

Changing Urban Populations: Regional Restructuring, Racial Polarization, and Poverty Concentration

William H. Frey and Elaine L. Fielding
University of Michigan

Overview

New Contexts for Urban Demographic Change

The contexts for urban demographic change in the United States have led to sharper divisions in the growth prospects, diversity profiles, and economic structures across broad regions of the country as well as within metropolitan areas.¹ Some of the worst consequences of these new demographic growth trends are borne by inner-city residents in selected parts of the Rustbelt and also in coastal areas that serve as ports of entry for the flow of immigrants that has accelerated over the course of the 1980s.

The changing structure of the U.S. economy is increasingly concentrating poverty and unemployment among racial minorities in the inner cities and a growing number of suburban communities. Joblessness among African-American males, increasing teenage pregnancy and single-parent households, children in poverty and poor health, homelessness, welfare dependency, crime, drugs, gangs, and violence—these and related problems reduce national economic growth through the loss of human resources and labor productivity. Moreover, they diminish the quality of life throughout metropolitan areas. Many urban communities and their low-income residents must be brought back into the mainstream of American life with decent jobs, stable families, adequate health care, affordable housing, and accessible transportation.

Understanding the changing population profiles of urban America, with its increasing number of immigrants and growing diversity imposed upon a background of unfortunate racial and income polarization, is a necessary first step in meeting the challenge of diversity. This overview provides a backdrop by focusing on the forces that shape key demographic trends across broad regions and in metropolitan areas and then shows how these trends have led to disparities in growth and decline, racial polarization, and poverty concentration. The disparities that now exist across the Nation's urban landscape have been strongly influenced by three elements (Frey, 1993; 1995a), discussed below.

Urban and Regional Restructuring. The 1980s brought a return to urbanization against the backdrop of the “rural renaissance” of the 1970s (see figure 1). The latter is now seen to be a result of exogenous or cyclical economic and demographic forces that temporarily increased the growth of small metropolitan areas and nonmetropolitan territory. The rural renaissance also resulted from an industrial restructuring that reduced the employment-generating capacities of many northern industrial centers. The new urban growth patterns are clearly not a return to the past. Rather, they reflect new industrial structure shifts that favor knowledge-based advanced service industries in metropolitan areas serving as corporate headquarters or areas with otherwise highly diversified economies. Growth has also occurred in recreation and retirement centers catering to large waves of retirees. Still, many small areas and nonmetropolitan counties, particularly those in the interior part of the Nation that relied on less-than-competitive industries, did not fare well during the economic downturns of the 1980s. In summary, urban and regional restructuring has created sharper economic and demographic growth distinctions across regions and metropolitan areas.

Immigration-Related Minority Gains. The expanded role of minority populations is the second important influence on population redistribution in the United States. The increasing immigration from Latin America and Asia, as well as the population growth of native-born minorities, has led to a sharp nationwide disparity in growth between the minority and majority (non-Hispanic white) populations.² These national disparities differ across regions and metropolitan areas. Although minorities (Hispanics, blacks, Asians, American Indians, and others) have dispersed to a greater degree than in earlier decades, most minority growth is still strongly concentrated in the South and West and in certain metropolitan areas. For example, 20 percent of the total minority growth over the 1980s accrued in just one metropolitan area—the “majority-minority” (a term that designates a minority population exceeding 50 percent) Los Angeles metropolitan area. More than one-half of the decade-long minority growth accrued to just nine metropolitan areas. In contrast, more than two-thirds of the Nation’s metropolitan areas have lower minority percentages than the Nation as a whole. These disparities in racial and ethnic profiles across broad regions and metropolitan areas can be linked to similar disparities in the age of residents, skill levels, and poverty compositions of these regions.

A Suburban-Dominated Society. The third important distribution-related development of the 1980s is the continued outward spread of people and jobs away from the historically dominant central cities of metropolitan areas. Although the urbanization of the suburbs is not a new theme, and the suburban office boom was already noticeable in the 1970s, evidence suggests that the broad expanse outside central cities has become the primary area of activity for the majority of metropolitan residents (Cervero, 1989). The growth of the non-central city portion of the metropolitan area (that is, suburbs) resulted both from the relocation of activities outside central cities in older northern and eastern metropolitan areas and from the recent suburban growth in southern and western metropolitan areas, where central cities never dominated their areas’ economic and residential landscapes as completely. Although *Edge City: Life on the New Frontier* (Garreau, 1991) has popularized the significance of suburban office and commercial complexes, available empirical research supports the following conclusions: Suburban areas have captured the bulk of employment and residential growth in the 1980s; the modal commuter both lives and works in the suburbs; and several suburban cities have begun to rival their historically dominant central cities in the production of export goods and services (Pisarski, 1987; Stanback, 1991). This is not to devalue a focus on central-city demographic dynamics. On the contrary, it underscores their plight as places that house a plurality of the Nation’s minorities and disproportionate shares of urban poverty and recent immigrant populations.

These three trends—the new disparities in urban growth and decline, the growth of minorities, and suburban dominance of metropolitan activities—are signature characteristics of contemporary urban America. They shape evolving patterns of minority and poverty concentrations in broad regions and metropolitan areas as well as in selected central cities. These evolving patterns are discussed in greater detail below. Because minority concentration is occurring both across regions and within metropolitan areas, the roles of immigration and national minority growth and their selective impacts on the internal redistribution of minorities are first discussed.

Immigration and Minority Gains: National and State Impacts

Immigration's Role in National Growth. The Nation's population continues to grow at the rate of about 1 percent per year. The most pronounced shift is linked to the greater role of international migration, which now accounts for more than one-third of U.S. population growth. During the 1980s about 10 million immigrants entered the United States as legal aliens, undocumented aliens, or refugees. This increase, the largest since the 1900–10 decade, accounted for more than one-third of national population growth.

The heightened immigration component of the Nation's population growth can be attributed, in part, to the high numbers of illegal aliens from Latin America and the refugees who have immigrated from Southeast Asia, Cuba, and elsewhere. It is unlikely that this increased immigration will taper off. Although the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was intended to stem further undocumented immigration, it is estimated that annually between 100,000 and 300,000 persons will immigrate illegally. Moreover, the Immigration Reform Act of 1990 will increase the number of legal immigrants as well. The immigration experience of the 1980s has led the U.S. Census Bureau to revise its projections for future population growth. Primarily because of new immigration assumptions, the projected year-2000 population has been revised from 268 to 275 million. This projection, compiled in December 1992, assumes a net annual immigration of 880,000 (including 200,000 illegal aliens) for each year of the projection. The earlier 1989-based projection assumed an annual net immigration of 500,000.

Nationwide Gain in Minorities. There are two factors that contribute to minority population growth. One is the generally higher fertility rate observed for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, compared with that of the non-Hispanic white population. The second engine that will continue to generate significant minority population growth is immigration. This growth can be traced to the 1965 immigration legislation, which effectively decreased immigration allotments from Europe and Canada and increased allotments for developing countries, particularly those in Asia. As a result, the share of legal immigrants originating in Asian countries increased from 13 percent during the 1960s to about 44 percent during the 1980s. Latin American countries, especially Mexico, continue to account for 40 percent of legal immigrants and almost as many illegal immigrants. As a consequence, the expanded immigration anticipated over the 1990s will be disproportionately of Latin American and Asian origin.

The disparity between minority and majority growth rates over the 1970s and 1980s can be sketched statistically. During both decades each of the primary minority groups increased its population by a significantly higher rate than did whites. Disallowing whites who are Hispanic, the white "majority" population grew by only 4.4 percent during the 1980s, in contrast to a +30.9-percent growth for the combined minority populations. About three-quarters of the Asian populations' 108-percent growth over the decade can be attributed to immigration. Once heavily dominated by immigration from Japan, China, and the Philippines, recent Asian growth encompasses a much wider array of nations,

including India, South Korea, and Viet Nam. About one-half of the Hispanic population's 53-percent growth can be attributed to immigration, with the remainder stemming from natural increase (the surplus of fertility over mortality). Mexicans made up 13.4 million of the 22.3 million U.S. Hispanic population in 1990. The remainder consisted of Puerto Ricans (2.7 million), Cubans (1 million), and other Central and South Americans (about 5 million).

Although Asians and Hispanics represent the fastest growing minorities, the black population remains the most dominant, comprising about 30 million (12.1 percent) of the 1990 U.S. population. Black fertility has declined over the last decade, but its natural increase is still large enough to account for most of the 13-percent growth in the black population. (About one-sixth of this growth is attributable to immigration from Africa and the Caribbean.) However, the continued sharp disparity between the growth rate for blacks and the higher immigration-generated rates for Asians and Hispanics will lead to an increasingly smaller representation of blacks among both the minority and total populations. In 1990 blacks comprised for the first time less than one-half of the combined minority populations. In fact, the Census Bureau's projections for the year 2050 portray a population that is 21 percent Hispanic, 15 percent black, 10 percent Asian, and 1 percent Native American. Under this scenario, majority non-Hispanic whites would constitute only 53 percent of the total population.

Minority Socioeconomic Characteristics. There remain sharp differences among minority groups on measures of income and socioeconomic status, which have triggered debates about the wisdom of current immigration practices. Blacks continue to fare worse than other major minority groups, despite continued socioeconomic improvements. In 1990 the median household income for blacks was only 58 percent of that reported for the majority white population. The comparable figures for Hispanics and Asians were 69 and 118 percent, respectively. Statistics for 1990 show that 29.5 percent of blacks lived below the poverty line, compared with 25.3 percent of Hispanics and 9.8 percent of non-Hispanic whites. Although the Asian population showed a higher median household income than that of the majority white population, its poverty rate was slightly higher at 14.1 percent.

These comparisons, however, camouflage important underlying shifts that are emerging within minority groups. For example, within the black population one finds an emerging affluent population. Black households with incomes of \$50,000 or more grew by 73 percent between 1980–90. They now comprise about 12 percent of all black households, compared with 8.3 percent in 1980. A similar, but less dramatic, rise in affluent households is also observed in the Hispanic population. In addition, the Hispanic and Asian populations are highly diverse in their socioeconomic characteristics. Cubans fare much better than Mexicans on measures of income and poverty, and Puerto Ricans fare worse than either Mexicans or blacks. The Asian population is just as diverse. Although on average Japanese, Filipinos, Indians, Chinese, and South Koreans fare as well as, or better than, non-Hispanic whites, that is not the case for many recent immigrants from Southeast Asia (Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, for example). Immigrants from Asia and Latin America will continue to make important contributions to the U.S. labor force. Taking notice of this fact, the Immigration Reform Act of 1990 placed greater emphasis on economic criteria such as occupational skills in determining which populations to favor for immigration.

A final noteworthy national trend related to minority growth is the compositional change of households. The 1970s trend away from traditional married-couple-with-child households has continued through the 1980s. Married-couple households (with or without children) now represent only 56 percent of all households, and married-couple households

with children represent only 26 percent. Over this period, female-headed family households and nonfamily households registered the greatest numerical gains. An important aspect of changing household composition is its link to household socioeconomic status. For many Americans the shift away from traditional households has meant reduced incomes and higher rates of poverty. Female-headed family households have fared the worst, and the trend is most evident within the black population. In 1991 female-headed families had a poverty rate of 35.6 percent, in contrast to 6 percent for married-couple families and 11.5 percent for all families. Among black families 51.2 percent of those with female heads lived in poverty. The poverty rate for Hispanic female-headed families was almost as high—49.7 percent. Yet the impact of female-headed-family poverty is much more severe among the black population, because a far larger share of black households are included in this category, and the share continues to increase. In the total population, female-headed families account for 55 percent of all families living in poverty. Hence, more than one-fifth of all children are in households living below the poverty level. This is the case for 45.6 percent of all black children. The links between household composition, race, and poverty are significant for selected central cities and are discussed in a later section.

Impacts on States: Migration Dynamics. The demographic trends discussed above reveal a Nation of continuing population growth, increasing diversity, and marked segmentation on measures of socioeconomic status. Yet the national picture camouflages the distinctly varying patterns of broad regions and individual States that result from their divergent immigration and internal migration experiences.

A significant distinction is whether a State's dominant migration flow is comprised of immigration from abroad or internal migration from other States. As the maps in figure 2 reveal, the geographic patterns of gains from these two sources generally do not overlap.³ States that are dominant destinations for migrants from abroad, such as California and New York, tend to be those with large existing populations of earlier immigrants from Latin America and Asia (Bean and Tienda, 1987; Bartel, 1989; McHugh, 1989; Barringer, et al., 1993). A somewhat different group of States constitutes the greatest internal migrant magnets—those that are located largely in the South Atlantic, Pacific, and Mountain census regions. In several cases States that lost a large number of internal migrants gained significantly from immigration.

To clarify these distinctions, a typology of States is presented (see table 1), based on their dominant sources of migration change (Frey, 1994a, 1995c). States classified as “high-immigration States” include the six with the largest 1985–90 migration from abroad, where the immigration component overwhelms net internal migration (California, New York, Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, and Massachusetts). In fact, all of these States except California lost internal migrants to other States during the 1985–90 period. (Note: Although California ranked seventh among States in attracting internal migrants during this period, its growth dynamics are clearly dominated by migration from abroad.)

The six States classified as “high internal-migration States” (Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, Washington, and Arizona) displayed the greatest net increases in their migration exchanges with other States over the 1985–90 period. In each case the net internal migration gains significantly exceeded immigration gains. (This is the case for Florida as well, despite its strong attraction for immigrants.) The main attraction of these States for internal migrants is a growing economy and, in most cases, climatic and other amenities that serve as additional “pulls” for elderly retirees (Taeuber, 1992; Frey, 1992).

The five “high out-migration States” (Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Iowa) displayed the greatest net out-migration in their exchanges with other States and did not receive a substantial number of migrants from abroad. Although several of the high-immigration States (for example, New York, Illinois, Texas, and New Jersey) displayed greater levels of net internal out-migration than some of the high out-migration States, the demographic dynamics of the former are much more heavily influenced by the immigration component.

Although this migration classification of States is based on the dominant immigration/internal migration component of population change, it is also intended to serve as a vehicle for characterizing the race and socioeconomic status selectivity associated with these distinct migration dynamics. Sharp differences in race-migration dynamics are associated with each class of States. The characteristic dynamic for most high-immigration States is a large, primarily minority immigration stream, coupled with a significant, largely white net internal out-migration. Although California’s internal migration is positive, it too sustained selective net out-migration of important white population segments, which is discussed below. Clearly, substantial minority immigrant flows dominate demographic change in all of these States.

The characteristic migration dynamic for the high-internal migration States contrasts sharply with those described above. In this second group, the strong white internal-migration gains dominate growth over the 1985–90 period. Almost the reverse pattern characterizes the race-migration dynamic in high out-migration States. For these, it is a large net out-migration of whites that dominates migration over the 1985–90 period. In fact, with the exception of Louisiana, the minority component of total net out-migration from these States is extremely small. They are losing large numbers of whites, who are not being replaced by migration from abroad.

If these dynamics continue, a situation could develop in which a few immigrant-destination States would continue to gain larger minority populations while losing (predominantly white) internal migrants to other prosperous areas. These processes serve to maintain or even exacerbate a pattern of polarization, which could lead to regional and State differences in racial composition, age structure, and other demographic characteristics that separate the largely minority immigrant populations from the white majority population dominating internal migration streams. These dynamics will be highlighted in the discussions that follow.

Regional and Metropolitan Trends

Growth and Decline in the 1980s

Although immigration has an important impact on metropolitan population growth, areas that gained largely from internal migration have benefitted from economic gains stemming from national and worldwide economic restructuring. The patterns of gains and losses associated with restructuring have led to a resurgence in urban growth in some metropolitan areas, especially larger areas on the coasts. However, many smaller metropolitan areas and rural areas in the Nation’s interior have not benefitted from this regional restructuring.

Growing metropolitan areas tend to be those that have successfully transformed their economies from manufacturing to advanced services, FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate), high-tech research and development, and growing new industries (Noyelle and Stanback, 1984). Less stable growth occurred in smaller, nonmetropolitan areas engaged

in peripheral, routine production activity that could be phased out by decisionmakers located in corporate or (in the case of defense activities) Government centers. Declining growth still occurs in areas that are heavily invested in “old-line” manufacturing.

Nonetheless, much of the deindustrialization-related urban decline of the 1970s turned around in the 1980s. Of the eight “million-plus” metropolitan areas that lost population in the 1970s, three (New York, Philadelphia, and St. Louis) began gaining in 1980–85, and an additional three (Detroit, Milwaukee, and Buffalo) showed gains in 1985–90. Of the eight, only Pittsburgh and Cleveland continued to lose population in the late 1980s, and their level of loss was minimal.

Still, the fastest gainers among the largest metropolitan areas have no histories of heavy industrial manufacturing but have economic bases tied to faster growing economic sectors that tend to be located on the coasts.

When examined from a 30-year perspective, however, it can be seen that the nationwide trend in the 1980s toward reurbanization has been coupled with a deceleration of redistribution to the Sunbelt. Although southern and western growth in the 1980s continued to outpace northern growth by a wide margin, the differential has been reduced—particularly for the South and particularly for the 1985–90 period.

The greatest 1970s-to-1980s reductions in Sunbelt growth are seen for smaller and nonmetropolitan areas of the South and West. These are the areas that contributed most substantially to Sunbelt gains in the 1970s. Although nonmetropolitan areas in the Northeast and Midwest also showed growth slowdowns, these regions’ largest metropolitan areas have rebounded somewhat from their 1970s declines, leading to a slight increase in the Northeast region’s decade-long growth.

Patterns for individual metropolitan areas confirm these regional and urban shifts. Of the 85 small metropolitan areas (with populations less than 250,000) located in the South and West regions, 59 showed higher rates of growth in the 1970s than in the 1960s. However, only 12 of these 85 areas grew faster in the 1980s than in the 1970s, and just 15 of them grew more rapidly in the 1985–90 period than in the early 1980s. At the other extreme, none of the 18 large northern metropolitan areas grew faster in the 1970s than in the 1960s, but 15 showed increased growth in the 1980s and 14 of the 18 grew faster in 1985–89 than in 1980–85.

These shifts suggest that some of the strong period-related draws of small Sunbelt locations have diminished over the 1980s and that several large Snowbelt metropolises benefitted from restructuring or better economic times. Those shifts appeared to accentuate in the late 1980s and are characteristic of particular locations within the Nation’s three broad regions.

