 1296) In December 1950 the city was informed that it could lose 500 of the remaining units unless additional development commenced immediately. The city’s response was to

increase the density of the Palisades project to 413. When the Schlobohm Houses opened in 1953, “all of the city’s 1,213 units of public housing were concentrated within several blocks of each other in southwest Yonkers.” (Ibid., p. 1297)

Between 1951 and 1953, the MHA continued to propose sites for the remaining 300 units from the 1949 allocation. Two of the three sites not strongly opposed were in minority neighborhoods in southwest Yonkers, close to downtown. Eight of the 11 proposed sites generated intense neighborhood opposition; all of these were in overwhelmingly white areas. A dominant concern of east-side residents was the effect such projects would have on property values. Not only was the east side an inappropriate area for such housing, but there was no possible need for it. Edward O’Neill, councilman for the east-side ward, argued before the planning board that building public housing in “fine, residential” neighborhoods constituted “a body blow to [the city’s] finances.” (Ibid., p. 1298)

In 1956 the city renewed its funding request to complete the remaining 335 units allocated in 1949. In 1956 and 1957, the MHA formally proposed eight sites. Despite concerns expressed by city officials that nonaction would jeopardize further housing assistance, and the “city’s urban renewal plans might be delayed for lack of relocation housing,” none of the proposals was approved by the council. (Ibid.)⁴ Representatives from Runyon Heights, “a long-standing and self-contained enclave of black homeowners. . . .” (Ibid.) opposed the site because its development would not “integrate Runyon Heights into the communities surrounding it,” but enhance its racial isolation. (*U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.*, 837 F. 2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1987))

In spring of 1958, the Authority proposed five more sites for consideration: three in southwest Yonkers and two in east Yonkers. Even though the planning board recommended against the two southwest Yonkers sites, “because they lay in the paths of proposed highways,” the council approved the sites by a three-fourths override vote. The three other sites were approved by the planning board; however, the council rejected “the sites proposed for the white neighborhoods,” and approved the Runyon Heights proposal over the community’s opposition. Shortly before voting on the three sites, council members received a letter from a committee “delegated by 12 taxpayer and civic associations,” stating that:

We personally prefer a public referendum with time to acquaint each and every citizen with the full facts on public housing. Where will these tenants come from? How will we provide schools? How much will it cost us over the years? What safeguards do we have against our having to absorb the overflow from Puerto Rico or Harlem? Where will the people go that will have to vacate their private homes? (*U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.*, 624 F. Supp., 1985, p. 1300)

Approximately two decades later Yonkers had approved enough suitable housing sites to use the remainder of the 750 units that had been allocated in 1949. The particular choice of the handful of sites from the dozens submitted by the MHA provides clear evidence of intentionality in selecting areas of “high minority concentration” for public housing development. All sites not already heavily minority impacted were rejected either by the planning board, the city council, or both bodies.

Housing Decisions: 1958–67

For the next several years, the city focused on providing housing for senior citizens. Elderly housing was not perceived as minority housing, and four senior citizen projects were constructed with little

opposition between 1958 and 1967. In 1963 the Authority proposed another eight sites for seniors. However, when a local news article reported that some sites might be used for families displaced by urban renewal, the public strongly protested and six of the sites were rescinded. (*U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.*, 837 F. 2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1987))

“[N]o apparent efforts to increase the city’s stock of public housing for families” occurred until 1964 when the city sought funds for the Riverview urban-renewal project. HUD notified the city that funding had been rejected because the city’s earlier “relocation track record” had been inadequate. (*U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.*, 624 F. Supp., 1985, p. 1302) To qualify the city had to provide housing for 300 families. Supported by the Yonkers Urban Renewal Agency (YURA), the MHA “embarked on a vigorous campaign to find and approve sites.” (Ibid.)

Over the next 22 months, 30 sites were recommended as suitable for public housing. The large number of sites was partly an effort by the MHA and YURA to find enough sites acceptable to the city council to meet HUD’s 300-unit requirement. In addition, civil rights groups—CORE, the NAACP, and the Yonkers Council of Churches—and HUD itself were urging “scattered-site” housing. (Ibid., p. 1304)⁵

The MHA submitted 11 sites to the planning board and council. The five sites located in predominantly white areas of east and southwest Yonkers generated protests and petitions. In May 1965 the planning board approved the 4 southwest Yonkers sites, but the council subsequently referred all 11 sites to its housing committee. (Ibid., p. 1303) In April 1966 the council housing committee recommended the four southwest sites “that were, or were rapidly becoming, heavily minority,” that a year earlier had been approved by the planning committee. The 19 other sites were recommended by a subcommittee of YURA’s Citizens Advisory Committee. Other than registering once again the pervasive opposition “that existed to the placement of public housing in any heavily white area of Yonkers,” there is no evidence the list was taken seriously. (Ibid., p. 1305)⁶

When the council met in February 1967 to consider which of the sites to select, it faced two choices: (1) continue to build on sites in the “most heavily minority areas” in and around the downtown, or (2) scatter the public housing throughout the community to avoid undue concentration.⁷ True to past form, the council selected the first option. (Ibid., p. 1306) In May 1967 HUD informed city officials that the sites would not be approved, and the Riverview urban renewal project was officially halted. (Ibid.)

With one exception conventional public housing as a “relocation resource,” or as a mechanism to increase the supply of assisted housing for poor families in Yonkers, ended in 1967. In May 1980 the city submitted a proposal to HUD for a Section 8 New Construction project that combined 80 units for seniors and 20 units for families.⁸ The Salisbury Gardens site was properly zoned and located in east Yonkers.

One week after City Manager Eugene Fox’s correspondence with HUD indicating city support for the project, HUD received a telephone call from councilman Edward Fagan protesting the project’s location in his ward. Over the next several weeks opposition increased, and Mayor Gerald Loehr sent a “mass mailing to area residents expressing his concern about the ‘unacceptable burden’ the project would impose on the neighborhood.” (Ibid., p. 1357) On September 2 the council held a well-attended public hearing. After discussion, the council voted unanimously to adopt a resolution “stating the city council’s opposition to the project, directing the city manager to withdraw his letter of support, and

directing the City Clerk to send a copy of the resolution to HUD.” (Ibid.) A Federal moratorium on Section 8 funding occurred shortly after the proposal’s submission, and “despite extra efforts by some HUD officials to obtain funds . . . it was not funded.” (Ibid.)

Over the 18-year history, 1949 to 1967, of conventional public housing construction in the city of Yonkers, on only two occasions were sites opposed by the community approved by the city council.⁹ Nine of 12 sites were endorsed by the council where there was no evidence “of organized opposition by area residents or civil associations.”

The city’s site-selection process over these years was motivated by “an apparent determination to avoid, at virtually any cost, a confrontation with community opponents of public housing.” (Ibid., p. 1310) Judge Sand could find no other explanation for the fact that “by 1963, more than 80 percent of the city’s existing or planned public housing was located within a several-block area of southwest Yonkers.” The deliberate effort to spatially isolate the poor was also evident in the city’s failure to promote the use of Section 8 certificates outside southwest Yonkers (Ibid., p. 1346), and its refusal to participate in the Section 8 Existing Program.¹⁰ Furthermore, despite the extreme concentration, the additional sites approved in 1966 and 1967 “were all located near that same area.” (Ibid., p. 1308) Leading up to his finding of city liability for the “extreme condition of segregation” existing in Yonkers, Judge Sand commented:

This is not a case in which City officials simply neglected to consider sites outside southwest Yonkers for family housing. Instead, it is a case in which sites were repeatedly considered and then rejected after the residents of those overwhelmingly white communities made their strong objections known. It is also a case in which it was generally acknowledged . . . that what was at issue in their site selection was whether the Yonkers community was “ready” to accept racial integration. . . . [T]he City’s actions not merely preserved but strengthened existing patterns of segregation by appearing to condone, or at least respect, the segregative sentiment that prevailed in east and northwest Yonkers. If City officials themselves appear unable or unwilling to breach a racial barrier, it becomes all the more unlikely that individual minorities will be encouraged to try, or that individual whites will be encouraged to abandon the attitudes that have erected that barrier. (Ibid., p. 1364)

The Court’s Remedy

The court entered an 11-part Housing Remedy Order on May 28, 1986.¹¹ The city was permanently enjoined from impeding the “availability of public or subsidized housing in east or northwest Yonkers”; consigning assisted housing to southwest Yonkers; “intentionally promoting racial residential segregation”; interfering with any person’s exercise of her/his “rights to equal housing opportunities”; or taking action “to deny or make unavailable housing to any person on account of race or national origin. . . .” (*U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.*, 635 F. Supp. 1577, 1986, p. 1,577)¹²

The housing plan required the city to take a number of affirmative steps to fulfill its previous commitment to “provide acceptable sites for 200 units of public housing as a condition for receiving its 1983 Community Development Block Grant funds. . . .” (Ibid., p. 1580) The steps included submitting to HUD an acceptable Housing Assistance Plan (HAP) for 1984–85; executing a grant agreement for 1984–85 conditioned on “the submission of acceptable sites for 140 units of family public housing”

(Ibid.); designating at least 2 sites for HUD preapproval, “along with the necessary supporting documentation”; submitting sites to HUD within 90 days for the remaining 60 units of public housing; and “causing the MHA to submit site development proposals . . . for the preapproved sites.” (Ibid., p. 1581) In the event the city failed to discharge the obligations assigned to it by the court, the responsibility for the development of the 200 housing units “devolve[d] on the plaintiffs and plaintiffs-intervenors. . . .” (Ibid.)

Noncompliance

The several implementation timelines of the Housing Remedy Order (HRO) were generally not complied with, especially Sections IV (public housing units) and VI (Plan for Development of Additional Subsidized Housing). The city refused to propose sites for the 200 units of public housing required within 30 and 90 days, and also refused to submit within 6 months a plan for additional subsidized housing.

On November 15, 1986, the city informed the court it had no intention of developing “a plan for the creation of additional subsidized family units . . . in existing residential areas in east or northwest Yonkers.” (*U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Education*, 635 F. Supp., 1986, p. 1577) The U.S. Department of Justice and the NAACP immediately moved for the imposition of sanctions; Judge Sand demurred and “patiently endeavored to secure voluntary compliance.” (*U.S. v. City of Yonkers*, 856 F. 2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), p. 448)

Over the next several months, the court continued to urge the city to implement the HRO. However, “some 18 months after its promulgation . . . [t]he progress to date in identifying available sites has been extremely disheartening. . . .” (*U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.*, 675 F. Supp. 1413, 1987, p. 1414)

In February 1987 Oscar Newman of the Institute for Community Design Analysis, and noted author of *Defensible Space* (1973), was hired by the city council as Outside Housing Advisor (OHA) to identify sites for the 200 court-required units of public housing and draft a long-term “affordable housing plan.” “After 3 months, the city wouldn’t pay me,” he said. So the judge said, “Mr. Newman works for me now and you will pay him.” (Stern, 1991, p. 10)

In April 1987 the city council proposed to have the units built on 12 sites, but then rendered the proposal moot by involving local civic associations in the selection of tenants. In review of implementation activity through the end of 1987, the Court of Appeals noted that the city had “taken no significant action to comply with the 1986 [HRO].” (*U.S. v. City of Yonkers*, 856 F. 2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), p. 448)

Newman had designated four school sites for use in fulfillment of the housing order. However, on July 15, 1987, the Yonkers Board of Education refused to return three of the school properties to the city claiming that parts of the buildings and adjacent school land were required to fulfill bona fide educational needs. The court disagreed, and “deemed” each site “city-owned land available for housing [for] purposes of implementing the housing order. . . .” (*U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.*, 675 F. Supp. 1407 (1987), p. 1412)¹³

Judge Sand threatened the city with bankrupting fines in the summer to force the city to “respond to his then 14-month-old order. . . .” (*New York Times*, November 20, 1987) The council, “after heated debate,” responded on July 7, 1987, by agreeing to build 200 units on 8 sites. The city, however, failed to follow through, triggering an earlier moratorium on new commercial development.¹⁴

The court instructed Newman to identify “any and all projects anywhere in Yonkers” that require some city support, such as tax abatement or zoning changes. On November 14, 1987, the OHA submitted the names and locations of four properties. On November 20 the court imposed a freeze “on any City action in furtherance or implementation” of the four projects. The freeze would continue “until the City has designated sites for 200 units of public housing, which sites are controlled by it and available for construction of housing.” (*U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.*, 657 F. Supp. 1413, 1987, p. 1415)¹⁵

On December 9, 1987, the OHA remitted to the District Court 9 privately owned properties that could be used to supplement the 4 school sites in producing the 200 units of public housing required by the HRO. (Memorandum from Oscar Newman, OHA to Hon. Leonard B. Sand, U.S.D.J., and all parties, December 8, 1987)¹⁶ Newman eventually produced a prototype design for semidetached houses that would be located in scattered pockets in middle-class neighborhoods. (Stern, op. cit.)¹⁷

Appeals Court Denial

The anxiously awaited Court of Appeals decision was announced December 28, 1987, affirming the District Court’s finding of city liability for intentional racial segregation in subsidized housing and justifying the series of remedial orders and injunctions against the city of Yonkers.

Over the next several months, a series of protracted negotiations occurred between the parties as they sought common ground over the disputed HRO. Prospects for agreement appeared doubtful. On January 19, 1988, Judge Sand threatened to find the city in contempt and to levy crippling fines if his demands were not accepted. He gave the city until 10 a.m. on Monday, January 25, to produce a plan. (*New York Times*, January 20, 1988) The court was advised by city counsel on January 25 that “the City was contemplating a consent judgment and that the City was prepared to designate 7 sites for the 200 units of public housing and to implement a long-term plan. . . .” (*U.S. v. City of Yonkers*, 856 F. 2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), p. 448)

After sitting through a nearly 5-hour “marathon attack” during which a mostly mute council was “denounced by residents as wimps, liars, snakes, and ‘masters of deceit,’” the council approved by a vote of 5 to 2 the consent decree entered into that same day. The consent judgment required that the city make three commitments: (1) renew its promise to build the units and identify seven specific sites; (2) “take specific steps within a prescribed timetable” to complete the construction of the 200 units; and (3) not seek to appeal the 1985 HRO “or any subsequently entered decree to the extent that such decrees relate to the 200 units.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 448–449)

Although promising “to work diligently [to agree on] various unresolved matters” and to submit another consent decree to the court by February 15, 1988, the city “promptly attempted to disavow . . . the terms of the consent judgment.” (*Ibid.*, p. 449) In mid-March 1988, Yonkers officials asked Judge Sand to release them from their promise not to appeal the housing discrimination ruling. (*New York Times*, March 11, 1988)¹⁸ The rationale for the request was that “unexpectedly vehement and growing opposition to the City Council’s decision has resulted in near chaos for the Council in its attempts to govern the city.” (*New York Times*, March 27, 1988)¹⁹

In an April 12th conference in the judge’s chambers, the city announced that it would not complete negotiations over the long-term housing plan.²⁰ In response to the city’s “not interested” position, the United States and the NAACP reworked a draft of the Long Term Plan Order (LTPO) prepared by city

lawyers during earlier negotiations, and submitted it to the District Court on May 2, 1988: The city objected to the revisions, and Judge Sand ordered plaintiffs to “revise their proposed . . . order” in light of the city’s objections.

On June 13, 1988, following a hearing and further changes, the District Court entered the LTPO. Subsequent events moved rapidly. While the city’s administration attempted to fashion an acceptable implementation strategy, the majority faction of the city council remained adamantly opposed to compromise. Over the next 7 weeks, a number of strategies were undertaken by the District Court to persuade the city council to endorse the LTPO short of contempt adjudication and the application of coercive sanctions.²¹ Illustrating the interactions between the court and city council are the following events, up to the August 26 affirmation by the Court of Appeals of contempt adjudications against both the city and council members.

Contemptible August

At a tumultuous Monday night meeting, August 1, the Yonkers Council, by a 4 to 3 vote, defied Judge Sand, rejecting the long-range proposal for 800 units of subsidized housing. (*New York Times*, August 2, 1988) Twelve hours later, the Federal judge found the city of Yonkers, and Councilmen Fagan, Longo, and Chema, in contempt.²² The city faced escalating fines—beginning at \$100 the first day, and doubling each day thereafter. The councilmen were fined \$500 a day; absent approval of the housing plan by August 10, the judge would have them jailed “until such time as [they] have purged [themselves] of contempt.” (Ibid.)

On August 3 the city had prepared a “doomsday scenario,” anticipating that it would run out of money to pay fines or salaries within 18 days. The city was counting on the Court of Appeals to grant a stay of the fines on August 9. In the meantime, Mayor Nicholas Wasiczko said the city was engaged in “damage control,” until one of the four dissenting members of the council “changes their vote.” (*New York Times*, August 4, 1988) Judge Sand had called on Governor Mario Cuomo several times in the contempt hearing to use his powers to help resolve the crisis, and “legal experts and others” in Albany “were studying options open to the Governor.” (Ibid.)

Over the next 5 weeks, Governor Cuomo was criticized for not speaking out on the Yonkers crises. On three separate occasions editorials in the *New York Times* criticized the Governor. On August 6 the paper argued that the situation in Yonkers “cries out for responsible dispassionate leadership,” but “[I]nstead of leadership, Mr. Cuomo offers ideas for tinkering with a carefully negotiated settlement.” On August 27 the *Times* editorial asked, “When will Governor Cuomo use his powers of persuasion to help resolve this crisis?,” suggesting bluntly that “It’s past time for Governor Cuomo to lead the powers that be in Yonkers away from resistance and toward reason and resolution.”

By early September the *New York Times* (September 1, 1988) was urging the Governor “to help fashion a creative political solution to achieve the goal of more affordable housing in Yonkers,” including the guarantee of State funds for sound management.

The last editorial found Cuomo’s reasons for not removing the four defiant Yonkers city councilmen from office (their appeals were before the Supreme Court) to be “a pinched excuse for inaction.” The

September 10, 1988, editorial concluded:

Mr. Cuomo cannot plausibly blame his inaction on the question before the Supreme Court. He needs to keep using his powers of persuasion and to educate the public, but removal from office remains a valid, necessary lever to use in pressing the Council to abandon its dishonorable contempt.²³

The Meltdown of Opposition

On September 2, 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected the city's appeal to block the court-ordered housing desegregation plan, but voted 7 to 2 to stay the contempt fines and possible incarceration of the four defiant councilmen.²⁴

Just hours after the Supreme Court's decision, Judge Sand again met with Yonkers officials in a "last-ditch effort to settle the crisis." Judge Sand suggested establishing an independent commission to carry out the housing order, but the defiant councilmen rejected his offer. Fines against the city were reinstated that day, to double daily, reaching a maximum of \$1 million a day by Saturday, September 10: "The impasse [had] hardened and the prospect of insolvency loomed for the State's fourth largest city." (*New York Times*, September 3, 1988)

During the next week city leaders, especially Mayor Nicholas Wasicsko, Acting City Manager Neil DeLuca, and officials of the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB),²⁵ held daily negotiations in city hall with the city council trying to devise a strategy that would sway a single vote. City officials and staff of the EFCB prepared a four-stage plan to phase out municipal services,²⁶ and the State board adopted the "doomsday" plan September 7, with 447 city workers to be dismissed over the first week of the plan, beginning Saturday, September 10. (*New York Times*, September 8, 1988) The Control Board also asked the Westchester District Attorney to prosecute the four councilmen because "the fines [the city incurred as a result of their votes] were not in compliance with the financial aid plan," thus violating the Control Board Act.²⁷

The second day of meetings between the mayor and council on September 5 ended with no resolution in sight and the city facing \$192,000 in contempt-of-court fines due on Tuesday. Although details of the talks were not made public, rumor had it that the council majority wanted basic changes in the long-term housing plan. The judge and plaintiffs, however, had ruled out such changes. (*New York Times*, September 6, 1988) On September 7, while the EFCB was adopting the "doomsday" plan for cutting city services, other city officials and the four recalcitrant councilmen were in negotiating meetings throughout the day. Vice Mayor Henry Spallone offered an alternative housing plan that would build the 200 public housing units in "each of four districts of the eastern and northwestern" sections of Yonkers.²⁸ The units would be single-family or condo housing, and "[a]pplicants would have to be employed, and tenants would eventually be able to buy the units." (*New York Times*, September 8, 1988)

The fallout from contempt fines, once they had passed \$1 million, began to wear down the opposition. By Thursday, September 8, 2 days before workers were to be laid off, pressure for settlement escalated and "[t]elephone calls urging the city to comply with the order clogged the lines at City Hall." (*New York Times*, September 9, 1988) The opposition began to unravel. The People's Union, a citizen

group backing Council resistance, “reversed itself and began lobbying at City Hall for the Council to give up.” (Ibid.) A powerful new group—the Committee of Organizations Meeting to Preserve Law in Yonkers—had emerged only 2 weeks earlier, intent on bringing “constituent pressure to bear on the Councilmen,” and to challenge the Save Yonkers Federation (SYF) for community leadership.²⁹ Another indicator of the shift in public opinion was the \$100 million class-action suit filed August 10 against the council members for wasting taxpayers’ money.³⁰

The council met twice on Friday, September 9, in an effort to negotiate a settlement, and by late afternoon Councilmen Peter Chema and Nicholas Longo had agreed to approve the housing plan if their proposed modifications were accepted by the District Court.³¹ The proposed changes would replace the first 200 units of low-cost housing “with 100 units of the public housing and 100 units of so-called layered, or mixed, housing.” (*New York Times*, September 10, 1988)³² In a conference call shortly before 5:00 p.m., Judge Sand “refused to consider any changes in the plan linked to the Council’s compliance.” (Ibid.)

“At 1:20 a.m., amid catcalls and applause in the ornate Council chamber,” the city council passed the court-ordered housing desegregation plan on a 5 to 2 roll-call vote. The defections of Longo and Chema thus ended a 6-week crisis “that had already cost the city \$819,100 in nonrefundable fines” and promised an end to the 8-year court struggle. (*New York Times*, September 11, 1988)

The Aftermath

A request for proposal to build the public housing units was issued in December 1988. Deluxe Homes, a 24-year-old Pennsylvania prefab manufacturing company, was selected from among 3 bids to build the first 142 units on 5 of the 7 sites. (*Herald Statesman*, May 24, 1989) Plans called for 12 to 48 units per site in “clusters of brick and vinyl” scattered throughout the city. The townhouse style was chosen “to blend in with surrounding single-family neighborhoods and [to] make tenants feel more a part of the community. . . .” (Ibid.)

Because the Deluxe bid was \$16.1 million, significantly higher than HUD guidelines,³³ the city had to convince the Federal agency to “spring for the additional bucks because the Yonkers housing case,” as a *Herald Statesman* editorial argued, “has drawn national attention. The success—or failure—of the court’s remedy order will be crucial to HUD’s efforts in other communities across the land.” (May 15, 1989) Yonkers, Westchester County, and State officials, including Governor Cuomo, lobbied HUD to make up the difference in the construction bill. (*Herald Statesman*, May 24, 1989) On June 30, 1989, Kemp committed additional funds for building the first 142 of 200 low-income housing units. (*Herald Statesman*, July 1, 1989)

HUD gave final approval to the Deluxe bid in early July, and on July 11 Donald Meske of Deluxe said he did not need all of the preparation time, and “[b]arring undue bureaucratic delays,” would be breaking ground by the end of the year. (*Herald Statesman*, July 12, 1989)³⁴

Election outcomes, new attorneys, bureaucratic delays, and community and political intransigence did surface, and defeated Meske’s optimistic timeline.³⁵ It was nearly 2 years after the May 1989 HUD approval that Deluxe Homes, on April 12, 1991, “began digging up a parking lot at Central Park Avenue and Clark Street” targeted for the first 24 units of court-ordered housing.³⁶ Many hailed the event “with

relief and hope.” Vice Mayor Spallone called the chances to stop the process “very difficult,” and “leaders of deep-seated community opposition promised to continue pressing appeals and lawsuits.” (*Herald Statesman*, April 13, 1991)

The 1989 Election. The results of the primary held “promise of better days” for Yonkers as conciliatory incumbent Mayor Wasicsko won with 70 percent of the primary vote, and procompliance Republican candidates Joseph Spencer and Thomas Dickerson won stunning victories over candidates intent on continuing the fight against Judge Sand’s housing order. Apparently “the silent majority of Yonkers citizens [finally made] their presence felt . . . in the quiet of the voting booth,” wrote William Sheerin, member of the Mayor’s Commission on Housing. (*Herald Statesman*, September 25, 1989)³⁷

The mayoral election was trumpeted as a referendum on the housing issue. Spallone switched party affiliation to avoid confronting Wasicsko in the Democratic primary.³⁸ The strategy worked: Spallone won the mayoralty with 53.5 percent of the vote, and joined a 6 to 1 Republican council. The alignment of the new council, however, reflected the old council’s 4 to 3 antihousing majority. The public was not yet ready to put the housing issue behind them.³⁹

Legal Maneuvering. Flush with his victory in the November mayoralty, and buoyed by the January 10, 1990, ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court that contempt sanctions against the four council members could not be imposed,⁴⁰ Spallone asked Corporation Counsel Herold to “examine the options of further legal action to prevent construction of court-ordered integrated housing.” (*New York Times*, January 14, 1990)⁴¹

A dispute over legal strategy had surfaced in early December 1990 between the council’s two attorneys, Thomas R. deRosa and Raymond P. Fitzpatrick. DeRosa opposed any further efforts to challenge the consent decree. Fitzpatrick, on the other hand, supported going after the entire housing plan because that strategy meant the chance to avoid any construction. Although a more conciliatory strategy would lessen the city’s “image of intransigence and financial instability,” the “council’s gang of four” (Spallone, Fagan, Chema, and Sialiano) had promised in their campaigns to continue the fight against the housing order. Moreover, something had to be done quickly, as the developer hoped to start construction in January. (*Herald Statesman*, December 17, 1990)⁴²

DeRosa announced his resignation on December 27, “mark[ing] the third time this year the city has lost its chief counsel in the case.” (*Herald Statesman*, December 28, 1990) As the construction date approached, Fitzpatrick began to prepare new attack plans to undermine the 1986 housing order. His strategy involved “using technical issues to eliminate some of the seven prospective sites.” (*Herald Statesman*, January 2, 1991) Fitzpatrick’s game plan rested on a single assumption: because the 1986 housing plan was a “total package,” any site found unsuitable would require the restructuring of the entire plan.

The day after Judge Sand gave official approval of Fitzpatrick as the city’s lead counsel, he was in Federal Appeals Court arguing three technical issues concerning land transfers to Deluxe.⁴³ Although the appeals would have no effect on the city’s obligation to ultimately build the housing, “if granted, they would reverse [Judge Sand’s] recent orders . . . to speed up the process of building the housing.” (*Herald Statesman*, January 18, 1991)

Oppositional Strategies

Site Selection/Purchase

Although the 7 sites for the 200 units of public housing had been identified, the city owned only 3 of them, and the other 4 would be taken in condemnation actions. In October 1988 Judge Sand threatened to bypass a defiant council and designate an alternate site for the disputed church-owned property, unless it made its own choice. (*New York Times*, October 5, 1988)⁴⁴ In March 1989 Yonkers filed papers seeking ownership of an 8-acre site off Gramercy Avenue, targeted for 40 to 44 units. The site was chosen by the judge because the city refused to pick the alternate as requested by the court.

In June 1989 the council balked at designating \$8.3 million from the budget to pay for the sites. Because the EFCB would designate the funds if the council refused, it voted 3 to 3 on June 27 not to allocate the money. On June 29 the EFCB declared a "fiscal crisis" and appropriated the \$8.3 million. The EFCB was accused by City Manager DeLuca of usurping authority in trying to "force compliance" with the desegregation order, and Vice Mayor Spallone charged it with attempting to "control the city's destiny." (*Herald Statesman*, June 30, 1989) In mid-August 1989 two checks in the amount of \$3 million were signed and ready to mail to purchase two of the four privately owned properties. The city had not agreed to prices on the Gramercy and Clark Street sites. (*Herald Statesman*, August 19, 1989)

Although site selection and purchase problems appeared solved by March 1990, another stream of delays occurred in late April that affected title transfer to the builder. The city had to document ownership on the Trenchard and Shore View sites. Moreover, the opposition threatened lawsuits to extend restrictions on the Helena and Walt Whitman sites. The city's concerns were eased when Judge Sand said the city must pay to nullify restrictions if a landowner sued, but it needn't "nullify all development restrictions around the property." (*Herald Statesman*, November 30, 1990)

Bank Loan

Because the contract between Deluxe and HUD stipulated payment at the completion of all 142 public housing units, Deluxe had to secure a sizable bank loan to build the units. In the summer of 1990, Deluxe sought a loan from the Chemical Bank. The bank verbally agreed to loan the money, but reneged in August 1990. According to Court Adviser Oscar Newman, the bank feared demonstrations from active community groups opposed to the low-income housing construction.⁴⁵

After "months of haggling between Deluxe, the bank, and HUD" a \$10 million loan agreement was signed in August 1991, giving the First Eastern Bank of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, rights to the five sites should Deluxe default on completion of the job. (*Herald Statesman*, September 2, 1991)⁴⁶

In October 1990 HUD gave Deluxe an ultimatum: have the financing arrangements completed by October 12, or it would suggest that the MHA readvertise the bid for the project. Apparently the builder and First Eastern were concerned about being left with a partially built project and the Government refusing to reimburse either of them. (*Herald Statesman*, October 6, 1990) What they sought were assurances that HUD would compensate them for losses resulting from boycotts and additional lawsuits filed by opponents of the desegregation housing plan. (*Herald Statesman*, October 9, 1990)⁴⁷

The bank loan impasse provided an opportunity for discussions among city officials and community groups over a contingency plan in the event Deluxe failed to get financing.⁴⁸ James Sardoval, city council aide, engineered a series of meetings between “civic groups on opposite sides of the housing desegregation debate” after he had discussed the proposal with Vice Mayor Fagan. (*Herald Statesman*, October 16, 1990)

The contingency plan contained four elements: (1) subsidized mortgages to 400 minority families; (2) rehabilitation of southwest Yonkers public housing projects; (3) social and development programs for the city’s west side; and (4) agreement from city and antihousing forces to drop all future challenges to the court-ordered remedy. (*Herald Statesman*, October 16, 1990)

The *Herald Statesman* called the discussions “the most encouraging sign in the last several years of the decade-old case,” and opined how wonderful it would be “if Yonkers residents finally could get together in an effort to resolve the issue themselves.” (October 17, 1990)⁴⁹

The Pennsylvania developer’s request for “staged” payments was rejected by HUD, but other assurances were offered. Federal protection would be available, if requested, to handle any “threats against the First Eastern Bank.” HUD also agreed to “assume the risk of any deficiencies” on the transfer of two of the properties, providing Judge Sand made the city remove all title defects. (*New York Times*, November 9, 1990)⁵⁰

Citizen Challenges

Along with numerous lawsuits from the city were several sponsored by community groups, especially the Save Yonkers Federation (SYF). The three suits described below illustrate the nature of citizen concerns, and the additional delays their litigation placed in the path of plan implementation.

