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EVALUATION OF THE URBAN INITIATIVES
ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

SEATTLE, WA, CASE STUDY

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This report is one in a series that comprises a comprehensive evaluation of the Public Housing Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration. The Final Report provides an integrated analysis of the design, implementation and impact of the entire demonstration, and each of the 15 site-specific case studies analyzes the implementation and impact of the programs at individual participating local housing authorities. The complete set of reports includes:

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Final Report

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program:

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PREFACE

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration was created by the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. The program was formally announced in May 1979 and awards were made by the following September. By early 1981, programs in all 39 selected sites were underway; and by mid-1982, all were essentially completed.

As the report notes, the design and implementation of the program were flawed. The demonstration was conceived and developed according to principles which the current Administration has sought to reverse--that influxes of Federal money and direct Federal involvement can provide solutions to local problems.

HUD is currently implementing a series of demonstrations designed to improve the quality of life of public housing residents. These demonstrations stress local autonomy in design and implementation, with communities free to tailor their programs to meet their own unique needs. The demonstrations emphasize the coordination of existing Federal, State, and local resources, rather than the duplication of existing efforts or the funding of new programs. They use existing HUD resources to leverage other public and private funds. And, they require the commitment of all sectors of the local community, with a special emphasis on public/ private partnerships.

The Department believes that the emphasis on local authority which characterizes current Administration policy and provides the basis for operating and planned demonstrations holds much more promise for improving the lives of low-income families than programs that are rigidly structured by the Federal government.

I. CONTEXT

A. The City

Seattle is the largest city in Washington state, and the industrial center of the Pacific Northwest. The closest large American port to Alaska and the Far East, it is a major center for exporting (wheat, lumber, apples and beer) and importing (Japanese consumer goods and Alaskan oil). Seattle is also a major fishing, lumbering, and railroading center, but since World War II the biggest industry has been aerospace. Boeing dominates the Washington industrial scene, at one time employing eight percent of the state's labor force. When Boeing slumped in 1970, sixty-two thousand people were laid off, and thousands left the state. Boeing has begun to regain strength since the late 1970s, but the state's economy remains weak. Like the rest of industrial Seattle, Boeing is centered on the Rainier Valley, a flat plain that slides into Puget Sound south of downtown. This is the blue collar district of the city, and most of Seattle's small black, Chicano, and Pacific Asian population live here in the hills surrounding the valley.

B. Demonstration Sites and Surrounding Neighborhood

The Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) chose two southeast Seattle projects Holly Park and Rainier Vista to be the targets of its Anti-Crime program. The physical plants of the two projects were very similar. Holly Park's 893 single family one- and two-story rowhouses sprawl over 100 acres of rolling hills. A power line and a major boulevard divide the project into two recognizable communities, "Lower" and "Upper" Holly Park. The project is immediately adjacent to Holly Court, a 97 unit project for the elderly, a shopping center, and a public park, and is surrounded by higher density residential neighborhoods.

Rainier Vista's 496 rowhouses are located some 1½ miles from Holly Park.

Like Holly Park, Rainier Vista boasts an attractive greenbelt, in contrast to the higher density grid of surrounding neighborhoods. Though the site is not adjacent to any commercial development, it, too, is divided by a major boulevard, and frequent transit service gives tenants easy access to downtown and commercial districts.

Demographically as well as physically, the sites are nearly identical. About 25 percent of families living in each site are elderly; about 60 percent are one parent families with children. Women head most households. In each project, some 40 percent of the residents are white, 44 percent are Black, and 17 percent are other minorities -- Pacific-Asians and Hispanics. Although unemployment figures are not available, jobs are scarce: only 20 percent of residents receive most of their income from a job, whereas some 40 percent of families cite AFDC payments as their principal source of income. Police reports indicate that the neighborhoods surrounding the sites are among the highest crime areas in Seattle. Tenants consider crimes against property -- burglary, larceny, and vandalism -- to be the most serious threats, but in Holly Park tenants feel the large, unpredictable youth population poses a constant threat of violence.

