

ORIGINAL

HUD-0004086

Contract HC-5231

EVALUATION OF THE URBAN INITIATIVES
ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

JACKSON, TN, CASE STUDY

1984

Prepared for:

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Office of Policy Development and Research

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Police Foundation
John F. Kennedy School of Government

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This report is one in a series that comprises a comprehensive evaluation of the Public Housing Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration. The Final Report provides an integrated analysis of the design, implementation and impact of the entire demonstration, and each of the 15 site-specific case studies analyzes the implementation and impact of the programs at individual participating local housing authorities. The complete set of reports includes:

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Final Report

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program:

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PREFACE

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration was created by the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. The program was formally announced in May 1979 and awards were made by the following September. By early 1981, programs in all 39 selected sites were underway; and by mid-1982, all were essentially completed.

As the report notes, the design and implementation of the program were flawed. The demonstration was conceived and developed according to principles which the current Administration has sought to reverse--that influxes of Federal money and direct Federal involvement can provide solutions to local problems.

HUD is currently implementing a series of demonstrations designed to improve the quality of life of public housing residents. These demonstrations stress local autonomy in design and implementation, with communities free to tailor their programs to meet their own unique needs. The demonstrations emphasize the coordination of existing Federal, State, and local resources, rather than the duplication of existing efforts or the funding of new programs. They use existing HUD resources to leverage other public and private funds. And, they require the commitment of all sectors of the local community, with a special emphasis on public/ private partnerships.

The Department believes that the emphasis on local authority which characterizes current Administration policy and provides the basis for operating and planned demonstrations holds much more promise for improving the lives of low-income families than programs that are rigidly structured by the Federal government.

I. CONTEXT

A. The City

The city of Jackson is located in the western part of the state of Tennessee. The area around Jackson (Madison County) consists largely of farms and small towns. Jackson itself contains some 49,000 residents in an eighteen square mile area. While the population has grown fairly slowly - from 39,000 in 1970, the housing stock has grown much more rapidly - from 13,000 units in 1970 to 19,000 in 1980. About two thirds of the population is white, a little less than a third is black, and only small percentages are Hispanic or Asian.

Public Housing has a lengthy history in Jackson. The first units were built during the Second World War. A few more projects were built in the mid 1950's. A third spate of construction occurred in the mid-sixties. As in other cities, public housing served two quite different groups of poor people: the elderly (only a fraction of whom were minority); and female headed families (a large fraction of which were minority). While these groups inhabited projects close to one another, the projects themselves were specialized - some designed for the elderly and some for families.

B. Demonstration Sites and Surrounding Neighborhoods

Jackson designated seven district projects as sites for the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. Their demographic characteristics are presented in Table 1. Jackson chose to focus on these sites because they thought the residents of these projects were victimized often, and that many offenders lived in or around the projects. They had seen systematic evidence for their views on victimization: a survey conducted by James Wright Associates in 1976 found the

rate of serious crimes committed in JHA projects to be 3.5 times that of the city as a whole. Residents were more than 8 times as likely to be murdered, and 2.5 times as likely to be raped.

Despite the fact that public housing residents were particularly vulnerable to crime, the residents were apparently not oppressed by the problem. Residents of the Jackson Demonstration Sites and the surrounding neighborhoods were among the most likely of all public housing residents surveyed in our study to say that they liked living in the project, and that they would recommend the project to their friends. Moreover, while residents ranked "crime in general" as a significant problem, they ranked all particular crimes as less significant problems than such things as rats, mice and other pests; stray dogs; and people who said insulting things. Table 2 presents the data on the citizens' perceptions of "problems". It is also worth noting that residents of the Jackson Housing projects were much less concerned about crime, felt much safer in their community, and (with the exception of Parkview Courts) were victimized less frequently than residents of projects in other cities. Table 3 presents the relevant data.

The residents of the Jackson Public Housing Projects also seemed relatively well satisfied with the Public Housing Authority. The four sites in Jackson registered the four highest ratings of all sites surveyed for the performance of project managers. They gave only slightly less impressive ratings to maintenance workers. And they also gave high ratings to the work of tenant organizations - despite the fact that these groups seemed relatively weak to our process observer. More consistent with the reports of our process observer is the fact that residents of Lincoln Courts, and Allenton Heights reported that they had relatively "little say in what goes on around here." Still, relations between tenants and the JHA seem relatively satisfactory compared to many other

· demonstration sites.

In many ways, then, the Jackson Demonstration sites did not fit the image of a community beset by crime surrounded by an indifferent bureaucracy. While the communities were poor and differentially victimized by criminal attacks, the overall rate of victimization was not particularly high, and the residents were relatively well satisfied with their community and the housing authority. Moreover, the Jackson Demonstration Sites had experience with programs of the type encouraged by UIACP. For several years prior to UIACP, CETA had funded a group of 15 community service officers to patrol the communities and advise citizens about security matters. Moreover, a traditional YMCA program provided substantial recreational programs for youth in the Public Housing Projects. Given these circumstances, it would be difficult for the UIACP to produce a noticeable impact on crime.

II. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

It proved difficult to reconstruct the process of developing the UIACP for Jackson. Nonetheless, two facts seem relatively clear. First, the Administration of the Jackson Housing Authority wrote the final proposal and handled most of the negotiations between the various HUD offices and JHA. Tenant input into the process was solicited via "Resident Association and Youth Council leaders." Both these organizations received sparse support and proved quite tenuous, both prior to the Program and throughout its duration, however. Thus, any kind of input from these sources claiming to represent the residents of the Jackson Housing projects must be questioned.

Second, because of the poor relations between the JHA and the HUD area office, many parts of the application were delayed in receiving approval. HUD requested revisions in several major components of the proposed program.