Initially filed in 1989, John D’Agnillo’s case was “one of two filed without lawyers by residents on behalf of the SYF.” (*Herald Statesman*, June 23, 1990)⁵¹ D’Agnillo claimed that implementation of the 1986 housing order involved an “enormous construction project” that required comprehensive environmental review. Furthermore, he accused HUD of violating its own regulations by studying the sites individually, instead of together. He asked District Court Judge Charles S. Haight to delay the start of construction while his case was being heard. (*Herald Statesman*, May 10, 1990)

On July 12, 1990, Judge Haight ordered the Yonkers Fair Housing Implementation Office (YFHIO) to undertake sewer and traffic reviews. Only planning could be undertaken on the mixed-income element of the long-term plan. Finding “no basis in fact or law to stay the construction,” he allowed development to proceed on the first 200 units, rejecting the motion of the plaintiff, supported by the city, for a preliminary injunction. (Memorandum Opinion and Order, 89 Civ. 5609 (CHS), June 8, 1980, p. 10)

The study Judge Haight requested was released by the YFHIO in early December, concluding that the 4,200 new housing units “can be accommodated by the present” roads and sewers “without significant negative” effects. If some areas experienced “worsening traffic congestion,” it could be relieved “by changing traffic signals and parking patterns.” Although not required by the court, the study did examine the housing plan’s impact on the public schools. New housing could add up to 2,335 new students, but because the housing would be slowly phased in “the school system should have enough space for the influx.” (*Herald Statesman*, December 13, 1990)

D'Agnillo appealed Haight's decision; he also filed a motion with Judge Haight asking that contempt sanctions be used against the YFHIO. On December 14, 1990, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals denied D'Agnillo's efforts to block the signing of a construction contract between Deluxe Homes and HUD. His emergency motion also sought to prevent transfer of ownership of the five sites to the developer, and to freeze construction funds until his appeal of Judge Haight's ruling that construction could proceed during the environmental impact study. The lawsuit was dismissed by the Federal Appeals Court on January 8, 1991.⁵² The dismissal action, along with the appeals court not delaying further the "city's obligation to turn over the five housing sites to Deluxe," increased the likelihood the construction contract would be signed. (*Herald Statesman*, January 9, 1991)

Louis Bartone and Edward Wagner, residents of the Gramercy Avenue-site neighborhood,⁵³ filed suit in Federal court on March 26, 1990. The Yonkers residents asked that Judge Sand not be allowed to execute the court mandate because he had abused his power by enforcing the order without a public hearing. On June 22, 1990, a three-judge Federal Appeals Court panel rejected, without a written opinion, Bartone's and Wagner's contention of abuse of power when Judge Sand "wrongly overrode zoning laws and environmental regulations in approving plans for the housing." (*Herald Statesman*, June 23, 1990)

The third suit entered the New York State court system. Five Yonkers petitioners asked the court to order the return of the sites and housing plans to the planning board and city council for further review. In April 1991 the U.S. Department of Justice moved to remove the case from State hands, and return it to Judge Sand's court to avoid further delays in construction. (*Herald Statesman*, April 12, 1991) Judge Sand ordered the city to have the lawsuit transferred to his court "to avoid possible conflicting rulings between State and Federal courts." (*Herald Statesman*, April 16, 1991)

On May 2, 1991, Judge Sand dismissed as "devoid of any merit" the residents' lawsuit. The lawsuit was filed too late because the plan was approved in 1988, and the several hearings held at the time should satisfy legal requirements for public hearings, Sand said. "There have been few building proposals which have received more careful scrutiny," he commented during the hearing, [or] "more widespread public attention and discussion in any community." (*Herald Statesman*, May 3, 1991)

Title Transfer

The acquisition of sites and their timely transfer to the developer were issues that slowed implementation of the court order from its issuance in 1986 until Deluxe began land preparation actions in April 1991. In one of three 4 to 3 votes over Judge Sand's housing order, the city council on March 13, 1990, ordered City Manager Neil DeLuca not to transfer the five city-owned east Yonkers properties to Deluxe Homes. (*Herald Statesman*, March 14, 1990) HUD pushed for quick transfer of the land to Deluxe in June 1990, followed by contract signoff and construction beginning in July 1990.

The U.S. Department of Justice planned to file a motion with the court asking that Judge Sand require the council, or the city manager, to turn the five sites over to Deluxe. Opponents of the housing order indicated they would oppose the plan, and O'Toole considered Judge Haight's ruling ordering studies of the impact on sewer system and major roads in Yonkers a "major victory." He warned housing proponents that "they go forward at their own peril." (*Herald Statesman*, June 12, 1990)⁵⁴

On July 31, 1990, Judge Sand directed the city to turn over the five construction sites and to change the building permit. These rulings were expected to “reinforce measures to lift the last two major road-blocks to building.” (*Herald Statesman*, August 1, 1990) Although the city initially complied with the order, Corporation Counsel Herold said that Yonkers lawyers were considering whether to appeal the two orders or Sand’s refusal to grant a delay.

The city hinted it might appeal Judge Sand’s July 24, 1990, order to turn over land to Deluxe for low-income housing construction. The title transfer was commingled with confusion over the building permit. When originally issued on May 7, 1990, the permits were for multifamily development. Deluxe requested modification from “multifamily” to “single family.” The construction company feared that using “a multifamily permit for a single-family design could attract a lawsuit from one of the many housing opponents in Yonkers.” (*Herald Statesman*, July 12, 1990) On July 13 Judge Sand ordered the city to change the building permit immediately so that the project could proceed.⁵⁵

The order to transfer the properties was issued on July 24, 1990.⁵⁶ Efforts to build a coalition among the council to appeal the judge’s order began immediately. External pressure mounted, and for the second time in the week “protesters marched outside . . . City Hall charging that the city administration was doing nothing to block implementation” of the housing plan. (*Herald Statesman*, July 27, 1990)⁵⁷

In August the city again indicated it would appeal Sand’s July order. City Manager DeLuca suspected that if Deluxe went bankrupt or did not complete the project, the city would be unable to recover the properties. (*Herald Statesman*, August 27, 1990)⁵⁸

On January 14, 1991, Deluxe and the Government signed the contract at HUD’s Manhattan office to build the first 142 low-income housing units.⁵⁹ Construction could now move forward “as soon as the weather breaks.” (*Herald Statesman*, January 15, 1991) An earlier signing had been delayed only “hours before the developer had planned to sign a contract,” when the Appeals Court granted a last-minute request from the city. City attorneys claimed it did not intend to prevent the transfer of the land: “[it] want[ed] a guarantee that the land [be returned] to Yonkers if it is not used for public housing.” (*Herald Statesman*, December 21, 1991)⁶⁰

In early February 1991, HUD threatened to freeze \$2.8 million in urban aid, effective on October 1, because of Yonkers’ continued refusal to transfer the land. (*Herald Statesman*, February 13, 1991)⁶¹ Anticipating the likelihood of council opposition, the administration began preparations for huge cuts in programs.

On April 9, 1991, the council tabled action to secure the urban aid, and in June referred the matter to committee. In September Judge Sand told the city it would lose another \$3.7 million if it did not apply for the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds by October 1991; the city was also to allocate \$337,000 of its own money to support the Fair Housing Implementation Office. The city faced renewed contempt fines because the U.S. Department of Justice asked the court to sanction the city’s latest act of defiance. Although the city was free to forfeit the grant, Judge Sand warned “it will not . . . frustrate the implementation of the housing order.” (*Herald Statesman*, September 11, 1991)

At the September 24 meeting, the council took no action on the CDBG issue, indicating a special session might be called later. City Manager DeLuca reminded the council that the court order “mandate[d] that the city take all appropriate action to apply for Federal funds.” (*Herald Statesman*, September 25, 1991) Unable to marshal the votes, the council took no action the next evening to meet

the application deadline. The \$3.4 million was forsaken because its acceptance required the city to build the housing. (*Herald Statesman*, September 28, 1991)

Sewer work at the Midland Avenue and Wrexham Road site was temporarily halted when the council referred to a review committee the developer's request for a street-opening permit to connect storm drains from the construction site to the nearby sewer line. Deluxe had been waiting for approval since early August, and the council's referral would cause the builder 2 more weeks of delay. (*Herald Statesman*, September 27, 1991) Judge Sand again threatened the city with contempt-of-court sanctions if it did not issue the permit by October 2, 1991. Council leaders said they would call a special meeting the next evening to approve the permit, not wanting "to put the city in contempt at a million dollars a day over a sewer," said Majority Leader Chema. Only Mayor Spallone was opposed to issuing the permit, suggesting the judge "[had] overstepped his bounds." (*Herald Statesman*, September 28, 1991)

Scattered-Site Housing

Construction Begins

The construction timetable for the first 142 public housing units was announced on March 18, 1991, while housing foes "vowed to keep the fight alive." Ground breaking at three sites was to start in early April, with completion targeted for November. On the same day the city filed an "emergency request" in Federal Appeals Court to delay construction while it sought another appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. (*Herald Statesman*, March 19, 1991)⁶² As city officials continued to seek "legal avenues to frustrate the housing order," ground was broken at the Central Park and Clark Street sites on April 12, quickly followed by digging up the playing field at the vacant Walt Whitman school site, where 48 units were planned. (*New York Times*, April 14, 1991)

Intent on pressuring Deluxe to stop construction, SYF President Jack O'Toole announced plans to stage a series of weekday and Saturday demonstrations, beginning at Clark Street on April 27 and moving on to the Shore View Drive site. O'Toole promised there would be "no violence, but we will demonstrate forcefully and on a continuing basis." (*Herald Statesman*, April 19, 1991)⁶³

As Project Manager Bob Novak had predicted at the beginning of excavation in mid-April, the first factory-built home arrived on July 8, 1991. Trucked in from Pennsylvania in two pieces, it was set that day on a concrete foundation on the site at Central Park Avenue and Clark Street. (*Herald Statesman*, July 9, 1991) Ten months later the first 142 units were "99 percent finished" and ready for mid-May occupancy. (*Herald Statesman*, April 25, 1992)

The Second 58 Units. In mid-April 1991 the MHA, for the second time, began looking for a developer to build the final 58 units of strongly opposed low-income housing on 2 east-side Yonkers sites. (*Herald Statesman*, April 23, 1991)⁶⁴ In February 1990 Deluxe Homes, with a bid of \$6.7 million, was tentatively awarded the contract, and in June was hired by HUD. But Deluxe ran into financing problems and backed out of the second phase in February 1991.⁶⁵

Two Westchester County developers submitted bids on July 2, 1991, of \$6.1 and \$6.6 million. Both proposals contained townhouse designs to "blend in with surrounding areas . . . each with their own front and back doors, around small park areas." (*Herald Statesman*, July 3, 1991)



Figure 12. Single-Family townhouses in Yonkers, New York.

As protection against another cancellation, the winning developer would be paid in stages, “eliminating the need to finance the entire project up front.” (Ibid.) The Authority recommended that TFH Building Corporation be given the contract. Although TFH’s bid was the higher of the two submitted, its “design and site layout plan,” along with more construction experience, earned it a higher overall rating.⁶⁶

Occupancy. Completion of the first 142 units of court-ordered public housing came nearer as HUD construction analysts inspected the buildings to certify that construction met Federal guidelines. Concomitantly, the MHA had started orientation sessions for tenants, educating them “in housing maintenance and responding to any potential neighborhood problems.” (*Herald Statesman*, April 25, 1992)

Approximately 40 families selected to live in the first 142 units began the first of 3 days of inspection tours of the properties in late May 1992 in preparation for signing leases. On June 1, 1992, exactly 11½ years after the suit was filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, tenants began moving into the townhouses built in the city’s white middle-class neighborhoods. (*Herald Statesman*, June 2, 1992) Half the families selected for the program were picked in a lottery from among 380 who applied to move into the MHA’s public housing projects. The other 71 would be selected from the public housing waiting list, with priority going to southwest Yonkers residents. (*Herald Statesman*, March 27, 1992)⁶⁷

The 142 units were officially opened on June 2, 1992, at a public ceremony held at the South Shore Drive site. It was a hopeful gathering of Government, religious, and civic leaders, and approximately 100 citizens, including some tenants of the new homes. Speakers talked of a “new beginning,” that the plan represented “a model” for the Nation, that “a healing” was underway. Attendees heard predictions of the end of “legal and political wars over the case.” Except for Jack O’Toole’s remarks of the day before that the court-ordered housing would “potentially [bring] ruination [to] the city of Yonkers,” the opening, as reported by staff writer Dave Sheingold, was decidedly upbeat. (*Herald Statesman*, June 3, 1992)

The development contract for the last two court-ordered sites was signed on June 19, 1993. By late September 1993, construction crews had begun installing factory-built homes at the Midland and Teresa Avenues site, and foundations were to be poured at the 44-unit Gramercy and Central Park site

in mid-October. The 14 townhouses at Midland and Teresa were to be occupied in early March 1994. Tenants moved into the first half of the 44-unit Gramercy site on September 1, 1994; the remaining 22 units were nearly complete.

Aftermath

Unlike the protests and appeals that stalled the timely construction of the first 142 units, “no major problems have arisen” at the last two sites, and “neighbors have coexisted peacefully” since the first units were occupied in 1992. (*Herald Statesman*, August 29, 1994) Many residents living near the seven sites continued to express resentment and anger as families from southwest Yonkers began moving into their new homes. Homeowners were upset that the future occupants were getting something for nothing. “I’m not asking for a handout,” Bridget said, “[b]ut do we need to pay taxes to support people who are going to get it for free?” (*Herald Statesman*, August 2, 1989) Concern over the effect the housing might have on property values was commonly expressed, as the following random remarks show: “You have young homeowners who have a mortgage. Now they have to worry about [their houses] going down in value.” (*Herald Statesman*, April 2, 1991) “I hope I can sell my house and get the hell out because I don’t think it’s going to work.” (*Herald Statesman*, May 29, 1992) “I worked all my life to buy this house and now they’re destroying me. God bless America. You tell me. Would you buy this house?” (*Herald Statesman*, April 2, 1991)

There were signs of resignation, and grudging acceptance as well. “I’m not worried,” Anne replied to a reporter. “I don’t think they’re going to rent to people who rob and steal.” (*Herald Statesman*, May 29, 1992) “Judge Sand is ruining the neighborhood. But what can you do? Maybe the whole thing will be nothing.” (*Herald Statesman*, July 23, 1993) “I’m not happy,” Edith said. “I have a wait-and-see attitude. Come back in 6 months.” (*Herald Statesman*, September 15, 1994)

In a special to *The New York Times*, Melinda Henneberger interviewed more than 30 people at the 5 sites, approximately 4 months after occupancy. At four of the five sites, Henneberger found “small signs of racial harmony.” However, at the Clark Street site, home to 24 low-income families, there was virtually no communication between the new families and residents. Long-time residents were “surprised that their new neighbors seemed to . . . care [for] their homes and [tend] their lawns.” The simultaneous expressions of outrage and hope were reflected in a Trenchard Street long-time resident: “Naturally they’re going to love it here. You would, too, if you got a townhouse for nothing that we’re paying for.” He then added: “The kids are O.K., and that’s all that counts, right? They’re the future.” White residents showed signs of conversion. Mary, who lived four blocks from the Clark Street site, admitted her fears were unfounded.

I still think the whole concept is wrong, that you can order people into an entirely foreign environment where they aren’t wanted, but it’s not the fault of these people. They got that pride of ownership right away. I can’t see any difference in the way I live and the way they live. They remind me of anybody. (*New York Times*, October 15, 1992)

Most tenants looked forward to the chance to establish homes in neighborhoods perceived as safe havens against the ravages of project life in southwest Yonkers. Staff writers for the *Herald Statesman* discussed the moves with families before construction commenced, at the time of the lottery, during

orientation, and in the weeks after occupancy. Even before any of the townhouses were built, west Yonkers families indicated their willingness to move to the hostile, racist east side. In random interviews at public housing projects, 15 of 20 tenants expressed a desire to escape, reflecting Mulford Gardens resident Luz's sentiments: "Of course I'd move. . . . It's so dirty here and it's getting out of hand with all the crime and the drugs. This place looks like it's poverty stricken." (*Herald Statesman*, September 5, 1991)

Parents and children alike evaluated the move from project environments to the east side favorably. "It's great. Everything is nicer," Diane said. Where they live now "the kids don't have a place to go out and play." (*Herald Statesman*, May 29, 1992) "This is a miracle," Yvette commented. "It's a new beginning, a fresh start. . . . On Riverdale Avenue [southwest Yonkers] you heard gunshots, you heard arguing, you heard shouting. I'm really glad I got out before my daughters got big." (*Herald Statesman*, September 15, 1994) "I want a place where my child can go out and play without gunshots fired over her head," reported Kellie. "I want her to be able to go to college and make something of herself. I'm not a bad person; why should I be deprived of a better place?" (*Herald Statesman*, March 27, 1992)

Hilda reflected the mood of many other tenants escaping from poverty-stricken southwest Yonkers when she said: "I think it's wonderful. I'm so happy, so happy. It's clean. It's no crime. No drugs. It's like a dream come true." (*Ibid.*) And Lindsay, an eighth grader, articulated the hopes and anxieties of the children:

Here you get your own place. Nobody can tell you what to do in the hallways. You don't have to worry about putting garbage in the hall. . . . We thought we were going to be stuck in Milford Gardens the rest of our lives. . . . Here, you smell the fresh air and everything, you can have a fresh start. (*Herald Statesman*, June 2, 1992)

Program Results

The scattered-site housing plan has succeeded in placing new units in well-established, non-Hispanic white neighborhoods with very low poverty rates. Table 6-1 compares the 7 sites for the 200 units of court-ordered public housing with the neighborhood characteristics of "five randomly chosen, existing housing projects." (Peterson and Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 106)

Table 6-1. Census Tract Characteristics of Scattered-Site Units and Old Housing Projects

Characteristic	Old Project	Scattered Site
Non-Hispanic white (percent)	18.5	90.6
Non-Hispanic African American (percent)	54.7	1.8
Hispanic (percent)	23.7	4.3
Poverty rate (percent)	25.8	3.8
Unemployment rate (percent)	11.5	4.4
Median family income	\$26,660	\$53,646
Population 25+ with college degree (percent)	14.2	26.2

Source: Peterson and Williams, *op. cit.*, table 17.1, p. 107.

The 200 units of low-income housing contain no more than 48 single-family dwellings. Rather than threatening neighborhood property values, “such housing would almost surely enhance their value and their neighborhood.” (*New York Times*, October 11, 1988)⁶⁸ A followup survey by the *Herald Statesman* of house sales in the neighborhoods near the first five sites found sale rates comparable to the rest of Yonkers. Moreover, “[t]he average sales price of homes was moderately higher than in the rest of Yonkers, just as it had been before construction of the public housing units.” (Peterson and Williams, op. cit., p. 107)

The scattered-site approach was “intended to minimize the impact on any one neighborhood.” To mollify neighborhood fears HUD absorbed the \$5 million difference between the \$16.1 million Deluxe bid and HUD’s own development guidelines.⁶⁹ “Those fears,” Sam Roberts wrote, “are magnified in places like Yonkers, which was the first affordable haven in Westchester County for refugees from New York City’s changing neighborhoods.” (*New York Times*, November 23, 1987) City officials argued that excellence in design and planning were “critical to the ultimate success” of the development; the more expensive townhouse design would make the housing “compatible with the surrounding community.” (Feron, op. cit., p. 62)

Oscar Newman originally proposed that “small clusters of townhouses or semidetached homes be scattered on eight or more sites.” (*New York Times*, November 23, 1987) His prototype—semidetached houses—was rejected by HUD as too expensive, but the townhouse design included “as much brick as possible, occasional bay windows, and units that look[ed] like single-family homes.” (Stern, op. cit., p. 9)

The MHA currently owns and manages 2,609 units of assisted housing: 1,500 family, 900 elderly, and 200 scattered-site units. The Authority has also issued 1,500 certificates or vouchers. Scattered-site units experience “less than” project housing when compared for six evaluative criteria: turnover (5 percent in a typical 6-month period), vandalism, resident complaints, neighborhood complaints about sites and about tenants, and rent delinquency.

Scattered-site families receive preoccupancy counseling. The Authority discusses the lease, provides information on community and social services, and instructs households on routine yard and premise maintenance. The overall effect of scattered-site housing is considered a step toward independent living for the residents. (Smith, Peter, Executive Director, MHA, telephone interview with author, November 21, 1994)

There have been no recorded malicious incidents since the units were occupied, and “though some skirmishing still is going on over the remaining second phase, housing desegregation isn’t the lightning rod it once was in the city.” (*Herald Statesman*, January 1, 1995) Property values have not eroded, crime is not rampant, and a handful of east-side neighborhoods have belatedly and grudgingly accepted assisted housing, avoiding “the grim high-rise public housing typical of the past everywhere in the Nation.” (Feron, 1989, p. 62)

What has not happened in Yonkers is “the doom forecast by foes.” However, some 2 1/2 years “after the opening of the first five sites,” integration, the goal of the lawsuit, has not happened either. Rather, the reality in Yonkers, writes Dave Sheingold of the *Herald Statesman*, is: “A palpable gulf . . . remains between tenants in the new housing and their neighbors—a gulf, that, by all accounts, represents the predictable remnants of the battle.” (December 13, 1994) Of the 25 residents Sheingold interviewed at

4 of the sites, “no tenants reported making friends outside the development; only one nearby resident said he had made a friend in the new housing.” (Ibid.)

A recent study suggests that the “racial impact of the new construction” will most likely be minimal. “Between 1990 and 2000 the affected tracts [will] have less than a one-half percentage point larger increase in the percentage of black population than would otherwise occur.” (Galster and Keeney, 1993, p. 179) Although the authors found a “quite modest” correlation between subsidized housing and “increasing minority presence,” they do not predict racial change for these neighborhoods.

White flight is less likely now than in the 1970s for three reasons: (1) on average, there is greater “white tolerance for residential integration”; (2) the assisted housing is “small-scale and low-density,” characteristics that “vastly improve the probability of the projects blending into their neighborhoods”; and (3) the metropolitan New York housing market will limit “the residential mobility of Yonkers whites.” (Ibid.)⁷⁰ Furthermore, “[r]apidly inflating single-family home prices, coupled with stagnant real-income growth of middle-class groups, have made it more difficult for whites to flee prospective integration and still find affordable alternative neighborhoods.” (Ibid., pp. 179–180)

Summary

The Gautreaux and Yonkers litigation are important for several reasons. First, the lawsuits are frequently cited as “prototypical example[s] of the legal problems inherent in court-ordered structural reform.” (Levit, 1994, p. 57) Being very direct attacks on the political status quo, the kind of aggressive court interventions triggered by the plaintiffs in Chicago and Yonkers activated the citizens of those communities “who [did] not want public housing tenants as neighbors.” (Silverman, *op. cit.*, p. 237) For a time, in both cities, the litigation brought the construction of family housing to a halt. Although the experiences of these two cities with scattered-site housing are more exceptional than typical, the cases and their consequences provide documentation for the main arguments posed at the start of chapter 5.

Second, the Yonkers and Gautreaux I decisions became action-forcing precedents that have required housing authorities, perhaps ripe for litigation, “to examine future [housing] policies more carefully [and] to look at their past actions.” (Ibid.) Although a decade after the lawsuits neither city had “disestablish[ed] racial segregation or produce[d] desperately needed low-income housing for Chicago [and Yonkers] blacks,” (McGee, 1976, pp. 948–49), many other housing authorities began to undertake their first scattered-site developments.

Third, the Gautreaux cases have taken on special significance in the national housing policy debate. Gautreaux I highlighted the issues of racial concentration and neighborhood and suburban resistance, and Gautreaux II called for the exploration of “metropolitanwide,” as opposed to “within-city,” housing strategies as an alternate remedy to persistent manifestations of racial discrimination. The Gautreaux Demonstration (the remedial part of Gautreaux II) was part of a “series of efforts designed to increase the housing opportunities of Chicago public housing tenants” by providing for metropolitanwide application of the Section 8 rental assistance program “in an effort to promote greater racial and economic dispersion” throughout the Chicago Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. (Perloff, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 30) The efforts to relocate inner-city, low-income African Americans to middle-class suburbs have been “highly valued and roundly applauded,” and the Gautreaux Demonstration “is looked upon as a mainstay in HUD’s future direction.” (Winnick, 1995, pp. 98–99)

Finally, in the Gautreaux and Yonkers litigation, there have been few discussions of the more recent successes in implementing the court orders. In light of the impressive Section 8 relief under Gautreaux II and the “long period during which the CHA scattered-site program produced virtually no relief at all” (Polikoff, 1988, p. 476), it is understandable that the Gautreaux Demonstration captured the lion’s share of journalistic and academic attention.

The retelling of Gautreaux I, so that the lens of inquiry shifts to the past 15 years rather than fixating upon the generally nonproductive formative years, should correct some of the negativism associated with Chicago’s experience with scattered-site housing. Moreover, because we now have 30 years of hindsight, “Gautreaux appears highly effective, forging a new institutional status quo that effectively sustained an innovative approach to public housing.” (Levit, *op. cit.*, p. 59)

The Chicago and Yonkers case studies demonstrate the difficulties of providing residential options for poor families who want to leave their “deadly neighborhoods” for the quieter, more secure streets of suburbanlike neighborhoods. The earlier case studies examined in chapters 3 and 4 document a significant number of successful scattered-site developments, but even these communities experienced some neighborhood resentment and barriers to the acquisition and placement of scattered-site units in certain residential neighborhoods.

If more than modest amounts of low-income housing are to be dispersed away from areas of concentrated poverty, then effective ways must be found to reduce the negative consequences that host neighbors generally associate with such housing, including structures architecturally unlike existing residences, lowered property values, increased neighborhood crime, and lifestyle changes. Chapter 7 examines the credibility of some of these perceptions, especially the belief that low-income or nonwhite entry into predominantly white neighborhoods is harmful to property values. It also discusses several mitigation mechanisms that communities might undertake when they embrace the scattered-site development strategy.

Chapter 7

Mitigation Strategies

In the 1960s housing professionals and a small number of publications such as *The Journal of Housing, House and Home*, and *Architectural Forum* began to report endorsements of small-scale housing units on scattered sites. It was the 1970s “before the concept of deconcentrating the poor through scattered-site, small-scale public housing [became] popular among reformers.” (Hays, 1985) Programs enacted before 1972 embraced the scattered-site strategy because Authorities by then regarded dense, project developments for families as failures and insisted that better ways had to be found to integrate low-income households into the wider community.

It has taken nearly 30 years for the evidence to accumulate documenting the viability of housing dispersal strategies, including scattered-site housing. This study has traced the changes in housing policy, beginning in the 1960s through the 1970s, when a number of new techniques came “to replace and supplement the traditional housing project approach.” The new techniques, such as turnkey development and, more recently, portable vouchers, encouraged the production of scattered-site units, and “permitted public housing tenants to live side by side with private market buyers and renters.” (Freilich and Seidel, 1970, p. 12)

The national and case-study programs reviewed in this study fully document that the scattered-site program has achieved several of its goals. In particular, it has replaced the institutional look of public housing, provided low-income families with housing choices in a wide range of locations, and, by opening up less segregated housing opportunities, decreased the effects of past discrimination.

Housing directors surveyed by Hogan and Lengyel and Belzer strongly endorsed the scattered-site program. Hogan and Lengyel’s study found three-quarters of the directors favorably disposed toward the program, and 80 percent were interested in undertaking more developments in the future. Belzer reported 97 percent of directors describing residents’ response to the program as positive. Both surveys asked about their communities’ overall impressions of the program, and more than 90 percent said the public impression was favorable. Self-evaluations of the program were equally laudatory, with success ratings of 90 percent or higher reported by housing directors in each survey.

Other evidence of program viability comes from the case studies discussed in chapters 3–6. When the 13 case-study directors were asked to compare their scattered sites to their projects on 6 evaluative criteria, scattered-site units had significantly less turnover, rent arrearage, vandalism, and complaints from tenants. On the other hand, directors reported almost as many neighbors with more or equal numbers of complaints about scattered-site properties and occupants as are leveled against projects and tenant families.

The research provides evidence that scattered-site programs are workable and should become a strategy in addressing the housing needs of low-income families. Scattered-site developments are not the solution to all housing issues; the elderly, for example, may find that high-rise structures better

address their needs. (Hogan and Lengyel, 1985, p. 14) Some families, moreover, may not be ready for such moves, which represent radical change in neighborhood surroundings, and some households experience difficulties accessing needed services.

In spite of the accumulating evidence that choice in residency works, such programs continue to provoke intense neighborhood resistance. The success of scattered-site housing has been reasonably argued. Even successful programs can be improved. Several suggestions derived from visits and conversations with housing authority staff that could be helpful to communities planning scattered-site programs in the future are presented in chapters 3 and 4.

Improvements to the program alone, however, are unlikely to bring down the walls of separation “driven by racial and ethnic antipathies” that have been building between city and suburb, at least since the early 1960s. Weir (1994) describes the politics of metropolitan America, increasingly segmented by income, as defensive localism where “[c]ritical areas of social policy—most important, housing and education—remain strongly tied to local prerogatives and capacities.” (Ibid., p. 339)

Do we have antidotes to combat defensive localism and community sentiments “motivated by anger, fear, and discrimination based on racial, economic, and social image of assisted housing”? (McGrew, op. cit., p. 376) How do we separate fact from fiction in the media’s fixation on the growing “underclass” and its social pathologies? Are there ways to integrate and prevent racial transition in host neighborhoods when the recipients of portable vouchers are labeled “project families”? Proponents of affordable housing and fair housing advocates think there are, and several of the strategies discussed below have long, successful histories.

The strategies are mitigation devices intended to reduce the intensity of opposition, including individual prejudice, neighborhood intransigence, and the penchant of certain citizens to structure political space to their own advantage. Weiher (1991) calls the outcome of that habit “the fractured metropolis” where “political boundaries . . . give geographic manifestation to racial antipathies permit[ting] citizenship to be manipulated to serve racial purposes.” (Ibid., p. x) A number of major impediments and the mitigation strategies that could mollify some of them, including marshaling facts to counter myth, will be discussed: (1) the myth of property value decline, (2) defensible space, (3) NIMBYISM, and (4) integration maintenance.

The Myth of Property Value Decline

Although there has been little systematic research on the effect(s) of public housing on property values, crime, and the character and quality of neighborhood life, the same cannot be said of discussions of the impact of racial integration on property values. Early judgments about the negative relationship between race and property values lacked supporting evidence, however.

The professional real estate literature circulating in the decade between 1923 and 1933 was “uniformly gloomy.” (Laurenti, 1960, p. 8) It subscribed to the common belief that nonwhite occupancy always brings financial loss to property owners in white neighborhoods. Consensus over the “depressing influence of nonwhite entry” began to crack between 1932 and 1955, when it became more obvious that other factors—“socioeconomic levels, physical condition of the neighborhood before entry, and price ranges of homes in the area”—affected the variability of property values. (Ibid., p. 9)¹

More rigorous research appeared in the post-World War II era, when “the nonwhite need for better housing . . . coincided with an ability to purchase it.” (Ibid., p. 6) During the 1950s and 1960s, the nonwhite populations of many large cities, especially those in the North and West, increased dramatically, thus overwhelming the “set-aside” areas for nonwhite groups. The ghettos expanded, and the change so feared by neighborhoods on the border of minority enclaves happened to “scores and even hundreds of all-white neighborhoods across the country.” (Ibid.)

Conducted under the auspices of the Commission on Race and Housing, Laurenti’s *Property Values and Race* (1960) brings a new level of sophistication into the discussion of the effects of race on property values. His work brought together two bodies of scientific research: first, earlier findings from studies conducted by real estate professionals in Chicago, Kansas City, Detroit, and Portland, Oregon; second, and representing the major portion of the study, his investigations of the effects of racial change on property values in neighborhoods in Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Oakland.

The earlier, somewhat comparable studies reviewed by Laurenti agreed that “nonwhite entry was usually associated with rising . . . prices,” but the price effects were open question[s] in several of the studies. (Ibid., p. 58) The major statistical finding for Laurenti’s cases was that “the entry of nonwhites into previously all-white neighborhoods was much more often associated with price improvement or stability than with price weakening.” (Ibid., p. 47) The evidence, in fact, suggested odds of four to one “that house prices in a neighborhood entered by nonwhites will keep up with or exceed prices in a comparable all-white area.” (Ibid., p. 52) Laurenti’s carefully crafted research casts strong doubt on the prevailing myth “concerning the harmful effects of nonwhite occupancy on property values.” (Ibid.)

Subsidized Housing and Property Values

Few studies examined the relationship between public housing projects and adjacent property values in the formative years of public housing. There is a large body of literature describing how neighborhoods mobilized whenever the Authority unveiled plans to reduce the density of population in the city core through slum clearance and relocation.² These often successful neighborhood battles culminated in even greater concentrations of assisted housing in large cities across the United States. The erosion of property values was a nonissue to many working- and middle-class white neighborhoods. The poor were concentrated in high-rise public housing, and the local political system did not intend to challenge residential segregation.

