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EVALUATION OF THE URBAN INITIATIVES
ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

SAN ANTONIO, TX, CASE STUDY

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This report is one in a series that comprises a comprehensive evaluation of the Public Housing Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration. The Final Report provides an integrated analysis of the design, implementation and impact of the entire demonstration, and each of the 15 site-specific case studies analyzes the implementation and impact of the programs at individual participating local housing authorities. The complete set of reports includes:

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Final Report

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PREFACE

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration was created by the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. The program was formally announced in May 1979 and awards were made by the following September. By early 1981, programs in all 39 selected sites were underway; and by mid-1982, all were essentially completed.

As the report notes, the design and implementation of the program were flawed. The demonstration was conceived and developed according to principles which the current Administration has sought to reverse--that influxes of Federal money and direct Federal involvement can provide solutions to local problems.

HUD is currently implementing a series of demonstrations designed to improve the quality of life of public housing residents. These demonstrations stress local autonomy in design and implementation, with communities free to tailor their programs to meet their own unique needs. The demonstrations emphasize the coordination of existing Federal, State, and local resources, rather than the duplication of existing efforts or the funding of new programs. They use existing HUD resources to leverage other public and private funds. And, they require the commitment of all sectors of the local community, with a special emphasis on public/ private partnerships.

The Department believes that the emphasis on local authority which characterizes current Administration policy and provides the basis for operating and planned demonstrations holds much more promise for improving the lives of low-income families than programs that are rigidly structured by the Federal government.

I. CONTEXT

A. San Antonio

Located 130 miles from the Mexican border and similarly distant from the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, the former preeminent Mexican town of San Antonio contains the Alamo, equivocal memorial to American patriotism. With a city population of 785,410 and a metropolitan population just below a million citizens (988,800), San Antonio now ranks as the nation's tenth and Texas's third largest city. Characterized as the most Hispanic major city in the United States, San Antonio is home to a Mexican-American majority of 52.2 percent, followed by 39.2 percent Anglo-American, 7.6 percent Black, and 1 percent other non-White inhabitants.

The city's commercial-industrial base is heavily reliant upon the U.S. military establishment. The list of local defense-related federal facilities indicates considerable dependence upon government -- particularly military -- payrolls: Kelly Air Force Base, Randolph Air Force Base, Brooks Air Force Base, Lackland Air Force Base, and Brooke Army Medical Center. National headquarters of the Air Force Air Security Service, Kelly AFB represents San Antonio's principal employer. The rapidly expanding medical industry, an amalgam of manufacturing concerns, tourism, service industries, and livestock production companies represent other statistically significant employers of the city's current work force of 387,300 persons. Unlike the state's major metropolitan centers of Houston and Dallas-Fort Worth, San Antonio has not developed a lucrative oil and electronics-based economy, but the city is commercially healthy. Recent Chamber of Commerce statistics for Greater San Antonio show annual retail sales in excess of \$14 billion.

Electoral politics are generally summarized as a running contest between Liberals, commonly supported by Mexican-American citizens, and Conservatives,

traditionally backed by the more prosperous Anglo middle class. Situated in the twentieth congressional district, San Antonio has been represented since 1961 by the Democratic congressman, Henry B. Gonzales, who ran unopposed in 1976 and 1978 and soundly beat his Republican opponent in 1980 with nearly a 5:1 margin. Of particular relevance to this evaluation of a federally-funded, conceptually innovative anti-crime program conducted in public housing in San Antonio is Congressman Gonzalez's legislative expertise; a member of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, he serves as chairman of the subcommittee on Housing and Community Development.

B. Demonstration Site and Comparison Site

Cassiano Homes, demonstration site for the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program (UIACP), is located on the west side of the city. One of 43 developments managed by the San Antonio Housing Authority (SAHA), this low-income housing project contains a total of 449 dwelling units -- a complement of 400 apartments constructed in 1953 and 99 units completed in 1966. A rowhouse design reminiscent of military housing is most commonly featured. A majority of the apartments accommodate families. When the UIACP application was submitted in June 1979, 435 units were designated for occupancy by "non-elderly families" while the remaining 64 units were reserved for elderly tenants. The annual turnover rate exceeded one-third of all apartments (36.6 percent) but the low annual vacancy rate of 1.3 percent indicated a constant demand for subsidized housing. The average monthly rent was quoted as \$32.