For example, the JHA proposed to hire a well qualified Security Coordinator

- to implement the Anti-Crime Program as well as review its admissions, screening and eviction policies and procedures. It also proposed to make several capital improvements specifically directed toward crime prevention. These improvements included more locks, window locks and door viewers. Several on-site social programs would be implemented, including Resident Associations to stem crime (i.e., block watches, citizen foot patrol), youth employment programs and local agency social services. Team-policing by the JPD was also proposed in order to ameliorate tenant-police relations. Several commitments for services from Jackson area organizations had been obtained to provide supportive resources for the Anti-Crime Program.

The major revisions of the proposal called for a greater spacing out of the components of the Anti-Crime Program. Moreover, while a vast number of activities had been planned with local agencies, the reviewers questioned whether the limited funds available to the JHA would ever allow it to realize its proposals along these lines. In short, the reviewers suggest that the anticipated individual strategies would be too complex to manage given the sparse planning presented in the proposal. The second recommended revision focused on the coordination between the "hardware" and "software" components of the program.

While a large proportion of funds (\$247,000) had been requested for physical modifications to the projects, the JHA had not adequately married the social aspects of crime prevention (i.e., block watches, etc.) to these activities. To answer this and other criticisms, the JHA responded with longer explications of their proposed activities which HUD eventually accepted.

III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

A. Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention

The Jackson Public Housing Authority proposed to improve their

management of crime prevention in three areas: 1) through the appointment of key administrative personnel; and 2) the tightening of screening and eviction policies and; 3) the training of security and maintenance personnel in crime prevention. Each of these efforts will be discussed below, first as proposed and then as implemented.

1. Proposals

The PHA proposed to strengthen security management by establishing a staff composed of a Director of Safety and Security, a Security Program Analyst and an Accountant Personnel Clerk. The Director of Safety and Security position would be filled by the then Director of Resident Services for a period of no less than eighteen months. Seventy percent of the Director's time would be spent coordinating the Anti-Crime Program while his remaining time would be spent supervising the on-going Title XX Resident Services Program. His duties in the Anti-Crime Program would include planning and directing JHA programs related to security, internal evaluations and the drafting of monthly reports for the Authority's Executive Director and the city's Board of Commissioners.

To enhance the accountability of the Anti-Crime Program, the JHA planned to hire a Security Program Analyst who would be responsible for program evaluation, reporting, and record keeping. The JHA also proposed to hire an Accountant/Personnel Clerk because of the complex accounting requirements and large number of new employees (principally youth employed through YCCIP) generated by the Anti-Crime Program. This individual's responsibilities would entail making out the Program payroll (for participants), the maintenance of personnel records, and general bookkeeping. Local Match funds (from the JHA) would pay the Director of Safety and Security's salary of \$22,113 (including fringe benefits). CDBG funds would pay the \$11,700 salary of the Security Program Analyst and DOL/YCCIP monies would pay the \$8,190 of the

Accountant/Personnel Clerk.

The JHA also planned to promote security by forming tenant screening and eviction policies to this purpose. The Resident Associations would make suggestions for codes defining reasonable resident conduct which would then be incorporated into resident leases. To insure the legality of these procedures all suggested changes, proposed either by the Resident Association or the JHA, would be reviewed by the JHA's attorney, the Legal Services Corporation, and HUD on the local and national levels. Moreover, any proposed eviction or denial of admission for reasons of security would be approved by JHA Executive Director in consultation with the Director of Safety and Security, the Director of Housing Management, and (in the case of eviction) the leadership of the relevant Resident Association.

The third component of Jackson Housing Authority's plan to strengthen security management was to hold training sessions on security issues for all PHA employees. Some crime prevention seminars had already occurred in Jackson prior to the Anti-Crime program's proposal. JHA management personnel (including project managers, the Director of Housing Management, and Maintenance Superintendent) participated in a forty-hour National Crime Prevention Institute training program. The Housing Authority Staff, which consists of fifteen Community Service Officers (CSO), also attended an eighty-hour training program which included: first aid and CPR; elements of the criminal justice system; police-citizen-community relations; procedural dealings with the police, other emergency services, social agencies and housing management; and knowledge of lease provisions. CSO's consist of both residents and non-residents and performed unarmed night security patrol in teams of two. They also conducted day and evening resident education programs on crime prevention.

Building on this base, the Director of Safety and Security would plan and

implement an Anti-Crime Program funded staff training program using the facilities of the Tennessee Center for Government Training (which funded the NCPI workshop mentioned above).

2. Implementation

The proposals created a license within which these activities could be implemented. Exactly how they were implemented depended on who became interested in carrying them out.

Implementation began with the appointment of the Director of Safety and Security. The JHA designated a former city councilman and the then Director of Resident Services to fill this job. The JHA selected him because it believed him to be the individual most responsible for the existence of the Projects Residents Associations and the CETA funded Community Service Officer patrol. The Director of Safety and Security possessed many other characteristics which recommended him for this position. He had a strong background in social services programming (internal JHA experience as TPP Coordinator, Director of Resident Services and external experience as Program Analyst; outside experience as Day Care Program Director and CAP Neighborhood Service Center Director) and he had a proven ability to marshal community support. He has also gained political experience as an elected member of the County Commission which would aid him in his ability to relate to local and state government organizations involved in the Anti-Crime Program.

Although the person designated as Director of Safety and Security was not officially employed with the Anti-Crime Program as Director of Safety and Security until July, 1980, he played a crucial role earlier in the development of the Program. After his appointment as Director of Safety and Security, he began to interview candidates for other Anti-Crime Program staff positions. He also busied himself with the recruitment of many resident volunteers who would

participate in the Program and accompany many local political officials to regional and national anti-crime conferences. Even after some of the critical staff members of the Anti-Crime staff were hired, the Director of Safety and Security performed much of the Program's short term planning and was instrumental in many of the implementation efforts until the staff became familiar with their responsibilities and the overall framework of the Program.