A Coastal-Interior Dichotomy. The Snowbelt-Sunbelt (or Northeast and Midwest-South and West) dichotomy continues to be useful for distinguishing large, absolute differences in population decline and growth between these two broad regions. Yet an additional geographic distinction is useful for analyzing the recent changes in urbanization patterns for these regions. This distinction separates the interior portion of each region from its coastal portion. The geographic distinction makes it plain that the observed growth declines in both the South and the West are concentrated heavily in their interior sections. These growth slowdowns are most severe for 1985–90 in the interior South, where small metropolitan areas grew negligibly and nonmetropolitan areas declined. These shifts, along with declines in this section’s large metropolitan areas, led to negligible growth (+0.6 percent) for the interior South in the last half of the 1980s.

Small and nonmetropolitan areas declined in the Sunbelt's coastal sections as well, although these declines were far less severe than in the interior sections. Indeed, smaller metropolitan areas in the coastal regions of the South and West show fairly consistent levels of growth. This consistency stands in sharp contrast to the boom-then-bust experiences of small areas in these regions' interior sections.

Small and nonmetropolitan areas in the northern part of the country also display disparate patterns for interior (Midwest) and coastal (Northeast) regions. Although these areas showed lower levels of growth in the 1970s than their counterparts in the Sunbelt, small Midwest areas fared even worse in the 1980s, particularly in the early part of the decade. Nonmetropolitan areas in this section registered negligible, and then negative, growth as the decade wore on. In contrast, small and nonmetropolitan Northeast areas showed increased growth in the 1985–90 period. These categories of Northeast areas grew faster than the large metropolises of the region.

The growth slowdowns of small and nonmetropolitan interior areas in both the Sunbelt and Snowbelt are strongly linked to economic influences. The worldwide, cyclical forces that stimulated the sharp 1970s growth in the Nation's smaller interior areas served to turn this growth on its head in the 1980s. The weak early-1970s dollar stimulated labor-intensive manufacturing in the South's eastern interior region and many small Rustbelt areas. But the dollar became stronger in the early 1980s with the change in the balance of trade. This fact, combined with recessions, led to reduced demand, which increased unemployment and disinvestment in these activities and areas. Likewise, the worldwide agricultural shortages that stemmed the decline of U.S. farming areas in the 1970s turned into agricultural surpluses in the 1980s, contributing to widespread declines in the rural and smalltown Midwest and selected parts of the South.

Still, it was the changing fortunes of the mining and petroleum industries that had the most severe impact on communities of all sizes—in Appalachia, the mountain West, and particularly the Southwest. Many of these areas grew at an exceptional pace during portions of the 1970s and early 1980s, but with the fall of worldwide petroleum prices toward mid-decade, boom turned to bust fairly quickly in certain large metropolitan areas as well as many small and nonmetropolitan areas.

The generally higher levels of growth of smaller and nonmetropolitan areas in the coastal sections of their respective regions results from particular economic specialties, such as the recreation and retirement industries in Florida, New England, and the Pacific Northwest. It is also explained by the more diversified economies these areas possess by virtue of being strongly linked to the broad urban networks in the coastal portions of their regions. Some of the areas (such as the Allentown, Lancaster, and Reading Metropolitan Statistical Areas [MSAs] in eastern Pennsylvania) are a relatively short distance from major metropolises and thus able to attract both employers and residents in search of somewhat lower labor and housing costs.

The growth prospects for large coastal metropolises in each region improved considerably over the 1980s, with areas that serve as national or regional advanced-service centers showing the steadiest population gains. Coastal metropolitan areas that specialize in recreation and resorts (such as Miami and Tampa–St. Petersburg) show spectacular but fluctuating growth. Together, both types of areas help to account for the steady growth in the Nation's coastal regions in the 1980s.

Regional Racial Disparities

The Nation's racial and ethnic minority groups are becoming an increasingly strong influence on population redistribution patterns. The combined minority population (including Hispanics and races other than white) grew more than seven times as fast as the non-Hispanic white "majority" population over the 1980s. The Asian population more than doubled, from 3.5 to more than 7 million. Hispanics grew by more than 50 percent, from 14.6 to 22.3 million. Blacks, the largest minority numerically, increased by 3.5 million over the 1980s, to a total of almost 30 million.

Because of these increases, the combined minority population now comprises 60.5 million people: almost one-quarter (24.4 percent) of the total population. Yet the minorities are far from evenly distributed across the national landscape (see figure 3). Historically, immigrants have tended to locate in traditional port-of-entry areas or areas that already have a large concentration of their ethnic group. Native-born minorities have tended to travel well-worn migration paths, with friends and family attachments taking precedence over economic opportunities. Although these stereotypes have shifted slightly during the 1980s, minority redistribution patterns are quite distinct from those of the white majority, which is more inclined to follow the "pushes" and "pulls" associated with regional restructuring. These new minority-majority patterns are likely to continue during the 1990s, leading to wider disparities in the racial and ethnic compositions of regions, metropolitan areas, and communities.

Regional and Metropolitan Patterns. Differences in the majority-minority compositions of broad regions and metropolitan categories are evident from the results of the 1990 census. Whites make up about three-quarters of the Nation's population and represent close to that share (72 percent) in the South. Yet the white share increases to 83 percent in the North (the Northeast and Midwest regions) and drops to 67 percent in the West. In large metropolitan areas (those with a population of more than 1 million) in the West, the white share sinks to only 63 percent. This stands in sharp contrast to the nonmetropolitan North, where 96 percent of the population is comprised of whites. These broad patterns camouflage even greater disparities among individual metropolitan areas and nonmetropolitan communities. What is significant about the 1980s is that the minority-majority growth patterns served to accentuate these differences. Minority gains are most heavily concentrated in the rapidly growing West and large metropolitan areas. In fact, minority populations in large metropolitan areas in the West grew by 59 percent—almost twice the national minority rate.

Each of the Nation's three largest minority groups (blacks, Hispanics, and Asians) is contributing to this pattern. Blacks and Hispanics show their highest rates of gain in the West, and all three minorities show their greatest gains in large metropolitan areas. There are some differences among the three, however. Hispanic gains are most heavily concentrated in the largest Sunbelt metropolitan areas, which are the leading destinations for Mexican immigrants. Asian gains occur mostly in large metropolitan areas in all regions, reflecting the destinations of more educated and skilled Asian immigrants who are responding to mainstream employment opportunities. Blacks, departing from past patterns, are relocating away from large Northeast and Midwest metropolises to large metropolitan areas in the South and communities of all sizes in the West. These patterns represent the ascendancy of more blacks into the middle class and show them following migration paths more consistent with those of the white majority. Still, there is also a strong element of return migration among both well-off and less-well-off blacks relocating in the South.

Despite these distribution differences among blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, the three minorities together differ sharply from the majority white population in their distribution across regions and metropolitan area categories. Almost one-half of the white population is located in the Northeast and Midwest regions, and more than one-half is located outside of the Nation's largest metropolitan areas. Among minorities, fewer than one-third are located in the northern regions, and almost two-thirds are located in large metropolitan areas. These majority-minority disparities increased over the course of the 1980s.

The disparities increased because the white population grew more slowly and with fewer disparities across geographic categories. The 1980s saw a modest shift of whites from the Snowbelt to the Sunbelt, resulting largely from employment dislocations associated with various boom-and-bust areas. Major migrations of elderly whites to selected retirement communities also occurred. Gains for whites were thus more modest and more evenly distributed across the South and West than were minority gains.

Individual Metropolitan Areas. The minority and majority growth patterns observed across regions and metropolitan categories are even more accentuated across individual metropolitan areas. This is apparent when one contrasts the areas having the greatest absolute increases in the white majority population over the 1980s with those that show the greatest increases in minorities (see table 2). The former areas represent the strong economic magnets of the 1980s—those attracting whites in search of employment opportunities. The latter represent the Nation's largest port-of-entry metropolitan areas for immigrants and have very strong concentrations of minorities.

Whites. Because the white population was not infused by a large migration from abroad, internal migration resulted in gains for some metropolitan areas and declines for others. Five metropolitan areas increased their white populations by more than 300,000 (as shown in table 2), and an additional 21 showed increases of 100,000 or more. Among these 26 large gainers are retirement and recreation centers (6 Florida cities plus Phoenix and Las Vegas), large regional centers (Dallas-Ft. Worth, Seattle, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Denver), Washington, D.C., and other South Atlantic cities (Charlotte, Norfolk, Raleigh-Durham, and Baltimore). Some of the latter, such as Austin, are high-tech magnets.

It is significant that only 3 of the 26 large white population gainers are California metropolitan areas (San Diego, Los Angeles, and Sacramento) and only 4 gained more minority residents than white residents (Washington, D.C., San Diego, Los Angeles, and Houston). Many white population gainers have very small minority concentrations (such as Minneapolis-St. Paul, Salt Lake City, and Portland, Oregon) and only one of the large white gainers (Minneapolis-St. Paul) is located in the North.

Of the 89 metropolitan areas that lost majority whites, 5 lost more than 100,000 and 31 lost more than 10,000. New York City was the biggest loser (-856,000), followed by Chicago (-190,000), Pittsburgh (-182,000), Detroit (-173,000), and Cleveland (-107,000). Other large metropolitan areas (Miami, Milwaukee, and Boston) also lost whites. Out of this group, most of the smaller areas where the white population declined were located in the Rustbelt or Oilpatch regions; that is, midwestern farming areas and western mining areas. Still, 32 of the 89 metropolitan areas that lost majority whites gained in total population. The most dramatic example of this is New York City, where a gain of 1.4 million minorities more than compensated for its loss of white residents.

Patterns of white growth and decline in metropolitan areas are in large measure consistent with the Snowbelt-Sunbelt, interior-coastal patterns for the total population discussed earlier. The white population, more than the minority population, responds to economic pushes and pulls across labor markets.

Minorities. All but eight of the Nation's metropolitan areas gained in minority populations over the 1980s, but most of this growth remains heavily concentrated in a small number of areas.

The Los Angeles metropolitan area, which houses 12 percent of the Nation's total minority population, garnered 20 percent of the Nation's total 1980–90 minority gain, representing 2.8 million people. Indeed, the five top gainers (shown in table 2) accounted for 43 percent of the Nation's minority growth. Four additional metropolitan areas (Dallas-Ft. Worth, Washington, D.C., San Diego, and Chicago) increased their minority populations by more than 300,000 during the 1980s. Eight of these nine (excepting San Diego) are among the areas with the top total minority populations in 1990. Together, these nine accounted for 43 percent of the Nation's total population and 54 percent of its growth in minorities in the 1980s. All served as port-of-entry areas for new immigrants or were traditional areas for blacks. In all except one (Dallas-Ft. Worth), minorities accounted for more than one-half of the overall population gain in the 1980s; and in each area the minority portion of the total 1990 population lies well above the national average.

Still, there exists a second group of 11 areas that gained between 100,000 and 300,000 minority residents in the 1980s. Several of these cities (Atlanta, Phoenix, Sacramento, Seattle, Orlando, and Tampa-St. Petersburg) have a smaller minority presence than the nine largest gainers, with most of their total gains coming from majority whites. Despite the increasing spread of the minority population during the 1980s, the bulk of minority growth is still concentrated in areas that had large numbers of minorities more than a decade ago.

Because of the concentrated nature of minority growth, minority composition varies widely across the United States. Ten metropolitan areas have minority majorities, including five small and moderate-sized metropolitan areas near the Mexican border, as well as Honolulu, Las Cruces, San Antonio, Miami, and Los Angeles. An additional 69 metropolitan areas with minority populations exceeding one-quarter of the total are located largely in the Southeast, Southwest, and Pacific States, along with a few large metropolitan areas in the North and on the eastern seaboard.

Yet in the vast majority (201) of the Nation's metropolitan areas, minorities comprise less than 25 percent of the population (see figure 3). In 97 of these, minorities comprise less than 10 percent. These white-dominant metropolitan areas are located primarily in the interior Northeast, the Midwest, and the northern Mountain and Pacific States.

Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. Although the three largest minority groups have spread to virtually all metropolitan areas, each remains heavily concentrated in only a few (see table 3). Although recent migration patterns have directed blacks away from traditional northern metropolitan destinations, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit still rank among the top six black metropolitan concentrations. These traditional destinations still have almost one-quarter of the Nation's black population, and the 12 metropolitan areas with more than one-half million blacks are home to 43 percent of the black population.

The growth rates of blacks in these 12 metropolitan areas demonstrate a distinct shift toward the Sunbelt, following a trend that began in the 1970s (see figure 4). It is significant that Chicago's black population actually decreased over the 1980s, and black population growth in Philadelphia and Detroit stood well below the national growth rate for blacks (13.2 percent). On the other hand, Atlanta, Miami, and Dallas proved to be exceptionally attractive to blacks. Other fast-growing areas not on the list include the South Atlantic areas of Orlando, Raleigh-Durham, and Tampa-St. Petersburg. This is consistent with the recent attraction of South Atlantic States as Sunbelt destinations for blacks.

Those metropolitan areas with large black populations are generally not the ones with the greatest percentage of blacks. Although most of the top 12 areas in table 4 have black populations greater than the national black percentage (12.1 percent), only three—Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Atlanta—have total populations that are more than one-quarter black. There were 30 metropolitan areas with black populations exceeding 25 percent in 1990. All are located in the South, and most are small. Some of the larger areas in this category include Memphis, New Orleans, and Charleston.

In contrast to blacks, both Hispanics and Asians are much more heavily concentrated in large metropolitan areas. The nine metropolitan areas with the largest number of Hispanics have 58 percent of the Nation's Hispanic population (Los Angeles alone has 21 percent). The four areas with more than one-half million Asians contain just over one-half of the Nation's Asian population. Moreover, the port-of-entry status of Los Angeles, Miami, Houston, and Dallas (for Hispanics) and Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York (for Asians) ensures that these areas will continue to be centers of high minority growth and concentration.

Still, the spread of these groups is evident in the fact that 29 metropolitan areas had more than 100,000 Hispanics in 1990 (up from 22 in 1980), with high levels of growth displayed in such areas as Washington, D.C., Boston, Phoenix, Orlando, and Tampa—St. Petersburg. Areas with Asian populations greater than 100,000 had grown to 12 in 1990 (up from 5 in 1980). High Asian growth rates from small population bases are seen in the majority of the Nation's metropolitan areas. Hence, these populations are still mostly concentrated, with some dispersal. The areas with high percentages of Hispanics tend to be located in the West and in Texas. Only two metropolitan areas have Asian populations that exceed 10 percent—Honolulu (62.9 percent) and San Francisco (14.8 percent).

The explosion of minority populations—both homegrown and immigrant—is producing a much more diverse national population. However, the trends in regions and metropolitan areas reveal the sharp disparities that have emerged. Some parts of the country, especially smaller communities in the North and Midwest, are becoming increasingly “whiter” and older than the national population. At the same time, growing multicultural port-of-entry metropolitan areas are taking on a much different demographic character. If current trends continue, the majority-minority polarization across regions, areas, and communities will intensify. Moreover, intrametropolitan concerns associated with residential segregation, multilingual education, and concentrated poverty will be heightened in those parts of the country that have served as magnets for minorities.

Disparities in Poverty Gains

Sharp disparities across regions in the gains of whites and various minority groups raise the question of whether these disparities are linked to increases of populations living in poverty. Table 4 compares metropolitan areas that gained the largest populations living in poverty with those that gained the largest nonpoverty populations over the 1980s. What is most noteworthy about these two lists is the fact that there is only a certain amount of overlap between them. Only 8 metropolitan areas are among the top 15 gainers in both their poverty and nonpoverty populations. Only two metropolitan areas (Los Angeles and Dallas-Ft. Worth) are among the top six on each list. Metropolitan areas gaining large poverty populations tend to be those that have a significant Hispanic or black component or that serve as port-of-entry areas for recent immigrants. Included among these are Texas border areas such as McAllen and El Paso, along with northern manufacturing areas such as Detroit and Milwaukee that have a significant number of blacks living in

poverty. In contrast, metropolitan areas that gained most in nonpoverty populations encompass a broader geographic scope, including national and regional financial centers such as San Francisco–Oakland and Atlanta, Government centers such as Washington, D.C., and resort and retirement centers such as Tampa–St. Petersburg and Orlando.

Table 5 shows the fastest growing poverty and nonpoverty areas, segmented by race. Both whites and blacks display distinct within-race differences in the areas that attract poverty versus nonpoverty populations. Among whites only four areas—Los Angeles, Dallas–Ft. Worth, Phoenix, and Tampa–St. Petersburg—appear on both “top 10” lists. Among blacks only two areas—Miami and Dallas–Ft. Worth—appear on both lists. Although the white gainers mirror the total population patterns discussed above, the differences between black poverty and nonpoverty gainers are noteworthy. The list of black poverty gainers is dominated by areas whose economies declined over the 1980s (for example, Detroit, Houston, New Orleans, and Cleveland), indicating that these gains result from higher poverty rates among resident (rather than in-migrating) blacks. In contrast, many areas whose nonpoverty black populations are growing appear to be migration magnets for the rising black middle class (for example, Atlanta, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco–Oakland).

Unlike the lists for whites and blacks, there is a strong overlap in the list of areas that gain Hispanic poverty and nonpoverty populations. As a result of this and the higher average poverty levels among Hispanics, six metropolitan areas that appear on both lists are among the seven largest poverty gainers (see table 4).

Finally, large numbers of poverty and nonpoverty Asian residents have amassed in three metropolitan areas—Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco–Oakland. In addition, areas with relatively small Asian populations—such as Fresno, Sacramento, Stockton, Boston, Minneapolis—show an increased number of Asians living in poverty. This increase can be attributed to the selective immigration of poorer Asians from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (Frey and Farley, 1993). In contrast, the number of nonpoverty Asians is increasing in Washington, D.C., Chicago, Texas (Houston, Dallas–Ft. Worth), and other areas in the West.

The strong impact of the Hispanic population on metropolitan areas experiencing the largest poverty population gains (shown above) suggests that immigration may play a large role in the distribution of poverty. An analysis of migration shows this to be the case. Over the 1985–90 period, California attracted a net of 403,000 migrants living below the poverty line. This number represents the sum of 445,000 migrants from abroad and a net out-migration of 42,000 internal migrants living in poverty. Among poverty migrants from abroad, 274,000 were Hispanic and 107,000 were Asian. California is the State with by far the largest immigrant population living in poverty. Florida (with 173,000) is second, followed by New York and Texas (with 62,000 and 60,000, respectively). An additional nine States gained between 30,000 and 60,000 poverty migrants, and seven States lost poverty migrants through net migration.

The strong impact of immigrants on the poverty migration to California also typifies poverty gains for New York and Texas, both of which registered net losses of internal poverty migrants over the period. (See interstate poverty migration patterns in figure 5.) Yet Florida’s poverty gains are more equally divided between immigrants and internal net in-migrants from other States. This is also the case for Washington and Arizona, which rank fifth and sixth, respectively, in total poverty net in-migration over the 1985–90 period.