The Rainier Valley/Empire Way commercial corridor that links the two sites has been economically depressed since the 1960s, and is a haphazard mix of fast food joints, shopping complexes, and industrial buildings. So far, Rainier/Empire has escaped the blight and deterioration of similarly depressed areas, however, and the district shows signs of making a comeback with the help of Federal EDA funding and aggressive city programming. The city government enjoys a reputation for cooperation with citizens groups, neighborhood and business organizations, and social service agencies, and has historically tried to bring these groups together in cooperative development strategies.

Chief among the social service agencies serving the southeast Seattle community is Neighborhood House, which has operated programs in all SHA projects and throughout the city for 25 years. Neighborhood House receives its funds from United Way, DOL (CETA), HEW, LEAA, and the City of Seattle, and recently has been subcontracted by the SHA to operate components of the Modernization and Target Project Programs. Neighborhood House also sponsors and provides support services for tenant organization in all SHA Projects.

The SHA also enjoys a close working relationship with the three major criminal justice agencies serving the city, the Seattle Police Department (SPD), the Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP), and the Law and Justice Planning Office. (Seattle is unusual in that crime prevention and criminal justice planning services are not assigned to the Police Department. Residential crime prevention programs are operated through CCPP, part of the city's Department of Community Development. The Law and Justice Planning Office is located in the city's Office of Policy and Planning, and writes and administers most of Seattle's LEAA grants.)

Before it began the Anti-Crime program, the SHA had successfully participated in several HUD programs. The SHA successfully completed all objectives of HUD's Target Projects Program, including reduction in vacancy rates and vandalism, and improved maintenance and rental income performance. (Holly Park was one of two Target Projects.) SHA also participated in the Modernization program, rehabilitating 2200 units at a cost of $24 million since 1973. (Again, Holly Park was included in the program.) The city and SHA have collaborated as well, with the city providing nearly $2 million for physical improvements in the Authority's four farm projects. The city also provides block grant support for social services, including the SHA-administered Neighborhood Housing Rehabilitation Program.

In summary, this complex of agencies had a long history of cooperative action. Combined with SHA's national reputation as a particularly well-managed authority and the relative health of the projects' communities and surrounding neighborhoods, there were few apparent organizational barriers to accomplishing the goals of the Anti-Crime program.

II. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

When first informed that Anti-Crime money might be available from HUD, the SHA Director of Resident Services was not interested. Only intensive lobbying by the Director of Neighborhood House prompted the SHA to submit a proposal at all, and the resulting program reflects this.

The SHA and Neighborhood House felt very differently about tenant participation. SHA Resident Services placed great emphasis on informing and mobilizing tenants, stressing social cohesion as a deterrent to crime. Neighborhood House, on the other hand, considered social services -- crisis intervention, mental health counseling, advocacy -- the proper approach. Although some tenants sat on the boards and worked as volunteers at each project's Neighborhood House center, and the agency recruited much of its staff from the ranks of tenants, residents were never involved in on decisionmaking at Neighborhood House.

Ironically, it was the SHA, not Neighborhood House, that drew the ire of residents. At Holly Park, for example, disagreement over how to spend HUD Modernization funds had flared into a lawsuit and demonstration in 1976. Since then, the tenant counsels and the SHA had reached an uneasy equilibrium: the SHA still proposed whatever it wanted to but allowed tenants to review the proposal as long as they did not alter any fundamental points. This was the approach used with the Anti-Crime program as well: once the proposal was written, the tenant councils first endorsed it, then sought to change details

as the program was implemented.

It may be that no more comprehensive tenant involvement was possible. Tenant council meetings were characterized by endless bickering over by-laws, and chronic inability to obtain a quorum. Black women and the elderly were not often represented at meetings, though they comprised most of the household heads at each project. About the only thing on which tenants seemed to agree was a cynical attitude towards the motives of the SHA and Neighborhood House.

The staff of Neighborhood House drafted the Anti-Crime proposal within a month of receiving the solicitation. The SHA wrote a Modernization proposal, and the two were integrated before submission of the whole to HUD. As one might have expected, the proposed Anti-Crime program emphasized social services: Neighborhood House would provide drug abuse counseling and education, victim/witness assistance, direct youth employment and career development services, for example. The City's CCPP would organize block parties and neighborhood surveillance, while the SHA would form a Teen Council, sponsoring educational and recreational programs, and use Modernization funds to harden targets at Rainier Vista and Holly Park. The elements would be integrated into a cohesive whole by an Anti-Crime Oversight Committee consisting of agency and tenant representatives, and run on a day-to-day basis by a Public Safety Coordinator (PSC). Holly Park was chosen to be a site because both residents and outsiders perceived it to be a dangerous place to live. Rainier Vista was a more cohesive, less violent community, but was isolated from the surrounding neighborhood.