In July, 1980, the Director of Safety and Security attended a conference in Kentucky at which the regional regulations for contract organizations (i.e., local agencies which contract to inject resources into the Anti-Crime Program) were established. This gave impetus to the Director's efforts to focus varied services in the community on the demonstration sites. During the D.S.S.'s tenure with the Anti-Crime Program he was successful in two areas: recruiting members of the Oversight Team for the Anti-Crime Program from among prominent local community members; and signing a cooperative agreement with the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation in Jackson that facilitated access of public housing residents to treatment services they provided.

The D.S.S. ultimately settled into a supervisory role in the Anti-Crime Program and has functioned as the nodal point of mediation and information between the Anti-Crime Program and a variety of interest groups in Jackson. It should be noted, however, that the site-observer reported a distinct attitude change in the D.S.S. during the course of this evaluation. At the outset of the evaluation the observer reports that the D.S.S. seemed very enthusiastic about the Anti-Crime Program. The DSS believed all of its shortcomings were only temporary and could be quickly remedied. Many of the social services in the Anti-Crime Program had demonstrated, in the eyes of the D.S.S. early successes. Notwithstanding his early enthusiasm, it later waned. In the fall of 1981, the Executive JHA Director left the JHA for a directorship at another

Housing Authority. The D.S.S. attempted at this time to secure the vacant position but was unsuccessful. Another long time HUD employee landed the job. Moreover, the JHA by dint of its proposed funding allocations abandoned, to some degree, the "soft-ware" (social services) components of the Anti-Crime Program in favor of the "hard-ware" (target hardening) components.

The JHA hired a Program Analyst in August, 1980 and she assumed a close support role with the Director of Safety and Security. She has primarily performed administrative tasks during her tenure with the Program and as of March, 1982 had not received the Anti-Crime Training promised her when she was terminated at the expected end of the employment period. The Program Analyst had continually criticized her superior's procrastination on processing reports which she had prepared and her subordinates and colleagues for not providing her with timely information for her reports. From data gathered by site observers, the Program Analyst seemed to be a hub of activity, performing all of her responsibilities in commendable fashion.

An Accountant and Personnel Clerk was hired during the fall of 1981. He continued in this post until the spring of 1981. At this writing (June, 1982) he is still working for the Program and, it should be noted, he played an important role in the writing of the last of Anti-Crime Program proposal revisions while working at another post within the JHA. So, the staffing objectives of UIACP were largely achieved.

The level of activity spawned by the proposals to use selection and eviction procedures to enhance security was a little less impressive. In January, 1980 shortly after the UIACP was funded, a review of the screening and eviction procedures was conducted, and a few minor changes were introduced in the leases of residents. It is unclear what role tenants played in this small change in policies. Moreover, there is no evidence that these modest changes

led to any important changes in who lived in the projects. No doubt, changes in this area were difficult because they were so intimately linked to both legal issues concerning the rights of tenants, and a potential conflict with other important objectives of Public Housing such as focusing on the most needy, assuring for access, and providing emergency housing to those in desperate straits.

The goal of training PHA personnel in security issues was pursued more aggressively. About \$4000 was allocated for this activity, and over 140 staff members have been trained including the UIACP staff. Still, some changes in the proposed program occurred. The training was held in a variety of locations rather than concentrated in the University of Tennessee. Moreover, some of the main line managers of the JHA such as the Director of Housing Management and the Maintenance Superintendent were not involved in the training sessions.

As one reviews these efforts to improve PHA management of crime prevention, one thing becomes clear: When money is available to finance an activity which someone wants to do, and the activity is not in strong conflict with some other important activity, it tends to happen. Thus, a program staff was recruited to manage UIACP and lots of training was provided. This was simply an "add-on" to the ongoing activities of the JHA. When there was no money and the changes involved conflicts, it was much harder going. Thus, significant changes in tenant selection and eviction policies and procedures did not occur. On balance, the lasting effect of UIACP initiative on the JHA management will be carried by the experience of the DSS as he continues in the JHA, and whatever effect the training had on the 140 staff members who received it. It is unclear how much these factors will elevate concern with security in the JHA.

B. Anti-Crime Service Facilities and Physical Redesign

The JHA proposed three different kinds of physical modifications in the

Demonstration Sites. First, it proposed to house the anti-crime program by transforming dwelling units in Allenton Heights and Lincoln Courts into space that could house a Police Community Relations Center, the Team Policing and Community Service Officers Headquarters and the Resident Organization support staff. The JHA would further provide all office equipment for their activities.

Second, the JHA proposed to increase the security of individual dwellings. This strategy stems from the JHA's finding that crime and resident fear of crime focus on burglary, robbery, assault, and rape; crimes which occur within victim's place of residence. Thus, the JHA would place special emphasis on unit security rather than control of common (public areas). Door and window locks, door viewers and window screens were to be provided in all Demonstration Sites.

Third, the JHA proposed some physical modifications designed to promote "defensible space" in common areas. They proposed to install lighting whenever necessary, and to landscape areas surrounding playgrounds, pedestrian walks and to instill pride of place, and define district areas of activity. In addition, the JHA proposed to construct physical barriers preventing access to Rosewood Gardens through a pine forest on the west side of the project.

The JHA also explicitly planned to solicit resident participation in the design of modernization programs:

All physical improvements will be done with extensive planning input from the resident body. Additional involvement will come during the Program as residents are recruited and used as force account labor, especially in making grounds improvements.

The JHA also planned to disburse YCCIP funds toward these efforts. Table 4 presents the proposed modernization budget disbursements:

Table 4
Jackson Anti-Crime Program
Proposed Modernization Budget Disbursements

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Funds</u>	<u>% of total Mod</u>
1. Architectural and Engineering Fees	\$18,000	7.3
2. Grounds Improvements	90,170	36.5
3. Utility Distribution System (lighting)	27,700	11.2
4. Security	60,000	24.3
5. Community Space	5,000	2.0
6. Office Furniture and Equipment	5,500	2.2
7. Maintenance equipment	2,000	.8
8. Community Spaces Equipment	29,600	12.0
9. Automotive equipment	9,000	3.6
Total	\$247,000	99.9

Prompt and timely implementation of these modernization proposals proved difficult. When we stopped reporting on activities in this project (March, 1982), the only modernization activities under way were those concerned with individual unit target hardening. Architectural and engineering work had been completed, and new locks had been ordered, but they had not yet arrived. No new lighting, landscaping, or access control had been installed. As a result, the actual level of modernization activities must be considered close to zero.