Again, with reference to the baseline statistics accompanying the anti-crime program application, the total population of Cassiano Homes was 2,206: 182 senior citizens (8 percent), 527 adults (24 percent), and 1,497 youths under seventeen years of age (fully 68 percent). Of the 487 families in residence at that time, the striking number of 344 families (71 percent) were headed by

single adults with several dependents; those 344 single heads of households were responsible for 1,187 additional residents. Ethnicity statistics were similarly furnished using the family as unit of analysis. A clear majority of 96.1 percent (468 families) was Mexican-American while 2.1 percent (10) were Black, 1.6 percent (8) Anglo-American, and .2 percent (1) other. That Hispanic majority reflected the citywide majority of 52.2 percent Hispanic citizens in exaggerated fashion. The tenant unemployment rate was conservatively labeled "high" insofar as only 151 project residents were employed when the UIACP application was drafted while 371 tenants were receiving federal assistance payments (chiefly AFDC). The average family income was reported as \$2,732 per annum with no expectation of an upward trend in this city in which, according to 1970 census data, 18 percent of all families received annual incomes of less than \$3,000. The local public housing authority was responsible for 13,000 such economically disadvantaged families and senior citizens. The high tenant unemployment rate and large number of families with incomes well below the national average were partially explained by the limited educational credentials of residents. On average, they completed fewer than 9 years of schooling.

The application's profile of crime rates, both impressionistic and statistically culled from recorded crime data, also portrayed a depressed environment. Police Sector 6, in which Cassiano Homes is located, was clearly plagued by the highest crime rate of all 11 city sectors. In 1977, the year from which baseline data were gathered, 8,036 of San Antonio's 66,024 documented Part I offenses were committed in crime-intensive Sector 6. Internal analysis further revealed a more severe crime problem at Cassiano Homes than at other public housing developments administered by the San Antonio Housing Authority. The average number of police calls per household of 2.21 was reported as in excess of double the average number of calls logged from SAHA's 42 other housing

properties. The San Antonio Police Department responded to 1,435 calls for service from Cassiano Homes' 499 apartments in 1977. More significantly, perhaps, it was determined that more of every type of crime -- violent, predatory, and property crimes -- was committed at Cassiano Homes than at the comparably sized San Juan Homes (493 families) which was judged a suitable yardstick and selected as comparison site for the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program.

Strong visual cues contributed to the prevailing opinion that crime and disorder were particularly problematic at the target site. Because of a rowhouse architectural design reminiscent of endless lines of military barracks, tenants were expected to park their cars in distant, unsecured parking lots where the automobiles were susceptible to theft and vandalism. Residents compensated for this design problem in an unsightly and unsafe manner by driving directly into their front or back yards where they might more easily maintain surveillance over vehicles -- a practice which destroyed yards and common areas used for access and endangered children's safety. Graffiti was ubiquitous, a trademark of Cassiano Homes. Other highly visible forms of anti-social behavior associated with the project's large youthful population were truancy, systematic intimidation of families by older youths, and substance abuse, such as glue- and paint-sniffing. Yet, despite the high rate of calls for assistance made to the police department, many crimes were never reported due to a lack of faith in the judicial system, a want of respect for law enforcement officials, and fear of retaliation by aggrieved parties. Vengeance, it was alleged, constituted the preferred means of dispute settlement among tenants. Fear of crime was thus high. According to the UIACP application, residents anticipated that victimization of crime was inevitable and they considered burglary and theft as daily occurrences.

II. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

A. Process of Program Development

As indicated, the factors which determined SAHA's selection of Cassiano Homes as the demonstration site for the UIACP included the volume of calls placed to the police department, the crime rate as compared with that of a comparable development, and the project's compelling modernization needs, with emphasis on the lack of adequate parking facilities and graffiti-ridden end walls of buildings. The primary determinant, however, was perhaps the community anti-crime program jointly directed by the San Antonio Housing Authority and the Mexican-American Neighborhood Civic Organization which was on-going when the announcement of UIACP funds was made. SAHA-MANCO, as it was known, functioned for two years prior to the start-up of UIACP activities in September 1980. Activities initiated under the auspices of SAHA-MANCO were soon to be phased out unless additional funding was obtained. The coordinator of that program was keenly interested in assuring continuity of funding, thus he contributed to drafting of the UIACP proposal.

The principal author of the application, however, was SAHA's Director of Human Resources, an individual who had also worked with the National Center for Housing Management in Washington, D.C., and thus had acquired expertise in various approaches to dealing with crime in public housing. Upon learning of the availability of UIACP funds in early 1979, he began to draft the proposal almost single-handedly, with some assistance from the SAHA-MANCO Coordinator and from SAHA's Coordinator of Security. He also called meetings with residents and representatives of the San Antonio Police Department. Members of the Cassiano Homes Resident Association reported their major crime-related concerns as vandalism, burglary, paint-sniffing, insufficient lighting, the need for a felt police presence, and generally inadequate security. Police officials, on the

other hand, stressed that tenants should be better educated on crime-prevention measures and aggressively encouraged to report crimes to the police.