Charles Abrams (1955) reviewed several reports from New York, Atlanta, Philadelphia, Portland, and Youngstown, between 1950 and 1953, that discussed the effects of public housing on neighborhood properties. In Portland, Oregon, a study reported price increases of 46 percent to 96 percent in the area surrounding a 400-unit project. Building activity increased in neighborhoods close to the racially integrated Tasker Homes project in Philadelphia. In Atlanta, private construction in the vicinity of an African-American housing project achieved gains eight times higher than the city. Mixed occupancy projects in New York City revealed “a definite increase in assessed valuations [of commercial property] for a depth of about two blocks surrounding the project.” A report by the Fair Employment Practice Committee for the Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority found that “[r]ather than lowering property values, integrated public housing projects . . . increas[ed] the value of adjacent property and stimulat[ed] the construction of private homes.” (Ibid., p. 291)

Changes in housing policy in 1968 and 1974, along with court challenges to the status quo mandating mobility options for low-income families, re-ignited the gut-level fear captured by Abrams in the 1950s:

The fears that obsess the average homeowner today are three. They are widely held, deeply felt, and founded upon the sincere belief that minority infiltration [is] a menace to his home, neighborhood, and security. The homeowner is afraid of losing (1) social status, (2) neighborhood associations, and (3) investment. (Op. cit., p. 262)

Subsequent to these events was the reawakening of interest in examining the fear at the core of neighborhood resistance to assisted public housing or other unwanted public facilities, the fear that such facilities depress residential property values. Marco A. Martinez, in a paper prepared for the California Department of Housing and Community Development, summarizes "all known and readily available material" on the effects of subsidized housing and group homes (including manufactured housing) on property values. (Martinez, 1988, p. 1)

The results of the Martinez literature review are slowly circulating among housing professionals. Mark Matulef, Director of Research for The National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO), reproduced capsule summaries of 11 of the 15 studies for the *Journal of Housing*. (November/December, 1988, pp. 286–287) The NAHRO review was attached, along with "An Open Letter to Yonkers, New York," by the *Journal of Housing*, urging Yonkers citizens to "put the emotionalism and fear aside for the moment and deal with some facts." Terrence Cooper, editor of the *Journal*, concluded:

Fears that public housing will cause a decline in property values are unfounded. Of course, we realize that many negative things have been said about public housing. Many people believe what they've heard. But public housing can be a valuable and viable addition to our neighborhoods and communities. (*Journal of Housing*, November/December, 1988)

Martinez pulled together material from 15 investigations undertaken between 1963 and 1986 on the controversial linkage between subsidized housing and property values. The programs reviewed cover a plethora of subsidy types, but, of particular concern to this study's focus, not scattered-site conventional housing. Five of the studies included conventional public housing, but in the Babb, Warren, and Baird studies, one of several categories of subsidized housing was analyzed. There are problems with the Nourse and Rabiega studies as well. Although Nourse focused exclusively on conventional public housing, detail is not provided on what the eight St. Louis public housing projects looked like. Rabiega's report, on the other hand, provides a range from 10 to 120, but no exact density for the "small, low-rise family projects" in Portland. Furthermore, the units were occupied by whites, thus obviating "the need to consider ethnic variables in the analysis." (Martinez, op. cit., p. 13)

The accumulated findings are welcome news to affordable housing advocates searching for illustrations of program viability to counter the prevailing mythology of damaged values. Only one study in the Martinez review, that of Fairfax County, Virginia, concluded that "subsidized or otherwise affordable housing impaired the values of adjacent properties." (Ibid., p. 23) The report also noted that the "average

value of all units increased over time, but prices were higher for units . . . further away from the subsidized projects.” (Ibid., p. 24) In summarizing the Martinez report, Ali Kamely (1995) concludes:

Despite the structural and geographic differences between reports, most come to similar conclusions that there are no significant negative effects from locating subsidized housing near market-rate developments. Some, in fact, reported positive property-value effects after locating subsidized units in the neighborhood. (Ibid., p. 24)³

Four studies not covered in the Martinez (1988) summary are reports commissioned by the Charlotte, North Carolina, and Lima, Ohio, Housing Authorities; the *Herald Statesman* analysis of property value effects in Yonkers, New York; and the Community Residences Information Services Program (CRISP) summary of major studies on the effect of group homes (community residences for the developmentally disabled, adolescent wards of the court, recovering alcoholics, and ex-convicts and parolees).⁴

Authority Commissioned Reports. The Puryear and Hayes (1988) study in Charlotte, North Carolina, charted price trend changes over time in four suburban test neighborhoods with scattered-site properties relative to control neighborhoods. Data on 2,189 sales of single-family homes within a 1½-mile radius of the housing developments were collected from county tax records for more than 10 years.

The findings showed no systematic relationship between proximity to scattered-site housing and declines in property values; neighborhood price increases from 84 percent to 127 percent over the study period; similar price changes before and after the units were constructed in all neighborhoods with projects; and declining sales prices between 1981 and 1983 affected all neighborhoods. In summary, the report found macroeconomic factors, household income, and housing characteristics such as size, age, and lot size to “override locational or neighborhood characteristics such as the presence of subsidized housing.” (Ibid., p. 3)

Dan-Lee Enterprises, Inc., reviewed the real estate sales activities of six neighborhoods in Lima, Ohio, in 1988. Five neighborhoods encompassed the Allen Metropolitan Housing Authority (AMHA) purchase of existing single-family homes or sponsorship of construction of scattered-site housing. The sixth neighborhood had no assisted housing and was chosen for comparison purposes. The study ascertained the impact of the AMHA’s scattered-site family projects “on the nicer neighborhoods of Lima, Ohio—a small urban center in a 10-county rural area.” (Correspondence from Thomas A. Redding, Executive Director of the AMHA, to Mark L. Matulef, Director of Research, NAHRO, December 20, 1988)

The market study recorded general sales activity and focused on properties that turned over at least twice during the 6-year review period. There were significant variances in the number of multiple turn-overs (3 to 16) and the number of assisted housing units (4 to 13) across neighborhoods. Sales prices in five neighborhoods, including the control, were relatively stable to moderately improved, with refigured average appreciations in the 2 percent to 3.8 percent range. One neighborhood, host to four preowned single-family units, had a resale history with depreciation/appreciation rates of 7.5 percent to 6.5 percent, suggesting fluctuation within a steady to slightly declining market. With the one noted exception, a 40- to 50-year old subdivision of single-family and multistory homes, the report generally supports the “little or no effect on values” results of most of the extant literature.

Study of Group Homes. The 10 studies summarized in the CRISP report to the Westchester Community Services Council generally followed a common research methodology of pre-test/post-test design. The studies included a representative sample of group homes, control group neighborhoods, and sales price data for houses sold in areas bordering the facility. The evaluations differed on length of time of reported real estate transactions (12 months to 10 years); type of sales data recorded (time on market, turnover); and examination of property value impact by type of facility.

The studies failed to corroborate the popular stereotype of erosion in property assessments. Proximity to group homes did not influence market values between test and control neighborhoods. The changes that did occur were unrelated to facility characteristics, but were associated with general market trends. Even studies that looked for differential facility effects (clientele served and number of residents) found no declines in property value. The Martinez summary included a study of the effects of group homes on single-family neighborhoods in the Shreveport-Bossier City, Louisiana, metropolitan area. The study tested whether property effects might vary by submarket area: homes sited in tracts with above- or below-average home values. The author found "no observable and statistically significant effects on housing prices" in high socioeconomic markets, but "in below-average socioeconomic areas where housing markets are weak, there was an observable and statistically significant increase in the price of houses sold near the group home site." (Martinez, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36)

Yonkers, New York. The aftermath of court-ordered scattered-site housing in Yonkers, New York, is mixed, according to a *Herald Statesman* review of reports by the Westchester Multiple Listing Service and interviews with sellers and local real estate brokers some 14 months after the first developments opened. There is no evidence of panic selling near the new sites, although "many home sellers have long waits and values dropping below \$200,000, especially if they live within a block of a site. . . ." (*Herald Statesman*, August 12, 1993)

At the height of the public housing furor, when the city faced bankrupting fines and several council members challenged Judge Sand to issue contempt citations, "residents predicted the [court] order would lead to crime and decay, followed by sinking property values." Such a scenario has not materialized, even though some brokers contend that homes are harder to sell in the vicinity of the sites, and customers who know the locations occasionally "pointedly ask not to be shown homes" in the neighborhood.

Contrary to "doomsday predictions about plummeting property values," staff writer Sheingold concludes:

But homes still do sell near the sites at higher than rock-bottom prices. And no obvious trend has emerged showing that the low-income housing is stifling their appeal any more than the continued slow real-estate market and buyers' concerns with Yonkers' overall reputation. (Ibid.)

Property Values and Scattered-Site Housing

The three dozen or so studies probing the relationship between subsidized housing, group homes, and nonwhite entry into white residential neighborhoods demonstrate the lack of a causal connection between any one of the factors and property loss. None of the studies, however, has examined the property value depreciation hypothesis in neighborhoods with scattered-site units.

Given the defining characteristics of scattered-site housing—low density, deconcentration, and location in middle-class neighborhoods—there should be little likelihood of negative effects on adjacent properties. When asked whether scattered-site operations had any quantifiable negative impact on property values or crime, housing directors were either unaware or considered the effect(s) marginal. It would be more comforting if we had direct evidence to that effect.

The fears of property loss, crime, and neighborhood deterioration are salient to host communities even in the absence of awareness.⁵ Both Rabiega's study of residents living within four blocks of low-rise public housing projects and Chandler's survey of Cleveland neighborhoods report only one-third of the residents were aware of the programs in close proximity to their homes. The imagined impact that scattered-site housing would have on neighborhoods and personal lives was hardly negligible, however. In Cleveland, for example, of 79 respondents who were aware of the Acquisition Housing Program, 19 percent considered moving, 11 percent would not make repairs to their property, and 30 percent judged the program negatively. (Chandler, 1990, table 14) On the other hand, slightly more than half supported expansion of the program (presumably, in some other back yard). In Portland, 46 percent of the families aware of the Housing Assistance Plan (HAP) projects were neutral, and 37 percent somewhat or very negative. Sixteen thought the projects' effects on property values would be negative, and 10 percent personally knew a family who moved because of the proximity of subsidized housing.

In Tucson, Arizona, after learning that assisted housing was being built in their neighborhoods, 46 percent of the residents disapproved. Residents were angered because the city had not consulted them on the location of the units, and 23 percent intended to move from the neighborhood. Although nearly 60 percent of the residents considered their neighborhood suitable for low-income families, 37 percent suggested other areas where scattered-site housing would be more appropriate. Fifty percent of the residents assumed their neighbors would receive the tenants coolly, and 52 percent feared their homes would lose value. The Cleveland, Portland, and Tucson data document the persistence of myth in the face of substantial evidence that property owners' fears of financial loss from locally unwanted land uses are not credible.

Defensible Space

That the physical design of housing and the demographic characteristics of neighborhoods affect behavior has long been recognized by housing officials. Until Oscar Newman's *Defensible Space* (1972) appeared, we lacked data on whether "the peculiar physical design of a project, independent of its urban location," could affect crime rates. (Ibid., p. xv) Newman's examination of New York City's Brownsville and Van Dyke projects revealed how physical design differences (high-rise/low-rise construction, entranceway location, open ground level space, and interior-space utilization) correlate with crime and vandalism rates. The "defensible space qualities inherent in the Brownsville design" are arguably responsible for the difference:

Van Dyke Homes was found to have 50 percent more total crime incidents, with over three and one-half times as many robberies . . . and 64 percent more felonies, misdemeanors, and offenses than Brownsville. [And] even though Brownsville Houses is an older project, beginning to suffer

from natural decay, Van Dyke annually required a total of 39 percent more maintenance work. (Ibid., pp. 48–49)

Over the next 20 years, “comparatively few defensible space improvements in public housing” were undertaken. (Cisneros, 1995, p. 12) In the 1990s, with growing awareness that a “significant segment of the existing stock of public housing will become nonviable in future years” (Schnare, 1991, p. 290) and because “crime and drug abuse have begun to undermine living conditions in many projects,” (Ibid., p. 291) Authorities were more “willing to try almost any technique, including defensible space, to alleviate the nightmare.” (Cisneros, op. cit., p. 12)

Defensible space techniques are gaining popularity across the United States as communities search for ways to protect their homes and their families from random acts of violence. Residents have come together to protect their communities by controlling access to residential streets in Bridgeport, Fort Lauderdale, South Central Los Angeles, Chicago, Dayton, Miami Shores, and North Philadelphia. (Jordan, 1993)

Community efforts are directed at crime reduction, including the elimination of drivethrough drug trafficking. Bridgeport, Connecticut, for example, placed concrete barriers diagonally across several intersections “to create a series of residential loops . . . that would impede through-traffic and make a quick getaway difficult for both drug dealers and buyers.” (Ibid., p. 32)

Prototypical of “walls that unite” is Oscar Newman’s strategy for the half-square-mile Five Oaks neighborhood of Dayton, Ohio. In 1990 Five Oaks was in “the throes of racial transition and decline,” having gone from 97 percent white to 43 percent African American in two decades. (*Newsweek*, July 11, 1994) The area had become “an ideal location for drug dealers and prostitutes who served a higher income clientele who usually made their purchases from their cars.” (Cisneros, 1995, p. 17) The city “was afraid that if Five Oaks fell, there would be a domino effect on surrounding communities,” and Newman was hired to change the community infrastructure in order to stabilize the Five Oaks neighborhood. (Newman, 1995, p. 151)

Newman’s plan for Five Oaks contained four elements. First, 10 mini-neighborhoods were created, each with a single entry portal “identified by attractive brick pillars.” Other entrances were “blocked off by iron gates hung on brick piers.” (Cisneros, 1995, p. 17)⁶ Second, the city encouraged resident ownership “by supporting modest rehabilitation and downpayments for first-time home buyers.” (Ibid., p. 19) Third, code-enforcement procedures were strengthened, including “penalties for absentee owners whose buildings had code violations.” Fourth, closer working relationships between the community and the police were to be encouraged. (Ibid.)

Although some of the evidence is anecdotal, the benign barricades do generate multiple benefits. While barriers clearly “broadcast an intolerance for antisocial behavior,” they also facilitate the “process of restoring a cohesive social environment.” (Jordan, op. cit., p. 33) Fort Lauderdale’s Riverside Park barrier project, for example, generated neighborhood volunteer programs for other improvement projects. In Toledo barriers “created a climate for reinvestment,” a landlord association was formed to work on renovations, and a resident services committee put together a directory of neighborhood talent. (Ibid., pp. 34–35)⁷

The Five Oaks application of defensible space delivered “dramatic and immediate” effects. Drawing from the city of Dayton’s 1994 evaluation of the program, Newman reports:

Within 11 months of creating the minineighborhoods: traffic was reduced by 67 percent and traffic accidents by 40 percent. Overall crime was reduced by 26 percent and violent crime by 50 percent. Robbery, burglary, assault, and auto theft were found to be the lowest in 5 years. (Newman, 1995, 152)⁸

For Newman, “the most exciting spinoff benefit” of the Five Oaks project was the restoration of the community’s two-family houses, typically owner-occupied duplexes with the second unit rented to a family racially and economically different from the owner. Thus, by stabilizing this community at very low cost, we were able not only to preserve a community for working- and middle-class inhabitants, but to create integrated housing for lower income residents in neighborhoods that are safe, have good schools and municipal services, and are close to jobs. (Ibid.)

The defensible space concept is not without drawbacks. First, barrier techniques sometimes don’t work. Operation Cul de Sac in South Central Los Angeles failed to reduce crime, and the barriers eventually became “graffiti magnets.” Another experiment in the North Hills section of Los Angeles also failed to create the neighborhood viability Newman’s efforts brought to Five Oaks. The South Central Los Angeles failure was not a flawed concept but the inability to “combine [reengineering city streets] with broader community efforts and to maintain financial and political support for them.” (Jordan, op. cit., p. 35) The results in North Hills, on the other hand, point out the critical need for community involvement and some minimum of social cohesion. As Jordan opines:

Defensible space has proven itself effective at maintaining the sense of community in places worried about losing it; it may be asking too much for a collection of physical barriers to create community where it has ceased to exist altogether. (Ibid.)

Second, it is important that adjacent neighbors—the city or suburb next door—not construe the gates or concrete barricades as racist or devices to separate communities by income. This is exactly what happened when the Hillcrest Neighborhood Association of Maplewood, New Jersey, proposed to install five gates ostensibly to keep “cars [from] careening through the neighborhood’s narrow streets to avoid traffic lights.” (*New York Times*, December 6, 1993) A border rift developed between Hillcrest, a racially diverse suburban neighborhood in Maplewood, and Newark. What began as a neighborhood effort to control traffic quickly became “a story about the affluent suburb versus the impoverished city and whites trying to barricade themselves from blacks with gates on selected streets.” (Ibid.)⁹

Third, defensive techniques are not always protective or community enhancing. In an effort to thwart repeated breakins, 71 year-old Pedro Pagan “made himself a prisoner of his fears” by encasing his Bronx home “behind window gratings and wrought iron gates backed by wire mesh and topped by gleaming coils of razor ribbon.” (*New York Times*, January 17, 1993) Extreme measures like Mr. Pagan’s often send the wrong message to criminals “that . . . residents have given up, shut themselves in and left the neighborhood up for grabs.” (Ibid.)

Fourth, a preoccupation with defensible space, particularly plans that incorporate gates, fences, and other obtrusive barriers, may foster in city neighborhoods the kind of common-interest housing developments (CIDs) that have “risen to prominence in most rapidly growing areas” since the 1960s. Walled communities are America’s new high-security suburbs, where families have purchased “safety from threats both real and imagined and control over who moves in beside them.” (Guterson, 1992) Gated communities “are part of a broader privatization movement [connected] to a growing skepticism about government’s ability to police streets, stabilize neighborhoods and property values, and generally look after the public realm.” (Dillon, 1994, p. 9)

Community preservation efforts like Five Oaks are to be applauded. Let us hope the self-pride and renewal achieved through in-city suburban restructuring does not mimic the exclusivity and segregation fostered in the proliferating suburban enclaves called CIDs. (McKenzie, 1993, p. 30)¹⁰

Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY)

Proposals to disperse public housing tenants commonly create unprecedented controversy. Cuomo’s “diary of a mistake”¹¹ is an excellent discussion of how scattered-site housing can be politically explosive when plans are made to move families from inner-city slums to middle-class white neighborhoods. Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) interim director France’s remark that he “avoided sites in wards that previously had none” is not distinctive of Chicago; rather, local politics shapes the site-selection process everywhere.

Emotions form the core of the NIMBY syndrome and they are nourished “over the issues of crime, race, and ethnicity.” (Lazin, op. cit., p. 7) Cuomo tried to capture the emotion of vociferous Forest Hills community groups when he wrote:

The entire scattered-site concept is obstructed, if not defeated, by the fear that low-income blacks mean crime—a fear so powerful that “morality” and “charity” are simply no match for it.
(Cuomo, op. cit., p. 137)

Even communities with admittedly successful programs are not immune to controversy.¹² The Denver Housing Authority’s plans to “acquire 132 single-family and duplex homes in middle-class neighborhoods” generated intense controversy. Opponents claimed recipient neighborhoods would suffer from “increasing crime, eroding dwelling maintenance standards, and lowering property values.” (Galster, 1989, p. 1)

There has been little discussion of the NIMBY syndrome in the planning literature, and “[m]ost attention has been directed toward conflict only over low-income housing developments and hazardous waste sites.” (Dear, 1992, p. 289) The “turf-protectionist behavior of facility opponents” described by Dear also affects siting controversies over homeless shelters, prisons, hotel and airport extensions, roads and railways, power plants, and human services facilities.

NIMBYISM “blossomed in the 1980s during the era of free-market government.” It soon became the acronym used to describe opposition to LULUs (locally unwanted land uses). (*Progressive Architecture*,

September 1993, p. 89)¹³ NIMBY'S roots, however, were planted in the 1960s when distrust in government emerged out of "the perceived failings of the experts: the development czars, the housing bureaucracies, the traffic engineers, and very definitely the planners and the architects." (Ibid.)¹⁴

The communities discussed in this study provide numerous illustrations of neighborhoods intensely opposed to being singled out as host locations for scattered-site housing. The Chicago and Yonkers case studies in particular document the tenacity and staying power of neighborhood anger once battle lines solidify and conflict moves into the public arena.

The socioeconomic and political variations between and among localities, the extent of racial and economic integration in housing, land availability, type of housing stock and housing market conditions, are just a few of the many differences that rule out finding a single solution to overcoming neighborhood resistance to dispersed housing. Because program experience with scattered-site planning is relatively short, and HUD has not clearly directed or guided the effort, "localities have designed housing dispersal efforts in relative isolation, without a foregoing body of experience to rely on, or a good information exchange network." (Silver, 1980, pp. 26–27) In calling for further research into techniques to overcome NIMBYISM, Silver acknowledges problems:

[I]dentifying successful program components is difficult because, ultimately, "it depends." What works in one area may be a disaster in another, and again, the most important variable is the ability of local officials and housing planners to understand the local market and social and political climate and design a program accordingly. (Ibid., p. 27)

This study's review of dispersal strategies and case-study inventories, Silver's intelligent discussion of components of successful dispersal programs, and the growing NIMBY literature are creating a body of findings (Freudenburg and Pastor, 1992, p. 40) on how to reduce the perceived "imbalance in the distribution of a project's benefits and costs" (Mazmanian and Morell, *op. cit.*, p. 126) and work within the parameters of neighborhood resistance.

Michael Dear's discussion of the lifecycle of NIMBYISM and his identification of factors that shape neighborhood responses to unwanted facilities provide planners with additional lessons on how to manage NIMBYISM through the development of community relations strategies. Dear's four factors—client characteristics, facility characteristics, the structure of the host community, and programmatic considerations—are used to organize the discussion of several mitigation strategies that planners, Housing Authorities, and nonprofit developers might adopt to counter the NIMBY syndrome.

Client Characteristics

Scattered-site housing is not an appropriate remedy for the shelter needs of all low- to moderate-income families. The ability of clients to fit into new neighborhoods must be considered. A move to a scattered site does not guarantee escape from the stigma normally attached to project living. Some find that the lifestyle and occupational differences between themselves and neighborhood residents make them feel socially isolated. (Hogan and Lengyel, *op. cit.*, p. 12)

Just as the mix of tenant characteristics can profoundly affect the environment of project housing,¹⁵ it can also condition neighborhood acceptance levels and facilitate or block the movement of families toward self-sufficiency in both resident-based and unit-based mobility programs. The reason why tenant selection is critical is that:

Scattered-site efforts often mean placing low-income units in neighborhoods for the first time, the conduct and lifestyles of initial tenants will strongly influence a neighborhood's reaction to the program, and their willingness to accept additional units. (Silver, *op. cit.*, p. 30)

The high ranking the New York City Housing Authority receives, for example, is probably because of two factors: (1) spreading the housing across all five boroughs and locating buildings outside existing ghettos, (Rich, 1980, p. 54) and (2) maintaining tenant diversity. Although nearly half of the families, and more than 60 percent of the African-American households, are headed by single parents, more than 70 percent of the family heads work. (Riley, 1989, p. 18)¹⁶ While Hogan and Lengyel (1985) concluded that families were more likely to settle comfortably into a different neighborhood life if they lived in an employed, intact household, this conclusion was not intended to suggest that only families with potential for upward mobility should be housed in scattered sites. Rather, housing agencies must recognize that large families headed by unemployed women, for example, may need management and social service support when moving to dispersed housing. (Ibid., p. 13) Turning developments into livable communities and changing the public's negative image of public housing requires "better screening of applicants and tougher treatment of abusive tenants." (Atlas and Dreier, 1993, p. 28) Client demographics, particularly the "preponderance . . . of low-income, single-parent families [created] insurmountable difficulties" for the scattered-site program in Chicago's north end. (DeZutter, 1983, p. 18) The Housing Resource Center (HRC) instituted screening and selection processes more rigorous than HUD criteria to control the effects of the imbalance. Evictions were used to "improve the properties, boost morale, win trust and cooperation," and demonstrate to the tenants and neighbors that the "HRC was willing to act tough." (DeZutter, 1986, p. 46)

The mixed-income strategy, so popular in discussions of how to reconfigure "distressed housing authorities" with high concentrations of low-income families, is an important element of HUD's Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program (HOPE VI or URD). Of the 19 HOPE VI sites, 12 included plans calling for income mixing (including rent ceilings).¹⁷ The need for income-mix strategies is less obvious for low-density, scattered-site developments, however.¹⁸ The Hogan/Lengyel and Belzer national inventories indicate that programs average from 4.7 to 6.2 units per site, thus reducing the appearance of inundation by a dissimilar class and/or racial group. Furthermore, the residents of scattered sites are extremely diverse. Tenancy characteristics of case-study communities reveal more married couples with children, earnings derived from work rather than welfare, and greater racial diversity in comparison to families living in large housing authority projects.

Authorities appear to "cream" when they rent scattered-site units. When we inquired about screening practices only, a few directors mentioned special requirements, however. St. Paul follows an eight-point "noneconomic" screening policy when selecting applicants for scattered-site units. The policy checks

whether “[tenants] would have a detrimental effect on other tenants or on the project environment; can live independently, manage a household and comply with the lease, and can pass eligibility screens.” (“Non-Economic Qualifications for Admission or Continued Occupancy,” *Statement of Policies*, 1988, Part III, pp. 2–4) The El Paso and Seattle Authorities prefer their own tenants, and both avoid selecting from the waiting list. El Paso project residents who request transfers are screened for scattered-site occupancy; in this way, the Authority can control for “families with good records of tenancy.” Seattle’s Resident Incentive Transfer Program moves families from “garden communities” into single- and multi-family homes throughout the city. Selection criteria include living in a “garden community” project for 3 years and the absence of “rent delinquencies, housekeeping problems, or any proven major complaints [during] the last 2 years.”

Facility Characteristics

Type, size, number, appearance, operations, and reputation of the sponsor agency are characteristics that condition community acceptance or rejection. (Dear, 1992, p. 292) This is good news for facilities planners because they can manipulate physical features, and thus perhaps diminish the NIMBY effect. Research in Seattle reveals that small developments (1 to 8 units) are more successful than larger ones (10 to 15) in terms of resident satisfaction and ability to integrate into new community life. Smaller sites, moreover, lessen neighborhood antagonism (measured by questions concerning perceptions of increases in crime and falling property values). Smaller developments are less obtrusive, and if the structures are made to blend easily into the neighborhood, attitudes are more likely to be positive. (Hogan and Lengyel, *op. cit.*, p. 12) Silver’s telephone conversations with local program officials in more than a dozen localities found strong confirmation for the importance of project design and scale factors. Projects that fit into the streetscape in terms of size, and that are sensitive architecturally to their surroundings, are likely to generate less opposition. Keeping the number and size of individual units in scale with already existing housing also serves to facilitate acceptance. (Silver, *op. cit.*, p. 29)

Early research on suburban tolerance toward subsidized housing indicates a strong preference for single-family dwellings, and when a sample of households in Dayton, Ohio, was asked to choose among multifamily options, they preferred only townhouse or rowhouse designs or garden apartments “with the appearance of a townhouse.” (Gruen and Gruen, 1972, pp. 17–25)¹⁹ Assuming the Gruens’ estimates of suburban preferences still hold, the choice of several Authorities to purchase and rehabilitate single-family and rowhouses to avoid structures unlike the homes and apartments of host communities was sound policy.²⁰

All, or substantial portions of the scattered-site programs in Rochester, Lancaster, St. Paul, Chicago, El Paso, Seattle, and Philadelphia, consist of single-family or small multifamily acquisition or rehabilitation units. These Authorities strongly support the acquisition strategy because the dwellings “avoid the stigma often associated with public housing”; they are “typical of the age and style of construction in a given neighborhood as to be unremarkable when compared to other homes in the same neighborhood”; the reconditioned single-family homes have upgraded whole neighborhoods, “some of which suffer from the presence of sore thumb dwellings”; and the “used-house” program helped facilitate the integration of

neighborhoods and in Seattle program supporters believe acquisition can “improve dilapidated housing, desegregate schools, and mix racial and economic minorities within middle-class neighborhoods.” (*Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, April 8, 1979)

New construction is generally more difficult to carry out, “not only because [it] involves higher density projects as a rule, but because they are very visible and are often seen as representing a threatening change in an area’s appearance or character.” (Silver, 1980, p. 28) New construction strategies are not universally opposed, however. Charleston’s infill development, incorporating Charleston’s historic single-house style into the new construction, illustrates how sensitively designed new construction can win over initial neighborhood resistance. (Crosbie, 1990) The court-ordered public housing in Yonkers contains townhouse units designed “to carefully echo the style and materials of the surrounding middle-class single-family houses—using brick, sloped roofs, and bay windows.” (Newman, 1995, p. 153)

In older, established neighborhoods, new homes and apartments will always be noticeable, regardless of the care taken by architects and builders to “enhance the residential character of the buildings and break up the monotony of a large number of similar units on the site.” (Kreisman, 1989) Some Authorities choose to skirt neighborhood opposition by purchasing existing housing because “new construction [is frequently] more subject to local zoning approval.” (Kellam, 1993, p. 800) Making use of older housing units can also “reduce the broad opposition to public housing from those who feel new construction is ‘too good’ for the poor.” (Hirshen and LeGates, 1975, p. 70)

Size and number are two characteristics of potential importance to community acceptance of scattered-site housing. Case studies indicate that these two variables, along with location, affect how assisted families evaluate the program. The location of scattered sites is important to success; negative neighborhood characteristics clearly affect attitudes and perceptions. Scattered-site residents in Seattle census tracts with 1980 median family incomes of \$7,396–\$14,744 had better feelings about themselves than occupants living in poorer areas of the city. Those in the depressed neighborhoods (as crudely measured by median family income) also experienced more adjustment problems and viewed their neighborhoods less favorably. (Hogan and Lengyel, op. cit., p. 12)

Major reasons identified in the Hogan/Lengyel study attribute program success to good design, small-scale projects, and attractive buildings that “promote individual pride and care of property.” Misjudgments in site location are costly. The placement of sites in “unsuitable” neighborhoods adversely affects the social mobility for poor families and alienates residents struggling to maintain neighborhood viability.

East St. Louis dramatically illustrates the problem. Authority staff admit that the public’s impression of the program was unfavorable, and the program failed: properties adjacent to the sites lost value “due to severe deterioration of the units”; tenants vacated the properties; and dozens of the units are beyond saving. (Scattered-Site Questionnaire) The South Park program in Tucson, and certain properties managed by the Housing Resource Center in Chicago, also suffered from the choice of unsuitable sites. DeZutter’s documentation of street locations where the CHA constructed scattered sites in the early years of the program suggests the importance of development methods and location factors in the appearance and maintenance of property.²¹ The South Park survey of resident attitudes demonstrates how important location is to the success of scattered-site developments. Poor neighborhoods clearly affect attitudes and perceptions.

Management Considerations

Good housing management consists of resident screening, agency support, and empowerment of the residents. The case studies suggest that a careful matching of units (density and neighborhood) and residents (intact, employed households) is important to the successful operation of scattered-site programs. Those processing applications can use this information to identify the best match consistent with HUD guidelines. The Authority and community social service organizations must recognize that “potentially more vulnerable” families need a different level of support to make a successful transition to scattered-site living. (Crewe, 1994) Most scattered-site households will need some agency support during the first few months of occupancy. Agencies should help in identifying community resources, parks, and services. If a good relationship has been developed between the agency and immediate neighbors, residents should be aware of this interaction as well. (Hogan and Lengyel, *op. cit.*, p. 13)

Next to tenant selection, “careful and prompt attention to unit maintenance” is essential because host neighborhoods are highly sensitive to outward signs of disrepair. Although the deconcentration of the program “often stretches the ability of local housing staff,” several Authorities have taken on the challenge. In answer to logistical and cost problems, the Rochester Authority merged its management and central maintenance/special services divisions into a new Housing Operations Division to better handle services and repairs at project site locations. The city was divided into four management areas in June 1982, with roughly equal numbers of properties assigned to each zone to minimize travel time between sites.

Features of the Rochester system also appear in El Paso, Tucson, and Seattle. Decentralized, or zone, management is intended to achieve better materials control, quicker response to maintenance calls from project managers or residents, and in Tucson symbolizes to tenants and neighbors concern for the program through “presence in the field.” Seattle’s four-zone realignment, adopted in early 1995, was expected to improve the program in terms of (1) greater efficiencies in response time; (2) better mediation in disputes between tenants and neighbors; (3) closer collaboration between the Authority and the police because precincts are also decentralized; and (4) more informed and timely referral of tenants to service providers who are also spread around the city.

Several Authorities reported problems managing the scattered-site units. Four problems mentioned in the Hogan/Lengyel survey were: (1) insufficient number of staff (62 percent), (2) maintenance problems with the units (46 percent), (3) delays in response to site-specific requests for assistance (38 percent), and (4) access to social services (30 percent). Belzer also found the program more costly, with 52 percent of the directors claiming higher maintenance costs. No clear pattern emerged when he asked directors to evaluate the ease or difficulty of maintaining the units, however.