C. More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation

The authors of the JHA Anti-Crime Proposal wrote that the "bedrock of (the Anti-Crime Program) is the resident and his organizations." The application continues in this vein by endorsing self-sufficient resident anti-crime efforts and pledging to include tenants in all phases of the Anti-Crime Proposal. Three new activities were central to the aim of enhanced self-defense. First, JHA hoped that Resident Associations in each of the Demonstration Sites would develop neighborhood watches, resident surveillance patrols, and other group security measures. The exact nature of these activities (paid or unpaid; special purpose or routine) was left unspecified. Second, JHA pledged to educate residents in crime prevention through an

Operation I.D. program, and through workshops and conferences. Third, JHA proposed to develop "neighborhood conflict resolution forums" designed to reduce friction among individuals and rival groups in the Jackson Projects. They would also provide an alternative dispute settlement mechanism to the criminal justice system and thus reduce the alienation felt by residents within the criminal justice system solving their conflicts.

In mounting these activities, the JHA would rely on two different institutions. On the one hand, they would rely on the Resident Associations within each project to provide legitimacy and access for PHA officials. On the other hand, they depended on the DSS to breath life into these largely dormant organizations. Given the background, orientation and experience of the D.S.S., this was not an unreasonable expectation. Moreover, the JHA would provide tangible resources to the Resident Associations. They would give training, potential influence over the activities of the UIACP, control of a small imprest fund, and the services of resident support staff hired under UIACP auspices. With this help, it was conceivable that the Resident Associations would become strong enough to create and sustain volunteer activity of the types imagined.

Implementation of these programs was, again, a bit shaky. Perhaps the strongest program element was the citizen education component. The DSS was joined eventually by a Victim/Witness Coordinator who took education and citizen crime prevention as one of her main areas of responsibility. Together, they fielded workshops and training for members of the Resident Association, for residents, and especially for the elderly. Moreover, an Operation I.D. program was advertised in May, 1981 and began operating in June. These efforts seem to have had a small effect. In Parkview and Allenton Heights, surveyed residents indicated moderately high levels of awareness and participation in activities described as crime prevention meetings, neighborhood watch programs, and

apartment watch programs. Parkview and Lincoln Park (but not Allenton) reported involvement in Project I.D. Data from Rosewood/Edgewood seems sparse. Still, it seems that the efforts of the DSS and Victim/Witness Coordinator had some impact on at least 2 and maybe three of the demonstration sites in Jackson.

The other proposed elements of the program fared less well. No citizen security patrols ever appeared: they were replaced by expanded police patrols by the Jackson Police Department (see below). Part of the explanation is the weakness of the Resident Association and the relatively low level of concern about crime and security. The idea of neighborhood conflict resolution forums never appeared again: its life was limited to the area presented in the original proposal. Again, the observer's judgement was that the Resident Associations were simply too weak to be able to attract or resolve any major conflicts.

On balance, tenant participation was limited. They were not involved in the program development or in the planning of modernization efforts. Moreover, the activities they were supposed to launch and sustain by themselves did not appear. This is particularly disappointing since the D.S.S. seemed well suited to accomplishing these purposes, and he was later aided by a very energetic Victim/Witness Coordinator who was also active in building resident participation. Despite this, the Jackson Demonstration sites are in the middle of the park with respect to relying on neighbors and friends to help protect their homes, and towards the bottom with respect to other self-defense measures such as marking property and buying locks. Perhaps the explanation for this lack of citizen effort is that crime was simply not a pressing concern for the JPHA residents.

D. Employment of Tenants

The Jackson Housing Authority proposed to accord priority to the hiring

of residents (particularly those who have already held temporary positions at the targeted projects) as well as make every effort to prepare temporary employees for mainstream employment.

The core of this effort involved giving preference to residents in hiring UIACP staff, and hiring 16 youths (aged 15-21) from the projects to "make physical improvements, provide direct program service, and provide clerical support to Resident Associations." The Modernization Labor Force Account would be used to hire additional resident labor to perform similar work. Prospective candidates for the latter positions will be youth and/or adult residents. Finally, the Director of Safety and Security would make increased efforts to expose residents of the Demonstration Sites to job opportunities listed with the Tennessee Department of Employment Security's "Job Bank."

The major accomplishments under this program element were three. First, residents did end up filling positions in the UIACP staff. The "Program Analyst" position was filled by a resident. (Check This Fact). Second, 6 youths were hired in the summer of 1981 to serve as support staff to the Resident Associations and the Jackson Police Department Team Foot Patrols. Third, an Assistant Youth Coordinator and 4 Recreation Aides were hired as part of the recreation program late in 1981. So, the UIACP translated into about 12 full time jobs for tenants lasting 1-2 years.

Somewhat less successful were the other proposed activities. The delay of the "modernization program" meant that the resident jobs associated with these activities did not materialize - or at least not during the period of our observation. The "job bank" proposal did not re-appear - perhaps because it was smoothly incorporated in the network of social services provided to residents of the housing projects.

D. More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/Witnesses

The social service component of Jackson's proposed Anti-Crime Program consisted of four main elements: two focused largely on youths as potential offenders, the third focused on the elderly, and the fourth on other potential victims of crime.