Internal migration streams redistribute poverty populations differently than the flows from abroad. Migration streams in the 1985–90 period show large transfers of poverty populations between California and its neighboring States, from New Jersey to Pennsylvania, from Illinois to Wisconsin, and from New York to North Carolina. Except for the latter exchange, these patterns indicate a tendency for largely white poverty populations to spread from highly urbanized States to adjacent territories.

It is clear that the areawide profile of metropolitan poverty gains is influenced differently by immigration and internal migration. Metropolitan areas that are prominent port-of-entry destinations for newly arrived immigrants are among those that increased their poverty populations considerably over the 1980s. At the same time, many native-born Americans from these areas who are at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum have relocated to nearby States. It appears that in these areas of high immigration, it is the minority poverty immigrant streams that exert economic pressures, causing low- and middle-income native-born out-migrants to move to other parts of the country. Because the immigrant poverty population is disproportionately made up of racial and ethnic minorities and the native-born out-migrants are largely whites, this process is leading, in some cases, to a pronounced racial change in the resident populations, particularly the lower income and younger residents. For example, in the State of California, 1990 census statistics show that non-Hispanic whites comprise less than 50 percent of the population under age 25 who are not high school graduates and who have incomes under the poverty level. Still, in other States and metropolitan areas (such as Detroit), poverty populations rose, due less to selective immigration than to worsening economic conditions for the less-skilled segments of the population.

Intrametropolitan City-Suburb Trends

City Gains and Declines

The majority of America's metropolitan-area population now lives in the suburbs. Although central-city population characteristics once were representative of the Nation's demographic profile, this is no longer the case. Now many central cities, particularly in the older regions of the country, show demographic profiles that are quite distinct from those of their suburbs and from the Nation as a whole. They are more racially diverse, have higher percentages of young adults and elderly persons, and have a greater incidence of poverty. During the manufacturing-to-services transformation of the Nation's economy, some cities fared better than others. Still, even in these cities, the kinds of white-collar jobs that have increased often do not match the skills and educational levels of large segments of their resident populations (Frey and Speare, 1988; Kasarda, 1988). This section outlines the growth and decline of the central city in preparation for subsequent discussions on racial-ethnic suburbanization and segregation as well as the concentration of poverty and its associated demographic characteristics in the Nation's central cities.

City-Suburb Trends. The rise in metropolitan growth in the 1980s lessened the declines and growth slowdowns many large cities sustained during the 1970s. This is evident in table 6, which shows trends for the dominant central cities and surrounding areas (suburbs) of the Nation's 25 largest metropolitan areas. The central city-suburb comparisons in this section pertain to central cities and metropolitan balances of 320 Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs), MSAs, and New England County Metropolitan Areas (NECMAs) as defined by the Office of Management and Budget on June 30, 1990. Of the 18 central cities that lost population during the 1970s, 6 (New York, Boston, Minneapolis–St. Paul, Kansas City, San Francisco–Oakland, and Seattle) displayed gains in the

1980s, and all but 1 (Denver) of the remaining 14 displayed reduced losses. On the other hand, four of the growing central cities in the 1970s showed smaller gains in the 1980s (Houston, Miami, Tampa–St. Petersburg, and Phoenix). Each of these is located in Sunbelt areas that sustained reduced metropolitanwide growth in the 1980s.

There are two main reasons why the larger central cities have rebounded from their 1970s losses. One has to do with the economic functions of some of these cities, which dovetailed with patterns of corporate growth and growth in related advanced service industries during the 1980s. That is, cities that serve as headquarters of corporations and related FIRE industries tended to grow in population and employment. A case in point is New York, where the metropolitan area's population growth became strongly concentrated in the central city—particularly Manhattan—where many of the employment opportunities increased. On the other hand, cities located within metropolitan areas where such industries are less prominent, or less centralized, did not rebound as well—Detroit's experience being a case in point.

A second continuing source of large-city growth accrues from the accelerated immigration to prominent port-of-entry cities. Immigrant minorities coming to the United States are more likely than the general population to locate in the central city. As a result, large immigrant streams to such areas as Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and Miami contributed to the central cities' growth and diversity.

Central City Population Losses. Although several large central cities have rebounded demographically to some degree over the past decade, many central cities of all sizes continue to experience a decline in population. This decline is a result of continued suburban spread as well as industrial restructuring patterns that adversely affect many central-city employment bases. In some cases, losses of whites in cities are countered by gains in immigrant minorities, although this is not the dominant pattern. Central-city population loss is addressed in table 7, which shows the rankings of absolute and percentage losses between 1980 and 1990 for the total, non-Hispanic white, and black populations. Figures for the groups not ranked and for Hispanics are included to identify those instances in which one group is being replaced by another.

The cities in the “absolute loss in total population” category are mostly large and are heavily concentrated in the Midwest and interior Northeast (see top-left panel of table 7). Chicago leads, with a loss of 208,000 residents. Other losers include three large east-coast cities (Philadelphia, Newark, and Baltimore) and three southern cities (New Orleans, Memphis, and Louisville). Most of these cities also lost black residents (except Detroit and Memphis, which gained substantial numbers of blacks during the 1980s). The numbers for Hispanics are striking; Chicago's population loss would have been much greater without the influx of 130,000 Hispanics between 1980 and 1990. Philadelphia, Newark, and Denver also partially offset their losses with gains of Hispanics.

Ranking cities by percentage of loss produces a different top 15 list, one that includes many cities in small metropolitan areas in addition to the large cities common to both lists. Most of the declining small cities have heavy manufacturing or mining-based economies and are located in the region where Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia meet (Johnstown, Pennsylvania; Wheeling, Huntington, and Parkersburg, West Virginia; and Steubenville, Ohio). In none of these cities was the loss offset by black or Hispanic gains.

About one-half of the top 15 losers of non-Hispanic whites (middle-left panel of table 7) also appear on the total population loss list. The remainder are cities that lost non-Hispanic whites but gained members of one or more minority groups. Many of these cities

registered gains in their total populations between 1980 and 1990. New York City is a case in point: It lost just over one-half million non-Hispanic whites and gained more than 300,000 each of blacks and Hispanics, as well as 270,000 Asians (data not shown), resulting in a total population gain of 253,000. (Note: Some of the blacks and Asians may also have been of Hispanic origin.) Several other immigration magnet cities (Los Angeles, Houston, Miami, and Minneapolis) attracted Hispanics and Asians while losing a substantial number of non-Hispanic whites. Milwaukee lost 66,000 non-Hispanic whites and gained blacks and Hispanics but still had an overall loss of 1,500 residents.

In terms of the highest percentage loss of non-Hispanic whites, several cities in New Jersey (Bergen-Passaic, Trenton, and Jersey City) are new to the list. All lost over 20 percent of their white populations while gaining Hispanics and, sometimes, blacks. Three large cities lost more than one-third of their non-Hispanic white population between 1980 and 1990: Miami (38 percent), Detroit (36 percent), and Newark (34 percent).

The 15 cities with the greatest black population losses (bottom-left panel of table 7) included some that are not on the list of greatest total population losers. Foremost among the latter is Washington, D.C., which lost 44,000 blacks, many of them to the suburbs. Washington's overall change was slight (-1,034) because it gained Hispanics (30,000) and whites (10,000). Atlanta (where blacks also suburbanized) and Dayton, on the other hand, had no such gains to offset their black losses. San Francisco lost both blacks and whites but gained enough Hispanics and Asians to register an overall gain of 45,000 residents.

The list of the highest percentage of black losses looks fairly similar to that of the total population. The main exceptions are Washington, D.C., and San Francisco, both of which lost 9 percent of their black populations between 1980 and 1990.

Conclusions about city population losses thus depend on the group in question and on whether the focus is on absolute or relative population loss. One group of large midwestern and northeastern cities appears repeatedly on lists, especially on the absolute loss list: Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Gary, Newark, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. These cities have sustained population losses over several decades through suburbanization and regional restructuring. A second group represents cities in which heavy white population losses were more than offset by gains in minority populations, primarily Hispanics and Asians: Boston, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, and New York. Those experiencing the largest percentage losses make up a third group, comprised of the central cities of small metropolitan areas located in the heavy manufacturing-mining district of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.

Minority Suburbanization

Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. In most metropolitan areas in 1990, suburbanization of non-Hispanic whites continued to outpace that of the combined minority population for the United States as a whole and for each broad region (see figure 6). In 220 of the Nation's metropolitan areas, more than one-half of the white population lives in the suburbs. For the combined minority populations (blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and others), however, this is the case in only 86 areas. Of course there are wide variations in the majority-minority disparities in suburbs across metropolitan areas. Because of their historical development patterns (Frey and Speare, 1988), disparities are greatest in large metropolitan areas of the Northeast and Midwest regions and smallest in the West.

Among minority groups, the number of members living in the suburbs also varies. Nationally, more than one-half of all Asians live in the suburbs, in contrast to 43 percent of Hispanics and less than one-third of blacks. The number of Asians and Hispanics living in the suburbs would be even higher if not for the tendency of recent immigrants from these groups to concentrate in central cities (Frey and Speare, 1988). Yet, as with the overall minority-majority group disparities, the number of people within these groups who live in the suburbs tends to be smallest in the West and largest in the older northern regions of the country.

Although black suburbanization has continued to increase over the last three decades, the gains have been extremely modest. The emergence of a bona fide black middle class and the passing of two decades since Federal fair housing legislation was enacted have not translated into significant increases in the number of blacks in the suburbs. In the 1980s the greatest gains of blacks in the suburbs occurred in several southern metropolitan areas with growing economies—such as Atlanta and Dallas—that attracted large numbers of middle-class blacks. Although the number of black suburban residents in most metropolitan areas increased during the 1980s, these gains were generally small. For the Nation as a whole, the proportion of black metropolitan residents living in the suburbs increased from 27 percent in 1980 to 32 percent in 1990—about the same increment observed in the preceding decade.

The overall impact of these selective majority and minority population changes has been to perpetuate the difference between the central city's minority makeup and that of the remainder of the metropolitan area. The percentage of minorities in central-city populations is generally much higher than those of their suburbs. This is less the case in western metropolises, owing to their more sprawling central cities, but it is quite true of most northern and southern metropolitan areas. Eleven of the Nation's largest central cities have populations comprised of "majority-minorities," led by Miami (83 percent), Detroit (70 percent), and Atlanta (65 percent). None of their suburbs has minority shares that high, although the multiethnic suburbs surrounding Miami and Los Angeles have approached "majority-minority" status.

The patterns for Hispanics, blacks, and Asians in 25 large metropolitan areas can be found in table 8. In general, they show that blacks are much more concentrated in central cities than Hispanics and Asians and that Asians are the least concentrated of the three groups. It is also clear that city-suburb separation by race and ethnicity is much lower in the West than in the other three regions. Because northeastern and midwestern metropolitan minority populations are most heavily comprised of blacks, overall majority-minority disparities are highest in northern metropolitan areas and have increased since 1980. City-suburb majority-minority disparities are lowest in western metropolitan areas and did not increase much in the 1980s. This is significant because western metropolitan areas have grown substantially as a result of recent immigration from Latin America and Asia.

Although city-suburb racial disparities deserve emphasis, it is also important to note that the three major minorities—blacks, Hispanics, and Asians—are moving to the suburbs in all regions of the country, albeit in varying numbers. Because of varying mixes of minorities and differing historical growth patterns, minority residential changes across communities and neighborhoods in the suburbs differ from region to region. New evidence from the 1990 census (not shown) reveals the following suburban scenarios:

1. Older metropolitan areas in which blacks are moving to the suburbs and being replaced by new minority groups show further redistribution of whites to the outer suburbs (for example, New York and Philadelphia).

2. Western and southwestern metropolitan areas with multiracial mixes exhibit lower levels of neighborhood segregation because of dynamic new transition patterns and the development of majority-minority suburban cities (for example, Los Angeles).
3. There is minority (largely black) growth and suburbanization in several southern metropolitan areas (for example, Atlanta).
4. Extreme patterns for individual areas include 1950s-style black concentration in cities; white suburban flight (for example, Detroit); and white gains in cities, coupled with suburban dispersal of minorities (for example, Washington, D.C.).

These scenarios suggest that new contexts for suburban racial change will emerge in our Nation's suburbs. The way the scenarios play out will have a long-term effect on the economic, social, and political development of communities that are just now evolving.

Suburbanization by Socioeconomic Status. Historically, suburbanization has been linked to upward mobility. That is, families with higher income levels or higher educational, socioeconomic, or occupational characteristics were more likely to live in the suburbs than in the city. Although this was true for the population as a whole, it was not until recently the case for blacks (Frey and Speare, 1988; Fielding, 1990). For other minorities, such as Hispanics and Asians, the link is a bit stronger.

The graph in figure 7 shows how suburbanization levels by education and race (for the population 25 years old and over) changed over the 1980s for the country as a whole. The proportion of the total population living in the suburbs remained stable for the two lowest educational groups (less than 9 years and 9–11 years of schooling), and increased slightly for the three highest educational groups. This pattern is somewhat misleading, however, because it characterizes none of the individual racial or ethnic groups.

The pattern for whites is most distinctive, because whites are more suburbanized at all levels of educational attainment than any other racial or ethnic group. However, the proportion of college-educated whites living in the suburbs declined between 1980 and 1990. This decline occurred in all regions and size categories of metropolitan areas, but was most pronounced in the largest ones. Some of the decline can be explained by gentrification, but most is attributable to the movement of the white population away from older metropolitan areas in the Northeast to central cities in other parts of the country.

Among blacks and Asians, change in suburbanization showed the traditional class-selective pattern, with greater increases for the higher educational categories. For black college graduates, vigorous suburbanization led to an increase of 7 points (from 33 percent in 1980 to 40 percent in 1990) in the percentage living in the suburbs. Hispanics displayed a different pattern, with nearly even increases across the educational categories.

Suburbanization by educational level within the races in 1990 is shown in the bottom portion of figure 7; again, whites stand out. Suburbanization among white college graduates (55 percent) is actually lower than that for all other whites, including the least educated (60 percent). The traditional pattern holds for each of the minority groups, however, with college graduates having the highest level of suburbanization. These patterns play out quite differently across regions, size categories, and metropolitan areas.

Dallas showed remarkable increases in suburbanization over the decade. It was class-selective, with decreases for the lowest educational category and large increases for the highest three categories. This class pattern was strongest among blacks. The proportion of black college graduates living in the suburbs doubled from 16 percent in 1980 to 33

percent in 1990. The Dallas area attracted a large number of high-status black in-migrants during the decade, many of them moving directly to the suburbs. Suburbanization patterns for blacks were quite similar in Atlanta (Frey and Fielding, 1993).

In 1990 blacks were the only group in this area whose suburbanization was highest for college graduates. The suburbanization level of whites peaked with high school graduates; for Asians and Hispanics, it peaked with those who had some college. This pattern of suburbanization by educational level is fairly typical of southern metropolitan areas.

In the Detroit metropolitan area, suburbanization increased for most groups over the decade, although the gaps between blacks and whites remain wide. For the total population and for whites, no class pattern is evident during the 1980–90 period. Among blacks, however, increased suburbanization is strictly limited to the higher educational categories. The increase was especially dramatic for black college graduates, whose suburbanization was 18 percent in 1980 and 27 percent in 1990.

During the 1980s in Los Angeles, only Asians showed significant gains in suburbanization. Here, decreased suburbanization occurred for the two lowest educational categories of the total, white, and Hispanic populations. These findings could be due to the heavy immigration of Hispanics with low educational levels during this period. (Note: The “white” category here contains white Hispanics.)

City-Suburb Status Gaps. Traditionally, the suburbs have been characterized by populations having a higher status than those of cities. The idea that suburbs house a higher percentage of college graduates than do central cities is not uniformly true (table 9). Nationally, only a slightly higher percentage of suburbanites (22.8 percent) than central-city residents (21.9 percent) are college graduates. However, this statement camouflages more distinct patterns for specific regions, size classes, and racial groups.

The suburban status advantage is sharpest in the Northeast and Midwest, in large metropolitan areas, and for minority groups. However, for areas that tend to be smaller or located in the South and West, and among whites, there is a tendency for the central city to show a greater percentage of college graduates than the suburbs. These regional and size-class distinctions are consistent with historical patterns of urban development. The older, larger areas in the North have a history of sharper city-suburb disparities, due to decades of suburban development and selective population movement. In smaller and newer areas, central cities encompass a greater share of the metropolitan population and often annex territories as development expands outward.

For whites, a reverse status gap exists in most categories. At the national level, cities show a higher percentage of college graduates among whites (25.6 percent) than do suburbs (23.2 percent). Both gentrification and the aging of suburban populations contribute to this pattern. That is, as in earlier decades, young, well-educated, white professionals tend to locate in central cities during their early adult years. This phenomenon, compounded by the selective flight of a cross-section of whites, increases the percentage of white college graduates in the central city (as well as the percentage of poorly educated whites who are unable to move out). In the suburbs the older, typically less well-educated cohort of whites takes up an increasing share of the population and reduces the college graduate representation. For small metropolitan areas, the socioeconomic characteristics of whites are weighed down by a larger proportion of rural or semirural residents in the suburbs. This explanation also holds for minorities in small metropolitan areas.

Except in small areas, all three minorities tend to display the stereotypical positive suburban-central city status gap that reflects a recent, selective movement of well-educated minorities to suburban communities. This tendency is most evident in large metropolitan areas. A good example of the disparate racial patterns can be seen in Chicago. Here the suburbs hold the advantage, with the largest overall number of college graduates (27.9 percent versus 20.5 percent for cities). Although there is a central-city advantage among whites, it is the large city-suburb gap among minorities that drives the trend for the total population in Chicago.

Although suburbs do not always hold the advantage over central cities on the percentage-of-college-graduates measure, they usually do on the other educational measure—the percentage that did not graduate from high school. That is, cities generally have a higher proportion of residents without a high school degree than do suburbs. Nationally, 27 percent of central-city adults and 20.4 percent of suburban adults attained less than a high school education. Although this city-suburb gap is larger for the three broad minority groups than it is for whites, whites show a disparity in the same direction. The gap is largest in the Northeast, where 28.6 percent of city residents have not graduated from high school, compared with 18.5 percent of suburban residents.

In many small- and medium-sized metropolitan areas in the South and West, the gap is reversed, with more people who are not high school graduates living in the suburbs. Again, this pattern can be traced to the semirural and sometimes agricultural populations in these suburban territories.