In the application submitted to HUD in June 1979, the Director of Human Resources made an effort to address the concerns voiced by residents and the police at the above-mentioned meetings. He also considered the results of the project's needs assessment survey conducted during the SAHA-MANCO program in identifying these additional problems: the lack of organized, supervised, recreation programs for youths, the high consumption of alcohol, and a lack of privacy due to population density. Finally, certain activities conducted during the SAHA-MANCO program which had attempted to alleviate those most salient sources of distress were endorsed by the UIACP. Operation Identification, tenant patrols, block watches and Project Peek-a-Thief furnish the main examples of activities whose operation beyond the expiration of the SAHA-MANCO program was to be guaranteed by UIACP funds.

In July 1979, SAHA received HUD's critique of their application. HUD reviewers determined that every program area of the proposed program needed to be strengthened with the exception of program area 1.2, "More and Improved Community Anti-Crime Facilities and Physical Redesign." As with all sites, HUD singled out points 2.3 ("More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/Witnesses") and 3.2 ("Stronger Links with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources") as particularly weak, and requested receipt of revisions by 4 September 1979.

The housing authority's revised application was better organized insofar as it was restructured around a central, unifying concept--"turf reclamation"--which was presumably inspired by the William Brill materials that accompanied the HUD review. These semi-final revisions outlined a three-part program. First, SAHA proposed to hire youths to perform Modernization tasks and

to provide security guard training at a local community college. Secondly, neighborhood security organizers responsible for tenant patrols, block watches, and crime-prevention workshops were to receive training on "turf reclamation" concepts. Finally, the housing authority would create an Anti-Crime Resources Center in order to facilitate integration of a network of public and private sector organizations' services with on-site anti-crime resources.

A cooperative agreement to implement the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program was issued in June 1980, and revised in September 1980 to incorporate statements of work for Victim/Witness, ADAMHA, and OJJDP components. The final budget, with the percentage of total federal funding assumed by each component noted parenthetically, was as follows: \$400,000 Modernization (61.49 percent); \$33,000 Community Development Block Grants (5.07 percent); \$66,000 Department of Labor (10.15 percent); \$20,000 Victim/Witness (3.07 percent); \$48,000 Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (7.38 percent); and \$83,500 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (12.84 percent). The final in-kind budget of local matching funds was set at \$165,801 or 25.49 percent of the aggregate federal commitment of \$650,500. The total operating budget, then, amounted to \$816,301. In September 1980, fifteen months after submission of the original application to HUD, baseline summary data were approved and the San Antonio Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program began to operate at Cassiano Homes.

B. Process Evaluation Methodology

A bilingual field observer trained by evaluation staff in April 1981 collected process evaluation data for approximately 12 months, from May 1981 until May 1982. During that year, this individual conducted formal interviews with program staff and the housing manager of Cassiano Homes and submitted written reports based on the same to the process evaluation team at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The observer also provided

documentation of the Victim/Witness and Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration programs administered at Cassiano Homes.

A supervisory visit to the site was made by the process evaluation Project Director in March 1981. In addition, the observer spent a week (1-5 March 1982) in residence at Harvard University for the purpose of drafting a preliminary process evaluation case study. Using all available resources and process evaluation data files, two research assistants at Harvard University subsequently collaborated to draft a more comprehensive process evaluation case study.

Program impact methodology will be discussed in Section IV.

III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

A. Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention

The housing authority's planned effort to upgrade crime-prevention initiatives at the target site incorporated these three proposals: appointment of a Public Safety Coordinator (PSC), creation of a Security Advisory Team, and institution of a training program for Cassiano Homes managers and foremen which would enable them to more competently identify potential security problems.

The Public Safety Coordinator was hired at the program's inception in September 1980 and remained with the program until 31 January 1982. Evidence supports the proposition that because of this individual's experience as coordinator of an anti-crime program similar to the UIACP, he was hand-picked for the position rather than a respondent to a posted employment listing. His long tenure in a program characterized by continual staff turnovers has been attributed to his insistence upon adhering to bureaucratic lines of authority and the emphasis he placed upon the cumbersome documentation requirements of the Anti-Crime Program. He was not a controversial figure. The PSC did not report directly to the Executive Director, as requested by HUD, but to the lower-

ranking Project Manager.

The Security Advisory Team was to have become a permanent committee charged with the responsibility of developing policies and procedures to maximize use of existing SAHA security personnel. Planned membership included the Public Safety Coordinator, the Deputy Executive Director, the Director of Housing Operations, a representative from the San Antonio Police Department, and the president of the Cassiano Homes Resident Association. The team was never formed, however, allegedly due to the Public Safety Coordinator's inability to engage the interest of proposed members.

With assistance from the Bexar County Legal Aid Society and the San Antonio Police Department, the Public Safety Coordinator provided one four-hour eviction training program for 17 managers and assistant managers of family developments in San Antonio.