The first program element called for expanded treatment of alcohol and drug dependence of among youth in the Demonstration Sites. Specific components of this program included: 1) diversion of youthful alcohol and drug abusers from the criminal justice system to the treatment center so that they could avoid a court record; 2) individualized counseling and treatment with an "emphasis on self-motivation"; 3) mobilization of health, mental health, social services, education, and employment resources to aid rehabilitation of offenders and; 4) community education for residents, especially parents of youths with drug and alcohol related problems. This program relied heavily on "linkages" with other agencies. Only about 25% of the total cost of this program would be paid by UIACP funds: the remainder would be paid by the Madison County Juvenile Court. In addition, the Jackson Area Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependency would provide the support of two minority outreach workers at no cost to the Housing Authority.

The second program provided recreational services to youths and their families. This program, too, was strongly "linked" to other institutions and programs. It would be based on the Lane College NCAA Summer Sports Program and would provide individual counseling, tutoring and transportation to the college as well as recreational opportunities. The Supervisor would be paid 50% by UIACP and 50% by the city. Recreation activities (equipment, some supervision, etc.) would be provided by the Jackson Parks and Recreation Department. UIACP would pay for staff (half the supervisor's salary and 4 Recreation Aides).

The third program was designed to provide information and referrals to the

elderly. The program was called HOPELINE, and one of its major components was TELECARE which reached elderly people with a daily telephone call to check on their well being and respond to requests for assistance. The Director of Safety and Security also planned to attend a seminar on "Crime and the Elderly" sponsored by the Institute for Community Development and the Southwest Tennessee Development District in order to explore additional anti-crime program options specifically concerned with elderly tenants. Planning assistance would be sought from the Area Agency on Aging and the American Association of Retired Persons so that the efforts of the Anti-Crime Program.

The fourth program was a Victim/Witness program with three elements: crisis intervention, coordination with the criminal justice system and public education. The Crisis Intervention component would utilize basic methods pioneered in the Jackson area by the Women's Resource and Rape Assistance Program (WRAP). The core of this component would be a twenty-four hour victim/witness hotline, manned by the Victim/Witness Director and trained volunteers who would be on call by rotation. The criminal justice component will seek to increase the likelihood of successful prosecution by providing positive reinforcement to victims/witnesses, reducing the level of frustration and increasing the level of satisfaction of victims/witnesses with the criminal justice system. Finally, public education and training would be organized by the Victim Witness Coordinator through the acquisition of crime prevention educational materials, the use of group meetings with residents on crime prevention, creation and maintenance of viable tenant organizations and the publication of Anti-Crime Program activities in the local newspapers. According to the Anti-Crime Application the Victim/Witness Program would afford the Anti-Crime Program one of the primary points of linkage with other components of the Program. The Victim/Witness Coordinator, in particular, would exist as a

primary link between the team policing units, Anti-Crime Coordinator and other local agencies.

All of these planned activities did occur though at varying levels of intensity. The program focusing on juvenile drug abuse and alcohol dependency was established, and 2 outreach workers hired. Only about 25 clients were enrolled in the program, however. The recreation program came into existence later in the Fall of 1981 and had dissolved by the late spring of 1982. It started later for two reasons: 1) the lack of transportation to and from the college; and 2) the existence of an active YMCA program which duplicated the planned UIACP program. Once started, it became fully staffed. Levels of participation remain unclear. According to the D.S.S. the program eventually dissolved due to failures of the Jackson Recreation Program to provide necessary services. The Recreation Aides remained on the payroll and were assigned to assist in a different program sponsored by the Girls Clubs. The program for the elderly became largely an education/prevention program. HOPELINE disappeared in 1981, and with it, the TELECARE service. The gap was filled by a few seminars and workshops in crime prevention and social service availability.

Perhaps the most successful of the social service programs was the Victim/Witness Program. The Victim/Witness Coordinator began to actively work with the Anti-Crime Program and to court resident involvement in crime prevention during October, 1980. She began an on-going Crime Report Record (CRR) to keep the Anti-Crime Program as well as the JHA accurately abreast of crime trends. Her initial contact with tenants occurred through police reports. During November in 1980, the Victim/Witness Coordinator sent fliers out to the residents of all targeted projects within the JHA to advertise the services offered by the Program. Specific notices were sent to Rosewood Gardens and Park

View Courts announcing the dates and times of WRAP seminar in those projects. Those workshops subsequently occurred during 1981.

The Fall of 1980 also witnessed the creation of the "crisis hotline." The Victim/Witness Coordinator developed a manual for hotline staff members during November, 1980 and began recruiting with the aid of the Director of Safety and Security, volunteers for the hotline. During the early part of 1981 the hotline began to function after a brief training session was conducted at Pilgrims Rest Baptist Church. The Attorney General of the State of Tennessee's staff presented the workshop. In July of 1981 the Anti-Crime staff decided to terminate the crisis line because of small number of calls received during its existence. In order to strengthen Resident Associations in Jackson, the Victim/Witness Advocate consistently met with tenants until her termination in August of 1981.

In summary, the services offered within this program seemed to have been spearheaded by the Victim/Witness Coordinator. This fact follows the explicit intent of the proposal which designated the Coordinator as the nodal point of organization within social service areas.

E. Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers

The proposal indicated that despite community relation efforts, tension existed between JHA residents and the Jackson Police Department. To improve the situation, the JHA proposed to establish a team foot patrol for the projects. They reasoned "that close contact with the residency, interplay with the Residents Associations, and close coordination with the Police Community Relations Program, (would) produce policing that is effective and sensitive to community needs." Deployment of police officers on foot rather than in radio cars would foster greater familiarity and trust between police officers and project residents. The proposed had three elements: improved training; foot

patrols; and the creation of Community Service Centers.

The training element called for a sergeant to be responsible for in-house sensitivity training of all Jackson police officers who work in the targeted projects. Local training of all police officers would be supplemented by National Community Crime Prevention Institute training. Officers selected for this training would be volunteers screened with respect to motivation and attitudes who would be "reinforced through extra pay and training."

The "foot patrol" element called for two-person teams in the projects. The selected senior patrol officers, "at least one of which is a minority," would report to a specifically trained Sergeant-rank Crime Prevention Officer.