Among the individual metropolitan areas, Los Angeles shows the highest suburban level of non-high school graduates. This is the result of its fairly heterogeneous suburban community, which includes a high percentage of minority populations. The city-suburb gap in the percentage not graduating from high school is especially high in Philadelphia (18.6 percent), Chicago (16.6 percent), and Detroit (16.4 percent).

The central city-suburb status gap on the per-capita-income measure conforms much more closely to the stereotype than was the case with education attainment. Nationally, suburban per capita income is \$16,507, compared with \$13,840 in the central city. The gap is larger in the Northeast and Midwest than in the South and West, increases with the size of the metropolitan area, and is more pronounced for minorities than for whites. A major exception occurs for whites in several southern and western metropolitan areas. This variation reflects the tendency for wealthy whites in the large metropolitan areas of these regions to reside in prestigious central-city neighborhoods, whereas middle-class families tend to live in the suburbs. For instance Atlanta, which includes several predominantly rural counties on its fringes, has a much higher per capita income for whites in the city (\$28,321) than in the suburbs (\$18,827).

The city-suburb gap in per capita income is largest at the national level for Asians (\$3,584), followed by blacks (\$2,217), and Hispanics (\$1,833). With only one exception, the positive gap holds for these three groups across all regions, size categories, and individual metropolitan areas. The exception for Hispanics in small metropolitan areas probably reflects their primarily agricultural occupations. A city-suburb gap of much greater policy significance than those just reviewed is one that leads to concentrated poverty populations in selected central cities. These populations are discussed further below.

Segregation

Measures of residential segregation constitute another means for assessing the residential concentrations of racial and ethnic groups at the local level. One measure of segregation

is the Index of Dissimilarity (White, 1986a). As used here it measures the degree to which one race or ethnic group is distributed across neighborhoods (census-defined block groups), compared with the rest of the population (White, 1986b). Scores on this index can vary between 0 (complete integration) and 100 (complete segregation). A minority group's score for a metropolitan area indicates the percentage of its population that would have to change neighborhoods to be distributed like the rest of its population.

Scores above 60 represent a high level of segregation, and those below 30 represent a low level. For most of the postwar period, blacks have shown substantially higher segregation levels than Hispanics or Asians (Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965; White, 1986a; Massey and Denton, 1989, 1993), and this generalization still applies, according to the results of the 1990 census (Frey and Farley, 1993).

When calculated for metropolitan areas with at least minimal minority populations, the average 1990 segregation score for blacks was 64, compared with 43 for Hispanics and Asians. Between 1980 and 1990, however, there has been a modest but pervasive decline in black segregation for U.S. metropolitan areas (see figure 8). At the same time, there were modest increases in the scores for Hispanics and Asians. Slightly more than one-half of all metropolitan areas increased their scores for Hispanics, and almost three-quarters increased their scores for Asians (Frey and Farley, 1993).

Increases in segregation for the last two groups are consistent with high levels of immigration and a tendency for new immigrants to locate in familiar neighborhoods. Hispanic segregation also increased during the 1970s (Massey and Denton, 1989), but the Asian segregation increases are new with the 1980s. The declines in black segregation were evident prior to 1980 but, as with black suburbanization, the most recent changes are not dramatic. Blacks still remain extremely segregated from whites in most parts of the country. However, there are important variations in segregation trends among metropolitan areas, related to their differing histories of urban development, race relations, and economic growth.

Hispanics. The Hispanic population is a diverse population that has grown rapidly through immigration. Among the 22.3 million Hispanics counted in the 1990 census were 13.5 million Mexicans, 2.7 million Puerto Ricans, over a million Cubans, and about 5 million identified with Central and South American countries or Spain. Each group tends to have strong regional preferences: Mexican-Americans tend to live in the West and Southwest, Puerto Ricans are more likely to locate in the Northeast, and Cubans are likely to be in the South, especially in Florida. Both national origin and regional residence are important factors affecting the segregation of Hispanics.

Among the 132 metropolitan areas with at least minimal Hispanic populations (see footnote a, figure 8), segregation scores on the Index of Dissimilarity ranged from 15 to 71, although most were in the range of 25–60. Metropolitan areas located in the Northeast tended to have the highest scores for Hispanics. In these areas Puerto Ricans are a dominant Hispanic group. Medium-sized and large metropolitan areas bordering the greater New York region—in eastern Pennsylvania and New England—show scores above 60. Many of these, such as Reading, Lancaster, and Allentown, Pennsylvania, received large inflows of Puerto Ricans who spread out from the New York region after 1980. Most of these areas also showed increases in segregation over the 1980–90 period. Chicago represents the sole large metropolitan area with a Mexican-dominated population that scored above 60 for 1990 and whose score was unchanged from the previous decade.

Metropolitan areas with the lowest scores for Hispanics tend to lie along the Pacific coast and in the southwestern part of the country. Here scores are in the 30 to 40 range. Still,

scores tended to increase in many of these areas as a result of recent Hispanic immigration. Immigration also tends to help maintain high scores in traditional port-of-entry metropolitan areas with already high Hispanic segregation scores (above 50). This is the case for Los Angeles, New York, Miami, and Chicago. During the 1980s most of the 20 areas with large Hispanic populations registered either gains or modest declines in their scores. This stability of scores can be attributed in large part to the influx of new immigrants.

Asians. The Asian population is even more heterogeneous than the Hispanic population. Since the immigration laws changed in 1965, and particularly over the last decade, large numbers of Asian immigrants and refugees have arrived from the Philippines, South Korea, India, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, in addition to the traditional Asian-origin countries of China and Japan. As with Hispanics, recent Asian immigrants tend to cause an increase in segregation scores in port-of-entry areas.

Among the 66 metropolitan areas with the minimum number of Asians for study, scores tend to fall within a fairly narrow range, generally in the thirties to forties. Areas with high scores (above 50) tend to lie outside the West and include New York and Chicago, both traditional port-of-entry areas. Areas with the lowest Asian scores (below 35) are generally located in the West but are not the traditional port-of-entry areas. Many are outside California and are destinations for some of the new southeast Asian immigrant groups. Although these areas show low absolute levels of segregation, new immigration contributes to some increase in Asian segregation. Still, the traditional destination areas for Asian immigrants—New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco—continue to exhibit high, although stable, segregation. Stable or slightly increasing segregation is consistent with Asians' relatively recent immigrant status in the United States.

Blacks. Segregation of blacks is of interest, historically, because of their persistently high segregation scores (Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965; Massey and Denton, 1993). Among the 232 metropolitan areas with at least minimal black populations, the average 1990 score for blacks decreased by 5 points—from 69 to 64—between 1980 and 1990. Although more than four-fifths of the metropolitan areas showed some decline in black segregation over the decade, there are persistent regional variations, and substantial declines are characteristic of only a handful.

The areas with the highest segregation scores—ranging into the upper eighties—continue to be in many of the large and smaller industrial Northeast and Midwest metropolitan areas that first attracted blacks from the rural South decades ago. Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland, and Philadelphia, as well as many smaller industrial areas, ranked highest in segregation in the 1980s and showed minimal, if any, declines in their scores. Those areas that showed the greatest declines tended to be located in the newer—and growing—parts of the country. There, much of the housing was built following the enactment of the 1960s civil rights legislation, and growing economies attracted new streams of middle-class black migrants (Farley and Frey, 1994; Frey, 1995a). Among those that showed the greatest declines in scores for blacks are “New South” metropolitan areas such as Dallas (which went from 80 to 64), Orlando (from 81 to 65), and Atlanta (from 79 to 72). Western metropolitan areas with relatively low scores reduced their segregation levels further during the 1980s (see table 9).

The 1990 census results have shown particularly strong declines in black segregation in multiethnic metropolitan areas, where Hispanics or Asians make up a large and growing share of the population (Frey and Farley, 1993). The existence of several minority groups, along with an immigration dynamic, has created a unique situation in which as-

simulated Hispanics and Asians can serve as buffers between blacks and whites. Analyses show that even when other explanatory factors are taken into account, the multiethnic setting serves to reduce black segregation. Over the 1980–90 decade, Los Angeles reduced its segregation score for blacks by 12 points (from 78 to 66), Houston by 11 points (from 77 to 66), and Dallas by 16 points (from 80 to 64). Hence, there are two kinds of metropolitan areas that have shown significant declines in black segregation: newer, economically prosperous metropolitan areas in the South and West, and selected multiethnic metropolitan areas. Nonetheless, there were metropolitan areas where large numbers of city-centered blacks still resided and experienced persistently high levels of segregation in 1990. This can only exacerbate the patterns of concentrated poverty and associated demographic characteristics discussed below.

Poverty

Urban poverty has emerged as a major policy concern over the last decade. Rising poverty rates in central cities and the increasing concentration of the poor in specific areas of cities have captured the attention of researchers and policymakers (Jargowsky and Bane, 1991; Ricketts and Sawhill, 1988; Wilson, 1987). This section focuses on poverty in cities and suburbs and covers the following topics: 1980–90 trends in poverty rates (the proportion of the population with incomes below the Federal poverty line) and the growth of the poverty and nonpoverty populations; the degree of economic polarization between cities and suburbs; the concentration of poverty within cities; the extent of female-headed households and their poverty rate; and the poverty rate of children.

Several themes run through this section. First, poverty conditions and trends vary widely across metropolitan areas and regions, generally mirroring area-specific economic conditions. Although the poverty rates increased only slightly across all areas between 1980 and 1990, some cities (such as Detroit and Houston) experienced large increases. Second, the poverty population is concentrated in the central cities of metropolitan areas and, within cities, in specific high-poverty areas. Trends in the concentration of poverty follow those for poverty rates, with increases in similar cities and regions. Third, poverty is worst among minorities (especially blacks and Hispanics), female-headed households, and children.

1980–90 Trends. Poverty rates for cities and suburbs for 1980 and 1990 appear in table 10 for the total population. As in all tables in this section, rates are shown for eight large metropolitan areas (two representatives from each census region) and for regions and varying metropolitan area sizes. Aggregating over all metropolitan areas, the poverty rate rose slightly for central cities, from 16.2 percent in 1980 to 18.0 percent in 1990 (see totals for table 10). The rate in suburbs remained stable at roughly 8 percent. These trends reflect the differential growth rates of the poverty and nonpoverty populations over the 1980s. In cities, the poverty population grew noticeably faster (18.4 percent) than the nonpoverty population (4.1 percent), whereas in the suburbs the differential was much smaller (poverty, 17.3 percent; nonpoverty, 14.9 percent).

Focusing first on cities, the trends vary by region, size, and metropolitan area. Among the four regions, only the Northeast showed no increase in its poverty rate. Here the poverty population actually declined slightly (-0.1 percent), whereas the nonpoverty population increased (0.4 percent). The largest increase in city poverty rates took place in the Midwest, where the percent in poverty went from 15.5 percent in 1980 to 19.1 percent in 1990. Behind this change was a growth (16.5 percent) in the poverty population and a sizeable decline (-9.6 percent) in the nonpoverty population. Changes in the poverty rates for the South and the West were almost the same as that for the country as a whole (about

two percentage points) and were based on increases in both the poverty and nonpoverty populations. The West had the lowest poverty rate in both years, and the Midwest and South surpassed the Northeast, which had the highest rate in 1980.

The change in city poverty rates between 1980 and 1990 was inversely related to the size of the metropolitan area, with the smallest areas experiencing the largest increase (3.1 percentage points). As with the Midwest region, cities in the small metropolitan area category had a growing poverty population (16.7 percent) and a declining nonpoverty population (-7.0 percent). In the medium and large metropolitan area categories, both poverty and nonpoverty populations grew, with the former growing faster and yielding increases in its poverty rate. Large areas displayed the highest poverty rate in both 1980 (17.1 percent) and 1990 (18.4 percent).

A sense of the wide diversity in trends among central cities can be gleaned from the statistics for the eight metropolitan areas shown in table 10. Changes in poverty rates between 1980 and 1990 ranged from an increase of 9.7 percentage points for Detroit to a decrease of 0.7 points for New York City. New York's decrease, like that of the Northeast as a whole, can be traced to a declining poverty population (-0.5 percent) and a growing nonpoverty population (4.0 percent). In Detroit the opposite was true: The nonpoverty population declined substantially (-23.5 percent) while the poverty population grew (28.8 percent). Similar, though less strong, growth patterns occurred in Denver, resulting in a rise in the poverty rate from 13.7 in 1980 to 17.1 in 1990. Three metropolitan areas registered declines in both their central-city poverty and nonpoverty populations, leading to decreases in the poverty rates for Philadelphia and Atlanta and an increase for Chicago. Two areas stand out as having cities with especially high poverty rates in 1990: Atlanta (25.9 percent) and Detroit (30.2 percent).

The pattern of change in the poverty rate of suburbs is quite similar to that of cities, although the suburban changes are smaller in magnitude. One variation occurs in the South, where the suburbs, unlike the cities, had a lower poverty rate in 1990 (10.2 percent) than in 1980 (10.4 percent). The ranking of regions and size categories by poverty rate is also different for the suburbs, probably reflecting a higher poverty rate among the rural populations of some suburban rings. Southern and western areas, as well as small metropolitan areas, show relatively high poverty rates in both years. Small metropolitan areas are also distinct in having experienced a decline (-2.9 percent) in their suburban poverty populations.

Central City Rankings. Looking at the rankings of various poverty measures provides another perspective, one that identifies the most distressed areas. Among the top 15 metropolitan areas in the rankings of 1990 city poverty rates (percentages) are two large cities (New Orleans and Detroit), three university towns (State College, Pennsylvania; Athens, Georgia; and Bloomington, Indiana) and three heavily Hispanic Texas border towns (Brownsville, Laredo, and McAllen). Although the number of residents living in poverty increased in all of these cities during the 1980s, not all cities had significant gains.

About one-half of the top 15 areas in 1990 city poverty rate also appear on the list of cities with the largest increases in poverty rate between 1980 and 1990. Industrial or midwestern cities (Flint, Jackson, and Detroit, Michigan; Youngstown, Ohio; and Johnstown, Pennsylvania) appear often on this list of top gainers in percentage of poverty. All but four of the cities on the list had growing poverty populations and declining nonpoverty populations.

Focusing on the absolute growth of the poverty population produces a different top 15 list—headed by Los Angeles—which gained nearly 200,000 poor residents between 1980 and 1990. It should be noted, however, that Los Angeles also tops the list of growth in nonpoverty population. Other magnets for Hispanic immigration appear on both lists: Phoenix, Fresno, San Diego, Anaheim, Fort Worth, Dallas, and San Antonio. Only four of the cities (Houston, Detroit, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis) on the list of top poverty gainers had decreases in their nonpoverty populations, accompanied by substantial increases in their poverty populations.

Similarly, most of the cities on the list of the top gainers in nonpoverty population made the top 15 list of poverty gainers. Several cities—especially New York City, Norfolk, Raleigh-Durham, and Jacksonville—stand out as having increases primarily in their nonpoverty populations. Consequently, these four experienced declines in their poverty rates between 1980 and 1990.

Blacks. Trends in city poverty rates for blacks over the 1980s generally parallel those for the total population, but most of the changes are larger in magnitude. For example, the city poverty rate declined (-3.5 percentage points) in the Northeast and rose (5.7 points) in the Midwest. Notable decreases in city poverty rates occurred for blacks in New York (-4.2 points) and Philadelphia (-3.2 points). New York had a substantial gain in its nonpoverty black population (23.7 percent), and Philadelphia's change was driven by a declining poverty population (-10.8 percent). Unlike the total population, the percentage of blacks in poverty declined in Los Angeles, both in the city and the suburbs.

In both the 1990 poverty rate and the change in poverty rate lists, many cities making the top 15 contain only a small number of blacks. Cities with high percentages of blacks in poverty in 1990 include two depressed Michigan areas (Benton Harbor and Saginaw) and an array of small deep-South areas (Houma, Monroe, and Alexandria, Louisiana; and Pascagoula, Mississippi). All of these cities had growing poverty and declining nonpoverty populations over the 1980s. Several also ranked high on the list of poverty rates for the total population.

The list of cities with the greatest increases in blacks living in poverty looks very different. It contains large and medium-sized metropolitan areas, all but two of which are located either in the Midwest or the interior South. Nearly all recorded large increases in their black poverty rates, ending the decade with rates well above the national average (31.1 percent). Major declines in the black nonpoverty population occurred in four of these areas (Detroit, Houston, New Orleans, and Cleveland). About half of the cities on this list were also among the top poverty gainers for the total population. Also on the list of black poverty gainers were three cities in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and Shreveport) and more midwestern industrial cities (Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Flint).

Differing somewhat from the total population, there is a small overlap between top gainers of blacks living in poverty and top gainers of nonpoverty blacks—only Dallas, Fort Worth, and Fort Lauderdale appear on both lists. This divergence in growth patterns, by class, for blacks was also noted in the earlier discussion of population change and migration for metropolitan areas and States. Another symptom of the phenomenon is that the majority of cities gaining in nonpoverty blacks witnessed an appreciable decline in their black poverty rates between 1980 and 1990. Cities gaining nonpoverty blacks include large ones with diversified economies (New York and Philadelphia) and others that have attracted high-technology industries or that have major universities (Boston, Charlotte, Raleigh, and Greensboro).

Hispanics. Poverty trends for Hispanics over the 1980s are quite similar to those for the total population, although increases in, and absolute levels of, poverty rates are higher for Hispanics. In the aggregate, Hispanic poverty increased 2.1 points (from 26.4 percent to 28.6 percent) in the cities and 1.4 points (from 17.7 percent to 19.1 percent) in the suburbs. Unlike the total population, increases in the city poverty rate of Hispanics were largest in the South and West regions. However, even after declining over the decade, the city poverty rate of the Northeast was noticeably higher in 1990 than that of the other regions, reflecting the concentration of Puerto Ricans there.

In the Dallas metropolitan area, the Hispanic population grew rapidly, both in the cities and in the suburbs. In both, the poverty population grew faster, resulting in a gain of 6.7 percentage points in the city poverty rate and 2.5 in the suburbs. The only city experiencing a decline in its Hispanic population was Detroit, which lost 13.6 percent of its city nonpoverty population.

Most of the cities in the top 15 for 1990 poverty rate and change in poverty rate have small Hispanic populations. The few with Hispanic populations over 10,000 and very high city poverty rates (that is, over 45 percent) are all in the Northeast region, and their Hispanic populations are comprised primarily of Puerto Ricans (Springfield, Massachusetts; Buffalo, New York; and Reading, Pennsylvania).