Authorities have implemented several cost-control strategies, including payment of utility costs; higher damage deposits; routine snow removal, grass mowing, and general upkeep of the property; and minor dwelling repairs. Preoccupancy counseling can save money if it becomes a screening device to select from the tenant pool households with behavioral attributes consistent with management norms (for example “prompt payment of rent, control of children, absence of criminal activity, and reasonable use of the [property]”). (Struyk and Blake, 1983, p. 11)

The absence of onsite services underscores the importance of sites accessible to amenities, including public transportation, job training, and social service. The adequacy of staff may be important to

Authorities, especially those with programs at the upper density limit (15 units per site). The Sunrise and Daybreak Grove developments in Escondido, California, 21-unit apartments about a mile apart, have solved the lack of onsite services by having the North County Housing Foundation “guide tenants to social services in the larger community.” (Fisher, 1994, p. 50)

A number of Authorities have talked about privatizing the management of their dispersed properties. Chicago’s 1983 experiment with contract management is a good example of what can be done. To lesser opposition to New Haven’s plans to scatter public housing across the city, Executive Director Echols promised homeowners that “a management company would care for the properties and tenants would be tightly screened.” (*New York Times*, August 27, 1991) In the Chicago case, the outcome was win/win: host neighborhoods were relieved that the CHA had nothing to do with the management of the units, and 80 percent of the tenants interviewed were pleased with the shift from the CHA to the Housing Resource Center.²²

The reputation of the Authority can affect how accommodating neighborhoods are to accepting assisted housing.²³ The image of the CHA is notoriously bad, and its mismanagement problems are legendary. The media’s concentration on “troubled Authorities” also feeds the public’s disdain of project housing. Homeowners in New Haven, for example, were strongly opposed to the Authority’s plans to buy houses and condominiums throughout the city and rent them to low-income tenants displaced when the city tore down a housing project. Along with the “scent of race [and] an odor of class,” city homeowners distrusted the Authority. “It can’t maintain its own projects, so who will care for these houses?” homeowners said. (*New York Times*, August 27, 1991) The 7-year legal battle in Newark over razing several 13-story towers was also about trust in the context of an Authority “which for decades was so rife with patronage, corruption, and mismanagement that Federal officials called it one of the country’s worst.” (*New York Times*, March 7, 1994)

Characteristics of Host Neighborhoods

Neighborhood homogeneity, “both social and physical,” is a key variable that distinguishes the more tolerant inner-city acceptance of LULUs from exclusionary practices of suburban jurisdictions. (Dear, op. cit., p. 293) The fact that suburban jurisdictions and many suburbanlike city neighborhoods are “comprised predominantly of single-family homeowners living at relatively low densities” (Ibid.) is datum housing planners ignore at their peril. When these places are targeted for affordable housing, including choice in residency options, it is imperative that only certain kinds of land-use practice be followed. The review of the literature and discussions with directors and professional housing staff from more than a dozen Authorities across the United States point to three strategies that could reduce barrier to dispersed housing, including NIMBYISM.

Policy Guidelines. The Authority and city should adopt policy guidelines, complementary to HUD site selection criteria, but also highlighting the communities’ own sense of fair-share responsibility for providing affordable housing. New York City’s groundbreaking attempt at implementing a system of equitable distribution of municipal facilities reveals the weakness of such criteria without regulatory or statutory grounding. (Rogers, 1994, p. 197) Such guidelines and criteria should not only be codified but also given “an explicit statement of legislative intent to equitably distribute burdensome facilities, and b adding a self-contained enforcement mechanism. . . .” (Ibid., p. 240).

Charleston, St. Paul, and San Diego illustrate useful components of such a policy. Charleston's guidelines for future development activity include no demolition of existing housing, land zoned for multifamily or business use, no private development interest in the land, density restrictions, and prescriptions for neighborhood compatibility. Among St. Paul's 11 criteria for single-family home acquisitions are: homes must be acquired from willing sellers only; there must be no home within 1 block, or a 300-foot radius, of another PHA-owned property; no concentration of purchased dwellings may be in any one neighborhood; all houses should be "modest but adequate"; all properties must be served by dedicated, improved streets with utilities; and homes must be compatible from a design standpoint with adjacent homes and others in the immediate vicinity of the home. (Public Housing Agency of the City of St. Paul, "Guidelines for Acquisition of Single Family Homes," December 1980, pp.1-2)

The city of San Diego's legislative guidelines leave no doubt that local housing actions are to be prointegrative. The guidelines contain the following language:

[S]upport efforts to enhance the balanced community policy; support State and Federal housing programs to provide low income housing throughout the community; effect the development of economically and racially balanced communities in newly developing areas of the city and in all city-sponsored or approved redevelopment projects; increase substantially the number of minority families residing in neighborhoods outside areas of predominant minority concentration, and inform minority and the majority families that all housing . . . is available to them on an equal opportunity basis.

New York City's Fair Share Criteria—effective July 1991—were intended to make "land-use decision making . . . fairer, and more open to public involvement." (Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 202) Seven goals were included in the criteria, two of which were "to stimulate community participation in city facility siting decisions, and to avoid siting conflicts by establishing consensus building programs that foster dialogue between city and community representatives." (Ibid., p. 208-209) Unfortunately, the criteria provided only "administrative guidelines," and the process failed when put to the test of replacing the city's homeless warehouses with a "system of smaller, community-based shelters." (Ibid., p. 216) Lack of legislative sanction turned the criteria into "mere public relations over true equitable distribution of facilities." (Ibid. p. 207)

Community Involvement. The community, especially the "host" neighborhood, must be involved in site selection, planning, and the physical design of the buildings from the very beginning. Although significantly more risky than stealth strategies (such as acquiring property or purchasing sites without notifying neighborhood residents), the purchase of sites in risk-free locations is wishful thinking. Community acceptance of scattered-site housing depends upon "effective public involvement." (Sharpe, 1981, p. 213) The public involvement strategies should be incorporated into the production process and ideally include the following elements: "community information program, priority neighborhood outreach, site selection, project design, and development." (Ibid.)

Several Authorities discussed in this study have tried to avoid land parcels for building that require a rezone. Few have a structured process for citizens to participate. When consultation did occur, it was mandated by State requirements for public hearings as in El Paso. If discretionary permits were required, as in San Diego, project staff worked with community planning groups. The site selection suggestions of

Fuerst and Decker (1977)—avoid land immediately adjacent to residential areas and search for land that may seem undesirable initially—may be useful strategies to get the job done, and they do avoid neighborhood opposition. However, these suggestions merely delay the time when the “rezone game” must be played on a larger stage, including “host” neighborhoods.

Several of the successful programs reviewed earlier illustrate the PHA’s acquiring properties inconspicuously “so that unfounded rumors and inflamed passions” would not be aroused. The irony Galster (1989) described when writing about Denver’s dispersal-plan controversy is understandable in the context of an admittedly successful earlier program. But less “sunshine” and more “stealth” is not the solution. There is scant evidence that any community escapes without at least one site controversy when developing scattered-site housing. On the other hand, there are several instances (Chicago, Yonkers, Forest Hills) of neighborhoods and whole cities becoming inflamed and badly damaged when the parties to the conflict could not find common ground.

Institutionalized mechanisms of community participation are called for. Notifying residents by posting signs, holding public hearings, and adhering to procedural approval processes are not enough. Rochester’s and Seattle’s participation policies reflect a trust in citizens and a belief that differences can be resolved. In Rochester, the selection of sites is determined by bargaining and “mutual decisionmaking” in a Task Force whose members are drawn from the city, the Authority, and the neighborhood. Seattle’s Community Participation Guidelines empower representatives of community organizations to be involved in the development and implementation of scattered-site housing in three ways: providers of community input on the purchase of sites; recipients of information on the intended purchase and initial determination of site density; and membership on the design team. In the latter role, community representative(s) attend meetings to discuss the basic design concepts of the site (number of units, size of units, and type of construction). Once schematics have been completed, representatives review them to determine if they want to suggest changes.

Whatever form of public involvement is chosen, the purpose of involving the public in the process is to ensure the delivery of the publicly assisted housing. The “benefits from the establishment of a public involvement program” are several, including:

[D]evelopments that are better integrated into the physical and social fabric of a community and more acceptable to its residents. Direct contact between the housing authority and the neighborhood also contributes to a spirit of cooperation and trust and insures that residents have access to accurate information. (Sharpe, *op. cit.*, p. 214)

Communication, Information Sharing, and Public Relations. In much of the research relating to NIMBY, one characteristic stands out: communication! Affordable housing and scattered-site developments are already widespread and in most locations residents are unaware that their neighbors may in fact be receiving housing assistance. The need for communicating the facts is apparent, to reduce both misinformation and misconceptions.

Wright’s study (1992) of the CHA’s outreach procedures contains important information on how communities might increase public awareness and thereby gain greater acceptance of scattered-site housing. His survey of residents in several Chicago community areas found that only 35 percent were

aware of the scattered-site program. The data suggest that images of assisted housing are shaped by high-rise projects and “where there is some knowledge it is very negative.” The CHA’s “inability or unwillingness to point to the location and design of new scattered-site units . . . contributed to a public perception of secrecy [thereby] raising the public’s suspicion of the program’s viability.” (Ibid., p. 19)

Of potential benefit to communities hoping to operate successful programs, however, was Wright’s other finding that community meetings “helped break down popular misconceptions of public housing.” Recommendation 7 of his report could fruitfully be appropriated elsewhere:

Educate the community leaders as to the nature of the program so they can carry the information back to their communities. Conduct an open citywide education campaign about the different types of public housing with particular emphasis on the appearance of the scattered-site units and their difference from the projects. (Ibid., p. 37)

Beginning with the planning process, public agencies must ensure that the neighborhood is informed and involved. This necessary formality not only reduces concerns, but gives the neighborhood a vested interest. Problems can be addressed and mutually resolved before they escalate to levels that threaten to tear the community apart (the maturity and old-age stages of Dear’s NIMBY cycle). “Community relations [must] be part of every program plan.” NIMBY sentiments will persist without a mechanism to facilitate collaboration. (Dear, 1992, p. 294)

If the host community buys in at the planning stage, can contribute at the implementation stage, and has an established resource, such as a mediation task force when problems do arise, the project can move forward. In two-way collaborative models, there is reciprocity between both parties, and as Dear argues: “In essence, collaboration involves establishing a social contract between the provider and host community. The operators offer a useful service, openly and honestly, and, in return, anticipate community support.” (Ibid., p. 294)

If these mechanisms and procedures have not been arranged well in advance of implementation, the ensuing resentments guarantee misguided attempts that doom all subsequent efforts at compromise. Not only is the community adversely affected, but the recipients of scattered-site housing are thrust into an untenable situation that was not of their making.

In summary, the mandated introduction of any units of low-income housing within a community should include: (1) a social contract between the community and the development agencies during the planning stages; (2) an ongoing mentorship program during the implementation stage that not only facilitates coordination of the program among recipients and residents, but could also act as an oversight mechanism (this group could include churches, the school, or local businesses); and (3) a structure to resolve conflict throughout the duration of the program (a mediation board perhaps composed of the mentors, selected residents, and participants from the appropriate agencies involved in the development).

Integration Maintenance Efforts

Scattered-site housing is more than a production mode, and it is “both meaningful and necessary to link the issues of racial and economic deconcentration” with discussions of such housing. Furthermore, our review of the scattered-site history encountered frequent interchangeability of the terms “fair share,”

“dispersed,” and “scattered site.” The conceptual overlap means that issues of fair housing and housing desegregation cannot be omitted from discussions about scattered-site *implementation*. The overlap also suggests that strategies employed by fair housing advocates can be useful to planners engaged in scattered-site development.²⁴

In the 1970s several municipal governments in “racially diverse suburban communities” on the borders of large cities began adopting public policies favoring racial diversity. (Lind, 1982, p. 604)²⁵ Integration-maintenance programs, as they came to be called, emerged in reaction to accelerating African-American suburbanization and the fear of resegregation and property loss.²⁶ There are currently a sizable number of integration-maintenance programs. Organizations across the country can select among several that are designed to initiate or maintain integration. (Chandler, 1992, p. 292.) Table 7–1 lists several integration programs, along with their goals.

Table 7–1. Key Elements and Objectives of Integration Programs

	Program Element	Objective
1	Financial incentives	Limited information available to homebuyers about uncustomary options.
2	Affirmative marketing to promote integration by matching clients with rental listings	Resegregation that occurs when African-American demand or search in an area exceeds white demand while whites continue to seek out other predominantly white areas.
3	Commitment from realtors to promote integration in housing	Realtors who play a major role in providing and guarding access to neighborhoods.
4	Strong building code enforcement	Prevention of deferred maintenance and the visible decline of property that has been associated with neighborhoods undergoing racial transition.
5	Diversity counseling	Issues and adjustments facing persons in integrated or potentially integrative neighborhoods.
6	Equity assurance to guarantee a certain housing resale value	Thwarting homeowner concerns about the decline in property values often associated with racially changing neighborhoods. These concerns have led to panic selling and blockbusting.
7	For-sale signs ban and real estate solicitation regulation	Dispelling outward indicators of neighborhood change by preventing the use of mechanisms that can create a panic atmosphere.
8	Monitoring or testing for discrimination	Detection of differential treatment inflicted upon persons who violate fair housing statutes.
9	Federal Section 8 rental assistance program to promote prointegrative moves.	Economic and racial integration of low-income minority households to enhance opportunities for upward mobility.

Source: Chandler, 1992, table 16.2, p. 293.

The fair housing literature is massive, and communities interested in developing strategies in support of affordable housing initiatives, including mobility programs like scattered-site housing, are urged to sample the literature. Because this study is about scattered-site housing, the four strategies emphasized are ones that seem appropriate for communities who want to incorporate these features into their housing plans.²⁷

Equity Insurance

This plan guarantees homeowners that the value of their property will not fall below a preestablished appraisal level. The device presumably “breaks the cycle of fear that can destroy integration [efforts] in much the same way that Federal insurance on bank deposits” prevents panic withdrawals, because the owner can simply sell the property. (Sander, 1988, p. 931)

In 1978, Oak Park, Illinois, initiated the “equity assurance program” as a tool in the struggle to maintain balanced integration. Participating homeowners pay a fee to the village to have their property appraised and must be enrolled for at least 5 years to ensure protection. “If, after 5 years, the owner sells the house for less than the appraised value, the village will reimburse the owner for 80 percent of the difference between the appraised value and the sale price.” (Lake and Winslow, 1981, p. 314) In the first several months after the plan was implemented, 100 homeowners enrolled. Nine years later only 140 out of some 10,500 eligible property owners had protection, and “[n]o one ha[d] ever filed claim.” (*Chicago Sun-Times*, June 10, 1988)

Equity protection has been adopted in other cities, including the south Chicago suburban communities of Calumet City, Riverdale, and University Park. (Ibid.) In Chicago, the concept was introduced in the late 1970s by the Southwest Parish and Neighborhood Federation, and the Chicago Neighborhood Organizing Project proposed a special service district to fund an insurance pool for enrolled homes. (Ibid.) During the 1983 mayoral campaign, Harold Washington, U.S. Senator Charles Percy, and Governor James Thompson, as well as Chicago aldermen representing African-American and white neighborhoods, showed interest in the plan. (*PA Times*, November 15, 1984)²⁸

The home equity plan was strongly endorsed in 1987 when an advisory referendum passed overwhelmingly in several Chicago neighborhoods. The referendum would establish six pilot neighborhoods—including one predominantly African-American area—financed by a special property tax paid by each homeowner. Only homeowners with certified appraisals were eligible to collect claims for any property losses, however. (*New York Times*, February 9, 1988) The plan was controversial, achieving passage in a close, racially divisive 26–24 vote in June 1988. African-American Mayor Eugene Sayer vetoed the ordinance.

In an effort to make the court-ordered housing plan more palatable to the city council, Yonkers Mayor Nicholas Wasiczko on two different occasions proposed an equity insurance program to “stabilize property values near sites of court-ordered low-income housing.” (*Herald Statesman*, November 20, 1989) Governor Cuomo promised the incumbent mayor State money to underwrite the program. The program never materialized but, had it passed, Yonkers homeowners would have been reimbursed if their home values decreased, under the look-alike Oak Park model. (*Herald Statesman*, November 14, 1989)

Equity insurance is analogous to a child’s security blanket, providing adult homeowners with a sense of well-being. Erik Wogstad of the coalition of neighborhood groups that sponsored the measure

in Chicago said of the plan: "The idea is to remove the element of fear. It would stabilize the neighborhood." (*New York Times*, February 9, 1988) And Alderman Gutierrez, the only Hispanic to support the measure, also saw the security side of the issue: "I don't see this as a black and white issue: I see this as a green issue. I am from a community that has seen what happens in white flight." (*Chicago Sun-Times*, June 9, 1988)

In a provocative analysis of integration-maintenance plans from an anti-subjugation perspective (the degree to which the plan oppresses or subjugates persons because of membership in a particular racial group), Goel (1990) finds equity insurance schemes acceptable:

Equity insurance programs stigmatize. To some extent, they reduce access to housing, although somewhat indirectly. They do not appear to force unwanted integration. They may assist black homeowners, particularly if black homeowners in integrated areas are covered by the programs as they usually are. In addition, they may help eliminate some segregation. (Ibid., pp. 412–413)

Mobility Grants/Mortgage Incentives

Mobility grants and mortgage set-asides are pricing mechanisms or forms of economic subsidy that can be "manipulated in order to control the demand" for housing by different racial and income groups. (Vodar, 1975, p. 180) These plans, also known as "financial incentives for diversity," can include tax credits (as the Milwaukee program does) and "bonus payments to tenants making nontraditional moves." The core feature each program shares is the monetary inducement provided to "attract and assist persons to make moves into areas where their race is underrepresented." (Freiberg, 1993, pp. 237–238)

Sander (1988) describes mobility grants in the context of African Americans seeking entry into predominantly white neighborhoods. The rationale for the subsidy is "to shift existing migration pattern just enough to undermine the self-reinforcing cycle of segregation and launch a new dynamic of integration." (Ibid., p. 929) Although mobility grants could be configured in various ways, Sander suggests two forms: (1) direct payments, the less expensive of the two, and (2) mortgage interest subsidies—"politically palatable and easier to monitor." (Ibid.)

Features of the mortgage interest mobility grant are incorporated into the integration-assistance loan programs of the Ohio Housing Finance Agency (OHFA) and the Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority.²⁹ Ohio's model program for Cuyahoga County was lobbied for by several fair housing groups concerned that voter-approved, low-interest home mortgage funds "inadvertently reinforce[d] segregated housing patterns." (*Sun Press*, July 11, 1985) On July 2, 1985, the OHFA board voted to set aside \$5 million "for whites and blacks who want to buy a first home in a neighborhood where their race is underrepresented." (Ibid.)³⁰

Statewide pointegration set-asides of \$9.5 million and \$10 million were made available in 1988 and 1989. Other metropolitan areas began to participate in the program after 1989, including Akron, Cincinnati, and Cleveland. Responding to criticisms by three African-American organizations, charging that the loan programs' "numerical ceilings serve to further limit the choices and participation of black homeseekers" and that the guidelines stigmatize by assuming that "predominantly black neighborhoods are inferior or undesirable," (Chandler, op. cit., p. 294) OHFA created a separate allocation for minority homebuyers, with preferences for predominantly African-American neighborhoods. (Ibid., p. 294)

Prointegration moves by white and African-American families under the 1989 allotment mirrored previous patterns: loan recipients moved “to the eastern suburbs where the bulk of the implementing agencies were located.” The set-aside for minority applicants was exhausted within 6 weeks of issuance: the majority purchased homes in Cleveland and the nearby “integrated suburbs.” (Ibid., p. 295)

Milwaukee’s prointegration mortgage program emerged out of a history of racially segregated housing practices beginning as early as the 1920s and culminating in the 1987 settlement of a school desegregation suit. (Freiberg, *op. cit.*) The settlement contained three initiatives aimed at Milwaukee’s “sordid legacy of racial apartheid.” (Ibid., p. 223) The Metropolitan Milwaukee Fair Housing Council (MMFHC), organized in 1977, was selected to implement the following programs:

- A housing counseling and recruitment center to provide services to persons of all races interested in purchasing or renting housing in areas where such persons, by their personal choice, would facilitate residential integration.
- The provision of \$5 million for home mortgages to be made available to persons who are certified as making prointegration moves.
- The designation of up to 15 percent of the total State allocation of Federal low-income housing tax credits for projects certified by the housing counseling and recruitment center. (Ibid., pp. 230–231)

Roisman and Botein (1993) report that the Center for Integrated Living (the counseling and recruitment set up by the MMFHC) helped more than 800 households make prointegration moves. The program results from 1989 to 1991³¹ showed:

A total of 812 households, 97 percent minority, 64 percent female headed, and 39 percent using rent subsidies, participated in the program. Of the 332 minority households that moved within the Milwaukee metropolitan area, 61 percent located housing outside of minority areas (racially diverse or 85 percent or more nonminority). Before receiving assistance . . . 67 percent of all minority households lived in minority areas (85 percent or more minority). (Ibid., p. 343)

Schools and Housing

In her national study of neighborhood stabilization efforts, Juliet Saltman (1990) found that two external factors—a systemwide school desegregation plan and the absence of high-density public housing—were critical to the effectiveness of community group efforts to stabilize transitional neighborhoods. (Saltman, 1990, p. 387) In their respective discussions of factors that affect the creation and maintenance of mixed neighborhoods, Marrett (1973), Downs (1973), and Helper (1986) concur on the importance of quality education “to the success of any program to promote racial or ethnic residential integration.” (Marrett, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–134)

For nearly 20 years Gary Orfield has pointed out the tight relationship between housing and schools in sustaining residential segregation, as well as providing bridges of escape toward an integrated society. Until the mid-1970s courts dealt with school and housing segregation issues separately. However, as

Orfield maintains, the two issues are mutually reinforcing: "Segregated schools promote segregated neighborhoods, and segregated neighborhoods promote segregated schools." (*The Housing Advocate*, 1980, p. 54)

There are at least three reasons why schools and housing "are part of an interlocking system, continually affecting each other":

- (1) [T]he real estate industry and prospective homebuyers often identify the attractiveness of a house by the school district in which it is located.
- (2) [T]he historical pattern of containment of African Americans in certain schools and residential areas continues, partially because of school board administrative inertia that limits the mobility of minorities.
- (3) [G]overnmental policies, both past and present, have played a significant and pathetic role in solidifying the relationship between segregated housing and school systems. (Ibid., p. 55)

Orfield's research of 12 communities with school desegregation plans found "unanimous support among officials for the proposition that school and housing desegregation should be coordinated." (Ibid., p. 14) Unfortunately, "almost no one does anything about it," and actual coordination between schools and housing agencies is "virtually nonexistent." (Ibid.) *Toward a Strategy for Urban Integration* (1981) remains timely even though many desegregated schools are resegregating, African-American and white parents alike oppose busing,³² and education choice schemes are in vogue.³³ Although coordination between school officials and housing agencies is still the exception, a handful of communities are moving in directions he would applaud.

Affirmative housing programs are "operating in several metropolitan areas in order to facilitate and/or complement . . . desegregation efforts." (Freiberg, 1993, p. 235) Milwaukee's program is one example, and the Seattle and West Palm Beach school systems and local governments "are supporting prointegration housing initiatives in order to facilitate school desegregation efforts." (Ibid.)³⁴

The Ohio school districts and cities of Cleveland Heights, Shaker Heights, and University Heights are involved in collaborative "areawide, multifaceted" strategies to achieve stable integration. Elementary school district boundaries are adjusted "to avoid racially isolated schools and significant resources are committed to maintaining a superior level of educational quality." (Galster, 1992, p. 281) The Ohio "Heights" experience and pioneering programs undertaken by Oak Park and Park Forest in Illinois are exceptions, however. Few of the communities comprising this study come close to the proactive style of "Shaker Heights, Oak Park and a half-dozen others [who] stand as oases that, while far from racial utopias, seem well ahead of the rest of the country." (*New York Times*, December 30, 1991)

Several of Orfield's strategies are generic, and some of them are presented in other sections of this study. Five of Orfield's 10 priorities to "move policy beyond incoherent and self-defeating attacks" on the issues of urban integration remain relevant in the 1990s: "(1) focusing on the issue; (2) obtaining housing expertise for school districts [and vice versa]; (3) attacking real-estate stereotypes about integrated schools; (4) housing counseling; and (5) integration subsidies." (Ibid., pp. 70-78)

Orfield's 1993 report continues to point to housing discrimination and "exclusion of affordable housing from many communities with strong schools [as] basic reasons for the persistence of segregation by race and income in the schools." (Ibid., p. 28) He suggests several policies, some reminiscent of earlier suggestions, to help "reverse the negative impacts of housing on school segregation." (Ibid.)

All assisted housing plans . . . should be reviewed by local school authorities; siting and marketing should be compatible with the district's desegregation plan; stably integrated neighborhoods [should be rewarded] by giving them neighborhood schools; HUD [should require] coordination of assisted housing policy with school desegregation; and school boards should request developers, who want new schools to help the marketing of their new subdivisions, to implement a policy for marketing to minority as well as white families so that desegregated education can be built into the new communities. (Ibid., pp. 28–29)

Good Amenities and High-Level Municipal Services

Research has long argued the importance of location and neighborhood quality to the choices individuals make when seeking a home. Customers will often "judge locations on the basis of physical appearance, proximity to work, friends, shops, and public facilities." (Millen, 1973, p. 163) Millen suggests how both amenities and public goods affect neighborhood stability:

The association between low neighborhood quality in these respects and the presence of large numbers of nonwhite residents has probably done as much to deter whites from entering or staying in mixed neighborhoods as any distaste for interracial contacts, which are common in other contexts. (Ibid.)

The Tucson and Seattle research, along with the empirical literature cited in chapter 2, document how important these same neighborhood amenities and public services are to newly arrived scattered-site families. Many "pioneer" families chose new neighborhoods to take advantage of the better schools, services, and safety provided by middle-income, suburbanlike city neighborhoods and suburban jurisdictions. The angle of vision of "host neighborhood" residents, however, associates low-income subsidized housing with "heavy concentration of minority persons, and with likely inclusion of problem families." (Foley, 1973, p. 124)

Many older suburban municipalities practice community revitalization and housing enhancement activities to counteract the "deferral of routine home maintenance" that often occurs when neighborhoods become diverse. (Lind, 1982, p. 643) Suburban communities in the Chicago and Cleveland areas have adopted "stricter housing code enforcement and point of sale inspection programs" to protect both owners and potential buyers from the "dangers of hidden deferred maintenance." (Ibid.) Cleveland Heights, Ohio, has had a comprehensive program since 1976 that combines "strong code compliance . . . with financial assistance to help low-income owners make [required] repairs. . . ." (Ibid., p. 644) Oak Park's equity insurance program requires compliance with the city's housing code, and Shaker Heights, Ohio, provides financial assistance "for housing repairs specifically targeted to interracial neighborhoods." (Ibid.)

It is particularly important during the first several months of settling in, when the “newcomer” is adjusting to the new neighborhood, and testy, defensive “old-timers” are looking for the transported behaviors of the “projects” to reappear, that the Authority and city be vigilant in sustaining the prevailing lifestyle of the community. If traditional municipal services are “maintained effectively, the community will be attractive to persons of all races, and those who already live there will have less incentive to move.” (Vodar, *op. cit.*, p. 182)

The several strategies discussed in this chapter will be needed in the struggle to make choice in residence a reality for families of modest means and limited choices. In the context of contemporary welfare reform initiatives, the downsizing of HUD, and other decentralizing policies, mitigation strategies may appear naive. The placement of responsibility for the neediest citizens at the doorsteps of local jurisdictions—those very places that practice “defensive localism” and use “public powers to achieve largely private benefits” (Salins, 1993, p. 103)—may seem an unfair burden. Fortunately, mitigation has proven successful in dozens of communities that have endeavored to help poor families leave poverty neighborhoods for safer havens.

Chapter 8

Conclusions

Public housing has been much maligned and fiercely opposed in many communities, especially since the 1950s, when the composition of public housing changed from “tenants [who] were white and generally upwardly mobile” to welfare-dependent African-American households. (McGrew, 1981, p. 376) Even then there was little conflict because public housing was confined to segregated, poor, inner-city neighborhoods. The site location conflicts¹ over the next three decades were generated by “the determination to build for those families outside of existing ghetto neighborhoods.” (Ibid.)

The urban riots that erupted between 1964 and 1968 produced “nearly a decade of intense ideological, social, and racial conflict.” (Edsall and Edsall, 1992, p. 48) The nature and causes of polarization between African American and white were well documented in the *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*. In the aftermath of the riots a growing concern emerged over the residential isolation of lower income groups, especially African Americans, and how the Nation should address their separation from mainstream society. Deconcentration strategies discussed in chapter 2 generated intense debate about where to build assisted housing in order to reduce the poverty conditions in “big-city crisis ghettos.” (Downs, 1973, p. 45)

Three ghetto enrichment perspectives—pessimistic, pragmatic, and instrumental—and deconcentration through residential mobility options shaped the policy debate during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Similar perspectives are now circulating as media reports about the “impacted ghetto” and the growing underclass “[help] return poverty to the national agenda.” (*Chicago Tribune*, March 21, 1989)

Today’s inner-city revivalists include, among others, Calmore (1993), Tein (1992), Sander (1988), and Johnson (1995). Calmore argues that community enrichment is an “appropriate prelude to broad-scale integration” (Calmore, 1993, p. 1492). Although unwilling to abandon integration as a “means of social mobility and betterment,” he suggests that fair housing be reconceptualized to mean “not only increased opportunity for African Americans to move beyond their socioterritorial disadvantage but also to mean enhanced choice to overcome opportunity-denying circumstances while continuing to live in black communities.” (Ibid., p. 1495)

Tein’s and Sander’s positions are advanced in the context of the failure of fair housing laws to bring about integration. Tein claims the court’s preoccupation with integration at the expense of antidiscrimination has resulted in “tokenism and devaluation of [the] nonwhite community,” and HUD’s prohibition of building ghetto neighborhoods “privilege[s] integration to the detriment of critical housing needs within existing nonwhite communities.” (Tein, 1992, p. 1463) Subsidized-housing tenants “should be able to choose better housing over integration.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, the dispersal demanded by the regulations “acts to dilute nonwhite political strength.” (Ibid., p. 1494)

Sander finds the caste system largely intact and urges the redevelopment of the ghetto as a strategy to promote African-American emigration to white neighborhoods. His embrace of ghetto enrichment has

little to do with Tein's argument that "judicial treatment of discrimination in subsidized housing has not accorded proper respect to [the] nonwhite community as a legitimate entity." (Tein, *op. cit.*, p. 1463) Rather, the vigorous promotion of policies that support integration would create:

Ideal economic and demographic conditions for redevelopment and integration in previously all African-American neighborhoods. The dangers of displacement—one of the chief flaws of past programs—are greatly reduced if African-American housing opportunities elsewhere are expanded and if redevelopment consciously preserves economic integration. (Sander, 1988, p. 874)

In her critique of Massey and Denton's discussion of strategies to eliminate the racial barriers in the urban housing market, including their support of residential mobility programs, Johnson (1993) suggests several limitations:

- The success of mobility programs does not prove the ineffectiveness of spatial equality strategies. "Improving safety, providing adequate role models, and improving access to jobs—all of which helped Gautreaux participants succeed in the suburbs—might well improve the lot of those who remain in cities as well." (*Ibid.*, p. 806)
- Deconcentration strategies may cause African Americans "to experience social isolation without the support of the traditional community, kinship, and social networks often found in churches and civic groups." (*Ibid.*, p. 808)
- Integration will fail to "secure better housing, improved job prospects, or political empowerment for most of the African-American poor." (*Ibid.*, p. 809) Integrated housing, moreover, "risks becoming an end rather than a means to the end of better housing and stronger neighborhoods. In that way, focusing only on integration may divert energy from galvanizing communities to demand equal resources." (*Ibid.*, p. 811)
- Finally, "integration is only politically pragmatic to the extent that it is tokenism; beyond that, it will likely be resisted." (*Ibid.*, p. 815)

Foremost among recent advocates for dispersal are Schill (1993) and Downs (1994). In the context of the dramatic April 29, 1992, Los Angeles riots, Michael Schill revisited the debate over what to do about the growing social isolation and concentrated poverty that characterized the "precarious situation of many large American cities. . . ." (Schill, 1992, p. 795) After identifying two traditional ways public policy has addressed the problems of distressed neighborhoods, "enabling people to leave them, and making them better places to live," (*Ibid.*, p. 857) Schill endorses deconcentration.