The Community Relations element called for the establishment of three Community Centers in Lincoln Courts, Allenton Heights, and Merry Lane. A Sergeant-rank Crime Prevention Officer would supervise the program and serve as principal liaison between the JHA and the JPD. He would also work with individual Resident Associations crime prevention programs. Services offered at the Community Relations Centers would include crime prevention education, counseling, tutoring, bicycle/motorcycle safety programs, cultural enrichment programs, and youth recreation activities. Other agencies such as the Home Demonstration Agents and Scouting groups would also be encouraged to offer program activities at the three centers. HUD designated that Modernization funds target on the rehabilitation of center offices; YCCIP funds would be used to the augment the staff. (See Above.)

Implementation of these proposals was very successful. Fairly early in the program, space for the Community Relations Centers was created in the three target sites. By the summer of 1981, 6 Community Relations Aids were hired. By the Fall, a Lieutenant from the Jackson Police Department was supervising the employees. The Community Relations Center did in fact offer public education

programs, workshops, and a regular program and traffic safety. A Boy Scout Troop and a Brownie Troop also appeared. The only difficulty with the Community Relations Center was that the single Lieutenant found it difficult to supervise staff in three different areas. As a result, parents within the Projects have proved somewhat reluctant to allow their children to attend activities at the center because of this lack of supervision. Still, the program (according to the site observer) gained some support toward the end of its duration.

Even more significant, however, was the initiation of team policing in two of the Jackson Demonstration Sites - Lincoln Courts and Parkview Courts. The program was initiated in early 1981 and continued until the Spring of 1982. It involved 5 JPD officers supervised by a Lieutenant. Two of the five officers were white, but they were happily accepted by the residents. Indeed, a Jackson Sun article in August 1981 describes the program as a great success, and quotes residents of the projects in the following terms.

"It (crime is cooling down a lot since they (the police foot patrol) came in," said one resident of Parkview Courts.

"We like our Anti-Crime," chimed in a resident who lives in Parkview Courts. "They (the two white officers) know how to talk to people here."

A resident of Parkview Courts said the program has improved attitudes toward the police. "It is a little safer out here," she said. "People respect them because they know how to respect people. (Kevin Barnard, The Jackson Sun, 8/20/81).

Whether this program had any real result on levels of crime will be discussed in the section evaluating the impact of the program.

F. Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources

This section details the resources which local agencies (both private and public) pledged and actually applied to the Program. The agencies which the JHA proposed targeting on the projects included the Madison County Community Service Program (a CETA funded program), the office of the District Attorney General, various agencies in the city of Jackson and local private sector

organizations. Each of these organization's activities are described below as the JHA proposed them and as they actually occurred.

In general these activities were designed to break the "Indian reservation mind set" which pervaded the projects by integrating JHA residents into the mainstream of Jackson community life. Some of these activities would be performed on site while others would attempt to attract residents away from the projects in order to break their isolation from the rest of the city.

Specifically, the Anti-Crime Program would utilize the resources of the Madison County Community Service officers. This security program consists of 15 citizens who have received an 80-hour training program in police/community/citizens relations, procedural dealings with the police and other agencies, lease provisions, first aid, CPR, and elements of the law. Various CSO's are assigned to different housing projects where they provide sporadic unarmed night patrol in teams of two and day and evening resident education programs. The JHA hoped to use the CSO's in its crime prevention education activities as part of the overall Anti-Crime Program. As the Anti-Crime Program neared its implementation stage in December 1979, the future of this CETA funded program was uncertain. In the end, it was cancelled.

The office of the District Attorney General was included in the Anti-Crime Application through the Victim/Witness program. As noted above, staff from this office would meet with Resident Association personnel to encourage crime reporting and to educate CSO's in various aspects of the criminal justice system. The Attorney General's office was also responsible for local administration of the Tennessee Victim Compensation Act. A pledge to inform residents and train JHA staff regarding its provisions had been procured from that office.

As well as the above commitments, the JHA obtained commitments from the

following "agencies and governmental bodies":

- (1) City of Jackson (Mayor's Office Police Department, Parks and Recreation Dept.)
- (2) Madison County (Office of the County Executive, CETA office, Juvenile Court, District Attorney General, Sheriffs Department).
- (3) Southwest Tennessee Development District.
- (4) Tennessee Law Enforcement Planning Agency.
- (5) Jackson-Madison County Ambulance Authority.

In addition to these commitments several neighborhood organizations and agencies and local chapters of national agencies committed resources to the Anti-Crime Program:

- (1) Jackson Area Council on Alcohol and Drug Dependency.
- (2) Jackson Mental Health Center.
- (3) Women's Resource and Rape Assistance Program.
- (4) Lane College.
- (5) Hopeline information and referral services.
- (6) Junior Federation of Girls Clubs.
- (7) Boy Scouts of America.

Twenty-six other agencies had formed referral arrangements or had exchanged staff training with the JHA. All of these agencies would be enlisted in the support effort of the Anti-Crime Program.

Finally, the JHA pledged to establish links with local businesses and industries through contacts with the Chamber of Commerce and the In-Town Council. The JHA, at the time of the Anti-Crime Proposal, had not yet procured any specific commitments from local business.

As of this writing, the CSO no longer exists because their funding ceased in February of 1980. But the involvement of the District Attorney General's office has proven quite consistent over the course of 1981. Several on-sight

workshops were held for various Resident Associations throughout the Jackson projects. Moreover, during the last six months of 1981, the Attorney General's office helped to train residents to be victim/witness advocates. An employee from the Attorney General's office was employed half-time by the Anti-Crime Program in order to coordinate these services.