In contrast to the lists for the total and black populations, the Hispanic growth lists for poverty and nonpoverty populations in cities are very similar. This finding also corroborates the earlier discussion of Hispanic growth patterns over large metropolitan areas. All of the cities on the two lists recorded gains in both their poverty and nonpoverty populations, reflecting massive immigration over the decade. Thus, changes in poverty rates over the 1980s depended on the relative size of the two groups' gains. Only two cities—New York and Boston—common to both lists actually had declines in their Hispanic poverty percentages. Other cities, such as Houston (12.4 points) and Tucson (9.6 points), saw substantial increases in their Hispanic poverty rates.

The Concentration of Poverty in Central Cities. As stated in the section on suburbanization by class, the concentration of poverty in central cities can be visualized in two ways: by looking at the proportions of the poverty and nonpoverty populations that live in the central cities of metropolitan areas and by comparing the poverty compositions (the percentage living in poverty) of cities and suburbs. For the purposes of this discussion, the former will be referred to as the centralization of poverty and the latter as the degree of metropolitan economic polarization.

Changes over time in both of these phenomena are influenced by two factors, which could have either opposing or reinforcing effects. One factor involves the destination choices of poor and nonpoor intrametropolitan movers and metropolitan in-migrants, whether native or immigrant. If poor movers tend to choose city destinations at the same time as nonpoor movers choose the suburbs, the centralization of poverty and metropolitan polarization would both increase. The other factor concerns changes in the poverty status of nonmovers. Economic conditions, such as the closing of a large factory in the city, could affect city residents disproportionately, thereby influencing polarization and concentration levels.

This section addresses the following issues: poverty concentrations, with graphs of the percentage in the cities by poverty status and race (figure 9); polarization, with statistics for the percentage in poverty for cities and suburbs by race (table 11); and, for two metropolitan areas, the impact of immigration and internal migration on poverty and nonpoverty populations (table 12).

The Percentage Living in Cities. For the United States as a whole, poor people are clearly more likely to live in cities than nonpoor people (figure 9). In 1990 the difference is 23 percentage points for the total population (37 percent for nonpoverty and 60 percent for poverty populations). Between 1980 and 1990, the proportion in cities declined for the nonpoor (3 points) and increased by 1 point for the poor. This increase is misleading, however, because it characterizes none of the individual racial or ethnic groups. Instead it reflects an overall increase in the proportion of minorities and their greater centralization.

Two observations hold for all the racial or ethnic groups: The poverty population was more centralized in 1990 than was the nonpoverty population, and decreases in the percentage living in cities over the 1980s were larger for the nonpoverty population. The gap in centralization is smallest (8 percentage points) for blacks, who also showed the highest rates of poverty (78 percent) and nonpoverty (66 percent) in 1990. Class-selective black suburbanization over the decade, identified in an earlier section, led to a relatively large decline in centralization for the nonpoverty population, from 71 percent in 1980 to 66 percent in 1990.

A sense of the variation in these patterns across metropolitan areas can be gained from looking at three distinctive cities: Dallas, Detroit, and Los Angeles. Their patterns and trends for centralization by poverty status are generally similar—with directions reversed—to those previously discussed for suburbanization by education and race.

In Dallas massive suburbanization over the 1980s led to decreases in the percentage in the city for all racial/ethnic and poverty-status categories. Decreases were larger for the nonpoverty populations for all racial and ethnic groups. An interesting change occurred for blacks. In 1980 poor and nonpoor blacks showed nearly equal centralization levels, but by 1990 nonpoor blacks were clearly less centralized (74 percent) than poor blacks (83 percent).

Detroit is very different. Here several groups (total, black, and Asian) experienced *increased* centralization of their poverty populations. The proportion of poor blacks living in the city of Detroit rose from 91 percent in 1980 to 92 percent in 1990. Nonpoor blacks in Detroit were less likely to live in the city, but still did so at a much higher rate (84 percent in 1990) than other groups (for example, nonpoor whites, 10 percent).

Los Angeles exhibited a third pattern that was distinguished by lack of change in centralization level over the decade. In addition, Los Angeles displayed relatively small gaps by poverty status within race and across race generally. The proportion living in the city increased for poor Hispanics and for whites, many of whom are Hispanic. Among poor Hispanics, 52 percent in 1980 and 58 percent in 1990 lived in the city. This trend can be traced to the influx of poor Hispanic immigrants to the city during the 1980s (see table 12).

City-Suburb Differences in Poverty Rates. Data relevant to the level of metropolitan polarization (that is, differing class compositions of cities and suburbs) in 1990 are provided in table 11. Poverty rates in cities are higher than in suburbs across all races, regions, size categories, and metropolitan areas. Nationally, 18 percent of those in the city population had incomes below the poverty line, compared with 8.1 percent for the suburbs.

Polarization by poverty status stems largely from variations in suburban poverty rates; city rates, though higher, vary within a narrower range. Nevertheless, cities do vary in their poverty levels because of their sizes, regional locations, and racial compositions.

For example, Detroit's high rate of poverty (30.2 percent) for the total city population is linked to both poor economic conditions and the large proportion of blacks, whose poverty rate is high.

The degree of polarization by poverty status tends to be greater in the industrial North than in the Sunbelt, as well as being higher in the larger metropolitan areas. These differentials can be attributed to the generally higher suburban poverty levels in the South and West and in small metropolitan areas. The pattern holds for the total population and for whites but sometimes plays out differently for the minority groups.

Polarization among blacks is highest in the Midwest but is also high in some large southern metropolitan areas. Among the areas listed, Atlanta had the greatest difference in city and suburban poverty rates for blacks (19.4 percent). For Hispanics the gap was largest in the Northeast, as typified by Philadelphia with a difference of 32.2 percent. The relationship between polarization and metropolitan size is reversed for both Hispanics and Asians. Asians in particular showed a high city poverty rate (30.6 percent) and a large city-suburb difference (14.0 percent) in small metropolitan areas, reflecting the destinations of recent Southeast Asian immigrants.

Among individual metropolitan areas, polarization levels tended to be high when city poverty rates were high, as in Detroit and Atlanta. Los Angeles, on the other hand, stands out as having a very low city-suburb difference in poverty rate. Even among blacks in Los Angeles, the gap is only 9.1 percent (city rate, 27.6 percent and suburb rate, 18.5 percent).

Some sense of the changes in polarization over the 1980s can be inferred from comparing the data in table 11 with that for 1980 in table 10. For the Nation as a whole, the gap in city-suburb polarization for the total population increased from 8.3 percent in 1980 to 9.9 percent in 1990. The increase was greater for blacks (from 7.8 percent to 11.7 percent), reflecting class-selective suburbanization over the decade. In some metropolitan areas, however, polarization levels decreased, both for the total population and for several race groups. In New York, for example, the city-suburb poverty rate dropped from 13.3 percent in 1980 to 12.7 percent in 1990 for the total population and from 10.7 to 8.8 percent for blacks. New York City gained many higher status in-migrants during the 1980s.

Some understanding of the causal factors operating behind the changes in centralization and polarization by poverty status can be gained from focusing on the experiences of two specific metropolitan areas, Detroit and Los Angeles (see table 12). This table describes the impact that two primary factors, immigration and internal migration, had on population growth by poverty category for cities and suburbs. For example, the +19.5 percent figure for the population in Los Angeles below the poverty level indicates that immigration caused the city's poverty population to grow by nearly one-fifth.

The main thrust of this table is that the sources of population change differ dramatically between Los Angeles and Detroit. In Los Angeles heavy immigration contributed most to the growth of the poor and near-poor populations of both the city and the suburbs. Because immigration dominated population change in Los Angeles and poor immigrants moved to both cities and suburbs, levels of—and change in—centralization and polarization by poverty were relatively small.

In Detroit, on the other hand, the concentration of the poor population in the city is high and increased over the 1980s. A similar statement can be made for the level of, and changes in, the city-suburb poverty rates. Here immigration had very little impact on population changes. Instead, it is differentials in internal migration by poverty level that

influence trends. For the city of Detroit, losses due to internal migration were lowest for the below-poverty-level population and highest for those with incomes more than three times the poverty-line income. The situation is reversed for the suburbs. Therefore, internal migration worked to increase the poverty rate in cities and to decrease it in the suburbs.

In summary, poverty is not exclusively a problem of central cities, but in all regions and metropolitan size categories and in nearly all metropolitan areas it is concentrated in cities. This concentration can be expressed in two measures based on the same underlying numbers. The first is the proportion living in cities, which is uniformly higher for the poverty population than the nonpoverty population. The second is the city-suburban difference in poverty rate, which is consistently positive. Changes over the 1980s in the concentration of poverty in cities varied widely across metropolitan areas, depending on the volume and destinations of immigrants and internal migrant streams and on differential changes in the income levels of city and suburban residents. In some areas the thrust of both trends was in the same direction, as in Detroit, where both differential internal migration and difficult economic conditions contributed to an increasing concentration of poverty in the city. Economic conditions in New York City yielded a decrease in the city's poverty rate, a decrease that was probably caused both by improved incomes among residents and by high-status in-migration.

Concentration of Poverty in Certain Parts of Cities. In addition to being concentrated in the central cities of metropolitan areas, the poverty population, especially among blacks, is concentrated in certain parts of the cities (Jargowsky, 1994; Kasarda, 1993). These areas have high poverty rates and also contain a disproportionate share of the poverty population. A common way to measure these phenomena is to examine the poverty rates for census tracts. If more than 40 percent of a tract's population lives in poverty, it is designated an "extreme poverty" tract (Jargowsky and Bane, 1991). The concentration of poverty is measured by the proportion of the city's total poverty population that lives in extreme poverty tracts. The number of extreme poverty tracts increased dramatically during the 1970s, as did the concentration of the poverty population in those areas. These trends had the greatest impact on blacks and Hispanics in large central cities (Jargowsky, 1994; Jargowsky and Bane, 1991; Massey and Eggers, 1990; Ricketts and Sawhill, 1988).

Both the number of extreme poverty tracts and the concentration of the poor in those tracts increased over the 1980s. Jargowsky (1994) reports a conservative estimate of 54 percent growth in the number of census tracts in which more than 40 percent of the black population was poor, and an increase from 37 percent to 45 percent in the proportion of poor blacks living in those tracts.

In comparison to the 1970s, definite shifts occurred in the 1980s in the regional and metropolitan size distribution of changes in poverty concentration. In the 1970s the majority of increases occurred in large cities in the Northeast and Midwest. During the 1980s the pattern of increase was diffused across all sizes of metropolitan areas. In fact, the largest increase in the concentration of poor blacks took place in small metropolitan areas (population less than 500,000). The Northeast switched to a decline in the concentration of the black poor, whereas the Midwest again had large increases. Both the South and the West experienced moderate increases in the 1980s, reversing their 1970s declines (Jargowsky, 1994; Kasarda, 1993).

Jargowsky (1994) emphasizes that increases over the 1980s in the concentrations of the black poor were spread over many individual metropolitan areas, again unlike the pattern of the 1970s. Detroit stands out as having had the greatest increase in the number of ex-

treme poverty tracts and a large increase in the concentration of poverty among blacks. Patterns are similar, though less extreme, for other old, industrial cities in the northern interior of the country (for example, Milwaukee, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Buffalo). Coastal cities in the Northeast (especially New York, Newark, and Philadelphia) recorded remarkable turnarounds from the 1970s, showing decreases in the number of extreme poverty tracts and also in the concentrations of poverty (Jargowsky, 1994; Kasarda, 1993). An analogous coastal-interior dichotomy occurred in the South, with the interior areas dependent on oil-based economies faring badly. In the West conditions worsened in Los Angeles, although concentrated poverty there primarily affects Hispanics, not blacks.

Overall, changes in concentrated poverty conditions over the 1980s are tied to broader metropolitan economic conditions. That is, cities with poor or declining economies (such as Detroit) are the most vulnerable to increases in poverty concentrations, whereas those experiencing good economic fortune (such as New York) may see decreases in their poverty concentrations. This view is corroborated by the findings in the foregoing section on the distribution of changes in citywide poverty rates. Kasarda (1993) also speculates that the influx of immigrants to northeastern coastal cities during the 1980s may have been a factor in their poverty concentration declines. Although many of these immigrants were poor, they did not necessarily concentrate in existing extreme poverty tracts.

Female-Headed Households, Children, and Poverty. One of the major concerns in the poverty literature is the rising number of female-headed households and their difficult economic situation (see, for example, Garfinkel and McLanahan, 1986; Wilson, 1987). The consequences of these changes are especially significant to the welfare of children (Danziger and Danziger, 1993; Danziger and Stern 1990; Newberger, Melnicoe, and Newberger, 1986). A preliminary look at these topics for urban areas in 1990 is provided by the data in table 13 (percentages of female-headed households in poverty).

Household Composition. Nationally, about 15 percent of city households and 9 percent of suburban households were headed by females in 1990. Among cities, the rates of female-headed households were highest in the Northeast (17.6 percent) and lowest in the West (11.6 percent). In suburban rings, on the other hand, rates were closer across regions, with the Midwest registering the lowest percentage (8.6 percent). For both cities and suburbs, female-headed household rates were positively associated with the size of the metropolitan area.

Individual areas exhibited diverse patterns for female-headed households. Detroit showed a very high rate for the city (28.1 percent) but an average rate for the suburbs (9.8 percent). In contrast, Los Angeles had a relatively low city (13.1 percent) and a high suburban (12.5 percent) rate of female-headed households. For neither Detroit nor Los Angeles can the findings be attributed to race. The patterns hold across all five racial or ethnic groups examined. However, racial composition is important to the total rates for some cities. In Atlanta, for example, the higher-than-average rate of female-headed households in the city (22.1 percent) can be traced to the predominance of blacks (who make up about two-thirds of the population) and the generally higher rates of such households.

Blacks displayed the highest rate of female-headed households nationally (32.9 percent), followed by Hispanics (20.8 percent) and, far behind, Asians (9.9 percent) and whites (9.6 percent). (Note: Non-Hispanic whites have even lower rates of female-headed households, but data were not available.) Within each racial group, patterns across geographic areas are roughly similar to those for the total population. Among whites, an interesting pattern surfaces for the four southern and western metropolitan areas listed: The rate of female-headed households was higher in the suburbs than in the city. Blacks showed little

difference in rates across regions or size categories, except for the lower rate for cities in the West (27.4 percent). Rates for blacks in individual metropolitan areas were all above 30 percent, again excepting the western areas (Los Angeles, 28.6 percent and Denver, 22.8 percent). Rates for Hispanics were particularly high in the Northeast (31.7 percent), where Puerto Ricans are concentrated. Asians are distinguished by their relatively high rates in the West (10.8 percent for cities, 9.6 percent for suburbs).

Poverty Rates Among Female-Headed Households. The contribution of the rising rate of female-headed households to increasing poverty depends on the proportion of female-headed households that are poor and where they are located. Female-headed households did exhibit higher rates of poverty than other households in 1990. Nationally, they made up 36.1 percent of those living in poverty in cities (see table 13). The poverty rate among female-headed households was lowest in the West (29.3 percent). However, patterns for the suburbs diverge, with rates for female-headed households being highest in the South and West. Consequently, the level of metropolitan polarization (the difference between city and suburban poverty rates) was greatest in the Northeast (19.4 percentage points) and the Midwest (19.8 points). That is, in these two regions, poverty among female-headed households is mostly a problem of the cities.

Unlike those of the total population, poverty rates among female-headed households were highest for both cities and suburbs in small metropolitan areas. The difference between city and suburban rates, however, was highest in large metropolitan areas.

Individual areas with high poverty rates among female-headed households are also the ones that had high rates of female-headed households. For instance, poverty rates were especially high in two heavily black cities, Detroit (48.2 percent) and Atlanta (43.6 percent). Polarization in female-headed household poverty was also high in these two cities and in Chicago, where the city-suburb difference was 26.3 points. City and suburban poverty rate differences are smaller in Dallas (13.0) and the two western cities, Los Angeles (6.6 percent) and Denver (13.4 percent).

Among the four racial/ethnic groups studied, Hispanics had the highest poverty rate (49.2 percent), followed closely by blacks (45.1 percent). The poverty rates of Asians (28.8 percent) and whites (24.8 percent) were much lower. Within each race, patterns were quite consistent with those for the total population. The Atlanta city poverty rate for whites was very low (14.1 percent), possibly reflecting the low percentage of Hispanics there. Poverty rates for black female-headed households were especially high in the Midwest (whose city rate was 50.2 percent) and the South (whose city rate was 47.5 percent), as illustrated by the rates for Chicago (45.9 percent), Detroit (50.1 percent), and Atlanta (47.7 percent). Among Hispanics, the regional pattern was different and paralleled that of the female-headed household rates. City poverty rates were highest in the Northeast (56.3 percent), and Philadelphia led the cities with more than two-thirds (67.5 percent) of its Hispanic female-headed households living below the poverty line in 1990.

Child Poverty. The large number of female-headed households and their tendency to live in poverty is linked to poverty rates among children, as seen in table 14. Nationally, in 1990, 26.6 percent of children under 18 in cities were poor, whereas in the suburbs the rate was 11.0 percent. Regional patterns are similar to those of female-headed households. That is, child poverty rates were lowest in western cities (21.5 percent). As a result, metropolitan polarization of child poverty is greatest in the Northeast (21.4 percent) and Midwest (20.1 percent). An analogous pattern appears when metropolitan size is compared with large areas showing high city and low suburban child poverty rates, and the reverse is true for small areas. This trend is driven partly by the fact that minorities are concentrated in large metropolitan areas.

Child poverty differences among the individual cities are influenced by their racial compositions. As observed for earlier poverty measures, the poverty rate for city children was highest in Detroit (44.1 percent) and Atlanta (40.9 percent), the two majority black cities. Poverty among suburban children was particularly high in the Los Angeles area, which contains many Hispanics. Suburban poverty rates for children were relatively low for two northern areas: Philadelphia (6.1 percent) and Chicago (5.6 percent).

The rate of child poverty in cities was higher for blacks (43.0 percent) than for Hispanics (36.8 percent), unlike that for female-headed households. Also new is the finding that the national city poverty rate of Asians (24.9 percent) is well above that of whites (16.0 percent). Interestingly, for all three minority groups, the trend across size categories was the reverse of that for the total population. Among blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, the percentage of children in poverty rises as the size of the area decreases, for both cities and suburbs.

For black children, as for black female-headed households, city poverty was especially prevalent in the Midwest (48.6 percent) and the South (43.9 percent). Black child poverty rates were above 45 percent in the Chicago, Detroit, and Atlanta metropolitan areas.

Child poverty was especially high for city Hispanics in the Northeast (46.5 percent). In Philadelphia more than one-half (56.6 percent) of Hispanic children were in families living below the poverty line. The child poverty rate was also high for Asians in Philadelphia (37.5 percent) and Detroit (41 percent).