B. More and Improved Anti-Crime Service Facilities and Physical Redesign

Multiple physical redesign and modernization activities were initially proposed by the housing authority. Most significantly, the creation of additional tenant parking lots proximate to the dwelling units, the installation of barrier posts to restrict vehicular traffic from proscribed areas, and the enclosure of the backyards of the rowhouses were conceived as elements of a comprehensive plan to manage the riotous traffic pattern described above. Fencing and playground equipment were to be installed in six locations in an effort to define recreational space. General security measures proposed were the provision of additional lighting and installation of window security guards on all first- and second-story windows. Lastly, an apartment was to be converted into a Neighborhood Anti-Crime Resources Center. Thus, the proposal focused on reclamation of land lost to mismanaged traffic in an attempt to create "defensible space" and stimulate residents' proprietary instincts.

Design and specification work for fenestration, parking, and lighting improvements were accomplished between October and December 1980. Periods of inactivity retarded the implementation process but the contracts for the much desired parking and lighting work were eventually awarded on 20 August 1981, and the improvements were made sometime prior to March 1982.

The installation of barrier posts, fences, and playground equipment as well as the enclosure of backyards was foregone, however, due to overruns in the Modernization budget. Most of the resources originally proposed to finance those activities (\$45,250) were diverted to fund construction of additional parking areas and to compensate, of course, for the reduced purchasing power of funds allotted in 1980 but spent in 1981/82.

One activity -- the installation of window security guards -- appears to have been fraught with difficulties engendered by unsound planning. Owing to poor technical advice, that planned improvement failed to conform to a HUD Minimum Property Standard which specifies that screens must accompany the window guards. Once the budget was redrawn, it was clear that a smaller physical area than planned would benefit from this target-hardening measure. Window security screens alone were eventually ordered and installed by 9 August 1982.

With regard to community anti-crime service facilities, two dwelling units were renovated to house the Anti-Crime Resources Center at Cassiano Homes. Initially, one unit was designated for UIACP staff occupancy while the other was set aside as an on-site office for community agencies. When representatives of the latter failed to respond to the invitation to open satellite offices at Cassiano Homes, the second unit was appropriated by a community cultural committee.

C. More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation

Three activities were specifically designed to further the principal

objective of the UIACP -- to galvanize resident interest in crime prevention and to mobilize them into effective self-help groups. First, three Neighborhood Security Organizers (a Director and 2 Outreach Workers) were to be hired. Second, the existing Cassiano Homes Resident Association was to be charged with the responsibility of organizing tenant patrols and block watches. Finally, assisted by the Neighborhood Security Organizers, the Resident Association was also to hold four neighborhood workshops on the subject of "Improving Community/Police Relationships." These activities were collectively referred to as the CDBG program.

The first CDBG Director was hired in October 1980 and terminated in March 1981. Activities falling within his jurisdiction were subsequently handled by caretakers. Discontinuity in direction predictably compromised the rate of successful implementation and the effectiveness of activities which were accomplished, even though the 2 Outreach Workers hired in January 1981 remained with the program.

The latter were responsible, first, for implementing a number of the SAHAMANCO Community Anti-Crime Program activities inherited by the UIACP -- viz., Operation Identification, Project Peek-a-Thief, GED classes and an Early Alert Program. Secondly, when the Resident Association (with only 4 active members) proved to be too poorly organized to assume a leading role in organization of the tenant patrols and block watches, that responsibility fell to the Outreach Workers. They claimed to have recruited 20 block captains and 30 residents for tenant patrols but observation disclosed a great disparity between the number of tenants committed on paper and the number who attended meetings. There was little evidence that the block watch or tenant patrol was ever organized. The 4 neighborhood workshops designed to ameliorate police-community relations were held between November 1980 and August 1981.

D. Increased Full- and Part-Time Employment of Tenants

When the Anti-Crime Program application was prepared during the Spring of 1979, it was reported that only 151 of Cassiano Home's 2,206 residents (including 527 "adults") were employed. The housing authority envisaged reducing unemployment among tenants by: hiring youths to serve as Community Service Officers, Security Guards, and Security Window Guard Installers; sponsoring a murals project; and working with the Resident Association and Texas Employment Commission to locate an employment outreach mechanism at the proposed Neighborhood Anti-Crime Resources Center. DOL funds were to provide the youth-workers salaries while the housing authority had received a tentative pledge from the Levi-Strauss Foundation to finance the murals project. These initiatives were referred to as the DOL program.