The site observer reports that all of the government agencies did participate in the Anti-Crime Program at one time or another. Agencies most active included: the Juvenile Courts, Attorney General's Office, the Jackson-Madison County Ambulance Authority, Jackson Area Counsel on Alcohol and Drug Dependency, Jackson Mental Health Center, WRAP, Junior Federation of Girls Clubs and the Boy Scouts of America. It should be noted that all of these organizations have served the Jackson area for many years. Their links with the Anti-Crime Program remain unspecified which could suggest that these agencies did no more than provide service to the projects which were being provided to other areas of the city, rather than "co-targeting resources" on crime with the Anti-Crime Program. The agencies most used as referrals included: the Jackson Area Counsel on Alcoholism, the Home Health Services of Madison Co., the Jackson Mental Health Center, and the Jackson Police Community Relations. Again the specific relations with these organizations remains unclear.

In summary, the exact nature of local governmental aid into the Anti-Crime Program seems to center around the Attorney General's office, the JPD and local agencies who simply performed on-going services throughout the duration of the Anti-Crime Program. It seems from all data sources that relevant links were not established with business and industry and the Anti-Crime Program.

G. Summary of Implementation

A review of the UIACP as actually implemented in Jackson indicates that the program consisted primarily of the following activities. Probably the most

important program elements were the establishment of team policing, foot patrol, and Community Relations Centers in collaboration with the Jackson Police Department. These activities had scale and visibility in the projects. Moreover, it does not seem likely that they would have occurred without the UIACP to provide the impetus.

Only slightly less important was the development of an UIACP staff committed to building resident capacities to deal with crime. Both the D.S.S. and the Victim/Witness Coordinator made substantial efforts to vitalize the Resident Associations and Youth Councils as instruments for self-defense. The efforts consisted of workshops, crime prevention education, and project I.D. In the Spring of 1981, their efforts were rewarded with the appearance of Residents Associations that elected officers, held meetings and sponsored a few activities. By the Fall of 1981, however, these Associations had largely collapsed. The focus of anti-crime activity shifted to team policing and the Community Relations Centers.

The Social Service components of the UIACP were only moderately successful. The program focused on juvenile drug abuse and alcohol dependence was established, but had only a small case load. The juvenile recreation program was also implemented, but it too seemed small compared with pre-existing programs. The programs for the elderly faded with the demise of HOPELINE, although the Victim/Witness coordinator picked up some of the slack with workshops and a 24 hour "hotline."

Tenant employment was also a modest success. Residents were employed as part of the UIACP staff (e.g., Program Analyst); as managers of some of the program elements (e.g., Youth Recreation); and as staffers for various programs (e.g., Community Service Centers and Youth Recreation). On balance, about a dozen jobs were created.

Perhaps the least successful element was the "modernization" plan. Very little had happened by the time we stopped our observation. This had an adverse impact on tenant employment as well because the modernization activities were supposed to generate jobs. No doubt, part of the explanation for the delayed modernization activities is the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures that govern expenditures of this kind in all public housing projects. But there is also some evidence that the program was deliberately delayed - perhaps to save the money and bureaucratic capacity for physical improvements that were judged to be more urgently needed. This would not necessarily be an inappropriate judgement in projects that were relatively safe but lacked other amenities.

So what emerged from UIACP was primarily an experiment with a different style of policing in the Jackson Demonstration Sites. This was accompanied by a burst of tenant organizing, some small programs directed at youth, and some expanded tenant employment. But none of these activities reached the scale that had characterized the CETA financed Community Service Officers, and all, like the CETA program, had largely faded by the spring of 1982. Whatever these activities produced any impact on crime, the fear of crime, or citizen satisfaction with their own communities is the subject of the next section.

IV. PROGRAM IMPACT

In gauging the impact of the UIACP activities implemented in Jackson, we have a limited amount of information that can be used. The primary source of information is the survey of residents. The survey includes information about: 1) residents' awareness and participation in the various program elements of UIACP; 2) assessment of trends with respect to general conditions in their neighborhoods; 3) levels of victimization; and many other variables. Moreover, the survey includes demonstration sites and surrounding neighborhoods, but no comparison sites.

Unfortunately, the survey was taken in late May and early June of 1981. As Figure 1 indicates, this was right in the middle of the implementation of the UIACP: it was shortly after the major organizing activities undertaken by the DSS and Victim/Witness coordinator and the creation of "team policing", but before the youth recreation program and the full scale establishment of the Community Service Center. This means that the survey can be interpreted as an "after the fact" evaluation for some elements of UIACP, but not for the others. Moreover, in interpreting the surveys as an "after the fact evaluation", we have no comparison sites on which to draw. So, all interpretations of the survey data as measuring the impact of the UIACP are weak.

The only other source of data for gauging the impact of the UIACP is recorded crime data. The difficulties with these data are, first, they may not be a consistent measure of crime over time, and second, that the numbers are very small and bedevilled by large seasonal fluctuations.

Still, despite these difficulties, it is possible to examine a few issues of program impact. We will look first at citizen awareness of the programs and see if the efforts of the DSS and Victim/Witness coordinator went unnoticed. Then, we will give a close look at available recorded crime data to see if the team policing program had much effect. Finally, we will look at the best overall measures of impact we have available.

A. Program Awareness

Table 5 presents data on citizen awareness of and participation in various elements of the UIACP. A review of these data indicate that the efforts to hold workshops, crime prevention meetings and so on did register on the perceptions of residents. About half the surveyed population was aware of crime prevention meetings, and, of those, about half claimed to have participated. This program element had the broadest impact.

Somehow narrower results were registered by the Victim/Witness program, Operation I.D., and the Youth Recreation Program. While relatively few people were aware of these programs, a reasonably large fraction of those who were aware of them in specific sites claim to have participated. Thus, very large fractions of those who lived in Parkview Courts and Allenton et. al. and were aware of the Victim/Witness program claimed to participate in them. For "youth employment" and Operation I.D." this pattern was more site specific. While all the sites seemed to be "aware" of youth employment programs, a relatively large fraction of Allenton residents claim to have participated. The focus of Operation I.D. was even narrower: only Lincoln Courts and Parkview Courts seemed to be aware of the program, and the residents in Parkview were much more likely to claim that they participated.