Rankings of child poverty in the top 15 cities for the total, black, and Hispanic populations appear in table 15. For the total population, child poverty rates in 1990 varied widely, from 70.5 percent in Benton Harbor, Michigan, to 7.8 percent in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Included on the top 15 list for the total population are three Texas border towns with large Hispanic populations (Brownsville, McAllen, and Laredo); New Orleans and two small Louisiana areas (Monroe and Alexandria); and three medium-to-large midwestern industrial cities (Flint, Detroit, and Cleveland).

The top 15 list for black children also looks similar to that for the entire black population. Half of the areas have very small black populations; all of the others are small metropolitan areas, mostly in the South (Houma and Monroe, Louisiana; Pascagoula, Mississippi; and Owensboro, Kentucky). Two Michigan cities on Lake Michigan (Benton Harbor and Muskegon) also made the list.

Unlike the list for blacks, the list of cities with the highest poverty rates for Hispanic children includes some larger cities, all in the Northeast (Springfield, Massachusetts; Buffalo, and Hartford). Most Hispanics in these cities are of Puerto Rican origin. Also on the list are some smaller areas in New York and Pennsylvania, as well as several scattered areas with small Hispanic populations.

Conclusion

Over the past decade, the growth-and-decline patterns of America's cities and broad urban regions have been transformed by changes in the global economy, as well as by new domestic social and economic trends. Regional and metropolitanwide industrial restructuring has created new dynamics of growth and decline across the national landscape, favoring locations that include corporate headquarters and advanced service centers, knowledge-based industries, and resort and recreation facilities. This trend has fostered a return to urban growth in several large metropolitan areas that had shown declines during

deindustrialization in the 1970s. However, it has resulted in continued or accelerated stagnation in many other areas that had economies still grounded in less-than-competitive industries and could not make the manufacturing-to-services transition.

Another increasingly important source of population growth in selected parts of the country is immigration. Although we are a Nation of immigrants, and migration from abroad has continued to reinvigorate the populations of our traditional port-of-entry areas, recent immigration to the United States is unique. Larger numbers of immigrants with more diverse racial and ethnic origins have led to new challenges for port-of-entry regions, which continue to gain from the vibrancy and vitality of the immigrants but also face increased demands on their social service systems. Moreover, migration data from the 1990 census make a clear distinction between areas gaining population largely from immigration and those gaining primarily from internal migration (Frey, 1994b). These two migration components differ sharply in race/ethnicity, skill levels, and even age. The continued disparity in the two sources of migration growth could well lead to racial and ethnic polarization across regions such as has long been evident within central cities and metropolitan areas.

The demographic trends of the last decade have also underscored the indisputable dominance of the suburbs as the primary locus of activity for new urban economic development and the growth of the Nation's white middle class. This trend has further emphasized the plight of recent immigrants, minorities, and poverty-stricken, low-skilled residents who continue to remain trapped in segregated cities and inner suburban communities and neighborhoods. Patterns of concentrated poverty, especially among minorities, have accelerated in many midwestern and southern metropolitan areas in the interior that experienced economic declines during the 1980s. Increases in the poverty population are also evident in the central cities of large port-of-entry metropolitan areas. Although minority and poverty concentrations in central cities are evident in most parts of the country, they have become particularly acute in these interior and immigrant-destination areas.

The urban demographic trends of the 1980s and 1990s have created both new opportunities and challenges. Sharper, more dynamic growth patterns have brought renewed population gains to the Nation's coastal regions—especially the South Atlantic States—and to the States surrounding California. Migrants attracted to these areas bring with them experience, education, and, among the elderly, significant disposable income. At the other extreme are many metropolitan areas located largely in the interior parts of the country that have suffered economic declines and selective out-migration of their younger and best-educated populations. In these areas in particular, levels of minority segregation and concentrated poverty have been exacerbated as the traditional stepping stones to entry-level jobs and affordable housing have disappeared. In the large, multiethnic immigrant port-of-entry areas in California, Texas, and the environs of New York, Miami, and Chicago, new demographic dynamics have begun to emerge. Both skilled and unskilled immigrants are moving to these areas, but a preponderance of the latter has fueled an out-migration of native-born residents at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum. Although poverty is not as concentrated in these areas as in older midwestern and southern cities, poverty populations—fueled by immigration—are rising, and Asian and Hispanic residential patterns are becoming more segregated. These dynamics of recent urban demographic changes are associated with regional industrial restructuring, racial polarization, and varied patterns of poverty concentration. They will pose continuing challenges for Federal and local policies aimed at creating opportunities for all racial and ethnic groups.

Authors

William H. Frey is Research Scientist and Associate Director of the Population Studies Center of the University of Michigan. Elaine L. Fielding is Assistant Research Scientist at the Center.

Notes

Metropolitan-Area Definitions

1. Following our earlier and standard practices, the tables and figures pertaining to regional and metropolitan trends (the section “Regional and Metropolitan Trends”) define metropolitan areas on the basis of MSAs and CMSAs (or in some cases, NECMAs in New England). Tables and figures associated with intrametropolitan city-suburb trends (the section “Intra-Metropolitan City-Suburb Trends”) conform to the central-city and balance definitions of MSAs, PMSAs, and, in New England, NECMAs. All definitions are consistent with those defined by the Office of Management and Budget on June 30, 1990. More specifically, definitions for figures and tables are as follows:

Figure 1: MSA and CMSA definitions as of June 30, 1990.

Tables 2, 3, 4, 5; figure 3: MSAs, CMSAs, and, in New England, NECMA counterpart definitions.

Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15; figures 6, 7, 8, 9: Cities and balance (suburbs) for MSAs, PMSAs and, in New England, NECMAs.

Race and Hispanic Status

2. In general, statistics for Hispanics include all Hispanics, and those for blacks and Asians include both Hispanic and non-Hispanic portions of those races. For whites, some tables and figures pertain only to non-Hispanic whites, and others include all whites (both Hispanics and non-Hispanics). Generally the latter situation occurs when a table cross-classifies race by other socioeconomic characteristics. More specifically, the following show figures for non-Hispanic whites:

Table 2; figures 3, 6. (Note: The term “minorities” in these tables and figures pertains to the population other than non-Hispanic whites.)

The tables and figures for whites, which include both Hispanic and non-Hispanic whites are:

Tables 5, 13, 14; figure 7.

Net Migration

3. The net migration displayed in the State maps in the bottom portion of figure 2 and in figures 4 and 5 pertains to net interstate migration (excluding migration from abroad) for the period 1985–90.

References

- Barringer, Herbert R., Robert W. Gardner, and Michael J. Levin. 1993. *Asians and Pacific Islanders in the United States*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Bartel, Ann P. 1989. "Where Do the New Immigrants Live?" *Journal of Labor Economics*, vol. 7, pp. 371–391.
- Bean, Frank D., Barry Edmonston, and Jeffrey S. Passel. 1990. *Undocumented Migration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
- Bean, Frank D., and Marta Tienda. 1987. *The Hispanic Population of the United States*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Cervero, Robert. 1989. *America's Suburban Centers: The Land Use Transportation Link*. London: Unwi-Hyman.
- Danziger, Sandra K., and Sheldon Danziger. 1993. "Child Poverty and Public Policy: Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Agenda," *Daedalus*, vol. 122, no. 1, pp. 57–82.
- Danziger, Sheldon, and Jonathan Stern. 1990. "The Causes and Consequences of Child Poverty in the United States," *Research Report 90–194*. Ann Arbor, MI: Population Studies Center, University of Michigan.
- Darden, Joe T., Richard Child Hill, June Thomas, and Richard Thomas. 1987. *Detroit: Race and Uneven Development*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Day, Jennifer Cheeseman. 1992. "Population Projections of the United States, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1992 to 2050," *Current Population Reports*. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, pp. 25–1092.
- Farley, Reynolds, and William H. Frey. 1994. "Changes in the Segregation of Whites From Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society." *American Sociological Review*, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 23–45.
- Fielding, Elaine L. 1990. "Black Suburbanization in the Mid-1980s: Trends and Differentials," *Working Paper #90–13*. Madison, WI: Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin.
- Fielding, Elaine, and Karl Taeuber. 1982. "Spatial Isolation of a Black Underclass: An American Case Study," *New Community*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 113–127.
- Fix, Michael, and Jeffrey S. Passel. 1994. *Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
- Frey, William H. 1990. "Metropolitan America: Beyond the Transition," *Population Bulletin* 45, (July). Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, Inc.
- _____. 1991. "Are Two Americas Emerging?" *Population Today*, (October). Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau.
- _____. 1992. "Metropolitan Redistribution of the U.S. Elderly: 1960–70, 1970–80, 1980–90," in Andrei Rogers (ed.), *Elderly Migration and Population Redistribution: A Comparative Perspective*. London: Belhaven Press.

- _____. 1993. "The New Urban Revival in the United States," *Urban Studies*, vol. 30, no. 4/5, pp. 741–774.
- _____. 1994a. "The New White Flight," *American Demographics*, (April).
- _____. 1994b. "Immigration and Internal Migration for U.S. States: 1990 Census Findings by Poverty Status and Race." *Research Report* No. 94–320. Ann Arbor, MI: Population Studies Center, University of Michigan.
- _____. 1995a. "The New Geography of U.S. Population Shifts: Trends Toward Balkanization," in Reynolds Farley (ed.), *The State of the Union: Social Trends*, pp. 271–336. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- _____. 1995b. "Immigration and Internal Migration 'Flight': A California Case Study." *Population and Environment*, vol. 16, no. 4 (March), pp. 353–375.
- _____. 1995c. "Immigration and Internal Migration 'Flight' from U.S. Metro Areas: Toward a New Demographic Balkanization." *Urban Studies*, vol. 32 (4/5). Forthcoming.
- Frey, William H., and Reynolds Farley. 1993. "Latino, Asian and Black Segregation in Multi-Ethnic Metro Areas: Findings From the 1990 Census," *Research Reports* 93–278. Ann Arbor, MI: Population Studies Center, University of Michigan.
- Frey, William H., and Elaine L. Fielding. 1993. "Race and Class Suburbanization in Multi-Ethnic Areas: Whites, Blacks, Latinos and Asians." Presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Miami, Florida.
- Frey, William H., and Alden Speare, Jr. 1988. *Regional and Metropolitan Growth and Decline in the United States*. New York: Russell Sage.
- _____. 1992. "The Revival of Metropolitan Population Growth in the United States: An Assessment of Findings From the 1990 Census," *Population and Development Review*, vol. 18, pp. 129–146.
- Fuguitt, Glenn V., David L. Brown, and Calvin L. Beale. 1989. *Rural and Small Town America*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Garfinkel, Irwin, and Sara McLanahan. 1986. *Single Mothers and Their Children: A New American Dilemma*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
- Garreau, Joel. 1991. *Edge City: Life on the New Frontier*. New York: Doubleday.
- Hartshorn, Truman A., and Peter O. Muller. 1986. *Suburban Business Centers: Employment Expectations*. Final Report for U.S. Department of Commerce, EDA. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce.
- Jargowsky, Paul A. 1994. "Ghetto Poverty Among Blacks in the 1980s." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 13. Forthcoming.
- Jargowsky, Paul A., and Mary Jo Bane. 1991. "Ghetto Poverty in the United States, 1970 to 1980," in Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson (eds.), *The Urban Underclass*, pp. 235–273. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Kasarda, John D. 1988. "Jobs, Migration and Emerging Urban Mismatches," in Michael McGeary and Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr. (eds.), *Urban Change and Poverty*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

_____. 1993. "Inner-City Concentrated Poverty and Neighborhood Distress: 1970 to 1990." *Housing Policy Debate*, vol. 4 (3), pp. 253–302.

Long, Larry. 1988. *Migration and Residential Mobility in the United States*. New York: Russell Sage.

Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1989. "Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation Among Five Dimensions," *Demography*, vol. 26, pp. 373–92.

_____. 1993. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Massey, Douglas S., and Mitchell L. Eggers. 1990. "The Ecology of Inequality: Minorities and the Concentration of Poverty," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 95, no. 5, pp. 1153–1188.

McHugh, Kevin E. 1987. "Black Migration Reversal in the United States," *Geographical Review*, vol. 77, pp. 171–187.

_____. 1989. "Hispanic Migration and Population Redistribution in the United States," *Professional Geographer*, vol. 41, pp. 429–439.

Nelson, Kathryn P. 1988. *Gentrification and Distressed Cities: An Assessment of Trends in Intrametropolitan Migration*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Newberger, C., L. Melnicoe, and E. Newberger. 1986. *The American Family in Crisis: Implications for Children*. Chicago: Year Book Medical Publishers, Inc.

Noyelle, Thierry J., and Thomas M. Stanback, Jr. 1984. *The Economic Transformation of American Cities*. Totowa, NJ: Roman and Allanheld.

Pisarski, Alan E. 1987. *Commuting in America*. Washington, DC: ENO Foundation for Transportation.

Ricketts, Erol R., and Isabel V. Sawhill. 1988. "Defining and Measuring the Underclass," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Measurement*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 316–325.

Stanback, Thomas M. 1991. *The New Suburbanization: Challenge to the Central City*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Swanson, Linda L., and David L. Brown (eds.). 1993. *Population Change and the Future of Rural America: A Conference Proceedings*. Staff Report No. AGES 9324. Washington, DC: Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Taeuber, Cynthia M. 1992. "Sixty-Five Plus in America," *Current Population Reports: Special Studies*. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Taeuber, Karl E., and Alma F. Taeuber. 1965. *Negroes in Cities*. Chicago: Aldine.



White, Michael J. 1986a. *American Neighborhoods and Residential Differentiation*. New York: Russell Sage.

_____. 1986b. "Segregation and Diversity Measures in Population Distribution," *Population Index*, vol. 52, pp. 298–321.

Wilson, William J. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Figure 1


U.S. Metropolitan Growth Trends, 1960-90




Source: Compiled from U. S. Decennial Census files at the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

Figure 2
Migration Patterns, 1985–90

Migration From Abroad 1985-90



Net Interstate Migration 1985-90



Source: William H. Frey, 1995. "The New Geography of U.S. Population Shifts: Trends Toward Balkanization." In Reynolds Farley (ed.) *The State of the Union: Social Trends*. New York: Russell Sage, pp. 271–336.


Figure 3
Percentage of Minority Population: 1990 Metropolitan Areas^a



^aIncludes Hispanics and non-Hispanic races other than white.


Source: William H. Frey. "The New Urban Revival in the United States," *Urban Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4/5 (1993) pp. 741-774.

Figure 4
Black Net Migration for Three Periods





Source: William H. Frey, 1995. "The New Geography of U.S. Population Shifts: Trends Toward Balkanization." In Reynolds Farley (ed.) *The State of the Union: Social Trends*. New York: Russell Sage, pp. 271-336.

Figure 5
1985–90 Net Migration for Poverty Populations



Source: William H. Frey. "Immigration and Internal Migration for U.S. States: 1990 Census Findings by Poverty Status and Race." *Research Report* No. 94-320, 1994. Ann Arbor MI: Population Studies Center, University of Michigan.



Figure 6
 Proportions Residing in Suburbs, 1980–90:
 Metropolitan Area Race and Ethnic Groups



Source: William H. Frey. "Minority Suburbanization and Continued 'White Flight' in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Assessing Findings from the 1990 Census." *Research in Community Sociology*, Vol. 4 (1994) pp. 15–42.


Figure 7

Proportion in Suburbs by Race and Education, for Total U.S., 1990, and 1980–90 Changes



Source: William H. Frey and Elaine L. Fielding. "Race and Class Suburbanization in Multi-ethnic Metropolitan Areas: Whites, Blacks, Latinos and Asians," Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1993.


Figure 8
 Distribution of Metropolitan Areas^a by
 Residential Segregation Scores, 1980 and 1990



^aMetropolitan areas for each minority group comparison include those where the minority has a 1990 population of greater than 20,000, or represents at least 3 percent of the metropolitan area total population.

Source: William H. Frey and Reynolds Farley. "Latino, Asian and Black Segregation in Multi-Ethnic Metro Areas: Findings from the 1990 Census." *Research Report* No. 93-278. Ann Arbor MI: Population Studies Center, University of Michigan, 1993.

Figure 9
 Proportion in Cities by Race and Poverty Status for
 Total U.S., 1980 and 1990



Source: William H. Frey and Elaine L. Fielding. "Race and Class Suburbanization in Multi-ethnic Metropolitan Areas: Whites, Blacks, Latinos and Asians," Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1993.

Table 1

Classification of States by Dominant Immigration and Interstate Migration Contributions to Population Change, 1985–90

Rank	State	Contribution to 1985–90 Change (1,000s)	
		Migration from Abroad	Net Interstate Migration**
High Immigration States ^a			
1.	California	1,499	174
2.	New York	614	-821
3.	Texas	368	-331
4.	New Jersey	211	-194
5.	Illinois	203	-342
6.	Massachusetts	156	-97
High Internal Migration States ^b			
1.	Florida	390	1,071
2.	Georgia	92	303
3.	North Carolina	66	281
4.	Virginia	149	228
5.	Washington	102	216
6.	Arizona	80	216
High Out-Migration States ^c			
1.	Louisiana	30	-251
2.	Ohio	69	-141
3.	Michigan	74	-133
4.	Oklahoma	32	-128
5.	Iowa	17	-94

**1985–90 in-migrants from other States minus 1985–90 out-migrants to other States.

^aStates with largest 1985–90 migration from abroad that exceeds net interstate migration.

^bStates with largest 1985–90 net interstate migration that exceeds migration from abroad.

^cStates with largest negative net interstate migration and not recipients of large migration from abroad.

Source: William H. Frey. "The New White Flight." *American Demographics*, April, 1994.

Table 2

Metropolitan Areas with Greatest 1980–90 Increases:
Total Population, Non-Hispanic Whites, Minorities

	Metro Area	Increase (1,000s)
Areas With Greatest Total Increase		
1.	Los Angeles CMSA	+3,034
2.	Dallas-Ft. Worth CMSA	+955
3.	San Francisco CMSA	+885
4.	Atlanta MSA	+695
5.	Washington DC MSA	+673
Areas With Greatest White Increase		
1.	Dallas-Ft. Worth CMSA	+487
2.	Atlanta MSA	+414
3.	Phoenix MSA	+412
4.	Tampa-St. Petersburg MSA	+345
5.	Seattle CMSA	+324
Areas With Greatest Minority Increase		
1.	Los Angeles CMSA	+2,795
2.	New York CMSA	+1,398*
3.	San Francisco CMSA	+787
4.	Miami CMSA	+635*
5.	Houston CMSA	+484

*Area experienced gain in minority population and loss in white population.