Organizational efforts were hindered from the outset by staffing problems. Three successive DOL directors served individual tenures of no more than 6 months. Security Guards were not hired because the local agency deputized to train them declined to perform that service. Security Window Guard Installers were, of course, not hired because that modernization task was not performed. Various (precise number unknown) youths filled the 7 recast positions of Community Service Officer and Community Improvement Trainee. Follow-up reports indicated that most of the youths were again unemployed when the program ended but documented one success story of a woman whose UIACP employment experience motivated her to attend a junior college and resolve personal crises. A number of murals was apparently painted on graffiti-ridden end-walls, as proposed. The planned on-site Jobs Data Bank was not implemented because Texas Employment Commission officials asserted that it would constitute an unnecessary duplication of services and a waste of finances.

E. More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/Witnesses

The San Antonio Housing Authority successfully requested funding for 3 subsidiary programs: \$20,000 for an LEAA-funded Victim/Witness of Crime program, \$48,000 for an Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) program, and thirdly, \$83,500 for an Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention-funded program.

The Victim/Witness Director hired in September 1980 remained with the program until June 1981, when funds were exhausted -- a notable achievement since this is the only program component which did not suffer from staff turnover. Minimal documentation of Victim/Witness activities was maintained but we do know that 3 workshops designed to educate tenants regarding the criminal justice system and to improve tenant/police relations were held between December 1980 and June 1981. Perhaps the most striking achievement of this program was the Director's organization of the Concerned Residents Committee (CRC) which was perceived as a viable alternative to the allegedly management-dominated Resident Association. However commendable the initiative, however, no strong resident leaders emerged from among the members and so the CRC disbanded when the Victim/Witness Director's tenure ended.

To the contrary, turnover in both the ADAMHA and OJJDP components was high, as it was in the CDBG component. The ADAMHA program handled a caseload of 18 individual clients. A survey was administered at the outset of the program to 97 tenants, aged 18 and older, to determine their substance abuse and mental health concerns. Respondents, representing 19 percent of all occupied dwelling units at Cassiano Homes, replied that the use of toxic inhalants constituted "the most serious problem" while great concern about teenage pregnancy, child neglect and child abuse were also expressed. A follow-up survey was also conducted but results were withheld from the process observer.

Effectiveness of the OJJDP program was likewise compromised by

administrative chaos and discontinuity in staff leadership. Accomplishments were recorded, however, including the founding of a Cassiano Homes Youth Organization, the establishment of a Youth Development Advisory Committee, and the scheduling of a number of "youth diversion activities."

F. Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers

Police involvement in the Cassiano Homes anti-crime program was to have assumed two forms. First, SAHA proposed that the San Antonio Police Department (SAPD) would provide training on minority relations and crisis intervention to all city police officers assigned to the demonstration site. No federal funds were requested as the staff time required for this sensitivity training was to have constituted a local match by the police department. The SAPD was also to have established a 24-hour mobile team and instituted a 40-hour-per-week "store front" unit at the project. The estimated \$100,000 cost of the latter activity was to have been financed by LEAA.

Neither proposed activity was implemented. The training program was abandoned because no funds had been allocated for any training that would satisfy police department standards. The value of such supplemental training was also questioned since "sensitivity training" already constitutes 40 percent of the police training curriculum. The "store front" unit proposal was abandoned early in the program as the housing authority failed to receive LEAA funds.

Police involvement in the anti-crime program was limited, perhaps as a consequence of the police department's internal problems. Negotiations between program staff and police officials were strained by a volatile incident in December 1980 in which a police officer allegedly used unwarranted force, killing a Mexican burglary suspect. An extensive reorganization of the police department which occurred during the UIACP also undoubtedly worked to the

detriment of the anti-crime program. The quality and rapidity of police response to calls for service from Cassiano Homes residents allegedly remains a problem, in the tenants' collective opinion.

G. Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources

Proposed attempts to improve relations between the San Antonio Housing Authority and local government agencies focused on invigorating linkages with the Alamo Area Council of Governments (a regional federation of local government bureaus), the city's Housing Task Force, Communities Organized for Public Service, the San Antonio Development Agency, and the San Antonio Economic Development Office.

According to the site observer, all evidence tends to confirm the proposition that virtually no effort was expended to further the objective of this program area.

IV. Program Impact

A. Impact Evaluation Methodology

Prior discussion has focused on the process evaluation portion of this comprehensive evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program conducted at Cassiano Homes in San Antonio, Texas. The principal contractor, the Police Foundation, and two subcontractors (DAMANS and Associates, Inc., and Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.) also conducted an impact assessment which analysed crime victimization rates, a variety of citizen attitudes, and changes in recorded crime. The impact component was designed, then, to document changes in crime patterns which might be attributable to program activities, as well as to elucidate residents' opinions on the quality of life at their housing project, the anti-crime program, the local police, their housing authority, and the seriousness of crime relative to their other concerns.