These results indicate that the UIACP education and self-defense programs were noticed in the demonstration sites. It is also apparent, however, that more specific client oriented services such as Victim/Witness support, youth employment, and Operation I.D. have a narrower effect with respect to both sites, and residents within sites. Apparently, word of specific activities does not spread broadly through the resident population.

B. Effects on Reported Crime

One of the most important and controversial effects of the UIACP in Jackson was a drop in reported crimes in a few of the demonstration sites which the Jackson Police Department attributed to the appearance of "team policing." In the summer of 1981, the Police Department published data indicating that while rates of homicide, assault, rape, robbery, burglary and illegal use of drugs had increased 45% in the city as a whole over the last year, the JHA projects had experienced a 21% decrease in crime. They also had an even more specific finding. As the Jackson Sun reported:

After daily foot patrols of the two highest-crime JHA neighborhoods - Parkview Courts and Lincoln Courts - began in April (of 1981) the level of unlawfulness dropped further . . . In the case of Parkview Courts it dropped 78 percent from the first quarter of this year (January-March) to the second quarter (April-June). (Kevin Barnard, The Jackson Sun, 8-21-81).

This result was specifically attributed to Team Policing because it "increased rapport with residents, made the neighborhoods safer and increased the rates of arrest and conviction" (Barnard, Jackson Sun, 8-81).

With these apparent successes, the Chief of the Jackson Police Department has argued that team policing (in which two officers continuously work together without any partner rotation and follow cases from arrest to sentence disposition) should be implemented city-wide and could serve as a model for other cities that might wish to install such a practice.

Yet, the statistics from which the successful conclusions of the team policing were drawn have been hotly disputed. Numerous mathematical errors and discrepancies between the typed reports (raw data) and charts summarizing the data have been found. These errors have fueled those in the Jackson City Hall who has argued against the local refunding of this aspect or any other aspect of the Program. City officials have also drawn attention to the exorbitant cost of refunding the team-policing aspect of the Anti-Crime Program -- \$100,000. This amount of money in these fiscally depressed and uncertain times seems in the minds of city officials, not only excessive but too much of a burden to be borne by the City alone. A Jackson Sun editorial suggested that the cost be pared down a bit and shared by the JHA and the city. This alternative also proved vexing in light of the JHA's shaky financial status.

The debate has still not been formally resolved. Substantively, the outcome seems clear. The JPD has pulled back its team-policing from JHA housing projects and have left them with the "traditional" radio-car patrol. This development, however, has not occurred without some resistance from citizens

(both in and out of the projects) and city officials who originally and at this writing support team-policing. Yet, funding still remains a problem.

It also remains unclear whether these programs had an effect on reported crime. Table 6 presents the reported crime data for the relevant periods in Parkview Courts. The change is also compared to levels of reported crime in Parkview Courts a year previously, and to reported crime in Lincoln Courts. The dramatic decline in crime from Jan-March, 1981 to April-June, 1981 seems more like a return to normal levels of reported crime after an abnormally high crime quarter than a clear reduction from previously high levels. Based on these data, it would be hard to conclude that the "team policing" had a noticeable impact on reported crime. This doesn't mean that "team policing" was a failure, of course. It could have had an impact on crime. And it could have had many desirable effects quite apart from controlling crime. But, the reported crime data does not seem to have been influenced much by this style of policing.

C. Overall Program Results

There are two measures available to us that provide some overall measure of UIACP's impact on Jackson, Tennessee. One is reported crime data for all the Demonstration Sites both before and after various elements of UIACP were implemented. The second is an assessment of trends in general conditions and crime over the last year by residents in the project. In reviewing these results, however, it is important to keep the timing of various events in mind. The survey while produced to assessment of trends was conducted in May-June, 1981: This was after public education and team policing, but before Community Service Centers and Youth Recreation. The reported crime data is divided at about the same point: data from January, 1978 to June 1981 is considered pre-program; while data from July, 1981 to Dec. 1981 is considered during the program. This is designed to catch any effects of Team Policing, Community

Service Centers, and Youth Employment on reported crime.

Table 7 presents the results. Given these data, it is unlikely that UIACP had much impact on reported crime. On the other hand, it is possible that UIACP had a small positive effect on residents' general views of condition in their neighborhoods and in crime. In each Demonstration Site, surveyed residents thought things were getting better, and in all cases they were more positive than the national average. This may reflect nothing more than optimism associated with the generally positive conditions in the Jackson Projects, but it is a hopeful indication.

V. SUMMARY

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime is implemented in Jackson Tennessee consisted of four major elements:

- The development of a stronger link with the Jackson Police Department through the establishment of Team Policing, Foot Patrol and Community Service Centers in the Projects.
- A major effort to organize residents around the crime issue through the use of education programs, workshops and Project I.D.
- Two small social service programs targeted on youth in the projects (drug treatment and recreation).
- About a dozen jobs for residents of the projects in the UIACP itself.

A variety of other proposed activities (including "modernization" programs; elderly care programs; etc.) fell by the wayside. Moreover, all of the activities indicated above had disappeared by the Spring of 1981. So, UIACP was a small, short run flurry of activity and employment in the Jackson Public Housing Projects.


The impact on the community was consistent with the temporary nature of the program. Citizens noticed activities that were widely advertised and in which

they were involved. But the program had no impact on levels of recorded crime. The program may have had an effect on residents' perceptions of things in general and the crime situation in particular had improved.

JACKSON
Merry Lane Courts


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units



JACKSON 34
Neff Circle


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units




JACKSON Rosewood Gardens

35


**RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons**

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




**RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons**

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




**RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons**

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




**RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units**



JACKSON
Allenton Heights


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units




JACKSON Edgewood Towers

37


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES Per 10,000 Occupied Units



JACKSON
Lincoln Courts


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units



JACKSON 39
Parkview Courts


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units



JACKSON 40
Washington Douglas Courts


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)



RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units