Source: William H. Frey. "The New Urban Revival in the United States. *Urban Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4/5 (1993) pp. 741–774.

Table 3

Metropolitan Areas With 1990 Populations of Blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Other Races, Exceeding 500,000

Metro Area	1990 Population (1,000s)	Percent Change 1980–90	Minority Proportion of Total Population
Blacks			
1. New York CMSA	3,289	+16.4	18.1
2. Chicago CMSA	1,548	-0.6	19.2
3. Los Angeles CMSA	1,230	+16.1	8.5
4. Philadelphia CMSA	1,100	+6.5	18.6
5. Washington, DC CMSA	1,042	+19.7	26.5
6. Detroit CMSA	975	+5.9	20.9
7. Atlanta MSA	736	+40.0	25.9
8. Houston CMSA	665	+17.8	17.9
9. Baltimore MSA	616	+9.8	26.7
10. Miami CMSA	591	+50.1	18.5
11. Dallas CMSA	555	+32.4	14.2
12. San Francisco CMSA	538	+14.8	8.6
Hispanics			
1. Los Angeles CMSA	4,779	+73.4	32.9
2. New York CMSA	2,778	+35.4	15.4
3. Miami CMSA	1,062	+70.9	33.3
4. San Francisco CMSA	970	+47.0	15.5
5. Chicago CMSA	893	+41.3	11.1
6. Houston CMSA	772	+70.2	20.8
7. San Antonio MSA	620	+28.8	47.6
8. Dallas CMSA	519	+109.4	13.4
9. San Diego MSA	511	+85.6	20.5
Asians and Other Races			
1. Los Angeles CMSA	1,339	+138.3	9.2
2. San Francisco CMSA	927	+103.9	14.8
3. New York CMSA	873	+135.5	4.8
4. Honolulu MSA	526	+15.9	62.9

Source: Compiled from U.S. Decennial Census files at University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

Table 4

Metropolitan Areas With Greatest 1980–90 Population Increases by Poverty and Education Attainment Status

Growth Rank	1980–90 Increase (1,000s)	Metro Areas ^a	Growth Rank	1980–90 Increase (1,000s)	Metro Areas ^a
Poverty Population			Non-Poverty Population		
1.	529	Los Angeles	1.	2,419	Los Angeles
2.	233	Houston	2.	810	San Francisco-Oakland
3.	162	Dallas-Ft. Worth	3.	778	Dallas-Ft. Worth
4.	134	Miami	4.	664	Atlanta
5.	116	Detroit	5.	659	Washington, DC
6.	101	Phoenix	6.	623	New York
7.	73	San Diego	7.	561	San Diego
8.	67	Fresno	8.	500	Phoenix
9.	60	McAllen, TX	9.	420	Seattle
10.	60	San Antonio	10.	396	Miami
11.	57	Milwaukee	11.	394	Tampa-St. Petersburg
12.	54	Minneapolis-St. Paul	12.	362	Houston
13.	54	El Paso, TX	13.	340	Orlando
14.	52	Pittsburgh	14.	318	Sacramento
15.	51	Sacramento	15.	273	Minneapolis-St. Paul

^aAbbreviated names for CMSAs, MSAs, or (in New England) NECMA counterparts as defined by the Office of Management and Budget, June 30, 1990.

Source: Compiled from U.S. Decennial Census files at the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

Table 5

Metropolitan Areas With Greatest 1980–90 Population Increases by Poverty Status for Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians

Poverty Population			Non-Poverty Population		
Growth Rank	Increase (1,000s)	Metro Area ^a	Growth Rank	Increase (1,000s)	Metro Area ^a
Whites			Whites		
1.	120	Los Angeles	1.	704	Los Angeles
2.	90	Houston	2.	518	Dallas-Ft. Worth
3.	74	Miami	3.	428	Atlanta
4.	63	Dallas-Ft. Worth	4.	412	Phoenix
5.	59	Phoenix	5.	342	Tampa-St. Petersburg
6.	46	El Paso, TX	6.	337	San Diego
7.	37	Pittsburgh	7.	327	Washington, DC
8.	34	Brownsville, TX	8.	316	Seattle
9.	32	McAllen, TX	9.	272	Orlando
10.	29	Tampa-St. Petersburg	10.	250	San Francisco-Oakland
Blacks			Blacks		
1.	81	Detroit	1.	465	New York
2.	60	Houston	2.	189	Atlanta
3.	53	Miami	3.	174	Washington, DC
4.	43	Dallas-Ft. Worth	4.	139	Los Angeles
5.	39	Milwaukee	5.	135	Miami
6.	31	New Orleans	6.	90	Dallas-Ft. Worth
7.	24	Cleveland	7.	81	Philadelphia
8.	19	Minneapolis	8.	61	Baltimore
9.	18	Baton Rouge, LA	9.	59	Norfolk, VA
10.	15	Shreveport, LA	10.	52	San Francisco-Oakland
Hispanics			Hispanics		
1.	471	Los Angeles	1.	1,437	Los Angeles
2.	121	Houston	2.	540	New York
3.	95	Miami	3.	332	Miami
4.	85	New York	4.	228	San Francisco-Oakland
5.	72	Dallas-Ft. Worth	5.	189	Chicago
6.	59	McAllen, TX	6.	187	Houston
7.	55	San Diego	7.	183	Dallas-Ft. Worth
8.	52	El Paso, TX	8.	164	San Diego
9.	49	Phoenix	9.	105	Washington, DC
10.	48	San Antonio	10.	89	Phoenix

Table 5

Metropolitan Areas With Greatest 1980–90 Population Increases by Poverty Status for Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians (continued)

Growth Rank	Poverty Population 1980–90		Growth Rank	Non-Poverty Population 1980–90	
	Increase (1,000s)	Metro Area ^a		Increase (1,000s)	Metro Area ^a
		Asians			Asians
1.	97	Los Angeles	1.	641	Los Angeles
2.	56	New York	2.	410	New York
3.	45	San Francisco-Oakland	3.	408	San Francisco-Oakland
4.	23	Fresno, CA	4.	105	Washington, DC
5.	21	Sacramento	5.	91	San Diego
6.	15	Stockton, CA	6.	88	Chicago
7.	15	Boston	7.	65	Seattle
8.	15	Minneapolis-St. Paul	8.	64	Honolulu
9.	14	Seattle	9.	63	Houston
10.	12	San Diego	10	59	Dallas-Ft. Worth

^aAbbreviated names for CMSAs, MSAs, or (in New England) NECMA counterparts as defined by OMB, June 30, 1990.

Source: Compiled from U.S. Decennial Census Files at the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

Table 6
Percent Change in Central City Suburbs of the 25 Largest Metropolitan Areas and by Region and Size Category, 1960–90

Metro Area ^a , Region, and Size Category	1990 Size (1,000s)		Central City			Suburbs		
	Metro Areas	Central City	Percent 10-Yr. Change		Percent 10-Yr. Change			
			1960–70	1970–80	1980–90	1960–70	1970–80	1980–90
Northeast								
New York	8,747	7,371	1.4	-10.4	3.5	22.0	2.3	1.7
Philadelphia	4,857	1,704	-3.1	-13.5	-5.8	25.1	6.4	8.4
Boston-Lawrence/Salem	3,784	1,259	1.5	-7.4	2.9	16.1	2.2	3.5
Pittsburgh	2,057	396	-14.1	-18.5	-13.0	4.2	-1.4	-5.8
Midwest								
Chicago	6,070	2,920	-4.7	-10.7	-6.7	39.8	13.1	7.4
Detroit	4,382	1,222	-8.5	-19.2	-13.0	30.9	9.5	2.5
Cleveland	1,831	506	-14.3	-23.6	-11.9	27.0	0.9	0.0
Minneapolis-St. Paul	2,464	727	-2.4	-12.5	0.5	51.2	22.4	22.8
St. Louis	2,444	601	-10.9	-22.4	-8.7	30.8	8.7	7.2
Cincinnati	1,453	364	-9.8	-15.0	-5.6	21.9	8.8	7.1
Milwaukee	1,432	685	-1.8	-9.3	-0.2	27.4	9.9	5.1
Kansas City	1,566	687	20.1	-6.9	1.0	8.2	17.3	16.8
South								
Washington, DC	3,924	818	0.6	-14.2	-0.1	64.9	16.6	27.7
Dallas	2,553	1,228	30.6	8.0	15.6	56.2	56.2	48.0
Houston	3,302	1,694	34.3	27.3	2.6	53.0	82.6	48.3
Miami	1,937	639	24.3	12.2	8.6	44.8	39.5	25.1
Atlanta	2,834	438	1.8	-12.7	-3.9	58.1	44.8	42.4
Baltimore	2,382	769	-2.8	-12.5	-6.0	34.5	19.7	16.8
Tampa-St. Petersburg	2,068	617	11.5	8.8	3.6	69.4	82.4	42.5

Table 6

Percent Change in Central City Suburbs of the 25 Largest Metropolitan Areas and by Region and Size Category, 1960–90 (continued)

Metro Area ^a , Region, and Size Category	1990 Size (1,000s) Metro Areas	Central City			Suburbs		
		Percent 10-Yr. Change			Percent 10-Yr. Change		
		1960–70	1970–80	1980–90	1960–70	1970–80	1980–90
West							
Los Angeles	8,863	4,272	11.8	4.7	17.9	21.7	7.7
San Francisco	1,604	724	-3.3	-5.1	6.6	29.6	5.7
Seattle	1,973	619	-0.5	-5.2	7.8	64.4	26.2
San Diego	2,498	1,219	28.0	28.1	29.7	35.7	47.7
Phoenix	2,122	1,543	66.9	44.1	35.7	-4.6	104.4
Denver	1,623	468	4.2	-4.3	-5.0	61.6	58.3
Region Totals							
Northeast	45,886	16,761	10.4	-0.8	3.3	20.8	5.9
Midwest	42,421	17,398	13.2	2.6	2.7	23.4	13.6
South	60,342	24,765	21.8	21.9	17.3	20.9	38.0
West	44,658	18,894	28.1	22.7	23.8	30.2	28.8
U.S. Totals							
Large Metro	111,187	43,927	18.4	7.8	12.5	31.3	17.7
Medium Metro	59,605	23,417	16.4	14.2	11.6	15.9	23.3
Small Metro	22,515	10,473	12.9	15.3	7.8	6.4	24.0
Total	193,307	77,817	17.1	10.6	11.6	23.2	20.1

^a The definitions for this and subsequent tables pertaining to central city suburb trends are consistent with MSA, PMSA, and (in New England) NECMA counterparts defined by OMB, June 30, 1990.

Source: Compiled from U.S. Decennial Census files at the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

Table 7

Rankings of Absolute and Relative Population Loss in Central Cities for Total, Non-Hispanic White, and Black Populations, 1980–90

Rank	Name	Largest Absolute Loss, 1980–90				Highest Percent Loss, 1980–90					
		Total	NH-White	Black	Hispanic	Rank	Name	Total	NH-White	Black	Hispanic
Total											
1.	Chicago, IL	-208,289	-242,308	-105,406	130,419	1.	Johnstown, PA	-21%	-22%	-7%	11%
2.	Detroit, MI	-182,575	-201,197	21,058	1,206	2.	Wheeling, WV-OH	-19%	-19%	-19%	-51%
3.	Philadelphia, PA	-103,986	-153,082	-2,303	36,993	3.	Gary-Hammond, IN	-18%	-28%	-10%	-7%
4.	Cleveland, OH	-68,206	-58,418	-15,942	5,425	4.	Youngstown-Warren, OH	-15%	-20%	-3%	0%
5.	New Orleans, LA	-63,171	-63,063	-125	-1,963	5.	Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY	-14%	-14%	-14%	-20%
6.	Pittsburgh, PA	-59,055	-55,287	-6,181	216	6.	Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV	-13%	-14%	-10%	-9%
7.	St. Louis, MO	57,494	-33,310	27,074	-301	7.	Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH	-13%	-14%	-11%	-39%
8.	Gary-Hammond, IN	-50,679	-34,483	-12,337	-2,561	8.	Niagara Falls, NY	-13%	-17%	6%	3%
9.	Newark, NJ	-50,226	40,591	-28,316	25,252	9.	Detroit, MI	-13%	-36%	3%	3%
10.	Baltimore, MD	-49,314	-56,063	4,331	31	10.	Pittsburgh, PA	-13%	-16%	-6%	6%
11.	Memphis, TN	-35,898	-67,219	29,058	-944	11.	Benton Harbor, MI	-13%	-53%	-7%	-12%
12.	Louisville, KY	-30,169	-26,818	-3,973	-298	12.	Cleveland, OH	-12%	-19%	-6%	31%
13.	Buffalo, NY	-29,747	-42,203	5,463	6,630	13.	Flint, MI	-12%	-23%	2%	1%
14.	Youngstown-Warren, OH	-25,540	-23,667	-1,427	-20	14.	Pascagoula, MS	-12%	-17%	13%	-37%
15.	Denver, CO	-24,755	-39,392	794	15,034	15.	Newark, NJ	-12%	-31%	-13%	28%
Non-Hispanic Whites											
1.	New York, NY	252,644	-508,413	318,350	381,224	1.	Benton Harbor, MI	-13%	-53%	-7%	-12%
2.	Chicago, IL	-208,289	-242,308	-105,406	130,419	2.	Miami-Hialeah, FL	9%	-38%	18%	34%
3.	Detroit, MI	-182,575	-201,197	21,058	1,206	3.	Detroit, MI	-13%	-36%	3%	3%
4.	Houston, TX	42,342	-172,320	20,220	174,588	4.	Atlanta, GA	-6%	-34%	-3%	150%
5.	Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA	647,687	-163,919	3,507	686,851	5.	Newark, NJ	-12%	-31%	-13%	28%
6.	Philadelphia, PA	-103,986	-153,082	-2,303	36,993	6.	Bergen-Passaic, NJ	2%	-31%	8%	46%
7.	Boston-Lawrence-Salem, MA	35,143	-101,029	41,466	70,288	7.	Gary-Hammond, IN	-18%	-28%	-10%	-7%
8.	Memphis, TN	-35,898	-67,219	29,058	-944	8.	New Orleans, LA	-11%	-25%	0%	-10%
9.	Milwaukee, WI	-1,485	-66,422	44,439	14,081	9.	Flint, MI	-12%	-23%	2%	1%
10.	Miami-Hialeah, FL	50,774	66,356	16,494	108,605	10.	Johnstown, PA	-21%	-22%	-7%	11%

Table 7

Rankings of Absolute and Relative Population Loss in Central Cities for Total, Non-Hispanic White, and Black Populations, 1980–90 (continued)

Rank	Name	Largest Absolute Loss, 1980–90				Highest Percent Loss, 1980–90					
		Total	NH-White	Black	Hispanic	Total	NH-White	Black	Hispanic		
11.	New Orleans, LA	-63,171	-63,063	-125	-1963	11.	Trenton, NJ	-4%	-22%	4%	70%
12.	Cleveland, OH	-68,206	-58,418	-15,942	5,425	12.	Birmingham, AL	-5%	-22%	8%	-55%
13.	Baltimore, MD	-49,314	-56,063	4,331	31	13.	Kankakee, IL	-9%	-20%	17%	107%
14.	Pittsburgh, PA	-59,055	-55,287	-6,181	216	14.	Jersey City, NJ	-2%	-20%	9%	11%
15.	Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN	3,941	-54,575	26,985	7,190	15.	Youngstown-Warren, OH	-15%	-20%	-3%	0%
Blacks											
1.	Chicago, IL	-208,289	-242,308	-105,406	-130,419	1.	Wheeling, WV-OH	-19%	-19%	-19%	-51%
2.	Washington, DC-MD-VA	-1,034	10,003	-44,118	29,810	2.	Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY	-14%	-14%	-20%	-20%
3.	Newark, NJ	-50,226	-40,591	-28,316	25,252	3.	Newark, NJ	-12%	-31%	-13%	28%
4.	St. Louis, MO	-57,494	-33,310	-27,074	-301	4.	Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH	-13%	-14%	-11%	-39%
5.	Cleveland, OH	-68,206	-58,418	-15,942	5,425	5.	St. Louis, MO	-9%	-9%	-10%	-4%
6.	Atlanta, GA	-17,705	-8,661	-14,380	2,735	6.	Gary-Hammond, IN	-18%	-28%	-10%	-7%
7.	Gary-Hammond, IN	-50,679	-34,483	-12,337	-2,561	7.	Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV	-13%	-14%	-10%	-9%
8.	San Francisco, CA	44,985	-18,043	-7,375	17,344	8.	Washington DC-MD-VA	0%	3%	-9%	111%
9.	Pittsburgh, PA	-59,055	-55,287	-6,181	216	9.	Chicago, IL	-7%	-17%	-9%	30%
10.	Louisville, KY	-30,169	-26,818	-3,973	-298	10.	San Francisco, CA	7%	-5%	-9%	21%
11.	Chattanooga, TN	-17,099	-15,591	-2,378	-321	11.	Greeley, CO	14%	8%	-8%	49%
12.	Philadelphia, PA	-103,986	-153,082	-2,303	36,993	12.	Muncie, IN	-8%	-8%	-8%	1%
13.	Dayton-Springfield, OH	-23,403	-21,496	-1,679	-458	13.	Johnstown, PA	-21%	-22%	-7%	11%
14.	Youngstown-Warren, OH	-25,540	-23,667	-1,427	-20	14.	Benton Harbor, MI	-13%	-53%	-7%	-12%
15.	Pensacola, FL	546	1,175	-980	120	15.	Cleveland, OH	-12%	-19%	-6%	31%

Source: Compiled from U.S. Decennial Census files at the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

Table 8
1990 Percent of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in Central City(s) and Suburbs of the 25 Largest Metropolitan Areas in Northeast, Midwest, South, and West Regions