Ghetto enrichment is rejected for two reasons. First, deconcentration brings the ghetto poor closer to "employment opportunities [and] facilitate[s] the flow of information regarding job openings. In addition, access to jobs would be facilitated by the reduction of the distance between place of residence and employment." (*Ibid.*, p. 811) Second, by "removing the young from the ghetto" the "[c]hildren would no longer be forced to live in environments bereft of middle-class influences and role models, where they are tempted to engage in unproductive, deviant, or criminal behavior by the influence of peer groups." (*Ibid.*)

Downs' (1994) suggestions for reducing the "accelerating deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods" (Ibid., p. 60) no longer rest on the single thread of suburban access he proposed 20 years earlier in *Opening Up the Suburbs*. Rather, household mobility is one of four remedial strategies cities might employ in fighting urban decline. (Ibid., p. 99)²

Household mobility strategies enable low-income families to "enjoy something closer to equality with the opportunities available to nonpoor people." (Ibid., p. 106) For low-income households, access to suburban environments means "sending their children to schools where most students are from working-class or middle-class homes; giving them job opportunities in businesses where most other workers have enough skills to earn decent incomes; and giving them the chance to live in neighborhoods not dominated by juvenile gangs, drugs, and fear of violence." (Ibid., pp. 106–107)

The "Underclass"

The phrase "culture of poverty," not "underclass," was used to describe the families who inhabited the "crisis ghettos" depicted at the height of the 1960s urban riots. The "April 1992 civil disturbances in Los Angeles stirred a strong sense of *deja vu*" and the "pictured syndrome—neighborhoods characterized by poverty, unemployment, bad schools, welfare, crime, early pregnancies, and female-headed households"—was a mirror image of the Watts disturbance of August 1965. (Levine and Williams, 1992)

More than a decade passed before the term "was added to the English language's expanding lexicon of inequality." (Steinberg, 1995, p. 137) In the hands of social scientists, the concept incorporated many of the elements of the syndrome of Los Angeles riot neighborhoods of both 1965 and 1992. The underclass "was redefined" in the process to refer "not to objective conditions of chronic poverty and joblessness, but to the socially dysfunctional behavior of the poor themselves." (Ibid., p. 139)

To break the cycle, a significant number of "new" national programs were formally authorized in 1965 and added to the "conventional" programs, including "(a) scattered-site projects; (b) acquisition programs; (c) leasing programs; and (d) turnkey housing." (George Schermer Associates, *op. cit.*, p. 50) The Leased Housing, Rent Supplement, and other more flexible programs "harness[ing] the enterprise and energy of the private sector" were intended to "intersperse low-income families in neighborhoods in which there [was] a wider range of incomes, thus reducing the scale and intensity of colonization of the poor." (Ibid., p. 52)

Although these "new private-sector programs were launched with the intent of penetrating suburban [and more stable city] neighborhoods," the initiatives "offered integration—and dispersion-related disappointments." (Silverman, 1977, pp. 381–382) The San Francisco Housing Authority's Section 23 leased units avoided ghetto neighborhoods, but more than 67 percent were located in "lower income white areas" and more than 75 percent of the leased units were occupied by the elderly. (Peel, Pickett, and Buehl, 1970, p. 93) Important causes of limited performance were underfunding by Congress and difficulties with initiating projects. (Taggart, 1970, p. 56) The rent supplement program was strongly attacked after members of Congress heard that the Federal Housing Administration's implementation instructions urged insuring offices to use the program "affirmatively to promote integration." (Ellickson, 1967, p. 521)

According to Keith (1973), the underlying motive was primarily racial: members of the Appropriations Committees were protecting the “white suburban communities from incursions” by the African-American families residing in central-city housing projects. (Ibid., p. 178) Taggart’s data on the geographic location of rent supplement projects showed a skewed distribution: 31 percent in blighted areas, another 36 percent in core city neighborhoods, and “only 9 percent in the suburbs.” (Taggart, op. cit., p. 59) “Spartan cost limitations” on construction along with their “uniformly low-income tenantry” made such projects not only unacceptable to suburban jurisdictions, but city officials and housing authorities were also “cautious about extending the programs to relatively stable moderate- and middle-income neighborhoods.” (George Schermer Associates, op. cit., p. 52)

Mobility options did little to break down the walls of suburban exclusion, and the meager funding of enrichment programs revitalized very few neighborhoods. The historical record on housing-mobility programs between 1965 and the enactment of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 did provide a wider choice of locations, and the units were “less easily identified as publicly subsidized.” However, the “programs [were] restricted in one way or another from operating in most suburban areas,” and very few “contribute[d] much toward achieving metropolitanwide mobility.” (Ibid., p. 54)

The emergence of an urban “underclass” as a consequence of the cities’ transformation from “centers of manufacturing to centers of service production and consumption” was discussed in President Jimmy Carter’s Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties. One of the Commission’s panel reports—*Urban America in the Eighties*—found the cities no longer able to “provide upgrading opportunities for the poor and to send them along—either upward through successive social strata or outward to alternative locations where economic opportunities exist in relative abundance.” (1980, p. 17) The Commission’s prescription for the increasingly distressed ghetto and the “relatively permanent” stranded group of urban poor was:

People-oriented national social policies that aim to aid people directly wherever they may live should be accorded priority over place-oriented national urban policies that attempt to aid people indirectly by aiding places directly. (Ibid., p. 102)

The administration’s efforts “to develop a comprehensive urban policy” (Kaplan, 1995, p. 667) had little congressional support, and because “Carter’s urban policy focused primarily on central cities and their poorer residents, it failed to meet the President’s initial comprehensive objectives. It was a flawed effort.” (Ibid., p. 668) That the “underclass” did not benefit from Carter’s commitment to the cities was reflected in 1980 census figures showing that “both the number and concentration of all racial/ethnic groups in extreme poverty tracts rose fairly steadily throughout the 1970s and 1980s.” (Kasarda, 1993, p. 95) Furthermore, “by 1990 racial-ethnic minorities composed the demographic majority in most of our largest cities,” and “central cities housed 43 percent of the . . . poverty population.” (Ibid., pp. 84, 82)

Several definitions of what constituted the underclass were circulating by 1987, and size estimates ranged from 0.4 percent to 5.3 percent (10–11 million) of the U.S. population. (*New York Times*, December 20, 1987) What was distinctive about the new definition of the underclass, particularly the frequently cited Urban Institute definition, was reliance upon behavior-based indicators rather than the traditional income-based definition. (The Urban Institute, 1987, p. 5)³

In summary, by the late 1970s, “the specter of an emergent underclass permeated discussions of America’s inner cities.” (Katz, 1992, p. 4). Much of the early debate was reported in the popular tabloids, including *Time*, *Newsweek*, *The Atlantic*, *Fortune*, and *U.S. News and World Report*. Academics joined the discussion in the early 1980s and, with the publication of Murray’s *Losing Ground* (1984) and Wilson’s *The Truly Disadvantaged*, (1987) “fueled renewed interest in the culture of poverty and the undeserving poor.” (Ibid., p. 15)⁴

The aborted efforts of the late 1960s and early 1970s to reduce the growing residential isolation of poor African-American households living in the city’s “crisis ghettos” by opening up the suburbs bears contemporary relevance. It suggests the fact that a program might succeed in breaking up ghettos and expanding residential options for the poor, but in doing so effectively neutralizes the strategy. Such an ironic twist and its replay in the 1990s ought to play a major role in structuring considerations of the scattered-site debate today.⁵

HUD’s *Reinvention Blueprint* contains one such restructuring strategy: “By opening up opportunities for very low-income families to move away from high-poverty developments, HUD’s reinvention also promises to bring working families back to distressed urban neighborhoods.” (*National Urban Policy Report*, 1995, p. 42). Mixed-income housing is the common name applied to this strategy, and the next section discusses its history, along with a few examples of mixed-income developments.

Mixed-Income Housing Strategies

How do we create stable communities, decrease isolation, remove stigma, provide positive role models, and foster community with the surrounding neighborhood? This question is being asked in more than a dozen cities where 32 housing projects “are slated for total or partial demolition over the next decade.” (Gurwitt, 1995, p. 17) These communities are considering remodeled housing and new construction “that’s low-rise, much less dense, perhaps even interspersed with new private market housing at the heart of our inner cities.” (Peirce, 1995)

The same question was raised in the aftermath of the urban riots of the 1960s. Unlike the discussion now, however, the *places* where the mix would happen were the growing suburbs. What is different about the conversation today is that community rebuilding in distressed neighborhoods, including the construction of new mixed-income housing, and choice in residency for families seeking geographical mobility are both considered appropriate strategies for reducing the multiple problems associated with concentrated poverty.

Residential Mobility Strategies

One arguably effective way to reduce the concentrated poverty and social isolation of inner-city neighborhoods is through mobility programs. In recent years, dozens of localities—“acting voluntarily or under court [order]—have established programs that seek to promote citywide or metropolitan area-wide residential mobility for low-income and/or minority households.” (Goering, 1995, p. iii) These programs come in two forms: (1) demand-side or resident-based, where the subsidy—Section 8 certificate or voucher—goes to the income-eligible household, which then searches, alone or with assistance, for affordable rental housing, and (2) supply-side or unit-based strategies where the “Federal

Government, States, and localities . . . promote the construction of affordable housing for moderate- and lower-income families in suburbs or in the middle-income neighborhoods of cities.” (Peterson and Williams, 1994, p. 6)

Housing mobility programs refer to residential moves between neighborhoods where the exit of poor households is away from areas of poverty and racial concentration to predominantly middle-income, more racially diverse neighborhoods. By 1993 resident-based programs existed in Chicago, Dallas, Cincinnati, Memphis, Milwaukee, and Hartford. Unit-based programs existed in 12 communities including Chicago, Yonkers, East Texas, Dallas, Montgomery County (Maryland), New Haven, Cleveland, Parma (Ohio), Omaha, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, and Boston. The programs vary in length of time in operation, the number of families assisted, distribution patterns of the mobility moves, and the extent of support services offered to participating families. Although both strategies are promising mechanisms to assist families to move to better residential environments, “fewer than 11,000 households have been served by all local special mobility programs over their combined lifetimes.” (Ibid., p. 6)

Three mobility programs operating under court-ordered fair housing suits have been evaluated. The Hartford and Cincinnati programs were cross-sectional studies; the Gautreaux demonstration study team employed a more sophisticated longitudinal design. The Gautreaux demonstration began to receive national news coverage in the mid-1980s, and several other cities—Boston, Cincinnati, Hartford, and Dallas—have initiated similar programs. The program became a national model for the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) for Fair Housing and was authorized in Section 152 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992. The general findings of the three studies are portrayed below.

Chicago and MINCS

The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) was heavily involved in shaping a “hopeful new initiative” in “demon[strating] efforts to bring about economic integration in public housing” through mixed-income tenancy. (Polikoff, 1994, p. 102) The Mixed Income New Community Strategy (MINCS), created under Section 522 of the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, permits public housing authorities (PHAs)

Table 8–1. Comparison of Three Mobility Programs

Criteria	Chicago	Cincinnati	Hartford
Those who chose the program were more upwardly mobile than those who did not.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Movers liked the new neighborhood that certificates allowed them to access.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Movers experienced segregationist activity in the new neighborhood but overall adapted well.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Movers doing better financially than those who did not move.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Movers' children doing better in school or attending better schools at the new location.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Movers experiencing a higher rate of employment after move than those who did not move.	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: *Regional Housing Opportunities for Lower Income Households*, 1994, p. 56

to use operating subsidies to lease privately owned units in the neighborhood of an existing public housing development.

Economically based on former CHA Chairman Vince Lane's "income-stratification plan," the two-tiered income lease program was designed to integrate the economic climate within public housing. (*Hyde Park Herald*, August 14, 1991) Lake Parc Place is "transitional," not permanent, housing for single mothers and their children. Onsite manager Ameisha Henderson explained: "It's what the CHA used to be and what they want to get back to. Lake Parc Place motivates [families] not to be afraid to venture out and move any place they want to go." (*Cityscape*, February 12, 1992)

Regarded as "an experiment in building a community of residents, not just tenants who isolate themselves from each other because they're afraid to interact," Lake Parc Place was the Chicago test site for MINCS. Two of six high-rise buildings that occupied portions of a 368-acre south lakefront site underwent a \$14 million renovation that was completed in August 1991, and by February 1992 50 percent of the 280 units were occupied. (*Chicago Business*, July 1, 1991)

The MINCS program manipulates a bundle of housing-related characteristics in promoting family self-sufficiency and community revitalization:

- As a "poverty deconcentration strategy," MINCS mixes working-class and very-low-income families in one public housing development.
- Broader neighborhood revitalization is added through leasing newly constructed or rehabilitated private market units to public housing tenants, and the construction of additional market-rate housing units in the Lake Parc community.
- MINCS provides "coordinated and comprehensive services designed to move families" toward self-sufficiency.
- MINCS encourages family savings. After the first year of participation—when rents are frozen—"any rent increases [are] put into an interest-bearing escrow account. The family is awarded the funds upon completing the program, or sooner if the money is to be used for purchasing a home or paying for college." (Shlay, 1993, p. 472)

Lake Parc Place has received favorable coverage in popular magazines. One year after opening, *Newsweek* called the development "thriving" and a "housing program that actually works." (*Newsweek*, June 22, 1992) The occupancy rate in September 1994 was 98.9 percent, with 4,000 families on the waiting list. The development's success is attributed partly to careful screening. Rescorp/Williams, a private company, was hired to manage the property. The rent-up of Lake Parc Place occurred over a 12-month period, with much time and effort devoted to thorough tenant screening.⁶

Some tenants admit they can't tell tenants on public assistance from working families. *Newsweek* reported "sketchy evidence" that some of the poorest residents were moving toward self-sufficiency. The National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing summarized early reports on the Chicago mixed-income strategy:

The manager believes that the mixing of different income groups has actually enhanced everyone. The relocatees who waited many years for the rehabilitation of the development are very

enthusiastic about helping around the two buildings while the working families are more accustomed to paying rent and not getting involved in day-to-day issues. However, the manager has noticed increasing participation in the monthly meetings on the part of the low-income “working” families. A similar pattern of “slow but sure” involvement of the higher-income residents in community activities has been found elsewhere when a troubled . . . project is revitalized into a mixed-income community. (Ibid., pp. 2–63)⁷

Inclusionary Housing

Inclusionary zoning and fair share housing strategies have been established in a handful of States, usually in “areas where exclusionary zoning is practiced or where housing costs are high.” (Burchell, Listokin, and Pashman, 1994, p. 33) Only four States—New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and California—have seriously reviewed local exclusionary practices. (Galowitz, 1991, pp. 76–79) Silverman’s early, yet comprehensive, review of State and local programs containing open communities mechanisms was not encouraging. He found “no real evidence that the few local inclusionary ordinances . . . had any material dispersion impact.” (Silverman, 1977, p. 393)⁸

Although 17 States have passed legislation “encouraging or requiring local governments to engage in formal land use planning that includes affordable housing development as an essential element,” (Salsich, 1994, p. 105) there has been “little significant expansion in the range of suburban housing opportunities.” (Briffault, 1990, p. 46) The history of California’s fair share housing laws illustrates the “unlikelihood of enforcement” when neither the State government nor the councils of government “have statutory power to compel localities to meet their fair share housing targets.” (Field, 1993, p. 43) Noncompliance is exacerbated when the courts “avoid substantive analysis of housing elements” (Ibid., p. 57) in deference to the legislature or city council. (Ibid., p. 59)⁹

The State with the most experience in fair housing litigation is New Jersey, where in 1985 a unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that not only was exclusionary zoning contrary to the State’s constitution, but that the State’s suburbs must rewrite their zoning codes to accommodate “a fair share” of the region’s poor families. The landmark *Mount Laurel* litigation has been successful in building new housing units, but “the doctrine’s implementation has been less successful in creating units for rental, units affordable to lower income households, and units accessible to poor people of color.” (Roisman and Tegeler, 1990, p. 352)

A significant amount of affordable rental and ownership housing, with some set aside for low- and very-low-income families, has been produced over the past 20 years. It has been estimated that 250,000 affordable suburban units have been produced between 1973 and 1993. (Burchell, et al., 1994, p. 61) Many of these developments, however, target the top rather than the full Section 8 income range. Even the most successful regional housing mobility programs “fail to produce a result that enables urban people of color to achieve suburban residence.” (Ibid., pp. vii and 5)

Table 8–2 lists the production figures for seven programs and the leading contributors to affordable production.

Because Montgomery County, Maryland, “may have the Nation’s most comprehensive and balanced local housing plan,” (Cisneros, March 1995, p. 18) it will be examined to show what can be accomplished

Table 8–2. Affordable Suburban Housing Units, 1975–95

Category	Estimated No. Suburban Units	Leading Examples	No. Units
Requires local housing plans	10,000	California	5,000
Local housing allocation	25,000	New Jersey COAH	15,000
Specialized access appeal or reward	25,000	Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit	20,000
Inclusionary zoning	50,000	Montgomery County	9,000
Regional superbidders	50,000	State HFAs	44,000
Affordable housing finance	50,000	California TIF	20,000
Portable certificates/vouchers	40,000	Large PHAs	10,000
Total	250,000		125,000

Source: *Regional Housing Opportunities for Lower Income Households, 1994, p. 61*

when government acts “consistently and sometimes at measurable cost to the local taxpayer to encourage, support, and facilitate the construction of lower-income housing” (Burchell, et al., 1994, p. 165) under (an) inclusionary housing plan.

Montgomery County is considered the pioneer of mandatory inclusionary zoning. In 1973 the County Council adopted a Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU) policy that required “all new residential developments of 50 or more units” to set aside 15 percent for low- and moderate-income renters or buyers. (Peterson and Williams, op. cit., p. 76) The MPDU program is the core of the county’s housing effort, where homeownership and rental development prices are targeted to working-class households. Families are selected by lottery from a waiting list of several thousand as new developments or turnover units become available. (*The NIMBY Report*, February-March, 1994, p. 1)

The county ordinance allows the Housing Opportunities Commission (HOC)—Montgomery County’s Public Housing Authority—to purchase up to one-third of the MPDUs in each development for sale or rental to very-low-income families. Between 1976 and 1992, 8,842 MPDUs had been produced. When units are purchased by the HOC or nonprofits, “additional deeper subsidies are often applied to make the housing affordable” to low-income households. The HOC, for example, “layers” onto the units one or several subsidies, including scattered-site public housing, State Section 8, and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program. (Burchell, et al., p. 164)

The MPDU program offers an array of housing opportunities for families at different income levels.¹⁰ The income-assisted units are usually integrated with the market-rate units. Typical developments “contain a mix of townhouses and expensive single-family dwellings. Some of the lower-income dwellings, however, are smaller and differ somewhat in design, and many contain fewer amenities and use standard rather than top-of-the-line features.” (*New York Times*, September 15, 1988) All developments are located in white neighborhoods, and 80 percent of the MPDU units managed by the HOC are occupied by people of color. (Roisman and Botein, 1993, p. 348)

Although touted as “one of the most highly regarded examples of a nationwide trend to scatter low- and moderate-income housing unobtrusively throughout a community,” (*New York Times*, op. cit.) there

has been no evaluation of residents who moved into the HOC units. A 1988 study by William L. Berry and Co. found appreciation rates slightly higher in MPDU developments when compared with neighborhoods without such units. The study also indicated that “MPDU units had no negative effects on nearby property values.” (Peterson and Williams, op. cit., p. 78)

As promising as the Montgomery County example of inclusionary zoning is, there are limits to the program, and its replication elsewhere is problematic. (*The NIMBY Report*, op. cit., p. 1) Limitations on program extension include:

- The atypicality of Montgomery County. This affluent, large county has “a highly sophisticated and extensively staffed county governmental apparatus. It was able to take advantage of an unusually strong premium housing market that made developers actively interested in building within the jurisdiction.” (Burchell, et al., p. 165)
- Program benefits are restricted to residents and workers living in Montgomery County, so the program is of little use to families with portable vouchers who want to move from ghetto neighborhoods in Washington, D.C.
- Production levels are not “commensurate with housing needs of Montgomery County’s low-income population.” (Peterson and Williams, op. cit., p. 78)
- The resale of units constructed under the program are restricted for 10 years for ownership units and 20 years for rentals. Although HOC has the “right of first refusal” to “purchase an affordable rental complex that is at risk of being taken out of the affordable housing stock,” there is no guarantee that the right will be exercised.
- The developer-driven program is always subject to the volatility of the metropolitan housing market.

In summary, it is difficult to say how successful mixed-income strategies will be when the locations for such developments are distressed neighborhoods the media portray as homes of the growing underclass. The Gautreaux Demonstration offers credible evidence that very-low-income families can make successful transitions in moving toward self-sufficiency. The Gautreaux program along with HUD’s MTO demonstration “provide access to amenities that could, ultimately, make economic independence possible.” (Shlay, op. cit., p. 461)

There are few examples of large housing project demolition and rebuilding on the scale being planned for communities under HOPE VI implementation grants. To call the undertaking a challenge is to trivialize the enormity of the job. Structural demolition and rebuilding onsite is the easy part. What is certainly harder is to alter the local environment of welfare recipients, and to “link the life of the public housing community to the social fabric of the surrounding neighborhood to relieve the institutional abandonment that accelerates the decline of distressed developments.” (Spence, 1993, p. 362)

Some have questioned the replicability of the Lake Parc Place experiment and the Cabrini-Green and Henry Horner Homes redevelopments. Because of their attractive locations—proximate to Lake Michigan

and close to downtown Chicago—both may sustain market-rate units and induce working-class households to live among former “project” families. George Galster, director of housing research at The Urban Institute, suggests some of the limits of mixed-income development:

It’s incredibly difficult to do in most areas where there is concentrated poverty. At Cabrini-Green, because of its proximity to the Loop, it’s conceivable that nonpoor individuals could be induced to live with poor individuals because it’s a great location. But Robert Taylor Homes? Uh uh, I don’t believe it. It’s a strategy with pockets of possibility, but it can’t be thought of as generalizable. (*Governing*, August 1995, p. 22)¹¹

Galster’s cautionary note points to the fact that many severely distressed “project” communities are nested within “deadly neighborhoods”:¹² spatial locations bereft of social capital—“features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”¹³ The 13 cities currently undertaking the total or partial demolition of their projects must provide “meaningful access . . . to the critical resource of social capital,” and ensure that “families of the nonworking poor are integrated with the working poor to foster those sinews of connection and trust out of which hope and opportunity grow.” (Spence, *op. cit.*, p. 367.)

The Gautreaux families James Rosenbaum has tracked over the past decade provide proof that the constraints such families face when living amidst concentrated poverty—poor access to jobs, few marriageable partners, and the absence of conventional role models—are situational and derivative of the lack of meaningful opportunities. Furthermore, because “the most popular destination” for Gautreaux families was northwest Cook County—an upper middle-income housing and rapid job growth area—they should have benefited from the presence of “working and middle-class [residents who could] provide mainstream role models that reinforce mainstream values pertaining to employment, education, and family structures.” (Wilson, 1987, p. 144)

Arguably, if working class and professional households can be attracted to the reconfigured project communities, then those families who choose to return will benefit from exposure to mainstream values through living in close proximity to working-class families. On the other hand, if access to jobs and quality schools are part of the mobility/opportunity equation of Chicago suburbs, then mixed-income housing is a necessary but insufficient factor in changing the opportunity structure of distressed inner-city neighborhoods.

The Clinton administration’s focus on overcoming the “vicious cycle of poverty concentration, social despair, and fiscal distress that plagues much of urban America” (*National Urban Policy Report*, 1995, p. 17) by expanding access to metropolitan opportunities, is now under attack for many of the same reasons that effectively killed the initiatives of the late 1960s and early 1970s. A central question is whether policymakers should structure a program that *fits* existing political parameters, or whether they should take the lead in advocating for a program that *challenges* those parameters. The next section depicts the ongoing nature of political resistance by examining suburban opposition to HUD’s Moving To Opportunity demonstration program in Baltimore, Maryland.

Suburban Resistance to Deconcentration

Tearing down the projects and deconcentrating the poor with the aid of portable Section 8 certificates and vouchers “depends on overcoming suburban resistance and assuring that there is affordable rental housing in the suburbs.” (Dreier and Moberg, 1995, p. 78) This was a daunting task during the first Nixon administration, when HUD Secretary Romney’s Open Communities strategy tried to disperse the ghetto poor into suburban neighborhoods. HUD’s new approach to “enable families to choose moderately priced housing in locations . . . away from high-poverty developments . . . where they can find safety, good schools, and economic opportunity” (Cisneros, 1995, p. 148) will surely meet equal resistance. Already, the Clinton administration’s “benign alternative” of helping “people, not places” has been “swamped by the tides of extreme conservatism.” According to Dreier and Moberg:

In Congress, the deconcentration strategy is the victim both of Republican budgetcutting and the resistance by many politicians, including some Democrats, even to token measures to encourage integration of the suburbs. And in suburbia itself, deeply entrenched racial practices lead to stubborn resistance against even moderate integration, and to resegregation when black migration occurs. (Dreier and Moberg, op. cit., p. 76)

Secretary Cisneros continued to advocate “an ethic of inclusiveness and civility” and urged jurisdictions to undertake regional approaches to rehousing families trapped in huge high-rise projects in America’s largest cities.¹⁴ The “model of integration by income and race across a metropolitan area,” exemplified by the Gautreaux Demonstration Project, was “the best hope,” he said. (*The Baltimore Sun*, May 3, 1994) Congress seemed to be listening, and both parties were poised to embrace “legislation that would give State and local officials more control over housing initiatives.” (*Congressional Quarterly*, October 1, 1994, p. 2809) The House in July passed the Housing and Community Development Act of 1994 by a vote of 345 to 36, and the Senate counterpart bill was approved by the Senate Banking Committee 15 to 3 on June 21. Both bills contained proposals “to lend local housing authorities up to \$4 billion to demolish troubled projects” and to encourage an expansion of efforts “to move poor families out of the inner cities.” (*The Philadelphia Inquirer*, August 30, 1994)

By early August 1994, Cisneros and his program had become a national political issue. Congress “appeared less enthusiastic” about the administration’s dispersal proposal to “provide counseling and rent subsidies so that poor, inner-city minority families could move to predominantly white suburbs.” (*The Washington Post*, August 7, 1994) The House bill approved only \$30 million of the \$149 million administration plan, whereas the Senate bill offered \$75 million.

The centerpiece of the administration’s “effort to change the fundamental pathology of American life—the growing gap between low-income and minority center cities and their more affluent, predominantly white suburbs—was now vulnerable because of the activation of intense opposition once people discovered what [was] afoot.” (*The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, June 13–19, 1994, p. 4)

The fierce resistance Broder predicted in June surfaced at last—precipitated by two events: (1) the August 4 *Wall Street Journal* article, “Clinton’s Wrecking Ball for the Suburbs,” by James Bovard, and (2) intense controversy in eastern Baltimore County over the implementation of the Baltimore Moving To Opportunity program. Over the next several weeks congressional support weakened, and reauthorization

of the Nation's major housing programs through 1996 "became entangled in the Senate's end-of-session gridlock, dooming the legislation." (*Congressional Quarterly*, November 5, 1994, p. 3,182)

Bovard's attack on Cisneros' income integration strategy for American cities and suburbs, and his inflammatory critique of HUD's Section 8 rental subsidy program, was timed to shape public policy. Bovard acknowledged that Congress was on the verge of passing a \$60 billion 2-year housing act. "It is high time," he wrote, "for the U.S. Congress to examine this out-of-control program that is a growing threat to American neighborhoods." (*The Washington Times*, August 17, 1994)

A month later Bovard accused the fair housing programs of "dictat[ing] where welfare recipients live in every county, city, and cranny across the Nation." (*The American Spectator*, September 1994, p. 26) He singled out Cisneros' request for \$149 million for "the so-called Moving To Independence program" that would assist poor families in moving out of poverty communities and implied that the Clinton administration considered it a violation of fair housing "if poor people cannot live like rich people." (Ibid.) The prejudicial and misleading criticism of Section 8 ("HUD's License to Sow Chaos") is revealed in the following comment:

Section 8 is the flagship of the Clinton administration's effort to impose racial and economic housing quotas on American suburbs. Basically, it seeks to end the stigma of welfare by granting welfare recipients the lifestyle of [the] self-reliant upper middle class. (Ibid.)

On August 11 Secretary Cisneros wrote to Speaker of the House Tom Foley acknowledging that "[m]any members of Congress" had contacted him with regard to the Bovard article's "serious factual errors and unfortunate stereotyping of assisted-housing residents." The letter's contents appeared as an editorial in the August 17, 1994, *Wall Street Journal*. Cisneros provided detailed information on the characteristics of HUD's Section 8 assisted housing program, noting that it had "enjoyed the steady support of five administrations and the Congress," and promised that the Clinton administration was "determined to ensure that the Section 8 program rewards work and good citizenship."

Baltimore was 1 of 5 cities selected from 21 eligible to participate in the Moving To Opportunity for Fair Housing Demonstration.¹⁵ The MTO program was conceived during the Bush administration and authorized by Section 152 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992. It was "funded under the Clinton administration with bipartisan support in Congress, including the votes of Maryland's entire delegation." (*The Baltimore Sun*, October 30, 1994)

MTO was modeled on remedial programs, such as the Gautreaux program in Chicago, "to provide funding for rental assistance and housing counseling services to reduce racial segregation in publicly assisted housing." (*MTO, Program Operations Manual*, Abt Associates, May 1994, p. 1-1). MTO's goal was "to help low-income families now living in public housing or project-based Section 8 housing [to] move out of high-poverty areas of large central cities and gain access to better housing, education, and employment opportunities in low-poverty neighborhoods." (Ibid.)

"Rumors involving the program [had] been circulating through jurisdictions around Baltimore since the local program was announced in March. . . ." (*The Baltimore Sun*, June 13, 1994) The winning communities were notified of their awards in March 1994, but Baltimore did not make its selection public because the timing was not right, said Baltimore County Housing Director Frank J. Welsh. Concurrently, the city was planning to announce the closing of four high-rise housing projects, and housing

directors in the city and surrounding counties agreed that “the suspicious Eastside residents would see the program as the beginning of a mass export of low-income city dwellers” to their communities. (*The Baltimore Sun*, July 31, 1994)

Meetings among the city, MTO staff, and county officials occurred in late September 1993 and again at a March 1994 meeting of the Baltimore Metropolitan Council when Mayor Kurt L. Schmoke of Baltimore and others briefed executives from surrounding counties, including Baltimore County’s Executive, Roger B. Hayden. (*The Baltimore Sun*, October 30, 1994) By May, MTO had become a hot topic. It exploded in June, when a flier surfaced accusing the government of “trying to keep MTO a secret and . . . to empty the residents of crime-infested Lafayette and Murphy Homes” (Baltimore high-rise projects) into Essex.

Anti-MTO meetings, usually sponsored by the Eastern Political Organization,¹⁶ were common in the late summer and early fall. The protest rallies drew hundreds with the news of the program having created a “racially tinged election-year uproar on Baltimore County’s blue-collar Eastside.” (*The Baltimore Sun*, August 30, 1994) In the aftermath of the acrimonious rallies, “nearly every county politician either opposed the program or remained silent.” (*The Baltimore Sun*, September 17, 1994) Even Baltimore County’s Hayden, who had earlier been neutral on the program, sent a letter on August 26 to Secretary Cisneros requesting that the program be delayed. Hayden denied his request was politically motivated, citing “lack of public information” and the absence of “citizen input” as justification for his concerns over MTO. (*The Baltimore Sun*, August 30, 1994)

The anti-MTO position worked well as a campaign strategy, and the latent fears and anger mobilized by the politically inspired Eastern Political Organization of Baltimore County suburbanites “put two U.S. senators on the defensive [Senators Barbara Mikulski and Paul Sarbanes], damaged HUD, and killed MTO for the future.” (*The Baltimore Sun*, October 30, 1994) “In an abrupt departure from her role as a champion for liberal causes,” Senator Barbara A. Mikulski, chairwoman of the House-Senate Appropriations subcommittee that oversees HUD, successfully “spearheaded a congressional effort to kill [the] program. . . .” (*The Baltimore Sun*, September 25, 1994) Money for the future expansion of the program was rescinded by a House-Senate Conference committee in August.¹⁷ (*The Baltimore Sun*, September 17, 1994)

The controversial MTO demonstration would proceed, however, according to Mayor Schmoke and city Housing Commissioner Henson. (*The Baltimore Sun*, September 21, 1994) Even Louis L. DePazzo, who sought a seat on the County Council “and used MTO to bludgeon his opponent in the primary,” recognized that he could not stop the MTO pilot program in Baltimore. (*The Baltimore Sun*, October 30, 1994)

The short-term impact of Baltimore County’s defeat of the Clinton administration’s Housing Choice and Community Investment Act of 1994 on Chicago’s scattered-site program will be minimal. That program, after all, is running on a separate track mandated by the Federal Court, not Congress. Vince Lane’s plans for “de-densifying” more than the Cabrini-Green project and helping displaced families find new homes and enriched environments in the suburbs are less likely to materialize.¹⁸ He faces other challenges, including further “privatizing” of the CHA and completing the scattered-site development demonstration on the north, northwest, and southwest sides of the city that he proposed on January 8, 1990.¹⁹ The Eastern Maryland backlash and the “baffling aspect of the protests” in Baltimore County’s

blue-collar neighborhoods would not have surprised him. (*The Baltimore Sun*, September 25, 1994) Lane has faced significant neighborhood opposition to his plans for the city, and he realizes that “racial fears are never far below the surface” in hypersegregated Chicago and the increasingly stratified towns and villages of the greater Chicago multicounty metropolitan area. (*The Baltimore Sun*, October 3, 1994)

As for Alex Polikoff, the congressional rescission of the expansion of MTO will certainly be profoundly disappointing. Considered “the father” of Section 152 Moving To Opportunity for Fair Housing (an amendment to the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act), he has championed for close to 30 years the “choice in residence” concept on behalf of every American, but especially the poor. “In the emerging mobility debate,” wrote Polikoff, “more is at stake than bureaucratic in-fighting or arcane punditry.” (*Chicago Tribune*, June 24, 1994)

And what of HUD Secretary Cisneros? Cisneros is making “the first real effort at promoting integration and neighborhood diversity in 30 years,” says Douglas Massey. Unfortunately, the outcome for Cisneros’ opening up the suburbs strategy through metropolitan incentives and choice in residency may repeat the fate of George Romney at the hands of Nixon. The first effort at building the “real city” (ending the race residential segregation of the city through the development of assisted housing in the suburbs) was Romney’s quietly planned Open Communities strategy. The plan died when Warren, Michigan, strenuously resisted becoming the first site for HUD’s full-scale effort “to disperse largely black and poor populations of center-city ghettos into largely white and affluent suburbs.” (*National Journal*, October 17, 1970, p. 2251) Cisneros may not suffer Romney’s exact fate—Cabinet expulsion—but the Baltimore County episode suggests the damage neighborhood resistance can do when public policy tries to promote neighborhood integration.