The standard constituent elements of the impact assessment of the

anti-crime program are: (1) an analysis of victimization and attitudinal resident surveys conducted at the target site and, if possible, at a comparison site; (2) an analysis of changes in recorded crime; and (3) a site-by-site study of the youth employment programs. As will be explained, recorded crime data will be discussed but have been disregarded for the purposes of this evaluation because of deficiencies in the record. Also, no site-specific study of the YCCIP Youth Employment Program at Cassiano Homes was prepared by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., as originally proposed. On joint recommendation from HUD, the Department of Labor, the Police Foundation, and that institution, the initial evaluation design was modified to delete the Cassiano Homes youth program from the site-specific analyses.

Attitudinal and victimization surveys were conducted by DAMANS and Associates, Inc., fieldstaff between 22 May 1981 and 30 July 1981, at both the target site and at a comparison site, San Juan Homes. Survey statistics are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Resident Survey Statistics

project	total # apts.	sampled households	completed households/ respondents	refused	vacant	household response rate	sampling rate
Cassiano Homes	450	205	177/236	8	4	88%	54.6%
San Juan Homes	493	215	179/262	2	5	85%	43.6%

Both long and short survey instruments were developed. The former outlined a detailed investigation of the attitudinal issues discussed later in this section while questions in the latter focused on recent victimization experiences and fear of crime. The distribution of completed interviews is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1

	<u>long forms</u>	<u>short forms</u>	<u>total # respondents</u>
Cassiano Homes	84	152	236
San Juan Homes	101	161	262
totals	185	313	498

This survey data provides a rich satisfying vein to mine with respect to both magnitude and timing. The surveys were conducted during the Summer of 1981 when most anti-crime program activities were drawing to a close. Thus, one may argue that the results plausibly assess at least the initial impact of promotion of the UIACP and residents' involvement in, or indifference to, the program.

Secondly, recorded crime data were gathered for the complete calendar years of 1977, 1978 and 1981. Partial statistics were furnished for 1979 (January, February, March) and 1980 (August - December, inclusive). Discrete statistical profiles of the target site and the comparison site were furnished. For each year, 3 tables were constructed. The recorded crime summary tabulated monthly incidences of murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and stolen automobiles. The second table aggregated statistics in the following manner: personal crimes (murder, rape, robbery, assault); violent crimes (murder, rape, assault); predatory crimes (robbery); property crimes (burglary, larceny, auto theft); burglary; non-auto property crimes (burglary and larceny). theft (larceny and auto theft). The third table documented recorded crime per 10,000 persons, using the categories adopted in the aggregate summary.

B. Resident Survey Analyses

1. Program Awareness. More than half of the residents surveyed at Cassiano Homes were aware that crime-prevention meetings were held at the housing project. While 58 percent of the respondents indicated knowledge of such meetings, strikingly disparate numbers of residents revealed familiarity

with particular program activities. Fully 71 percent knew of Operation ID which featured the engraving of personal possessions with electric instruments; it should be noted, however, that Operation ID had been carried out under the SAHA-MANCO anti-crime program for two years prior to the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. Awareness of other programs varied; 46 percent knew of the youth employment program, 19 percent were apprised of ADAMHA program activities, and 7 percent of those surveyed knew of the Victim/Witness Program. It was reported that 32 percent of the residents were aware of an apartment watch program and 10 percent knew of a neighborhood watch program but, in light of the UIACP design at Cassiano Homes, it is difficult to interpret these statistics because the terminological distinctions should have had no import for residents at the target site.

2. Program Participation. Participation rates were measured in terms of households rather than individual residents. Thirty-two percent of Cassiano households contacted were reported to have participated in crime-prevention meetings. Fully 53 percent of the households took part in Operation ID although it has been pointed out that that activity was also sponsored by an earlier anti-crime program. While 7 percent of the households reported participating in the youth employment program, only 3 percent were involved in the ADAMHA program and 1 percent acknowledged participation in the Victim/Witness Program. Involvement of interviewees in social service activities was clearly low in that, of 177 households surveyed, approximately 5 reported participation in ADAMHA activities while 1 or 2 indicated participation in the Victim/Witness Program.

3. Fear, Victimization, and the Quality of Life. Some sense of resident cohesion exists at Cassiano Homes. Residents report that it is fairly easy to distinguish residents from outsiders, for instance. Also, 45 percent of

those interviewed consider the project "a real home" and 39 percent replied that tenants tend to "help each other." Yet, considerable fear of crime was documented. While an equal number of men and women feel unsafe (33 percent), newcomers are particularly worried about crime (53 percent). One curious findings was that 77 percent of high school graduates feel unsafe while only 28 percent of those who have had fewer years of schooling expressed commensurate anxiety. Since level of education does not generally correlate with fear of crime, no judgment may be made without ascertaining the number of high school graduates in the sample. Tenants were particularly concerned about property crimes; 55 percent rated vandalism a big problem and 47 percent classified burglary as such a problem. Only 10 percent were worried about robbery while 32 percent rate unruly teenagers a big problem.