Region and Metro Area	1990 Percent Black			1990 Percent Hispanic			1990 Percent Asian		
	Central City	Suburbs	Difference	Central City	Suburbs	Difference	Central City	Suburbs	Difference
Northeast									
New York	28.6	11.8	-16.9	24.3	8.4	-15.8	7.0	3.6	-3.4
Philadelphia	40.5	7.6	-32.8	6.9	1.8	-5.1	2.7	1.9	-0.8
Boston	15.2	1.7	-13.6	10.8	2.0	-8.7	4.8	2.2	-2.6
Pittsburgh	25.2	4.1	-21.1	1.0	0.5	-0.5	1.5	0.6	-0.9
Midwest									
Chicago	38.3	6.8	-31.5	19.2	5.6	-13.6	3.7	3.8	0.1
Detroit	66.3	4.2	-62.1	3.1	1.5	-1.6	0.9	1.5	0.6
Cleveland	46.6	9.1	-37.5	4.6	0.8	-3.8	1.0	1.2	0.2
Minneapolis-St. Paul	9.6	1.2	-8.4	2.8	1.0	-1.8	5.2	1.6	-3.6
St. Louis	40.1	9.9	-30.2	1.2	1.0	-0.2	0.8	1.0	0.2
Cincinnati	37.9	4.8	-33.1	0.7	0.5	-0.1	1.1	0.7	-0.4
Milwaukee	28.0	0.8	-27.2	6.2	1.1	-5.1	1.8	0.8	-1.0
Kansas City	26.3	2.3	-24.0	4.5	1.7	-2.8	1.3	1.0	-0.3
South									
Washington, DC	51.7	19.9	-31.7	6.9	5.4	-1.5	2.9	5.8	2.9
Dallas	25.6	7.2	-18.4	19.7	9.6	-10.0	2.5	2.7	0.2
Houston	27.5	9.1	-18.4	27.5	15.1	-12.4	4.0	3.7	-0.3
Miami-Hialeah	16.7	22.4	5.8	67.6	40.2	-27.4	0.7	1.7	1.0
Atlanta	62.4	19.3	-43.1	2.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	1.0
Baltimore	58.1	10.5	-47.6	1.1	1.4	0.3	1.1	2.1	1.0
Tampa-St. Petersburg	20.4	4.1	-16.2	8.3	6.1	-2.2	1.4	1.0	-0.4

Table 8
 1990 Percent of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in Central City(s) and Suburbs of the 25 Largest Metropolitan Areas in Northeast, Midwest, South, and West Regions (continued)

Region and Metro Area	1990 Percent Black			1990 Percent Hispanic			1990 Percent Asian		
	Central City	Suburbs	Difference	Central City	Suburbs	Difference	Central City	Suburbs	Difference
	West								
Los Angeles-Long Beach	13.9	8.7	-5.1	37.9	37.8	-0.1	10.0	11.5	1.5
San Francisco	10.9	4.9	-6.0	13.9	15.1	1.2	29.1	13.5	-15.6
Seattle	8.6	2.0	-6.6	3.4	2.5	-1.0	10.4	5.2	-5.2
San Diego	8.7	4.2	-4.5	20.9	20.0	-0.9	11.1	5.0	-6.1
Phoenix	4.0	2.1	-1.9	16.2	16.5	0.3	1.8	1.4	-0.4
Denver	12.8	3.1	-9.7	23.0	9.0	-14.0	2.4	2.3	-0.1

Source: Compiled From 1990 U.S. Census files at the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

Table 9

Black/Non-Black Residential Segregation Scores by Region for Metropolitan Areas With Large Black Populations.^a

Region and Metro Area	1990 Black Population	Black Percent of Total Population	Black/Non-Black Residential Score	
			1990	Change 1980–90
Northeast				
New York	2,250,026	26%	71	-3
Philadelphia	929,907	19	80	-2
Newark	422,802	23	81	-1
Boston	233,819	6	68	-7
Midwest				
Chicago	1,332,919	22	86	-4
Detroit	943,479	22	88	0
St. Louis	423,182	17	81	-4
Cleveland	355,619	19	86	-3
Kansas City	200,508	13	75	-5
South				
Washington, DC	1,041,934	27	66	-5
Atlanta	736,153	26	72	-7
Baltimore	616,065	26	75	-3
Houston	611,243	19	66	-11
New Orleans	430,470	35	73	-3
Dallas	410,766	16	63	-16
Memphis	399,011	41	75	0
Norfolk	398,093	29	56	-9
Miami	397,993	11	74	-6
Richmond	252,340	29	64	-4
Birmingham	245,726	27	79	0
Charlotte	231,654	20	64	-3
West				
Los Angeles	992,974	11	66	-12
Oakland	303,826	15	64	-8

^aMetropolitan areas with 1990 black populations greater than 200,000.

Source: William H. Frey and Reynolds Farley. "Latino, Asian and Black Segregation in Multi-ethnic Metro Areas: Findings from the 1990 Census." *Research Report #93-278*. Ann Arbor, MI: Population Studies Center, The University of Michigan, 1993.

Table 10

1980–90 Trends in Poverty Rate and Population Growth by Poverty Status for Central Cities and Suburbs by Region, Metropolitan Size Category, and Selected Metropolitan Areas

	% Poverty City		% Poverty Suburb		Growth in Poverty Population		Growth in Non-Poverty Population			
	1990	1980	1990	1980	City	Suburb	City	Suburb		
Selected Metro Areas										
New York, NY	19.2	19.9	-0.7	6.5	6.7	-0.2	-0.5	-1.4	4.0	1.9
Philadelphia, PA	20.9	21.2	-0.3	4.8	6.2	-1.4	-7.6	-16.6	-5.9	9.9
Chicago, IL	21.2	19.8	1.3	4.3	4.1	0.2	-1.1	13.3	-8.8	7.5
Detroit, MI	30.2	20.5	9.7	6.2	5.4	0.8	28.8	18.3	-23.5	1.5
Dallas, TX	17.2	13.3	3.8	7.4	6.5	0.9	48.9	69.0	10.3	47.0
Atlanta, GA	25.9	26.5	-0.6	7.2	8.7	-1.5	-6.9	17.6	-4.0	44.6
Los Angeles, CA	18.3	16.0	2.3	12.1	11.0	1.0	35.0	29.9	14.5	17.4
Denver, CO	17.1	13.7	3.4	6.8	5.4	1.4	19.3	55.3	-8.4	21.6
Regional Totals										
Northeast	18.5	18.6	-0.1	5.8	6.5	-0.7	-0.1	-5.1	0.4	7.4
Midwest	19.1	15.5	3.6	6.1	5.8	0.4	16.5	8.4	-9.6	1.5
South	9.1	17.0	2.1	10.2	10.4	-0.2	23.4	24.7	7.2	27.9
West	15.1	13.1	1.9	9.7	9.0	0.6	40.0	34.1	19.2	24.3
U.S. Totals										
Large Metro Area	18.4	17.1	1.2	7.1	6.8	0.3	17.7	30.1	8.1	25.1
Medium Metro Area	17.3	15.1	2.2	8.9	8.7	0.3	20.6	11.0	2.4	7.4
Small Metro Area	17.8	14.7	3.1	11.3	10.7	0.6	16.7	-2.9	-7.0	-9.0
Total	18.0	16.2	1.8	8.1	7.9	0.2	18.4	17.3	4.1	14.9

Source: Compiled from U.S. Decennial Census files at the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

Table 11

1990 Percent in Poverty, by Race and Ethnicity for Central City(s) and Suburbs of Region and Metropolitan Categories and Selected Metropolitan Areas

Metro Areas, Regions, and Metro Categories	Total		Whites		Blacks		Hispanics		Asians					
	City	Suburbs Difference	City	Suburbs Difference	City	Suburbs Difference	City	Suburbs Difference	City	Suburbs Difference				
Selected Metro Areas														
New York	19.2	6.5	12.7	4.8	7.5	25.3	16.5	8.8	33.2	16.4	16.8	16.1	4.5	11.6
Philadelphia	20.9	4.8	16.1	3.9	7.4	29.3	14.1	15.2	45.4	13.3	32.2	29.2	8.6	20.5
Chicago	21.2	4.3	16.8	3.3	7.3	33.0	14.5	18.4	24.1	9.9	14.2	17.3	3.9	13.4
Detroit	30.2	6.2	24.0	5.6	13.6	35.1	19.7	15.4	33.5	10.0	23.6	30.2	6.3	23.9
Dallas-Ft. Worth	17.2	7.4	9.8	5.5	4.3	28.8	19.6	9.3	27.2	17.8	9.4	18.0	6.8	11.1
Atlanta	25.9	7.2	18.7	5.1	5.0	34.7	15.3	19.4	28.1	13.9	14.2	30.7	9.8	20.9
Los Angeles	18.3	12.1	6.2	8.9	3.7	24.6	16.0	8.6	27.6	18.5	9.1	16.2	10.8	5.3
Denver	17.1	6.8	10.4	5.9	6.5	27.0	20.5	6.4	30.6	13.6	17.0	26.2	9.8	16.4
Regional Totals														
Northeast	18.5	5.8	12.7	5.2	7.1	27.3	14.8	12.5	33.8	14.0	19.9	18.9	6.5	12.4
Midwest	19.1	6.1	12.9	5.5	6.8	35.1	18.7	16.3	24.8	11.4	13.4	28.9	6.6	22.3
South	19.1	10.2	8.9	8.1	4.1	32.5	21.8	10.6	29.6	21.9	7.8	20.0	9.0	10.9
West	15.1	9.7	5.4	7.7	3.6	24.8	16.6	8.2	25.3	19.4	5.9	17.3	10.1	7.1
U.S. Totals														
Large Metro Areas	18.4	7.1	11.3	5.6	5.9	29.8	16.3	13.5	28.1	16.3	11.9	18.0	8.7	9.3
Medium Metro Areas	17.3	8.9	8.4	7.5	4.6	32.7	23.9	8.8	29.2	25.8	3.4	20.1	9.1	11.0
Small Metro Areas	17.8	11.3	6.4	13.6	9.7	37.5	30.4	7.1	31.2	26.8	4.4	30.6	16.6	14.0
Total	18.0	8.1	9.9	6.6	5.4	31.1	19.5	11.7	28.6	19.1	9.5	19.1	9.0	10.1

Source: Compiled from 1990 U.S. Census files at the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

Table 12

Impact of Immigration and Internal Migration on City and Suburb Populations by Poverty Status for 1985–90 Period, Los Angeles and Detroit

Metro Area Poverty Category	Central City		Suburb	
	Percent Change due to: Immigration from Abroad	Internal Migration	Percent Change due to: Immigration from Abroad	Internal Migration
Los Angeles				
Below Poverty	+19.5	-11.5	+14.9	-8.3
1.0–2.0	+13.2	-11.4	+12.9	-3.5
2.0–3.0	+9.3	-13.5	+8.2	-2.3
3.0+	+3.4	-10.9	+3.0	-2.6
Total	+9.1	-11.5	+7.0	-3.4
Detroit				
Below Poverty	+1.1	-5.9	+1.5	-21.0
1.0–2.0	+0.8	-8.5	+1.3	-3.1
2.0–3.0	+0.7	-7.7	+0.8	-1.5
3.0+	+0.4	-19.2	+0.7	+2.4
Total	+0.8	-11.2	+0.9	-1.0

Source: Compiled from 1990 U.S. Census files at the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

Table 13

1990 Percent of Female-Headed Households in Poverty for Central Cities and Suburbs by Race, Region, Metropolitan Size Category, and Selected Metropolitan Areas

	Total						Whites			Blacks			Hispanics			Asians		
	City		Suburbs		Difference		City		Suburbs		Difference		City		Suburbs		Difference	
Selected Metro Areas																		
New York	35.2	17.2	18.0	24.5	11.4	13.1	34.4	27.0	7.4	53.7	38.3	15.5	21.9	19.7	2.2			
Philadelphia	34.4	14.2	20.2	19.8	11.3	8.5	38.1	25.1	13.0	67.5	32.9	34.7	47.4	23.3	24.2			
Chicago	38.6	12.3	26.3	18.8	9.1	9.7	45.9	25.3	20.6	47.8	21.3	26.5	22.0	10.5	11.4			
Detroit	48.2	20.3	27.9	38.3	18.1	20.2	50.1	36.4	13.7	62.7	30.7	32.0	46.9	18.4	28.5			
Dallas-Ft. Worth	31.0	18.0	13.0	15.1	12.9	2.2	41.3	35.3	6.0	37.3	33.2	4.1	33.3	19.2	14.0			
Atlanta	43.6	17.9	25.7	14.1	11.0	3.1	47.7	26.5	21.2	45.7	24.3	21.4	44.4	24.2	20.2			
Los Angeles	29.7	23.1	6.6	19.9	16.8	3.1	35.6	28.8	6.8	41.6	32.6	9.0	21.5	19.8	1.7			
Denver	34.1	20.7	13.4	24.1	17.9	6.2	41.0	40.6	0.4	51.5	37.8	13.7	44.7	22.2	22.5			
Region Totals																		
Northeast	35.7	16.2	19.4	26.1	14.3	11.8	37.7	26.9	10.8	56.3	34.4	21.9	29.9	18.4	11.6			
Midwest	39.9	20.2	19.8	27.7	18.0	9.7	50.2	34.7	15.5	51.0	29.7	21.3	42.8	18.7	24.1			
South	37.4	24.5	12.9	23.2	18.8	4.5	47.5	37.0	10.5	45.0	35.4	9.6	33.8	21.6	12.2			
West	29.3	23.6	5.7	22.7	20.1	2.6	38.8	31.8	6.9	42.5	36.3	6.1	25.2	21.4	3.8			
U.S. Totals																		
Large Metro Areas	35.2	18.6	16.6	22.3	14.9	7.4	42.4	29.2	13.3	48.2	31.6	16.5	27.8	19.6	8.2			
Medium Metro Areas	36.9	24.1	12.8	26.4	20.1	6.3	49.0	41.9	7.1	51.6	44.7	6.9	28.9	23.5	5.4			
Small Metro Areas	38.7	30.4	8.3	29.7	26.0	3.8	55.6	50.4	5.3	53.5	49.0	4.4	44.3	35.5	8.7			
Total	36.1	21.4	14.7	24.8	17.7	7.2	45.1	34.3	10.9	49.2	35.5	13.6	28.8	20.9	7.8			

Source: Compiled from U.S. Census files at the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

Table 14
1990 Percent of Children Less than 18 Years Old in Poverty for Central Cities and Suburbs by Race, Region, Metropolitan Size Category, and Selected Metropolitan Areas

	Total		Whites		Blacks		Hispanics		Asians					
	City	Suburbs Difference	City	Suburbs Difference	City	Suburbs Difference	City	Suburbs Difference	City	Suburbs Difference				
Selected Metro Areas														
New York	30.0	9.3	20.0	6.4	13.6	34.3	22.7	11.6	45.6	23.9	21.7	18.7	3.0	15.7
Philadelphia	31.5	6.1	25.4	14.2	4.4	9.8	20.2	20.7	56.6	18.2	38.5	37.5	9.1	28.4
Chicago	33.1	5.6	27.4	15.9	3.9	12.0	20.6	26.3	30.4	11.7	18.7	19.3	2.9	16.4
Detroit	44.1	8.7	35.4	30.5	7.7	22.8	27.3	21.0	44.5	13.4	31.1	41.0	6.8	34.2
Dallas-Ft. Worth	25.3	9.2	16.1	13.1	6.4	6.6	23.7	14.6	32.7	21.4	11.3	19.8	7.5	12.3
Atlanta	40.9	9.5	31.4	10.2	5.8	4.4	20.7	27.7	38.2	15.9	22.3	33.5	10.5	23.0
Los Angeles	27.2	17.4	9.8	19.2	12.9	6.3	36.6	24.1	34.2	23.5	10.7	21.5	12.7	8.8
Denver	27.4	9.0	18.4	18.6	7.4	11.2	39.1	30.9	40.8	18.3	22.5	32.9	11.7	21.2
Region Totals														
Northeast	29.0	7.6	21.4	18.6	6.6	12.0	37.8	21.4	46.5	19.3	27.2	22.8	5.7	17.1
Midwest	28.2	8.1	20.1	15.6	7.0	8.6	48.6	26.6	31.2	14.1	17.1	35.3	5.9	29.4
South	27.8	13.7	14.1	16.0	10.2	5.8	43.9	28.8	37.7	28.1	9.7	20.5	9.5	11.0
West	21.5	13.7	7.9	14.8	10.5	4.3	35.8	23.9	31.7	24.6	7.1	24.5	12.9	11.6
U.S. Totals														
Large Metro Area	27.9	9.7	18.3	16.1	7.2	9.0	41.7	22.9	36.4	20.7	15.7	23.2	9.7	13.5
Medium Metro Area	25.5	12.2	13.3	16.1	9.6	6.5	44.3	31.6	37.5	32.6	4.9	27.4	10.9	16.6
Small Metro Area	23.5	14.9	8.5	15.6	12.2	3.4	48.9	38.1	38.0	32.5	5.5	33.8	21.2	12.6
Total	26.6	11.0	15.6	16.0	8.6	7.5	43.0	26.7	36.8	24.4	12.3	24.9	10.4	14.5

Source: Compiled from 1990 U.S. Census files at the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

Table 15
Rankings of Child Poverty Rate in Central Cities for the Total, Black, and Hispanic Populations.

Total Rank	Highest 1990 City Poverty Rate		Highest 1990 City Poverty Rate		Highest 1990 City Poverty Rate	
	Metro Area	1990% In Poverty	Black Rank	Metro Area	1990% In Poverty	Hispanic Rank
1.	Benton Harbor, MI	70.5	1. Eau Claire, WI	100.0	1. Cumberland, MD-WV	80.0
2.	Monroe, LA	52.9	2. Provo-Orem, UT	100.0	2. Hagerstown, MD	76.7
3.	Augusta, GA	50.4	3. Houma-Thibodaux, LA	75.0	3. York, PA	73.0
4.	Brownsville-Harlingen, TX	49.7	4. Benton Harbor, MI	71.8	4. Monroe, LA	69.2
5.	McAllen-Edinburg-MI	46.6	5. Cumberland, MD-WV	67.7	5. Erie, PA	68.5
6.	Ft. Pierce, FL	46.6	6. Owensboro, KY	67.3	6. Springfield, MA	65.7
7.	Laredo, TX	46.4	7. Monroe, LA	67.2	7. Jamestown-Dunkirk, NY	65.7
8.	New Orleans, LA	44.7	8. Williamsport, PA	66.1	8. Anderson, IN	65.4
9.	Flint, MI	44.6	9. Vancouver, WA	65.6	9. Elmira, NY	63.4
10.	Athens, GA	44.3	10. Johnstown, PA	65.4	10. Buffalo, NY	62.6
11.	Detroit, MI	44.1	11. Casper, WY	65.0	11. New Bedford-Fall River, MA	60.6
12.	Cumberland, MD-WV	43.8	12. Sioux City, IA-NE	64.6	12. Harrisburg-Lenahan, PA	60.3
13.	Johnstown, PA	43.3	13. Medford, OR	63.6	13. Utica-Rome, NY	59.8
14.	Cleveland, OH	43.0	14. Pascagoula, MS	63.6	14. Hartford-New Britain, CT	58.9
15.	Alexandria, LA	42.2	15. Muskegon, MI	63.3	15. State College, PA	58.7

Source: Compiled from 1990 U.S. Census files at the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.