The Baltimore County story is profoundly disturbing, for it shows how deeply suspicious, angry, cynical, and racist large segments of the public are when government tries to shape remedies for complex social problems. The hostility is more acrid when the policy involves alternatives to public housing projects. In the current context of public perception of the poor, even a program like MTO, which “pushes housing policy in the right direction, providing help and hope,” is judged critically. Public housing “had become so associated with publicly financed ghettos that the idea of any type of public housing [alternative] had become unacceptable to all neighborhoods.” (Tarlock, 1988, p. 580) The validity of this observation is certainly true for Baltimore County and Chicago.

Is There a Future for Scattered-Site Housing?

In the context of the Baltimore “political firestorm” that ended financing for the second year of the program (*New York Times*, March 28, 1995), one can legitimately question the realism of supporting choice-in-residency strategies that aim to integrate neighborhoods beyond the ghetto. Middle- and upper-income households have for more than four decades been deserting the city, “seeking social separation from the lower classes as well as better housing and more spacious surroundings.” (Erber, 1977, p. 306) Most Americans now live in the suburbs. What is troubling about that statistic is that it signals more balkanization and widening of the gap between city and suburb, “between the haves and the have-nots, as more affluent people physically distance themselves from the problems of poor urban residents.”

(*New York Times*, December 12, 1995) Moreover, the country's increasingly conservative, antigovernment political climate is unlikely to support programs to unslum the slum through dispersal strategies, even those as benign as the Clinton administration's MTO demonstration.

A major aim of this study has been to examine the scattered-site strategy when undertaken by PHAs. Several housing specialists leveled criticisms against some of these new housing programs that fostered "mobility, freedom of choice, and inclusiveness for the metropolitan area as a whole, while simultaneously encouraging and fostering the revitalization of the central slum areas." (George Schermer Associates, 1968, p. 44) The following are typical remarks:

- It's too expensive. The cost per unit "rises appreciably with a diminution of units per project." (Ledbetter, 1967, p. 502) There is "good evidence that large, multibuilding projects can be substantially cheaper than those built on scattered sites." (Taggart, 1970, p. 34)
- "Neither the benefits of mixing nor the costs of separation have been adequately quantified." The "presumed educational and employment benefits to be gained from dispersing low-income families throughout metropolitan areas do not yet seem so certain as to justify the huge subsidies which such an effort would require." (Grigsby, p. 108)
- Scattered-site housing in minute quantities is an "inefficacious sprinkle of a cure on a massive disease. The few relocated assisted persons to scattered-site clusters are merely remarginalized by virtue of their systemic isolation." (Tein, p. 1463) "[E]ven quite expensive dispersal programs could do no more than modestly reduce existing low-income concentrations." (Grigsby, p. 108)
- "[L]and is simply unavailable, except at very high prices, in those neighborhoods into which the proponents of [the scattered-site] approach wish to send low-income families. Where land is available in large parcels sufficient to accommodate three- or four-unit projects, the expense, the zoning and building code regulations, and the vigorous opposition from the residents of the invaded neighborhood would pose grave problems." (Ledbetter, p. 502)
- "It is probably impractical to assume that very low-income, problem-ridden white and Negro families can be moved into middle-class neighborhoods, or into racially mixed developments and be expected to develop viable, mutually supportive communities." (George Schermer Associates, p. 36) Moving "unstable, problem-ridden families" into stable social environments "runs head-on into the aspirations, the values, and the self-interests of the nonpoor. One cannot be optimistic about implementing this element beyond a very nominal limit." (Ibid., p. 34)

Benefits Unproven

Many of these observations remain undocumented hypotheses; a few require additional research to demonstrate their validity. However, this study and the works of Rosenbaum (1995), Peterson and Williams (1994), and Burchell, et al., (1994) on housing mobility programs contain data that counter some of the earlier doubts about the efficacy of spatial deconcentration strategies, including the scattered-site housing model.

This study did not examine the costs and benefits of the scattered-site housing model. The Belzer survey and several directors from the case-study communities discussed in chapter 3 believed the program was more expensive, however. Bratt's review of studies completed between 1968 and 1988 on the benefits and costs of public housing found it to be:

Less costly to subsidize a household through the Section 8 Existing Housing program than to subsidize the *construction* of a new unit of public housing . . . the cost of subsidizing households in *existing* [author's italics] public housing units is no higher than the cost of subsidizing households in *existing* private units through the Section 8 program [and] although no definitive conclusions can be drawn about the present cost of building new public housing in comparison to the other types of subsidized housing programs that have been utilized in the past, public housing does emerge in a relatively positive position. (Bratt, 1989, p. 73)

The benefits of residential mobility have been carefully examined by James Rosenbaum and his associates at Northwestern University, who studied the social, educational, and employment progress of Gautreaux families for more than a decade. The study found the Gautreaux "[s]uburban movers were significantly more likely to be employed after their move than Gautreaux families" who remained in the city, and "children in suburban Gautreaux families generally fared well in school." (*Housing and Development Brief*, 1994, p. 4) The "geography of opportunity" premise that "where someone lives has an important impact on his or her social and economic prospects" (Rosenbaum, 1995, p. 266) was confirmed, but needs to be replicated.²⁰

Few Units/Little Impact on the Problem

Scattered-site housing, particularly the conventional public housing model examined in this study, remains an "inefficacious sprinkle" compared to the need for affordable housing. The Hogan/Lengyel and Belzer surveys reported that scattered-site units account for only 8 to 9.5 percent of the PHAs' inventory. Thus even though the program appears to produce highly successful developments, it will not make much of a dent in the broader problem where "[n]early three-fourths of very low-income renters pay over 30 percent of their income for housing, and more than 4 in 10 pay over half of their income for housing." (Bogdon, et al., 1992, p. 11)

Downs (1994) and Rusk (1996) offer illustrations of how current mobility programs—Gautreaux in Chicago and inclusionary zoning in Montgomery County, Maryland—could be expanded and the "volume of out-movement" increased sharply. (Downs, op. cit., p. 108) Using figures from 44 of the Nation's largest cities, Downs calculates that "setting aside 5 percent of suburban housing units built in the 1980s would have permitted 12.7 percent of the 1980 inner-city households (in the 44 areas combined) to move to the suburbs. In 13 of these areas the share would have exceeded 30 percent." (Ibid., p. 110)

Rusk demonstrates how a significant reduction in Baltimore City's concentrated poverty population could be realized if a "Montgomery County-type, Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit policy were established" for the seven-county Baltimore Metropolitan Area. (Rusk, 1996, p. 111) The genius of Montgomery County's strategy of targeting communities in the "process of being created" is that there are "no neighbors already in place in the proposed subdivision, townhouse project, or apartment complex who are organized to object." (Ibid., p. 89)

“New housing in new neighborhoods is the major strategy,” and Rusk’s intent is “to achieve for poor black households the same general assimilation into middle-class neighborhoods that poor white households already experience in the Baltimore region.” (Ibid., p. 108) Based on new housing starts in the Baltimore region from 1970 through 1989, the MPDU policy would apply to 10,000 units a year. (Ibid., p. 113)²¹ Five hundred of these units (5 percent) would be purchased by the Housing Opportunities Commission “to meet the goal of voluntarily relocating 21,000 poor black households from Baltimore City. Over a 20-year period approximately 10,000 homes and apartments would be set aside for low-income qualified households, enough to absorb about half of the 21,000 poor black households being voluntarily relocated.” (Ibid.)

Although the proportional share of several of Baltimore’s suburban counties would increase dramatically, “such relative increases in poor black households would really reflect the current degree of racial exclusion within those counties.” (Ibid., p. 109) Overall, the redistribution would be modest.

Poor black households as a percentage of total population would range from only 3 percent of Howard County to 6 percent of Queen Anne’s County. In the process, the proportion of poor black households within Baltimore City would drop from 14 percent to slightly over 7 percent. (Ibid., p. 110)

Land Availability Issues

Ledbetter’s observations about the difficulties of obtaining affordable sites in decent neighborhoods remain valid. A major barrier to an Authority in finding a “desirable site location” is that public housing developments are “small tax producer[s],” and “the locality is not inclined to select a prime site for its location for better ratables.” (Genung, 1971, p. 740) The greater “per-unit cost for small projects,” and “the difficulty of finding sites with low acquisition cost,” have also hampered the production of scattered-site units and their placement outside of areas of minority concentration. (Peel, Pickett, and Buehl, op. cit., p. 81) If HUD were to raise the acquisition cost limits (an unlikely outcome given congressional underfunding for assisted housing with dispersion potential), “more land in white areas would be accessible. . . .” (Ibid., p. 144) The availability of buildable lots and high land costs in areas outside of minority-impacted neighborhoods hampered the Chicago scattered-site program and accounts for the overconcentration of assisted units in Latino neighborhoods. The clustering of scattered sites in only a handful of census tracts also describes the Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Tucson, and San Diego programs. Where large land parcels were available and affordable, several Authorities discussed in chapter 3 did not seek rezoning in fear of triggering the neighborhood opposition Ledbetter saw as a major barrier to scattered-site development.

Problem Families and Supportive Environments

This study provides little information on whether “unstable, problem-ridden families” can be moved successfully from ghetto environments to middle-class neighborhoods. Although most directors who responded to the Hogan/Lengyel survey maintained that scattered-site families were no different than project families, the case studies suggest otherwise. The Housing Resource Center’s selection policy was

more restrictive than HUD criteria, and to qualify for an apartment families had to pass an initial screening that included home visits, "contact with former landlords, employers, and creditors," and conversations with the teachers of children who lived in the household. Followup surveys of 13 programs also found prospective families routinely screened and counseled, and some Authorities offered scattered-site apartments as "rewards" to families with "good neighbor" records in the projects. Unfortunately, we cannot settle how much "creaming" occurred in the selection process. Furthermore, we cannot answer Hartman's concern about the Gautreaux experiment: "Are only those most likely to succeed selected, making the program of only limited applicability to central-city minority households?" (1993, p. 1562)

The studies of scattered-site programs in East St. Louis, Chicago, and Tucson provide some evidence that neighborhood conditions can adversely affect the success of the program. The East St. Louis scattered-site program was judged a failure: properties adjacent to the sites had declined in value due to the deterioration of the units, impoverished conditions of the neighborhood, and the depressed economy of the city. DeZutter's evaluation of scattered-site units on Chicago's North Side found "the worst cases of tenant neglect and vandalism, the worst garbage areas, and the worst social problems" in buildings located in downtrodden areas. (DeZutter, 1976, p. 80) Whether site size, neighborhood quality, or family composition alone is more critical than the two other variables presumed to account for successful scattered-site outcomes calls for further research.

Although a "myriad of small projects cannot house as many families as a couple of well-located large projects" (Ledbetter, *op. cit.*, p. 502), scattered-site developments, in tandem with portable Section 8 vouchers, are demonstrably effective ways to house low-income families and reduce the concentration of poverty in inner-city neighborhoods. Compared with certificates and vouchers, which are short-lived and "merely help pay rent," scattered-site programs deliver "hard" units and "have the virtue of long-term availability"; the likelihood of including "three-, four-, and five-bedroom units needed by large, low-income families"; and "add[ing] to the stock of community-owned housing." (Roisman, 1995, p. 1351)²²

A selling point for vouchers and certificates is their potential for enlarging choice and dispersal; "they enable racial and economic integration in jurisdictions in which PHAs might not be able to build units." (Ibid., p. 1370) The cases discussed in this study also demonstrate that "hard" units owned by the Authority can offer the same advantages if scattered-site developments are small, if they are well designed to fit the architectural character of the neighborhood, and if tenants are closely screened.

Several Authorities have minimized community resistance and avoided rezone battles by using existing housing in their scattered-site plans. Because they "generally require no zoning or other land use permits," housing acquisition can be "a valuable [if] underutilized method of expanding low-income housing opportunities in predominantly white, middle-class communities." (Tegeler, 1994, p. 233) Whether this strategy deflects "middle-class opposition to public expenditures to give the poor new housing perceived as or actually better than the homes they themselves occupy" (Hirshen and LeGates, 1975, p. 68) is not clear. On the other hand, "cost constraints tend to make lower income placements in existing units all the more attractive to legislators and administrators." (Silverman, 1977, p. 476)

The barriers to the exercise of choice in residence are daunting, especially when sought by low-income minority families. Housing is neither an entitlement, a fundamental right under the Federal constitution, nor a "routine municipal responsibility." Rather, the development of housing has traditionally been regarded as a private-sector responsibility, and its acquisition through private ownership part of the

American dream and one of the rewards of our economic system for “hard-working and law-abiding” households. (Howard Husock, “The Folly of Public Housing,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 28, 1992)

When housing is considered a special social good, its quality and location are influenced by local jurisdictions where “excuses of cost, zoning, or local political restraints” (Peel, Pickett, and Buehl, *op. cit.*, p. 145) frequently defeat the Federal Government’s efforts to produce “housing to achieve social objectives that the marketplace may ignore . . .” (Listokin, 1991, p. 177) According to Tegeler (1994), the “delegation of control over publicly assisted housing to small governmental units forms the underlying legal structure of housing segregation.” (Ibid., p. 215) The Housing Act of 1937 placed responsibility for subsidized housing developments in independent local Authorities. Because assisted housing is not a State-mandated program, municipalities can refuse to establish housing authorities. (Ellickson, 1967, p. 509) The cooperation agreement requirement of the Housing and Community Development Act “requires local government approval before public housing may be developed within a jurisdiction.” This section has provided jurisdictions with a “standardless local veto over federally funded public housing.” (Ibid., p. 217)

Today, many of the same forces that fostered segregated public housing in its early years and that contributed to the development and persistence of the ghetto remain in place. (Kellman, 1993, p. 800) Neighborhood opposition based upon “fear of the spread of [the] ghetto and its awesomely negative characteristics” (Polikoff, 1995, p. 1698) and control over zoning that “enables local residents to affect the character of the local community—to determine the look of the place—and to decide who their neighbors will be” (Briffault, 1990, p. 57) powerfully reinforce racial segregation in American housing. Furthermore, unless overridden, local requirements for city council site approval will continue to limit the expansion of housing options for poor families, as the Chicago and Yonkers case histories demonstrate.

The policy choices contained in the *Kerner Commission Report*—the enrichment and integration options—continue to influence contemporary urban policy discussions. (Yinger, 1995, pp. 208–209) Arguments over which direction to choose are still heard, but the either/or nature of the earlier debate has lessened. Current writings underscore choice, particularly from the vantage point of inner-city families, and a more balanced policy on what to do about the underclass has emerged. Chester Hartman (1993) sees both strategies as necessary elements in a solution of housing and neighborhood problems. For Hartman, the real question is “how the two strategies should be combined—an issue involving resource allocation decisions, national and local politics, expressed preferences, and housing market and neighborhood realities.” (Ibid., p. 1563)

Two key ingredients of a combined policy are (1) to offer escape through housing mobility programs counseling, and search assistance, and (2) “to change the situation norm of ghetto poverty areas [for families who chose to remain in inner-city neighborhoods] through fostering mixed-income communities, which by their very nature also help the ghetto poor to see that they have some chance of moving out of their situation.” (Polikoff, 1995, p. 1697) Unfortunately, “in the foreseeable future resources in pursuit of either agenda will be quite scarce and . . . next to vanishing for dispersalists.” (Winnick, 1995, p. 100)

The “structural realities that shape metropolitan spatial inequality” (Shlay, 1995, p. 711) must con-

tinue to be challenged because the costs of leaving housing policy to market forces is not acceptable. Anne Shlay's multidimensional and holistic conception of housing policy incorporates elements from the "real city" and "interwoven destinies" themes of HUD Secretaries Romney and Cisneros. In recognizing that political constraints "remain the centerpiece for any debate on reducing metropolitan inequality across space," (Ibid., p. 712) Shlay calls for "a broader view of housing."

In that enlarged context, the major goal of housing policy is to equalize opportunities across space and social groups. This will require Federal leadership to mitigate serious local constraints such as political fragmentation, fiscal crisis, exclusionary land-use regulations, unequal public expenditures for education, and the dual housing market. . . . If housing policy is to equalize opportunities across space, the political agenda will require addressing these political realities. (Ibid., p. 714)



Endnotes

Chapter 1. The Origins of the Scattered-Site Strategy

1. Built in 1955–56, Pruitt-Igoe “was one of the world’s most densely compacted little towns, with a population of 10,000 stacked up in 33 11-story buildings set row upon row on a 57-acre plot.” (*The Washington Post*, June 17, 1973)
2. This characterization was certainly not true of early housing developments. (Friedman, 1966) According to Bratt (1989), “most public housing developments (54 percent) are relatively small, having fewer than 200 units; most family public housing units (75 percent) are in low-rise buildings (4 or fewer stories); [and] only 7 percent of all family public housing projects are both high-rise and have more than 200 units. . . .” (Ibid., p. 65) Also see Matulef’s (1987) analysis of NAHRO’s 1986 survey of public housing agencies.
3. The assistance methods have included Section 23: Leased Housing for Low-Income Families (1965); Section 101: Rent Supplements (1965); Section 236: Rental Assistance (1968); Experimental Housing Assistance Program (1970); Section 8: Leased Housing Assistance (1974); Section 8 vouchers (1983); and conventional public housing scattered-site developments (1957). See Milgram (1989), Weicher (1980), and Hays (1985).
4. For other discussions of design issues in the 1950s and 1960s, see Hays (1985, pp. 96–99), Wolman (1971, pp. 14–19), Struyk (1980, pp. 29–37), and Steiner (1971, pp. 130–134).
5. The new programs, some of which began as pilot demonstrations, had been emerging since 1961. Most of them were formally authorized in 1965, including “the nonprofit, below-market interest rate programs, the 221(h) program, the emphasis upon small, scattered-site developments, the turnkey approach, the acquisition and leasing programs, and rent supplements. . . .” (George Schermer Associates, op. cit., p. 57) Two scattered-site programs that preceded Cedartown’s pioneering program were Connecticut’s “temporary veterans housing program” that yielded “many State-city scattered projects in 1947.” In 1952 the Housing Authority of Menomonie, Wisconsin, developed a 60-unit, low-rent project “with dwellings scattered throughout the community.” (*Journal of Housing*, November 1958, p. 359)
6. Although this title closed some of the gaps in the Kennedy Executive Order, “FHA mortgage insurance and VA loan guarantee[s] outside urban renewal areas and Farmers Home Administration housing were exempt as was conventionally financed housing not located within urban renewal areas.” (Montgomery and Mandelker, 1979, p. 375)

7. In *Jones*, the decision “clearly departed from the rationales of earlier Court decisions and began a period in which Federal courts vigorously fought housing discrimination.” (Sander, 1988, p. 879)
8. Barton (1996) argues that the debate between demand or supply subsidies is not over and that a fourth phase of that debate is emerging at the local level. Housing preservationists are hard at work converting “expiring use” properties “to nonprofit ownership,” and by their successes “[demonstrate] the point that creation of social housing is an analytically distinct policy from use of supply subsidies, even though they may often be used together.” (Ibid., p. 109)
9. Correspondence between B.H. Marshall, Jr., Executive Director of the Wilmington Housing Authority, to B.H. Grant, Chairman, Cedartown Housing Authority, February 18, 1958.
10. Interview with M.I. Frost, March 8, 1988. Frost was Cedartown’s Executive Director from 1939 to 1969.
11. Correspondence, M.I. Frost, Executive Director, Housing Authority of Cedartown, with S.P. Coco, Jennings, GA, August 30, 1961.
12. Interview, “Jimmie” Hitt, Executive Director of the Cedartown Housing Authority, March 8, 1988.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

1. Arguments over enrichment strategies, or spatial deconcentration, have reappeared in the wake of the 1992 Los Angeles riot. See the discussions by Schill (1993, 1994).
2. The distinction between the two mobility programs is based on whether the market intervention reflects a demand (resident-based) or supply (unit-based) strategy. This study’s focus on scattered-site housing reflects unit-based mobility programs. See Peterson and Williams (1994), HUD USER (1994), and Roisman and Botein (1993).
3. Program details are contained in Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) and the Program Guidelines for the Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing Demonstration for Fiscal Year 1993, *Federal Register*. (August 16, 1993, pp. 43,458–43,467)
4. Although it endorsed deconcentration, the Douglas Commission still discussed “small project[s].” (Ibid., p. 123)
5. Deconcentration and scattered-sites construction were reaffirmed in the reports’ recommendations that “public housing programs . . . emphasize scattered-site construction . . . and an intensive effort [to] recruit . . . sponsors willing to build outside the ghettos.” (Ibid., p. 482) See Schermer Associates. (1968, pp. 68–97)
6. A discussion of the paradoxes and inconsistencies in the pursuit of “better housing for non-whites, a dislvement of ghettos, and integrated residential patterns” is found in Weaver. (1965, pp. 79–81, 85–87)

7. A third way, which reflects ambivalence, is indicated in the responses of housing elites. When asked if public policy should be directed toward improving housing conditions within ghettos, dispersing the ghetto, or both in approximately equal proportions, 31 of 67 respondents favored both in roughly equal proportions. (Wolman, 1971, p. 177)
8. An argument for a “slum-stabilization” strategy somewhere between the pragmatic and instrumental perspectives was suggested for Chicago’s Woodlawn neighborhood by Moore, Livermore, and Galland. (1973, pp. 41–59)
9. The studies Labrie examined were Grodzins (1957, in Raab, 1962), Kain and Persky (1969), and Davidoff, Davidoff, and Gold (1970).
10. From this perspective minority concentration is a necessary condition for the development of countervailing power. The instrumental perspective opposes residential integration and metropolitan government reforms because they reduce this power base.
11. An earlier discussion of choice in spatial location is “Alternative Overall Strategies for Coping With the Nation’s Housing Needs.” (1976, pp. 119–123)
12. See Glazer (1974, pp. 89–111). Glazer doubts the seriousness of metropolitan apartheid and whether the “benefits to be gained by opening up the suburb” can be achieved. He concludes his essay with this query: “Is this degree of heroism necessary?” His answer is no, “for integration of blacks is occurring, while a major public policy for the integration of the poor would be impossible to implement.” (Ibid., p. 110)
13. Fuerst has consistently supported high-rise housing as appropriate for assisted families. The height of the buildings are not the root of the problem for projects; “rather it is [p]oor locations; poor tenancy controls; enormous concentrations of very poor, socially troubled families; design flaws; poor maintenance; few supporting social services; and inept management [that] are far more responsible for public housing problems. . . .” (1991, p. 118)
14. The demonstration program grew out of an agreement between HUD and the plaintiffs following the Supreme Court’s April 1976 8–0 decision. (*Hills v. Gautreaux*, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976)) HUD was instructed to use “the Section 8 rental subsidy program to provide Gautreaux families with subsidized housing opportunities throughout the metropolitan area.” (Polikoff, 1988, p. 473)
15. *Banks v. Perk*, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972)
16. For the mail-out questionnaire (sent to residents without listed telephones), 25 were attempted and 18 returned. For the 35 telephone interviews attempted, 30 were obtained. Overall, 48 responses were received, for a return rate of 80 percent.
17. The purpose of the question was to determine whether a significant number of scattered-site families wanted to work actively to maintain the condition of their units and outside space. The exterior appearance of scattered-site units will generally have a significant effect on how

- neighboring property owners perceive the use of units for low-income tenants and whether they support or oppose acquisition or construction of additional units in the neighborhood.
18. The private managers were the not-for-profit Housing Resource Center, “a proponent of self-help strategies to help house low-income families,” and the Albert H. Johnson Company, a “seasoned” for-profit professional management company. (DeZutter, 1984, pp. 1–2)
 19. The Housing Resource Center is a “nonprofit housing reform group affiliated loosely” with Chicago’s legendary Hull House, “a network of settlement houses started by Jane Addams.” (DeZutter, 1984b, pp. 1–2, and *Neighborhood News*, July 22, 1983)
 20. Webber and Klammer (1991) suggest two important reasons why Burbe and Rohe’s Durham study provides “few, if any, useful conclusions about the effectiveness of other deconcentration programs.” (Ibid., p. 451) First, the 140 units per development was “considerably higher than the number generally advocated in deconcentration plans.” Second, the developments were only 2.6 miles from downtown Durham—too close to central-city projects to “represent true deconcentration, which involves scattering housing over an entire city or metropolitan area.” (Ibid.)
 21. Another strategy relies on the private or nonprofit sector to produce affordable housing. It is then up to “the public sector partner to arrange further subsidies so that the units can be brought within the financial reach of the poorest neighborhood.” (Peterson and Williams, 1994, p. 72)
 22. The latest development in the decade-long litigation was the February 7, 1995, order requiring the Dallas Housing Authority to “develop, through construction or acquisition, an additional 3,205 public housing family units in predominantly white areas.” Considered “perhaps the most comprehensive desegregation remed[y] ever,” U.S. District Court Judge Buchmeyer’s order represents a “tenfold increase in the number of subsidized apartments planned for poor minority families.” The order also called for the desegregation of the certificate and voucher programs. (*The Dallas Morning News*, February 17, 1995)
 23. Results of the 1992 demolition of the 194-unit Logan Fontanelle North project are encouraging. By fall 1993, 150 families had been placed in single-family homes purchased by the OHA on the open market. The homes were distributed throughout Omaha’s seven councilmanic wards with “no OHA property closer than three blocks to another.” (*The NIMBY Report*, Number 1, 1993)
 24. The screening rules included annual incomes of approximately \$15,000, 1 year of employment history, and an interview with the OHA executive director.
 25. This restriction precludes significant participation by low-income households living in Washington, D.C. Approximately 94 percent of the participants are residents of Montgomery County
 26. The Housing Opportunities Commission purchased another 119 units through September 1994

27. Roisman and Botein (1993) claim that the MPDU program has achieved both economic and racial integration. They also report that of the 420 MPDUs sold directly to families “nearly 60 percent went to people of color.” (Ibid., p. 348)

Chapter 3. National Scattered-Site Programs

1. Although Section 8 has provided shelter for many income eligible households, it is questionable whether the program has done much to encourage low-income housing opportunities in those cities where there were few assisted units previously. The literature suggests that holders of Section 8 certificates seek the most affordable housing, which is generally located in economically depressed neighborhoods.
2. Whether vouchers encourage dispersal is debatable. The experimental housing allowance program had “little if any impact on locational choice, economic or racial concentration, or neighborhood quality.” (Cronin and Rasmussen, 1981, pp. 107–8)
3. Being especially interested in scattered-site programs in large cities (Authorities with at least 5,000 assisted family units), a second followup was sent to 16 PHAs in January 1983.
4. Housing Authorities were not included for the following reasons: The program was Section 8 Existing or Moderate Rehabilitation; the program served the elderly; condominium sales or homeownership were involved; the questionnaire was incomplete; the program was in an early planning stage; or responses reflected a number of different subsidy programs.
5. Nineteen percent of Authority directors indicate a difference between scattered-site and project residents. Scattered-site families tend to be employed, earn more, and are white.
6. As one Housing Director commented, “Political problems of siting and costs of new construction made acquisition by purchase in the market, with no rehabilitation, a quicker and more economical method of providing housing.”
7. The conventional method has the Housing Authority acting as the developer and identifying the land and housing to develop or renovate. The PHA hires the architectural services and is therefore responsible for the design. The construction is publicly bid, and the Authority is accountable for all development and leasing of the property.
8. Under turnkey the PHA requests proposals from private parties to develop the housing. Private developers purchase the land or the housing, and they take full responsibility for design or renovation. When the housing is complete, the developer sells the units to the PHA for a previously agreed-upon price and turns the key over to the Authority.
9. For an early critique of public housing, see the series of articles in the *Architectural Forum*. (April, May, and June 1957)

10. The special requirements included residents submitting three choices regarding where they wanted to live, no deviation from minimum occupancy standards, the ability to perform routine maintenance, and qualification with utility companies for direct utility service.
11. Forty-one percent of the authorities used the following 3 deconcentration criteria: (1) site-density limit of less than 6 units per site; (2) no more than 15 units per site; and (3) site-density limit of no more than 25 units per site. Four Authorities imposed a minimum distance of $\frac{1}{4}$ mile from the nearest family project of 25 units or more, and 3 Authorities had a maximum of 2 projects, or 15 units, on 1 block, and a minimum distance of $\frac{1}{8}$ mile from the nearest family project of 16–25 units.
12. A 1985 HUD report suggested that scattered-site housing was not inherently inefficient. See *The Financial Status of Scattered-Site Public Housing*, Office of Policy Development and Research, Policy Development Division, October 1985.
13. Satellite facilities are characteristics associated with Authorities that employ a decentralized or zone concept of management. Because scattered-site units are widely dispersed, many Authorities find it advantageous to divide the city geographically, decentralize maintenance, and monitor responsibilities.
14. Other Authorities mentioned community involvement, the presence of vacant lots, the need for in-fill housing, and the fact that major rehabilitation had been done to the units as reasons for a successful program.
15. Two important recommendations of the LUHP were rehabilitation of existing public housing and additional low-income housing, with scattered-site development as “the most effective approach.” (Ibid., p. 172)
16. Community Development Block Grant revolving funds were loaned to the CHA for the acquisition of the property.
17. This was not the case when the program began. Originally, the Authority had wanted a project resident at each site to provide “stability, contact, peer pressure, and someone who knew Authority policy.” CHA had trouble recruiting project residents because of the Authority’s utility policy. To gain experience in “the reality of neighborhood life,” scattered-site households were to pay their own utilities. Project residents, however, wanted to continue to deal with the Authority, and many refused to move to scattered-site units.
18. Charleston’s 1985–88 HAP called for 175 units of new construction “all built in scattered-site configurations containing a small number of units per complex.” CHA submitted an application to HUD for 267 units, including 47 on 6 to 8 sites.
19. A discussion on the relaxation of HUD rules for site proposals in impacted minority areas is found in Vernarelli. (1986, pp. 214–234)

20. Cameron would not follow that procedure again. Rather, he would “take the list of sites and run them by neighborhood councils to see if they had something different to suggest about the development of the properties.”
21. Between 1975 and 1988, Charleston’s population increased 15.3 percent, and its area increased 149 percent. (Memorandum, City of Charleston Department of Planning and Urban Development, to Mayor Riley, January 26, 1988)
22. In 1980 the average stay in nonelderly family housing was 3 years. The stay had increased to 7 years in 1987. (St. Paul PHA, *Ten Years of Excellence in Housing*)
23. Acquisition of single-family homes followed guidelines that included the following: no concentration in any one neighborhood; homes acquired from willing sellers only; no home within a 300-foot radius of another PHA property; exclusion from areas with more than 75 public housing units; only “modest but adequate homes” acquired; and design compatibility with adjacent homes. (*Guidelines for the Acquisition of Single Family Homes*, revised December 1980)
24. This is in marked contrast with changes in the racial composition of larger developments, where more than 70 percent of the families were Southeast Asian. In 1986, 20,200 Southeast Asians resided in St. Paul. (*Ten Years of Excellence*, op. cit.)
25. Six years later, in December 1994, 78 percent of units in the four-family projects were occupied by Southeast-Asian households, and slightly more than half the scattered-site families were immigrants, primarily from Asia. (Hester, F. Allen, telephone interview, December 2, 1994)
26. The Authority denies approximately 20 percent of scattered-site applicants. In practice there is close scrutiny of potential tenants. As Executive Director Jon Gutzman remarked, “Where we have discretion, we use it to the maximum.” (Personal interview, June 6, 1988)
27. The policy varied significantly from the November 1980 statement, reissued in June 1983. (See *Statement of Policies Public Housing Program*, PHA, March 1988.)
28. Screens included disturbance of neighbors, destruction of property, poor living or housekeeping habits, and a history of criminal activity.
29. On average, scattered-site units house more children than project housing. Only 62 percent of Rochester’s family projects have three or more bedrooms.
30. Rochester’s HAP plan for 1989–91 included as 1 of several housing goals the construction of 75 new units of public housing for small and large families. The city recommended that the units “be constructed in small clusters” and that sites follow three guidelines: “(1) accessible to public transportation and consumer services; (2) not located in areas where impaction would be negative; and (3) not located in areas where existing public housing is concentrated.” (City of Rochester, *Housing Assistance Plan: 1989–1991*, revised November 23, 1988, p. 6)