When queried about crime-prevention strategies, 90 percent replied that they get someone to keep an eye on their homes while they are away. A large number, 54 percent, said they had had their valuable possessions engraved. Only 6 percent admitted to possession of a gun for personal protection and 5 percent of those surveyed said they had installed additional locks in their homes. Most significantly, perhaps, tenants expressed the belief that they can do very little to reduce crime at Cassiano Homes.

As serious as the crime problem may be, however, tenants most vigorously complained about the quality of services at the development. The project manager's performance was rated as poor. Work done by the maintenance staff was unequivocally evaluated as poor. The contributions of the Resident Association to tenant life were accorded only a marginally higher rating and tenants affirmed that they have little "say...about decisions made by the housing authority." It was alleged that city police do a fairly poor job of providing protection to residents although that judgement was qualified; the quality of

citizen-police interactions which do take place were rated less harshly.

With regard to personal victimization experiences, the greatest number of residents, 16.4 percent, reported that they had been victims of burglary during the past year. Of next greatest magnitude, 12.1 percent of the respondents indicated that they had been targets of threats and intimidation. Only 4.6 percent said that they had been victims of violent crime and only 2.3 percent reported being victims of predatory crimes.

Striking similarities in the portrayals of life at the demonstration site and at the comparison site emerge from the results of the attitudinal and victimization surveys. Commensurate numbers of respondents replied that they like living at their projects and would recommend the development to friends, with some reservations. A slightly greater number of tenants at the comparison site consider the housing project a real home (52 v. 45 percent) and believe that tenants generally help each other (43 v. 39 percent). A comparable number of tenants feel unsafe in their neighborhoods at the target site (32 percent) and at the comparison site (31 percent). Residents of both developments rated the performance of city police as poor. Burglary was judged a particularly big problem at both sites while it was reported that robberies occur much less frequently. Tenants at both projects assessed the performance of their respective tenant organizations as fair; curiously, however, San Juan Homes' residents rated their resident organization as more effective than did tenants at the demonstration site, yet those same residents of San Juan Homes believed that they have much less say in housing authority administrative decisions than do Cassiano Homes residents.

The differences in attitudinal survey responses are particularly instructive. Residents at the comparison site reported fewer grievances concerning maintenance issues; work done by the project manager and maintenance

staff was given much more favorable ratings at the comparison site than at the demonstration site. Tenants' fear of vandalism seems to correlate with the quality of maintenance services. Almost twice as many Cassiano Homes respondents (55 percent) were worried about destruction due to vandalism than were San Juan Homes tenants (29 percent). In fact, more demonstration site residents perceived that nearly all types of crime-related concerns about public disorder were "a big problem" than did those at San Juan Homes. For example, higher numbers complained of neighbors fighting (34 v. 20 percent), substance abuse (42 v. 32 percent), parents beating their children (18 v. 5 percent), and trash left lying around (49 v. 28 percent). Consequently, Cassiano Homes residents indicated that they had taken more measures to guard against crime, particularly by appealing to friends to keep an eye on their property while they were away (90 v. 64 percent). Fewer Cassiano Homes residents (5 percent) had installed additional locks, however, than had tenants at San Juan Homes (15 percent). Few residents at either site admitted to obtaining a gun for protection - Cassiano Homes (6 percent) and San Juan Homes (5 percent).

The results of victimization surveys confirmed the prevailing attitude that a greater number of virtually all types of crime were committed at Cassiano Homes than at the comparison site. Percentages of victimization rates reported by respondents are recorded in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2

	<u>Burglary</u>	<u>Threats and Intimidations</u>	<u>Violent Crime</u>	<u>Predatory Crime</u>
<u>Cassiano Homes</u>	16.4	12.1	4.6	2.3
<u>San Juan Homes</u>	10.7	8.5	3.0	.6

It can also be seen from this figure that similar patterns of relative frequency were reported by residents of both projects.

4. Perceptions of Change. Two questions posed by interviewers were designed to elicit how residents thought then-current (i.e., as the UIACP program was nearing completion) conditions compared with conditions prevailing before the anti-crime program was implemented. When asked whether the project was a better or worse place to live, Cassiano Homes residents replied that the quality of life there was considerably better. Also, in the opinion of those residents, crime had become considerably less of a problem. Residents of San Juan Homes, where no anti-crime program had been conducted, determined that the same notable degree of improvement in the quality of life had occurred at their housing project during the year. Those residents also judged that crime had grown to be less of a problem at San Juan Homes during the year although they were not quite as enthusiastic in that determination as the residents of the demonstration site, Cassiano Homes. Notably positive trends were thus recorded at both housing projects.