31. The acquisition of existing stock is an appropriate choice for the RHA because the median age of the city's housing stock is 78 years, and new construction in some of Rochester's older neighborhoods would appear intrusive. Moreover, "[d]espite its age, most of the substandard stock is suitable for rehabilitation," thus reducing the overall costs of the scattered-site program.
32. General Accounting Office, *Community Development: Revenue and Demographic Characteristics of East St. Louis, Illinois*. (August 13, 1986)
33. For example, A. Wendell Wheadon, former Executive Director of the Authority, was convicted on 17 criminal counts in connection with HUD modernization funds, including fraud, bribery, embezzlement, and tax evasion. (Land of Lincoln Complaint, n.d., p. 18)
34. During this time the Authority's deficit increased from \$180,600 to more than \$3,000,000, and from 1982 to 1985, it escalated from \$3,000,000 to \$14,000,000.
35. The contract with Thacker came almost 1 year after HUD recommended that the Authority go private.
36. Thacker's situation was impossible. The Board "delves into its management activities at all times, including voting on who would be janitor." Thacker's efforts to depoliticize operations by excluding the city from contract matters, personnel decisions, and determinations of who should be admitted to public housing angered the mayor. (Mooring, telephone interview, July 21, 1988)
37. In a declaration of breach, management control is returned to the local Authority when the Secretary decides to do so.
38. The team was composed of five or six HUD employees, headed by Norm Dice of the Cincinnati field office. HUD attorneys hand delivered letters advising the Board of Commissioners of the breach, hoping that within 2 to 3 months private management would be in place. The contract with Quadel was delayed by negotiations over detail, community protest, and issues of liability.
39. Oversight was frequent, and twice-daily conversations between Mooring and Stephanie Stafford, Quadel's onsite acting director, were common.
40. This did not mean that Quadel or another contractor would be there. In the interim— 3 years at a minimum—GAO or HUD could provide oversight. (Mooring, op. cit.)
41. The 3 properties included Chinquapin Village, a Navy project for torpedo plant workers, and Cameron Valley Homes (264 units) and Ramsey Homes (15 units), both Lanham Act projects constructed for defense workers. (Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 1982 *Annual Report*, p. 3)
42. The replacement housing would include 60 new units built on the Cameron Valley Site. Assisted housing residents would be "integrated with market-rate" residents. (1986 *Annual Report*, p. 5)

43. The scattered-site concept was chosen for new assisted housing “as it allows a low density of units and architectural styles that are well integrated into surrounding neighborhoods.” (Ibid., p. 7)
44. When Section 8 and leased housing are added, EPHA is responsible for approximately 10,000 units of assisted housing. (*Executive Director’s Annual Report*, Housing Authority of the City of El Paso, May 31, 1989)
45. *Annual Report, 1981*. (Housing Authority of the City of El Paso, p. 18)
46. This decade of growth, however, placed the Authority in a vulnerable fiscal position. The Authority’s reserves dropped from 64 percent to 25 percent between 1971–73, and the reserve balance was volatile throughout the decade. (EPHA internal memorandum, March 31, 1982)
47. The excluded areas contained pollution industries that fouled the environment, making the area unsuitable for residential development.
48. Michael, P., EPHA Eligibility Officer. (Personal interview, March 7, 1989)
49. Marquez, D., EPHA Occupancy and Lease Enforcement. (Telephone interview, January 10, 1995)
50. Bolend, M., Assistant to Deputy Executive Director Schellhamer. (Telephone interview, January 17, 1995)
51. The homes would be kept under separate title to simplify resale to private owners, according to Bruce Ryder, Solicitor for the Authority. (*Intell*, June 24, 1971) HUD never approved the HOPLIF request.
52. Theurer, A.M., Section 8 Coordinator. (Telephone interview, January 17, 1995)
53. As of March 1995, the City of San Diego Housing Authority (CSDHA) is made up of the entire city council sitting as the Housing Authority. The CSDHA provides oversight of the Housing Commission and is chaired by Mayor Susan Golding. The Housing Commission consists of seven members appointed by the mayor and approved by the city council. Five of the members are private citizens, and two board members are assisted housing clients. (Gray, P., Community Relations Specialist, San Diego Housing Commission, letter to the author, March 16, 1996)
54. In 1950 voters in Eureka, California, petitioned the city to place a referendum on the ballot on the council’s proposal to develop 500 units of conventional public housing. Article IV, Section 1, permits referenda on legislative matters. However, on appeal, the California Supreme Court held that Eureka’s decision to seek Federal funding for the project was an “executive,” not a legislative act, and Article IV did not apply. This decision triggered Proposition 10, which ultimately was incorporated as Article 34 of the California constitution.
55. In a separate opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackman, argued that Article 34 “on its face constitutes invidious discrimination,” and is “an explicit classification on

- the basis of poverty—a suspect classification that demands exacting judicial scrutiny.” (*James v. Valtierra*, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), p. 684)
56. At the time of the Supreme Court’s decision, Article 34 had been used by California voters to prevent the construction of almost half the low-rent housing proposed for the State.
 57. Data on referenda outcomes are contained in State of California, Department of Housing and Community Development, *Article 34 Referenda*, January 1, 1985.
 58. The commission included Public Housing Acquisition, Public Housing, New Construction, State Rental Housing (35 units), and Section 8 New Construction (8 units). There were 661 family units with more than 15 units per site. These were not profiled in the survey on scattered sites completed by the Authority.
 59. In 1979 there were no commission-owned rental units for very-low-income families. (*The Commission Report*, Summer Quarter 1986, p. 3)
 60. On two prior occasions, the commission was forced to cancel new construction projects. This action led HUD to withhold “millions in San Diego City CDBG entitlements.” (*Report to the Housing Authority*, November 18, 1986) The Mast Boulevard Property cancellation required the city to repay HUD loans totaling \$668,646. The Housing Commission acquired the property in December 1981. However, the city of Santee (that borders the project boundary) opposed the development because “all emergency services would have to be provided by their city because of the distance of San Diego’s services.” On August 24, 1982, the San Diego City Council upheld the appeal filed by the city of Santee and denied the project, in effect, making it unsuitable for development for at least 1 year. (*San Diego Housing Commission Report 82–126*, October 1, 1982) The Euclid Avenue development would have contained 60 family units and cost the commission \$965,000 for site acquisition, planning, and administrative costs. The property was approved for purchase on December 15, 1981, but the city council denied the use of more than \$300,000 in CDBG funds to supplement site acquisition funds from HUD. On August 17, 1982, the council heard an appeal from the Webster Community Council concerning the site, and on November 8, 1982, they rejected the Euclid project. (*San Diego Housing Commission Report 82–134*, October 22, 1982, pp. 1–2)
 61. Virtually all tenants of new public housing units are existing commission clients. In most cases, the client has been on a commission waiting list for a larger unit. Others are families with a disabled member who are given the opportunity to transfer to a new unit accessible to the disabled member. Prospective tenants of new public housing units undergo the Housing Commission’s normal screening process. (Gray, op. cit.)
 62. As of 1960 only one project was considered integrated. This state of affairs resulted from the combination of the neighborhood composition rule and the PHA’s “freedom of choice” policy that allowed potential tenants to “list their choice concerning the location of the public housing projects which they prefer.”

63. This was the acronym used by Schermer (op. cit., pp. 148–156) in discussing Philadelphia’s used-house program.
64. Apparently Rizzo’s letter worked, because soon thereafter HUD General Counsel David Maxwell instructed HUD Regional Director Theodore Robb to “keep a low profile in the Whitman controversy.” (*Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo*, 425 F.Supp. 987 (1976), p. 1005)
65. Sixty-five percent of the nonwhites in 1982 were African American and 22 percent were Hispanic.
66. The areas were: (1) Northeast/Germantown, (2) North, (3) South, and (4) West. See *II Tenant Selection and Assignment*, (PHA Eligibility for Admission, July 21, 1988, pp. 5–6)
67. The 1994 operating budget reflected an awareness of these past problems and reallocation of resources. The maintenance budget was increased 19 percent, which enabled the hiring of 73 skilled maintenance workers. (*Year-End Report*, 1994, p. 12)
68. The safety of scattered-site units became an issue in January 1993, after a three-story detached rowhouse owned by the PHA collapsed, trapping two of the three residents. The PHA immediately instituted a citywide survey to determine “how many of its 7,000 scattered-site units . . . originally connected to other homes . . . are now standing alone because adjoining houses were demolished.” Dennis Glancey, Acting Director of Scattered-Site Housing for the PHA, attributed the collapse to the lack of yearly inspections due to staff shortages, stating, “There’s fewer inspectors than there are mechanics.” (*Philadelphia Tribune*, January 5, 1993)
69. In October 1993 the PHA announced a \$236,000 grant to undertake lead-based risk testing on its scattered-site properties.
70. The three are the Richard Allen Homes (1941), Bartram Village (1942), and Passyunk Homes (1942).
71. The rehabilitation undertaken reflects the new administration’s concerns regarding large numbers of vacancies. Philadelphia’s vacancy rate was 24 percent when it was under HUD management, and the PHA was classified as MOD-troubled in 1992, “due to its inability to identify modernization projects and obligate and spend . . . funds, despite the fact that properties throughout the city were in serious [disrepair].” (*Year-End Report*, op. cit., p. 20) In September 1994 Executive Director White reported that the PHA had “already rehabbed, in the first 4 months of 1994, more vacant units than . . . all of last year.” (*Philadelphia Architect*, op. cit., p. 11)
72. In addition to replacement housing, the PHA plans to develop an 80-unit, mid-rise building for senior citizens near the Allen site. (*PR Newswire*, October 14, 1993)
73. Vince Lane visited Philadelphia in February 1994 to talk with tenants about “the crumbling Southwark Plaza public housing project,” and to the PHA about his vision of making the boundaries of public housing and the community vanish by de-densifying poverty. Lane’s plans

for Philadelphia were based on his own Lake Parc model and called for “converting 312 of Southwark’s 542 high-rise apartments and 127 of its 236 low-rise apartments to moderate-income units for families and the elderly.” (*The Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 28, 1994)

Chapter 4. Tucson and Seattle: Successful Experiences With Scattered-Site Housing

1. South Park is an older, well-established neighborhood in Tucson, whereas “New Site” refers collectively to the locations of the 120 units of scattered-site housing built in 1973.
2. Much of the variation in the two developments was a function of New Site being allocated under a rent-range system. Twenty percent of the units were reserved for families paying rents from \$0–20 per month, \$41–60, \$61–80, and over \$81. The average rent was \$60. The rent range allowed a more diversified tenant base, including household heads who worked, compared with the poorer families living in South Park units.
3. Peattie (1971, pp. 305–6) argues that small scattered-sites render public housing stock less visible and special.
4. See Schorr’s (1966) discussion of the relationship among housing, poverty, and insecurity in the United States.
5. The two questions were: “In general, would you say that it is best to leave things to fate, or is it best to make plans for the things you want in life?” and “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”
6. The ladder methodology and the “self-anchoring striving scale” are discussed in Cantril (1965) and Kilpatrick and Cantril (1960).
7. An attempt to integrate both by race and class was tried in Boston with some early success. “Fully 75 percent of all tenants surveyed said income and racial mixing was either desirable or didn’t matter.” (*Wall Street Journal*, June 25, 1974)
8. Social impact studies of housing are discussed briefly in HUD’s *Housing in the Seventies*. (1973, pp. 2106–2115) On social mixing also see Millen (1973) and Marrett (1973). HUD claims that “[d]ispersing residents out of central cities reduces demand in such cities for housing and discourages maintenance by landlords which eventually may lead to abandonment.” (1973, p. 2112) Other comments include: “small and separate increments are less likely to be seen as the invasion of a threatening alien force” (Haigh and Kitchell, 1974, p. 371); “dispersing the public housing stock [renders] it both less visible and . . . less special” (Peattie, op cit., p. 305) “less stigma would be attached . . . to inconspicuous public housing projects, especially when these were located in white communities” (Bellush, 1971, p. 115); and “lesser numbers of low-income families might find it much easier to be accepted and assimilated in middle-class neighborhoods.” (Ibid.)

9. Class distance was measured in terms of resident's self-placement—upper middle-class, lower middle-class, middle-class, and lower-class—compared with their judgment of the class position of tenants. Nonjudgmental residents “don't know” the class position of tenants, and high-class distance residents place tenants in categories below their own.
10. Socioeconomic status was defined as a function of education, family income, and occupation. See Sheatsley. (1966, p. 315) The findings were supported in a third series of National Opinion Research Center (NORC) reports discussed in Greeley and Sheatsley. (1971, pp. 13–19)
11. In contrast to Bradburn, Hunt found no relation between education or occupation and attitudes toward housing.
12. Pascal suggests another reason for less bigotry: “Their households typically have fewer children.”
13. Glazer (1974) sees benefits to small-scale units. It benefits the residents of public housing more than the neighbors.
14. On the racial transition of neighborhoods and the “tipping” phenomenon, see Goering (1978).
15. *The History of Yesler Terrace.*
16. *Annual Population Report*, Housing Authority of the City of Seattle, December 31, 1983.
17. For further discussion of CDBG support for Seattle's scattered-site program, see General Accounting Office. (March 30, 1982, pp. 24–30)
18. The SHA was limited to neighborhoods north of Mercer Street or within the central area if residents approved. The central area was primarily poor and of minority concentration, and was initially prohibited as a location for assisted housing. At the request of the Evergreen Legal Services and the Innersite Housing Alliance, the area was included by HUD in the scattered-site housing project because they feared long-time residents would eventually be driven out by rising housing costs.
19. The SHA was willing to work with neighborhoods in scattered-site planning, as witnessed by its actions in west Seattle and Fairview. Lee Hepfer, SHA's project manager for scattered sites, told the west Seattle residents that the Authority would not compromise on putting units on the purchased sites but that the number of units were negotiable. The SHA would work with the community to mitigate any impact such developments might have on the neighborhood. (*West Seattle Herald*, October 10, 1979)
20. Mattson interview with Sakai Gawarda, graduate student working on an independent study under my direction, Winter Quarter 1980.
21. Delivery problems resulted from the purchase of too many homes that could not be brought up to code or meet HUD requirements. The SHA was also understaffed, especially with regard to qualified rehabilitation personnel. (*Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, March 13, 1980)

22. Seattle officials claimed it took up to 32 months to complete new housing units financed by HUD and that moderate rehabilitation required approximately 200 days.
23. This was the number of units authorized by HUD for 1982.
24. Density issues were debated many times during the evolution of the Seattle program. The city council had originally limited the number of units per site to four. However, when it learned more about site availability and land costs, it raised the lid to 15. (*Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, April 8, 1979) With higher density came intensified community opposition, however. Mike Marshall was convinced that density mattered. "Where the number of units was eight or less, the feelings were positive. Eight to 12 units evoked more interest, and plans for more than 12 brought comments about negative impact to the neighborhood." (*Seattle Sun*, April 22, 1981) To cushion the impact of higher density developments, the SHA limited the number of bedrooms to two. It also promised yard and play space on site for the children in the housing. (SHA, Fact Sheet #1: *What Is the Scattered-Site Program*, p. 3)
25. In November 1983 the Seattle School Board adopted a resolution to initiate a program of cooperation with government agencies, realtors, community councils, and others to "promote housing desegregation," including the "use of closed school sites for moderate density, mixed-income family housing." (Resolution 1983-27, Item 11, adopted November 16, 1983) An Integrated Housing Committee was established in January 1985 for housing and related services. Residents were guaranteed anonymity. Furthermore, completed surveys and computer tapes were stored at Seattle University. In all respects clients were assured of the benign interests of the Authority; this should have led to unbiased responses. A series of meetings were held over the next year to discuss strategies to develop mixed-income housing on school surplus sites, and thus reduce the burden of busing. Although the meetings were informative and they brought together several groups interested in fair housing initiatives, no closed-school site was converted to moderate density, mixed-income family housing.
26. Residents of scattered-site housing received notice from the SHA that in-person interviews would be conducted and that the survey's purpose was to assist in the delivery of quality housing and related services.
27. Another discussion of social interaction and public housing tenants is found in Kriesberg. (1968, pp. 43-49) Bradburn's questions about "neighboring" are the same as our queries. The responses were from white residents living in neighborhoods with varying degrees of racial balance. In general, intraracial neighboring was higher than interracial interaction. The amount of socializing reported by scattered-site residents compares as well to interracial neighboring by whites. Our data, however, are not strictly comparable to Bradburn's because the table does not report interaction by race.
28. The semantic differential is a method of observing and measuring the psychological meaning of concepts. For additional discussion, see Kerlinger. (1964)

29. The thermometer measure is a well-respected tool used in political behavior research. It has been utilized since the 1940 Presidential election. See Cantril. (1947)
30. Housing Authority of the City of Seattle, *Annual Population Report*, December 31, 1993.
31. Housing Authority of the City of Seattle, *1987–1988 Large Family Program*, Administrative and Financial Plan, Appendix 1.
32. Jepson, S., Project Manager, SHA Holly Park Demolition project. (Telephone interview, January 10, 1995)
33. A continuum of income levels was chosen (rather than one-third low and two-thirds market rate) to emphasize that “the new Holly Park is inclusive and to avoid opportunities for identifying two groups—the poor and the privileged.” (SHA, *Holly Park: Preliminary Program*, March 23, 1994, p. 3)
34. According to the Authority, a development-based waiting list “involve[s] site-based property management staff in the placement of residents and thus promotes stability and self-sufficiency.” (Ibid., p. 5)
35. Holly Park URD Planning Grant, Executive Summary, February 23, 1994.
36. Koenig, R., Administrator, Housing Management Division, City of Tucson, chapter 6. (Telephone interview, January 10, 1995)
37. O’Callahan, V., City of Tucson. (Personal interview, June 4, 1989)
38. See Woo, D., “Analysis of Resident Incentive Transfer Program,” prepared for Ron Oldham, Director of Housing Management, SHA, June 29, 1992.
39. Because nearly three-quarters of the SHA’s scattered-site properties are located in the north end, additional staff, including two managers, will be assigned.
40. VanHouten, L., Management Aid II, SHA. (Personal interview, January 13, 1995)

Chapter 5. Chicago, Illinois

1. This was prior to the 1958 Cabrini Extension that increased the number of units sixfold by adding 1,925 apartments in high-rise buildings. (Bowly, p. 116)
2. A discussion of CHA’s biracial policy, and the site location controversy surrounding its implementation, is found in Meyerson and Banfield. (1955, pp. 121–150)
3. Wood served the Authority for 196 months. Her tenure exceeded that of Alvin E. Rose, the next closest in longevity with the CHA, by 78 months. (GAO, 1989, p. 32)
4. Separate Authority status meant that the CHA was not responsible to the city council for its selection of housing sites. (Hirsch, op cit., p. 219)

5. Figures for 1980 confirm that Chicago was “the most segregated city” among the 25 largest cities with 100,000 or more African Americans. Not only has the city’s position remained unchanged since 1950, but “spatial separation between African Americans and whites has increased. . . .” The extent of residential segregation is based on Tauber’s “index of dissimilarity.” (Tauber, 1976, pp. 884–889)
6. Controls were also utilized to maintain racial homogeneity in elderly housing under the “proximity rule.” Application by persons “living within a two-block radius of the site of an elderly housing project were granted priority.” This rule easily obtained councilman approval because “it was a fair assumption that a white site would be occupied by whites.” (*Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority*, 296 F. Supp. (1969), p. 912) The rule was abandoned in the early 1960s when the Public Housing Administration informed the CHA that its continuation would result in the loss of Federal funds.
7. In “unusual” circumstances a project could house 240 persons. (*Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority*, 304 F. Supp. 736 (1969), p. 739)
8. The intent was that “new housing in white areas would be at least half white.” (Bowly, op. cit., p. 191) The CHA Advisory Committee, appointed by Judge Aspen, took the 50- percent rule seriously. “If a community sees its neighbors moving into a scattered-site building, some of the neighborhood tensions can be eased.” (*Final Report*, December 12, 1985, p. 3)
9. *Chicago Tribune*, February 13, 1969. Welfeld reports that by the time the Gautreaux litigation reached the U.S. Supreme Court at the end of 1975, “a grand total of 63 units had been completed.” (1976, p. 129) According to Fuerst and Petty (1978), because of the “sweeping nature” of Austin’s decision, “CHA simply did nothing for a decade, contending that suitable sites were not available in the most white ‘general areas’ of the city. . . .” (Ibid., p. 104)
10. Undoubtedly, some of the CHA’s “overall management problems” resulted from frequent turnover of top management. GAO’s 1989 report documents the instability: “Since 1981 there have been eight different . . . directors or acting directors, and excluding the current director who was hired in June 1988, their average tenure has been less than 12 months.” (Ibid., p. 32)
11. Aspen delayed the implementation of the order for 60 days to allow the CHA to continue to talk to other parties on the chance that a private individual might take over the entire responsibilities of the CHA. (Transcript of proceedings, May 14, 1987, p. 64)
12. It took the receiver almost 6 months to get HUD to revise its Total Development Cost (TDC) cap to provide realistic construction costs for new townhouse construction. (Phil Hickman, Director, Scattered-Site Program, The Habitat Co., correspondence with author, March 6, 1990)
13. The early politics surrounding the implementation of the Gautreaux decision through 1972 are described in McKay. (1973)
14. In the fall of 1991, HUD/Chicago imposed a moratorium on scattered-site development in predominantly Hispanic census tracts. The moratorium was lifted in March 1992 when

- HUD/Washington determined there was an “overriding need” for sites for projects in areas of “minority concentration.” (Ronnie Shorenstein, Office of General Counsel, HUD, telephone conversation, March 16, 1992)
15. Memorandum to Mary Anderson, Chief, Housing Programs Branch, HUD/Chicago Regional Office, from Thomas Higginbotham, Director, Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, July 22, 1991.
 16. The per-unit TDC for a five-bedroom house in the Chicago market area in 1988 ranged from \$88,650 to \$106,800. In 1992 the TDC for a five-bedroom house was \$128,000.
 17. In October 1991 Habitat produced a block-by-block survey of 70 census tracts on Chicago’s north and northwest sides to determine the number of buildable residential lots in the 27.7-square-mile area. Nine owners were contacted, and Habitat learned that almost all lots were single-family zoned with fair market prices of \$45,000 to \$110,000, making assisted family housing impossible given the TDC cap.
 18. Four factors are responsible for the inability of Habitat to develop scattered-site units in white neighborhoods. The “highly desirable residential neighborhoods are already built up; there is little available land for sale; the few lots that do exist are expensive; and the property is zoned for low-density development, typically single-family dwellings.” (Interview with Phil Hickman, July 2, 1992)
 19. The overconcentration of buildings in the Limited Public Housing area preceded the Austin order.
 20. The skew in siting was even more pronounced if all units—new construction, rehabilitation, and the two elderly clusters—are included. On the basis of 1,051 combined units, 25.02 percent are in mixed areas, 24.07 percent in African-American neighborhoods, 41.2 percent in Hispanic communities, and only 9.7 percent in community areas that are more than 50 percent white. (Habitat, Summary of Fair Housing Enforcement Office data)
 21. The HUD Chicago regional offices moratorium was recommended after the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity examined the site locations of 540 prior scattered-site units and noted that only 1.8 percent, or 28 of Habitat’s new construction units, were in areas “that can be argued as increasing opportunities for housing choice for minorities outside of concentrated areas.” (Higginbotham memorandum to Anderson, *op. cit.*, July 22, 1991.)
 22. The importance of the neighborhood preference was pointed out in the Final Report of the CHA Advisory Committee (1985), which was appointed by Judge Aspen. “If a community sees its neighbors moving into a scattered-site building, some of the neighborhood tension can be eased.” The Advisory Committee recommended that the CHA clearly specify the process “for recruiting and selecting tenants from the local community,” and that they “identify applicants.” Community outreach remains a problem for the CHA, and in 1990 the Authority began a “bold new project” in 72 community areas to register tenants for scattered-site housing.

23. On April 5, 1991, HUD and plaintiffs filed a joint motion to remove the “revitalizing” area and return to the earlier General or Limited Area classification. The reason for the request was that 1990 census data “revealed that the minority concentration of the city had increased.” (Janis memorandum, *op. cit.*, p. 2)
24. The Advisory Committee was appointed by Judge Aspen on January 13, 1984. The committee made seven recommendations in November 1984 and in July 1985, but only some were carried out and “too slowly to generate widespread support.” (*Ibid.*, p. 2)
25. The HRC is a program of the Uptown Center Hull House Association, a community center with a variety of social service programs that serve the Uptown community. (*HRC Tenant Handbook*, July 1985)
26. The HRC looks for families “who know how to care for an apartment, have paid rent on time, have well-behaved children, and are willing to do their share to keep scattered-site buildings in good condition.” (*Ibid.*, p. 4)
27. The common area policy consists of eight common-sense guidelines intended to foster respect for residents’ rights to a “secure, clean, and peaceful place to live.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 18–19)
28. The HRC evicted more scattered-site tenants in 2 years than the CHA had in the previous 8 years. (DeZutter, *Public Housing That Works*, *op. cit.*, p. 44)
29. The Tenant Selection Committee is “made up of HRC residents who have been chosen to participate because they have very high standards for their housing and for their neighbors.” (*HRC Tenant Handbook*, *op. cit.*)
30. In 1983 rent delinquencies made up 50 percent of rent collections per month. In 1988 there was only a 6-percent monthly delinquency.
31. This was facilitated through a quarterly newsletter that provided residents with information on procedural changes, money-saving programs, and social services.
32. The elderly units mentioned were 307 apartments reallocated from funds committed by HUD to the CHA. (Letter from Phil Hickman to Louis M. Berra, Director of Housing Division, HUD, Chicago, May 13, 1988)
33. Habitat’s first new construction program met with community resistance. The Edgewater Community Council and the Southeast Side Residents for Justice objected to 21 of the 101 townhouses. Petitioners claimed that construction would resegregate the Edgewater neighborhood and impede integration efforts in Kenwood. Although sympathetic to the “productive role that community groups can play in the site selection process,” Judge Aspen denied petitioners intervenor status, finding the process and determinations by the CHA and Habitat in conformity with the consent decree. (*Chicago Sun-Times*, August 16, 1990; *Gautreaux et al., v. Jack Kemp*; and CHA, Memorandum Opinion and Order, August 15, 1990)

34. The West Humboldt Park Fair Housing Coalition and the Community West Coalition, for example, claimed that Habitat's plans to build 650 units in Humboldt Park and West Town neighborhoods "amount to an 'unfair and disproportionate' ratio of low-income subsidized housing." (*Chicago Tribune*, January 13, 1994)
35. The *Chicago Tribune* editorial, moreover, reported that while 22 percent of Chicago's Hispanic population are poor, only 2 percent are served by the CHA.
36. Fuerst's opposition to Chicago's scattered-site program is not to dispersal of buildings into better neighborhoods; rather, it is the belief that low-density units (interpreted by the CHA at the time of the Austin ruling as 2 to 12 units) are a Lilliputian program that can assist only a handful of families. (*Chicago Tribune*, September 19, 1984) See Fuerst and Petty (1991, pp. 118–130) in which they argue that tall buildings, if "conveniently located, can solve the problem of site shortage and can be attractive and functional." Much more important to the success of housing for the poor are good management, "careful tenant selection," and the provision of amenities, not building height or architecture.
37. Fifty percent of "eligible" tenants were income-qualified families living in community areas where scattered-site units were being built; 25 percent were tenants wanting to transfer from CHA projects; and 25 percent were drawn from CHA's waiting list. (Wright, op. cit., p.1, and footnotes 1 and 2)
38. For further reflections on the role of courts in affecting social and institutional change, see Polikoff. (1988, pp. 476–478) For other discussions on the critical role of courts and judges as implementors, see Rosenberg (1991), Yarbrough (1982), and Shayne. (1990)
39. Lane's modest interest in the scattered-site program was revealed on January 8, 1990, when the Authority formally submitted to Polikoff and Daniel Levin, president of Habitat Company, a \$32 million proposal to conduct a scattered-site development demonstration on the north, northwest, and southwest sides of the city. Because this would be the first time the CHA developed new housing since 1987, it represented a public relations opportunity to build a new image of responsible development, rather than a new public housing strategy. On this point Lane said, "It is not my intention to get into the scattered-site development business. The bottom-line message to the community is this: Don't view this as a CHA project." (*Chicago Sun-Times*, July 12, 1990)
40. The press has provided coverage of the Authority's "surprise raids" to sweep gangs from the projects, workshops sponsored by tenant rights groups that hope to empower residents, efforts to create social stability in the projects through income mixing, reestablishment of management control of tenant selection and eviction, and renovation of high-rise buildings.
41. Contractors completed \$14 million worth of rehabilitation on 282 units in 2 of the buildings during the summer of 1991, including extensive interior changes. Further amenities would include lighted basketball courts, entertainment center, convenience store, day care center, full-time security, and intercom system.

42. The Washington Park Project (renamed Lake Parc Place) is in the Oakland neighborhood, one of Chicago's poorest, and with more than 40 percent of its land vacant, a prime area for revitalization. (*Washington Post National Weekly*, August 12–18, 1991, p. 31)
43. Twenty-five percent of the units are to be set aside for "very poor" families, with the remainder going to middle-class households. (*Wall Street Journal*, December 10, 1990)
44. The plaintiffs had filed a Motion for Further Relief on November 21, 1990, requesting the court to enjoin the CHA from rebuilding four high-rise buildings in the South Lakefront area of Chicago. The motion was denied on April 2, 1991.
45. The crossroad Polikoff refers to was the new flexibility the CHA had in view of the 1992 congressional amendments to HUD regulations on public housing demolition. The CHA could now "restructure and desegregate certain of its public housing developments through demolishing some buildings, rebuilding others, contracting with private developers to construct new units, and issuing rent vouchers." (Blair-Loy, *op. cit.*, p. 1540)
46. Lane's plans to tear down the high rises were scuttled by Congress in early October 1994. (*Chicago Sun-Times*, October 4, 1994) What Lane hoped for was to raise approximately \$1 billion from selling bonds. The collateral would come from the replacement units, "with the loans repaid by income generated by the developments." (*Chicago Tribune*, October 5, 1994)
47. CHA residents are a sizable voting bloc in 4 of Chicago's 50 councilmanic wards. If the high rises were torn down, "up to 30,000 registered voters could be relocated." On Chicago's south side, "CHA residents account for 35, 28, and 20 percent of the voters in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th wards. On the west side, 19 percent of the 27th ward's voters live in the projects." (Burnham, *op. cit.*, p. 3)
48. The Asian, African-American, and Hispanic populations have increased by 68 percent in suburban Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, and Will Counties. These minorities make up 17.3 percent of suburbia, up from 11.2 percent in 1980. (Cuadros, 1993, p. 3) As Chicago's suburbs diversify, they also have become more impoverished (a 14.2-percent increase in poverty from 1980), "accompanied by a dramatic increase in residents living in federally subsidized housing." (*Ibid.*, p. 4)

Chapter 6. Yonkers, New York

1. The U.S. Court of Appeals referred to the litigation as "unique in its conjoined attack on the actions of state and municipal officials with respect to segregation in both schools and housing. . . ." (*U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.* 837 F.2d 1181 (2nd Cir. 1987), at 1185)
2. The first two periods, 1948–58 and 1958–67, reflect conventional public housing development. The third period, 1968–74, finds the city turning to other government programs and private developers to construct family and elderly projects. The last period coincides with passage of the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act and the onset of the Section 8 certificate

- program. Although HCDA provided funds for new construction for families, the city avoided that option. Instead, they requested Section 8 certificates for families and senior citizens, money to rehabilitate projects in southwest Yonkers, and funds for new projects for seniors.
3. Title 1 required cities to provide housing for families displaced from urban renewal areas. At this time Yonkers' city officials equated public housing with relocation housing.
 4. The proposed Ridgeview Avenue site in east Yonkers produced "the first apparent evidence of open discussion of the racial implications of site selection for public housing." (*United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.*, 624 F. Supp. 1276 (1985), p. 1298)
 5. Minority groups "had begun expressing concern about the segregative effects of locating subsidized housing in heavily minority areas" as early as 1959. From the mid-1960s there was "regular and often public expression by minority and other community groups, and even some city officials, of support for the concept of scattered-site housing. . . ." (*Ibid.* p. 1332)
 6. The site list was passed on to the city manager in January 1967. Documents submitted to the court provide no indication of what happened to CAC's suggestion that five of the sites be further considered. (*Ibid.*, p. 1305)
 7. HUD had been pushing the city to adopt a "balanced housing program" since the mid-1970s. In July 1971 HUD's New York area office wrote a memorandum "concluding that . . . Yonkers' relocation housing programs were in violation of the civil rights laws and recommended disapproval" of Federal renewal funds for the city. (*Ibid.*, p. 1323)
 8. The number of family units was later increased to 42. The Salisbury Gardens proposal likely occurred because of the U.S. Department of Justice's discussion of an impending lawsuit against the city.
 9. The first was in 1951 when, after 14 months of opposition and approval by a single vote, the Frederic Street site was approved. The second case ended in the construction of the 108-unit Loehr Court senior citizen project in 1958.
 10. Testimony at the trial suggested that the council was aware of the "geographic mobility the program would give to those of low and moderate income" if they chose to move from southwest Yonkers to white neighborhoods in other parts of the city.
 11. Appropriate to this discussion—one that focuses on the scattered-site housing remedy—are three sections: I. Injunction(s); IV. Public Housing Units; and VII. Occupancy Priorities.
 12. These five items were part of the injunction against the city. A sixth injunction enjoined the city from interfering with the implementation of the school desegregation remedy.
 13. The School 4 site was not contested because it had already been turned over to the city by the school board. Even after 18 months of delay by the city, Sands informed the city that the court would consider alternative sites if they were consistent and appropriate with the purposes of the HRO. (*Ibid.*, p. 1413)

14. The court had issued an order on November 9, 1987, “continuing and imposing a further freeze” on the Austin Avenue Executive Office Development.
15. The court estimated that litigation costs already exceeded \$15 million, and if the city succeeded in blocking construction of the 200 units of public housing in east Yonkers, it must return \$19.8 million in CDBG grants and forgo another \$10.1 million it was scheduled to receive for 1985–87. Judge Sands believed these resources would be better spent on implementation than on “efforts to frustrate the court’s order. . .” (Ibid., p. 1416)
16. The 4 school sites could accommodate 132 units. Therefore, Newman was looking for privately owned sites to house an additional 68 units.
17. HUD rejected the design as too costly, substituting townhouse design instead.
18. The city promised to return \$30 million in Federal funds if the U.S. Supreme Court would set aside the public housing mandate of the HRO.
19. The city’s request to amend the January 28, 1988, Consent Judgment was denied on March 31, 1988. The city did not appeal the ruling.
20. By this time the city was more than 6 weeks late in complying with the February 15, 1988, timetable.
21. On July 12, 1988, Judge Sand outlined a plan to create a special commission “vested with the powers held by the seven-member city council” to implement the long-term housing plan. (*New York Times*, July 13, 1988)
22. Because Vice Mayor Spallone was not represented by a lawyer, his contempt hearing was postponed until August 4. He was then charged with contempt; his \$500-a-day fine was made retroactive to Tuesday.
23. Cuomo would not remove members of the city council who disobeyed the order until the outcome of the appeal process. He was aware of the consequences of removal, as the following statement makes clear: “I understand that removal could eliminate what may be an important incentive for full and lasting compliance with the letter and spirit of the court’s order, and I will take this consequence into account if and when the exercise of my power of removal has to be considered.” (Press Office release, August 22, 1988) Cuomo’s willingness to marshal State resources in an effort to “bring the community together in a joint, harmonious, and effective implementation of the law’s requirements,” however, had to await city council compliance with the rule of law. (Press Office release, August 29, 1988) Less than a week after the crisis ended, on September 15, 1988, Governor Cuomo appointed a Special Housing Task Force to “help ensure not only that the housing is constructed quickly, but that it is designed, managed, and supported in a way that achieves its potential to enhance everyone’s life in the community.” (Press Office release, September 15, 1988)

24. On March 6, 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the city's appeal of municipal fines, but agreed to take the councilmen's appeal. Arguments before the Court were scheduled for October 2, 1989.
25. Phase One would affect nonessential discretionary spending. In Phase Two sanitation services and maintenance of streets and buildings would end. The third and fourth stages would witness serious reductions, including "cutbacks among the 500 police officers and 400 firefighters." (*New York Times*, September 4, 1988)
26. Gail F. Shaffer was Secretary of State and head of the EFCB. The Control Board was imposed on the city in 1984. On January 24, 1998, New York's new Secretary of State Alexander Treadwell indicated he hoped to see fiscal control returned to the city. "No situation should be extraordinary for 11 years," he said. (*Herald Statesman*, January 24, 1995)
27. District Attorney Carl A. Vergari rejected Ms. Shaffer's request, "citing constitutional, legal, and financial reasons as well as citing the Governor's own decisions to refrain from moving against the Councilmen until the Supreme Court had acted." (*New York Times*, September 7, 1988)
28. The current plan had four of the seven sites clustered in Spallone's east-side district.
29. The organization held its first formal meeting on August 26, the same day the Appeals Court upheld the contempt order imposed by Judge Sand on August 2d. Twenty groups, including four municipal labor unions, several homeowners' associations, and political action groups, were members of COMPLY. Until COMPLY emerged Yonkers residents had been divided between 2 groups: the Save Yonkers Federation (SYF), a coalition of 43 civic associations "which opposes any subsidized housing and urges continued defiance," and Citizens and Neighbors Organized to Protect Yonkers (CANOPY), an assemblage of 8 civic associations committed to compliance with the court order but opposed to "low- and moderate-income housing in east Yonkers. . . ." (*New York Times*, August 28, 1988)
30. The suit sought to hold the councilmen liable for the city fines, as well as legal fees, and potential tax increases and economic damage following Moody's suspension of the city's bond rating. Thomas Dickerson, vice president of CANOPY and chairman of the Class Action Committee of the New York Bar Association, donated his legal services on behalf of the 65 taxpayers, "most of whom belong to CANOPY." (*New York Times*, August 28, 1988) Moody's Investors Service had suspended the city's BAA rating in early August "due to uncertainties" resulting from the daily fines imposed by Judge Sand. (*New York Times*, August 4, 1988)
31. The NAACP had been "unilaterally negotiating" with Longo and Chema through the good offices of City Manager DeLuca and City Counsel Paul Pickelle. (*New York Times*, September 10, 1988) In order to make the plan palatable to the council, city officials also discussed mechanisms to protect homeowners against economic loss in the event their block was selected as a site for public housing construction.

32. The total plan would involve building 600 units: 33 percent moderate-income, 50 percent market-rate, and 17 percent (or 100 units) public housing.
33. HUD guidelines allowed the agency to spend \$11.4 million, leaving a \$4.7 million overrun on the Deluxe bid.
34. Before construction could begin, the city had to turn over title of the sites to the MHA. Deputy corporation counsel indicated the titles would be transferred by the end of the year. (Ibid.)
35. The timetable for building the 142 units included the following: (1) December 8, 1989: preparation of detailed construction plans by developer; (2) January 22, 1990: review of detailed plans by HUD; (3) February 1, 1990: final conference among all parties in desegregation lawsuit, followed by construction; and (4) another 6 to 12 months: developer's estimate for construction and opening of homes for occupancy.
36. Ground for the second of five sites was broken on April 17, and Property Manager Bob Novak expected installation around mid-June, with the job set for completion by November 1991. (*Herald Statesman*, April 18, 1991)
37. The 25-member Citizens Advisory Council on Responsible Compliance was appointed by Mayor Wasiczko on December 7, 1988, to "forward to officials community opinions on the design and construction of the housing, lobby for sources of funding for the housing . . . and look at screening processes for tenants." (*Herald Statesman*, December 8, 1988)
38. The softness of Wasiczko's 70-30 primary victory was revealed when a *Herald Statesman* poll showed Spallone leading Wasiczko by 9 percent 3 weeks before the general election. (*New York Times*, November 9, 1989)
39. Incumbents Spallone, Chema, and Fagan were joined by Salvatore Sialiano who won Spallone's former seat, a southeast Yonkers' constituency strongly opposed to desegregation.
40. Holding that individual sanctions "effect a much greater perversion of the normal legislative process" than the imposition of sanctions against the city, the District Court "should have proceeded with such contempt sanctions first against the city alone in order to secure compliance with the remedial order." (*Spallone v. U.S.* 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990), p. 634)
41. In March 1989 the council had discussed creating a committee to search for a "legal escape" from the city's settlement of the court-ordered desegregation plan. The motion to bring in legal experts to advise the council whether Judge Sand used "judicial coercion" in obtaining the January 1988 vote was linked to the U.S. Supreme Court appeal of the contempt-of-court fines.
42. In March 1989 the council fired the law firm that had represented them since 1980. The Vedder Price firm told the council there was no valid basis for continuing to contest the settlement because it was somehow illegally forced on the city. The council was under immense pressure from the SYF to carry out its campaign promises. Fitzpatrick was brought in at its urging to challenge the council's 1988 settlement. (*Herald Statesman*, December 28, 1990)

43. The three included (1) the right to reclaim the sites if they were not used for public housing, (2) relief from the obligation to nullify deed restrictions on properties, and (3) release from further responsibilities related to providing sites.
44. Mayor Wasicsko asked Judge Sand to remove the council from the process of selecting sites. The city took no position on the judge's selection of an alternative but said that "to do so would invalidate the consent decree." (Ibid.)
45. Chemical Bank denied Newman's allegations, claiming its decision was made "strictly for business reasons." Newman's judgment was contained in a report he made to the District Court. (*Herald Statesman*, October 3, 1990)
46. O'Toole of SYF said the sites should revert back to the city. The issue was before the U.S. Supreme Court at the time.
47. Although demonstrations had not occurred before Chemical Bank backed out, after Newman went public with the alleged reason for Chemical Bank's withdrawal, housing foes, especially SYF, called for boycotts of financial institutions that would lend construction money to Deluxe. O'Toole's threat of pickets and boycotts was called "the latest in a series of demonstrations, controversies, and lawsuits that have dominated Yonkers since 1985." (*New York Times*, October 12, 1990)
48. The two groups were CANOPY and SYF.
49. For his efforts at compromise, Sardoval was fired by City Manager DeLuca. His miscalculation was in not informing council members of the ongoing discussions. Majority Leader Peter Chema considered Sardoval's action a "breach of the work ethic that goes with working in and around the council chambers." (*Herald Statesman*, October 19, 1990)
50. At a November 29, 1990, hearing, Judge Sand said if landowners sued to challenge the two sites, the "city would be liable for expenses that result." (*Herald Statesman*, November 30, 1990) The development restrictions affected the Helena Avenue and Whitman school sites; deeds on both properties contained clauses prohibiting the kind of construction planned by Deluxe.
51. The city had originally opposed the suit, but it later filed notice with the court that it was joining D'Agnillo in contesting Judge Sand's decision to allow construction to proceed.
52. D'Agnillo appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. On June 28, 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court refused his appeal without comment.
53. Sand had chosen the Grammercy site in October 1988 as an alternative to the disputed Catholic church property.
54. These actions were triggered by Judge Height's decision in the D'Agnillo lawsuit. His ruling was not intended to hold up construction of the first 142 units. Thus, the U.S. Department of Justice moved to accelerate the transfer of the land.

55. Four of seven council members said they favored appealing the change on the grounds that Sand “improperly overrode city building codes.” (*Herald Statesman*, July 14, 1990)
56. Sand’s order required the city to act by the time the developer signed the contract. If the city refused, “a Federal rule would be applied to automatically transfer the land.” (*Herald Statesman*, July 26, 1990)
57. As 50 residents rallied outside city hall, calling for DeLuca’s ouster for unprofessional management of the city’s affairs, the city council discussed what action to take on the contentious land-transfer issue. Alleging that it aimed to limit the city’s liability, on August 29 the council voted 6 to 1 to challenge Sand’s order ceding the properties to Deluxe. Majority Leader Peter Chema described the council action as being taken “not from a housing point of view, but from a business point of view, from a real estate management perspective.” (*Herald Statesman*, August 30, 1990)
58. Deluxe’s concern at this point was that it needed the land as collateral for the construction loan.
59. The only remaining block to construction was the city’s renewal of its request to delay turning over the sites to Deluxe. At the time of the signing, the court of appeals had not acted on the request.
60. The Authority chairman also refused to sign the contract until it was changed to shield Authority board members from personal liability in case of future litigation.
61. HUD withheld the city’s CDBG for 2 years in the mid-1980s. The council had consistently refused the annual CDBG each year since 1987, and each year Judge Sand and the plaintiffs had submitted the request for the city.
62. On April 1, 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant a stay on groundbreaking for the first court-ordered townhouses.
63. Protests were generally nonviolent. Acts of vandalism included window breakage, spray-painted racist remarks, and the words “Shoot Sand” painted on a large boulder at the Midland Avenue site. The only serious act of intimidation was a pipe bomb blast at the Walt Whitman site. (*Herald Statesman*, January 25, 1992)
64. The project was divided into phases because of delays in obtaining the two final sites.
65. The developers’ withdrawal was related to uncertainties in obtaining another loan. The company’s bank feared community opposition would jeopardize the completion of the project.
66. The Authority and HUD used a special rating system: 80 percent on the proposal’s quality and the builder’s track record and 20 percent on price.
67. The court order stipulated that half of the new units would be occupied by project residents with good records who wanted to relocate.

68. Forty-eight units is well above our own figure—15 or less per site—for acceptable density. Oscar Newman had recommended “spreading the first 200 units on double the number of sites to promote integration and avoid creating concentrated high-rise projects.” (*New York Times*, November 20, 1987)
69. On March 27, 1989, an intergovernmental working group comprised of representatives of the State of New York, the city of Yonkers, the Yonkers Municipal Housing Authority, Westchester County, and the Director of Fair Housing Implementation wrote Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp, stating that HUD “support appropriate waivers and use of HUD special program and discretionary funds that will be necessary to permit a design for the new required public housing that is substantially compatible with the community. . . .” The rationale for special consideration was that public housing would be “divided among five sites—some [with] abnormal site conditions; use a townhouse design in areas made up of predominantly single-family homes; and be a necessary remedy for racial segregation in housing, justifying extraordinary measures to ensure that the developments are physically, as well as socially, integrated into the community.” (Correspondence between Governor Mario M. Cuomo and the Honorable Jack Kemp, March 27, 1989)
70. *Herald Statesman* staff writer Sheingold reported that “[o]n the blocks bordering each site, many houses have sold as former residents moved out during and after the controversy.” Homeowners remained angry and cautioned the MHA to tightly screen future occupants of the housing. The remaining source of tension was “noise from the new housing.” Among the tenants, however, “optimism abounds,” and tenants “talk with barely restrained glee about being out of crime-infested neighborhoods. Several said they had gotten new or better jobs since moving.” (*Herald Statesman*, December 13, 1994)

Chapter 7. Mitigation Strategies

1. Laurenti points to the emergence of three new ideas in the 1940s as marking a significant shift in belief among appraisers and real estate professionals: (1) minority occupancy might threaten values; (2) while nonwhites might cause market disruptions that would temporarily depress prices, neighborhood stability would eventually increase prices again; and (3) nonwhite entry does not harm—and may even improve—values. (Ibid., pp. 11–12)
2. See Meyerson and Banfield’s (1955) classic study of site-selection decisions in Chicago.
3. Kamely’s dissertation exams the effects of public housing projects and their occupancy characteristics on housing prices in the surrounding neighborhood. Although the dissertation abstract suggests that scattered-site projects “may also adversely affect residential property values,” this study takes a contrary position. Unfortunately, the position rests on anecdotal data and argument by analogy. What is needed is carefully tailored research that examines issues such as neighborhood location, density, single-family acquisition/new construction, recruitment screening, and centralized/zone management, to name a few important variables. Moreover,

- because scattered-site dwellings are located at the block level, data on price effects and other indicators of neighborhood quality should not be drawn from the level of the census tract.
4. Two of the CRISP studies are not included because they are attitude assessments of the social impact of community-residential facilities. The survey results for Decatur, Illinois, found higher approval of residential facilities from neighbors living close by than from Decatur citizens in general; in Green Bay, Wisconsin, 62 percent of a random sample of neighbors supported group-home facilities if they had “direct experience with” or knowledge about a specific facility.
 5. Wright’s study of the CHA’s outreach procedures to bring information to communities about the scattered-site program found that approximately 60 percent of the residents in five Chicago community areas were aware of CHA’s high-rise projects, but only 35 percent were aware of the scattered-site program.
 6. Newman’s design for Yonkers’ scattered-site housing had “no interior or exterior areas that were not assigned for the specific, private use of individual families.” The grounds were subdivided so families had their own front and rear yards. Even the garbage receptacles were privatized, with the “individual garbage cans placed in the ground along the front walks leading up to each unit’s entry door.” (Ibid., p. 153)
 7. The gates could be unlocked to provide emergency access. The purpose of such defensive strategies was to “increase the risk for criminals entering the area” and to “encourage proprietary feelings by residents. . . .” (Ibid., pp. 17, 19)
 8. Neighborhood perceptions of crime changed as well. A University of Dayton resident survey found that “53 percent thought there was less crime and 61 percent thought the neighborhood was a better place to live in.” (Newman, 1995, p. 152)
 9. In a letter to Mayor Grasmere of Maplewood, Newark Mayor James Sharpe complained about Maplewood’s elitist mentality. “[I]t is disrespectful and smacks of class separation to decide on what to do with a border problem without consulting the other side of the border,” he said. (*New York Times*, December 6, 1993)
 10. In “Fortress America” Dillon quotes critic Stephen Klineberg: “The problem with enclaving is that it leads to the deterioration of any sense of connectedness to the larger community.” (Dillon, op. cit., p. 10)
 11. The phrase is used in Warner’s review of Cuomo’s *Forest Hills Diary*. Warner suggests that Forest Hills was the “case [President Nixon] capitalized on to compromise and curtail the Federal housing effort.” (*The New Republic*, 1974, p. 29)
 12. Denver’s program began in 1969 and consisted of 858 units, including 200 single-family homes. Galster (1989) suggests that an alteration in the application process—HUD’s March 1989 requirement that the DHA obtain city council approval (rather than its prior ruling of mayoral consent)—triggered the controversy.

13. Popper (1992) is credited for having coined the LULU term.
14. In their discussion of NIMBYism in the environmental arena, Mazmanian and Morell saw the syndrome emerging somewhat later, “symbol[izing] the broader failure of democratic discourse in the 1970s and 1980s.” (1990, p. 141)
15. Wood (1980) urged a return to the management policies of the 1940s, when projects “provide[d] homes for a broad cross-section of low-income households. . . .” She attributed the beginnings of the downfall of public housing to the 1949 Housing Acts’ requirement that LHAs give priority to families displaced by urban renewal, which resulted in the eviction of over-income tenants. (Ibid., p. 67)
16. NYCPHA’s Roy Metcalf was adamant about economic integration: “We have tried very hard to maintain an income mix and to retain as many of our working families as we can. Bitter experience has taught us that if you fill a place with nothing but problem families, it’s not going to work.” (Ibid., p. 19)
17. The traditional mixed-income strategy uses local preferences and ranking criteria to select working families and families with higher incomes (50 to 80 percent of the median income) from the waiting list over other lower income families. (Abt Associates Inc., *Keys to Hope VI: Local Research Affiliate Handbook*, October 14, 1994, p. 10:9)
18. A handful of jurisdictions with scattered-site programs have developments close to or exceeding 15 units per site. Thirty-five of El Paso’s 38 developments constructed from 1966 through 1982 are moderate- to high-density scattered projects, and 1 of Yonkers’ 7 sites has 42 rental units. Careful screening, along with mixed-income occupancy, would be advised for Authorities with programs at these densities, especially if they are three- and four-bedroom units.
19. The practice adheres to the Douglas Commission’s conviction that American cities are “primarily horizontal in form” where “single-family or two-family homes of generally no more than two stories predominate.” Present housing and residential densities “were not related to anticipated impacts.” (*Building the American City*, p. 124)
20. Apartment structures were to be avoided for four reasons: (1) they did not pay their fair share of real estate taxes, (2) they lowered adjacent property values, (3) high-rise buildings gave the community the appearance of a vertical slum, and (4) communities needed protection from a low-class invasion. (Ibid., p. 85)
21. DeZutter found scattered-site units easy to spot “because they [were] the newest buildings on their blocks, looking brutally stark and almost too new, surrounded as they [were] by dumpy vacant lots and makeshift parking.” (*Chicago Reader*, July 22, 1983) The study found the buildings with the most problems tended to be either: (1) “located in neighborhoods with lower socioeconomic indicators or, quite simply, more poverty, or (2) older buildings built in the first round of scattered-site construction from 1975 through 1978 so that “. . . tenants creating the most management problems were in the worst neighborhoods.” (1984b, p. 21)

22. Most of the aldermen, community organization leaders, and neighbors interviewed about the HRC saw their management of the north-side units as an improvement over CHA's efforts. (DeZutter, 1984b, p. 47) Public officials mirrored constituent preferences, with 89 percent sanctioning owner-occupied single-family houses. Many officials wanted assurances that "all new low- and moderate-income housing projects would blend in with the local architecture." (Ibid., p. 81)
23. GAO's review of 48 reports issued since 1979 on the CHA "disclosed 798 problems in every critical area of CHA's operations." (*Public Housing*, op cit., p. 24)
24. Correspondence between William Stafford, Director, Office of Intergovernmental Relations, City of Seattle, and Donna Sorkin, Public Technology, Inc., Washington, D.C., June 3, 1981. The context of the letter concerned a HUD memorandum critical of the linkage of the scattered-site housing concept with the concepts of fair housing and housing dispersal.
25. See Lind (1982, footnotes 4 and 26) for citations on some of the early programs in Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois.
26. The literature on fair housing often draws a distinction between integration maintenance and integration management tactics and strategies. Integration maintenance employs "information, education, and service programs to encourage voluntary conduct by housing consumers, providers, or other intermediaries consistent with sustaining an integrated housing market and avoidance of a segregated one-race market." Integration management, "in addition to persuasion, places limitations or prohibitions on consumer choice." (Lind, op. cit., p. 610)
27. See Polikoff (1986, pp. 44-45) for a list of several integration maintenance strategies not covered in this study.
28. On November 3, 1984, the Chicago Neighborhood Organizing Project received a \$71,000 HUI grant to study the home equity program and the neighborhoods it might protect. (*PA Times*, November 15, 1984)
29. These two programs, along with their counterparts in Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., are said to have "proven successful in persuading or reinforcing the decision of voluntarily participating homebuyers to choose homes in racially mixed neighborhoods." (Keating, 1994, p. 250)
30. The first-time requirement was waived in Cleveland and east Cleveland. The eligibility areas for African-American buyers included parts or all of 51 suburbs and 19 city neighborhoods. Thirteen suburbs and 22 city neighborhoods were eligible areas for white and other non-African-American buyers. The Ohio legislature was dealing with a controversial \$61 million appropriation to support court-ordered busing at the time the revenue bond set-aside to help integrate neighborhoods surfaced. The hope was that if housing integration could be accomplished, busing would be unnecessary. At the time, the Cleveland Board of Education was known to grant busing exemptions to both African-American and white families who made pointintegration moves. (*Plain Dealer*, July 3, 1985)

31. The Fair Housing Council worked to maintain the program after the contract ended in 1991, receiving legislative approval. The Governor vetoed the legislation, insisting that “WHEDA set aside the money from its own budget.” (Ibid., p. 343)
32. Orfield cites 1993 Gallup Poll data that reported declines in opposition to busing and only 4 percent of the public perceiving school segregation as a major problem for local schools. (Orfield, 1993, p. 25)
33. Research conducted by the Harvard Graduate School of Education on school choice programs in St. Louis, Milwaukee, and San Antonio found that “school choice plans may create greater racial segregation because Latino and African-American parents usually choose to send their children to virtually all Latino or all African-American schools in their communities.” (*Los Angeles Times*, July 14, 1995) An earlier study on the effects of school choice on racial integration (Plank, et al., 1993), using data from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, found no “definitive segregating or integrating effects of the various public schools of choice. . . .” (Ibid., p. 129)
34. The Seattle School District established an Integration Housing Task Force in the mid-1980s to develop collaborative strategies to foster and stabilize mixed neighborhoods. The district looked forward to granting neighborhoods exemptions from busing if they attained a measurable degree of integration. After several months of meetings, the task force was discontinued. Neither closed school buildings nor excess school acreage became sites for affordable housing. The school board is now considering ending busing to return to the concept of neighborhood schools in the hope of “bring[ing] the middle class of all ethnic groups back into the public schools.” (*Seattle Times*, July 24, 1995)

Chapter 8. Conclusions

1. For a discussion of site-selection issues, see Peel, Pickett, and Buehl. (1970, pp. 63–147)
2. Six strategies are identified, but two are unlikely to generate remedies for central-city problems. In addition to household mobility, Downs discusses area development, human capital development, and worker mobility strategies. (Ibid., pp. 101–112)
3. According to the GAO, those who discuss the concept refer to people who share some of the following characteristics: the women are permanently without connection to the legitimate labor force; they are likely to be persistently poor, to experience prolonged welfare dependency, and to experience high rates of out-of-wedlock births, often starting in the teen years; the children are likely to be persistently poor and to experience high school dropout rates; and some exhibit disproportionately high rates of criminal behavior. Others experience high rates of criminal victimization. (GAO, September 1990, p. 1)
4. For Peterson (1991) the “renaissance of social science” inquiry into the underclass and the “paradox of poverty in the late 1980s” is only “a picking up of the intellectual pieces that were left scattered in the early 1970s by the acrimonious debate over the existence and nature

- of the culture of poverty, Daniel Moynihan's study of *The Negro Family* . . . and the Nixon administration's family assistance plan." (Ibid., p. 4)
5. The insights contained in this paragraph were brought to the author's attention by an external review of the manuscript.
 6. Screening included credit check, security check, home visit, character letters, verification of present landlord, social security cards, birth certificates for all household members, review of current check stubs and utility bills, and children's report cards from school.
 7. Professor James Rosenbaum of Northwestern University is completing a study of Lake Parc Place that includes interviews with all working and low-income residents of the two buildings. The report was to be completed in December 1995.
 8. The difficulties of implementing "fair share" principles was illustrated in the 1970s in the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission's efforts to disperse in 4 years "14,000 units of federally subsidized housing throughout the Dayton, Ohio, metropolitan area." (Craig, 1972, p. 50) Only 4,510 new low- and moderate-income units had materialized by 1978 (32 percent of the target). Part of the problem was white suburban resistance. There were "major setbacks in obtaining zoning changes, and required local approval for rent supplements" in the south suburbs. (Ibid., p. 53) The housing moratorium and "lack of strong support" from the second Nixon administration also hurt the program and "communities in [the] region began to doubt our clout and whether we could or could not deliver." (Krumholz and Clavel, 1994, p. 59) The inability of the New York State Urban Development Corporation, armed with powers to supersede local zoning ordinances, and building regulations to do "fair share" housing also demonstrate the power of local resistance. When the UDC announced it would build 100 units of subsidized housing in each of 9 towns "in pale and affluent Westchester County," the local reaction "was fierce and immediate." (City, Winter, 1972, p. 7) The unified opposition won allies "statewide to their cause," and in May 1973 the State legislature revoked the agencies' zoning override power. (Burchell, et al., 1994, p. 177)
 9. Only 16 percent of the estimated 600,000 low-income units needed by 1990 were built, and 24 percent of California "localities did not produce a single low-income housing unit during the 5-year period from July 1987 to July 1992." (Field, op. cit., p. 45)
 10. In practice the sale or rental prices serve families in the income range of \$16,000 to \$46,000. (Peterson and Williams, 1994, p. 76) The formula used by Montgomery County serves participating families "at about 65 percent of the Washington, D.C., MSA areawide median." (Burchell, et al., 1994, p. 164) Deeper subsidies make the housing available to very-low-income families.
 11. Geographically, Cabrini Green is only three to four blocks west of Chicago's affluent neighborhood, the Lower Gold Coast, where incomes average \$82,269 per capita.

12. "Deadly Neighborhoods" is the name Christopher Jencks used in his review of Wilson's *The Truly Disadvantaged* to describe the neighborhoods inhabited by the urban underclass. (1988, pp. 23–32)
13. The concept "social capital" is used by Robert D. Putnam to describe certain preconditions of the "prosperous community." The absence of features such as "trust, norms, and networks" from many distressed neighborhoods, and their apparent importance to "economic development around the world," has made Putnam relevant to audiences worried about the deterioration of inner-city life. See "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life," *The American Prospect*. (Spring 1993, pp. 35–42)
14. The regional message is more broadly discussed in *Regionalism: The New Geography of Opportunity* (1995) and *Interwoven Destinies* (1993).
15. Other MTO cities are Boston, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. The second year of funding was canceled because of the politicization of the issue in Baltimore County, Maryland. (Gurwitt, 1995, p. 22)
16. The anti-MTO campaign was apparently engineered by Louis DePazzo, State Delegate from Baltimore County. At the time he was competing for a county council seat against Jean Jung, President of the Board of Directors of Community Assistance Network (CAN), the agency contracted to place half of the 285 MTO families. DePazzo is credited with helping to start the controversy shortly after the local program was announced in March 1994, "by stirring up one of the primary opponents of the plan" (referring to Jerry Hersl, Rosedale engineer). (*Baltimore Sun*, August 7, 1994) The Eastern Political Organization (EPO) sponsored protest rallies and endorsed candidates for elective office in the several blue-collar towns east of Baltimore "who feared that their neighborhoods would be inundated by poor blacks from the public housing projects in the city." (*New York Times*, March 28, 1995) In one endorsement letter, the EPO claimed, "MTO is only the beginning of a much larger move of 18,000 families in Baltimore City's public housing." (*Baltimore Sun*, September 10, 1994)
17. Senator Mikulski's letter to constituents opposed to the MTO contained the following rationale for her position on the Baltimore plan: "I cannot support a program—even a demonstration program—that is planned and implemented so poorly that it only gives the poor a hollow opportunity, and makes them, by virtue of the bungling of those who administer it, the object of greater stigma. No one deserves that kind of treatment."
18. In early spring 1995, Judge Aspen modified the Gautreaux consent decree that required that at least 50 percent of the replacement public housing be scattered throughout the city. (*Chicago Sun-Times*, March 9, 1995) The modification allows the CHA to enter into a five-phase, \$200 million redevelopment of the Henry Horner Homes "from high-rises to mid-rises and scattered-site housing." (*Chicago Tribune*, March 9, 1995) Referred to as an "historic" plan to level 2 vacant 16-story towers, the plan shifts the emphasis toward economic integration in an effort to

reweave one of America's poorest neighborhoods into a "neighborhood of mixed incomes, not just the poor." (Ibid.)

19. In the summer of 1992, Judge Aspen approved CHA plans for a Turnkey development of 275 units of scattered-site public housing on the city's north, northwest, and southwest sides. Once completed the new and rehabilitated units would be purchased by the Authority and management turned over to a private agency. (*Chicago Tribune*, June 6, 1992) In October 1992 Polikoff filed a status report with the court criticizing the CHA for "no tangible progress" on the pilot program. The Authority blamed the delays on restrictions imposed by the Court and HUD, high land costs in targeted areas, and limited HUD funding. (*Chicago Sun-Times*, October 22, 1992) After a 4-year lapse (from the time the court approved the pilot program in February 1990), the CHA approached Habitat for assistance and training. A joint venture was signed in 1994, but the CHA's interest in completing the project waned as HOPE VI demolition activities took center stage. Habitat will complete the Turnkey developments. The 1995 inventory consisted of 32 buildings with a total of 67 units. (Hickman, P., Senior Vice President and Director of Scattered-Site Programs, telephone interview, August 3, 1995)
20. The Rosenbaum findings are being tested in the MTO demonstration. The research component includes tracking 1,800 families in a 3-way experimental design at 5 demonstration sites—New York, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Baltimore. A final report to Congress will be tendered in 2004. (Abt Associates Inc., *Draft MTO Program Operations Manual*, 1994, pp. 1–3)
21. Five percent, or 500 of the 10,000 new units, would be purchased by the Housing Opportunities Council. These "deep-subsidy" units would be "the primary housing resource to meet the goal of voluntarily relocating 21,000 poor black households from Baltimore City." (Rusk, 1996, p. 113)
22. Connerly (1986) offers four reasons for relying on conventional public housing to increase the supply of assisted housing: (1) it will "more likely . . . preserve long-term affordability for low-income households"; (2) "tenants enjoy greater legal protection from evictions and . . . arbitrary landlord actions"; (3) "minority tenants are more likely to be admitted"; and (4) "there is no clear evidence that subsidized private housing is less expensive than subsidized public housing." (Ibid., pp. 143–144)

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