C. Recorded Crime Analysis: Measurement and Interpretation Problems

As stated, recorded crime data were collected for both the demonstration site and the comparison site for the entire calendar years of 1977, 1978 and 1981. Partial statistics were furnished for 1979 and 1980. Succinctly, in 1977, more incidents of every type of crime were committed at Cassiano Homes than at San Juan Homes. Cassiano Homes reported 252.04 incidents of personal crimes and 927.16 property crimes per 10,000 persons while the corresponding figures at San Juan Homes were 171.95 and 757.66. In 1978, a precipitous drop in the number of recorded personal and property crimes at both sites was documented during that year.

For purposes of information, it will be noted that, in 1981, 194.29 personal crimes and 508.85 property crimes per 10,000 persons were recorded as having been committed at Cassiano Homes while 107.87 personal crimes and 749.43 property crimes per 10,000 residents were recorded as having occurred at San

Juan Homes. Since incomplete data were furnished for 1979 and 1980, however, no trends may be inferred. We can only conclude by stating that, using the baseline statistic of 1179.21 recorded crimes per 10,000 Cassiano Homes residents, the crime index dropped, in 1978, to 997.48 and was recorded as lower again (703.13) in 1981. Comparable statistics for San Juan Homes--1977 (929.61) 1978 (643.62) and 1981 (857.31)--show a higher index in 1981 at San Juan Homes than at the demonstration site (857.31 v. 703.13). These statistics do not reveal the level of crime in either development just prior to the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, however, thus we cannot hypothesize about the impact of either the SAHA-MANCO or Urban Initiatives crime prevention programs on the basis of recorded crime data.

V. CONCLUSION

The San Antonio Housing Authority's Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program application, as revised, represented a carefully integrated proposed package of crime-prevention activities structured around the central, unifying concept of "turf reclamation." As implemented, the Modernization component did not address all priorities, due to the eroded purchasing power occasioned by inflation and one instance of unsound budgetary planning. Much desired parking and lighting improvements were notably provided, however, and an Anti-Crime Resources Office was opened at the demonstration site. The volume of activity in the social service components was low, perhaps because of the confusion generated by discontinuity in staff leadership but a caseload of 18 clients was developed in the ADAMHA component and some youth activities were organized. The failure to form a strong relationship with the local police department was probably due more to a causal intervening factor, the internal problems experienced by the police department, than to intrinsic deficiencies in the Anti-Crime Program.

Resident participation also proved to be problematic. Despite assurances

in San Antonio's proposal that the organized resident association at Cassiano Homes was very active, events proved otherwise and tenant leaders did not ultimately assume responsibility for stimulating residents' interests in program activities. Tenant participation came about chiefly through paid staff positions; at least 14 residents were directly involved in such salaried positions. A promising attempt to form an alternative to the allegedly management-dominated and inactive Residents Association was made by the Victim/Witness Director; the Concerned Residents Committee disbanded, however, when that director's tenure expired and thus that innovation was not institutionalized.

Measurement and interpretation problems were posed by incomplete recorded crime data. We do know that the recorded crime rate at Cassiano Homes was lower in 1981 than in 1977, the year of baseline data. Incidences of property crimes were particularly diminished. The absence of data for segments of 1979 and 1980 precluded the possibility of discerning trends. We can say that the total recorded crime rate per 10,000 persons in Cassiano Homes, which had been higher than that in San Juan Homes during 1977 and 1978, was lower than that of the comparison site during 1981. The recorded crime index at Cassiano Homes was 703.13 per 10,000 while at San Juan Homes it stood at 857.31. The diminished rate at the demonstration site was largely a reflection of a decrease in property crimes which may, of course, have been attributable to Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program measures.

Attitudinal and victimization survey results provided a much richer source of information for evaluators. One of the most salient features of the attitudinal survey findings was the extreme dissatisfaction with maintenance services at Cassiano Homes. The issue of poor maintenance also surfaced as a significant aspect of tenants' anxiety over crime-related concerns about public


disorder such as garbage, trash, graffiti, and extensive vandalism. One might construe the survey results to mean that tenants desired an improved maintenance program rather than a crime-prevention program. To the extent that Modernization component activities vastly improved lighting and parking facilities, the anti-crime program made considerable headway in addressing tenants' concerns. Any analysis of the origin, fate, and legacy of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program must justly conclude with the following survey result; when queried near the program's end, Cassiano Homes residents asserted that the quality of life at the housing project had improved during the past year and that crime had become considerably less of a problem during that time. Yet residents of San Juan Homes, where no program had been administered, reported similar improvements.

SAN ANTONIO
San Juan Homes

26


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units



SAN ANTONIO
Cassiano Homes 27


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)



RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units