Plans for each program component were richly detailed in the proposal, perhaps because each agency was operating nearly identical programs already. Much less detailed were plans for the integration of program components, and this proved to be a serious omission. HUD clearly intended the PSC to have

sufficient authority to direct each component of the program, in order to integrate them all; that intent was compromised by the considerable contractual autommy of Neighborhood House (the PSC had little legal authority), and the vast inexperience of the SHA with directing social programs (the PSC had no fund of organizational knowledge to draw on). In addition, the proposal emphasized referrals and cooperative agreements, but there existed no system for transferring information between (or even within) agencies. Thus even someone with authority and knowledge could not have ensured that a comprehensive set of services were made available to an individual in need of them. Although the Oversight Committee could have provided a means of achieving informal agreements between the agency bureaucracies, its authority and the possible form of these agreements remained uncertain.

The Anti-Crime proposal could be viewed as a set of tried and true programs clothed in new inter-agency guidelines. Given the considerable previous experience of each agency, the prospects for success of each component were high. However, there seemed little chance that a well-integrated, multi-front attack on crime would result. Moreover, if the program development process was to be any indication, there was little likelihood that anti-crime efforts would substantially improve levels of tenant control over anti-crime activities.

III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

A. Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention

The centerpiece of the SHA's improved management component was appointment of a Public Safety Coordinator (PSC) to manage the program. The PSC was also assigned to develop anti-crime-related SHA management policies, establish linkages to outside agencies, and conduct a vulnerability analysis. The PSC's role was ambiguous with regard to the social services provided by Neighborhood House (since it was a separate agency under subcontract to the SHA)

and the modernization activities under the direction of the Modernization Director (who worked for a separate division of the SHA).

A former public housing resident and experienced researcher began serving as PSC in December, 1979. Throughout her time as Coordinator, this woman identified clearly with the needs of tenants and was committed to tenant organization and mobilization. As her first task, she began meeting with local resident councils, the SHA Modernization Engineer, and SPD crime prevention staff with the aim of completing a vulnerability analysis of the two sites. Though assisted by an earlier study of vandalism in the sites conducted by a nearby university, the PSC was hampered by the fact that the SPD aggregates crime reports by census tract, forcing her to hand code crime reports in order to measure crime within the demonstration sites. The final report showed a remarkable consensus between the resident's subjective assessments of "trouble spots" at the projects, and the more objective tale of reported crimes.

The PSC was less successful in her effort to revamp the SHA's placement toothless and eviction policies. When the PSC drafted a procedure for screening new public housing applicants for a criminal record, tenant concern for questions of privacy and fair housing caused her to back down. A related plan to relocate tenants habitually arrested for crimes died when the SPD required that arrest data be used just for "research". The SHA did not change its long-standing policy of evicting tenants only for failure to pay rent.

Although she had no formal authority over the modernization activities, the PSC had an important influence on the modernization design by virtue of her thorough vulnerability analysis. She accompanied the Modernization Engineer on his visits to the sites, suggesting changes in the placement of lighting, walkways, and shrubs, as well as needed repairs.

The PSC fared less well with Neighborhood House. Her attempts to

coordinate the social services provided by this agency with other anti-crime activities met with opposition on several fronts:

o The Executive Director of the SHA and Neighborhood House were close friends, careful to maintain the autonomy of each agency. Any pressure put on Neighborhood staff by the PSC would seem to breach that autonomy, and would have been politically damaging to the PSC.

o Neighborhood House received few applications for Anti-Crime positions outside the ranks of its own employees. Though the PSC and SPD representatives sat in on interviews, final decisions on hiring were strictly at the discretion of the Neighborhood House Deputy and Executive Director.

o Neighborhood House had been running programs like Anti-Crime for many years, and simply included the new components into an existing bureaucratic structure. This made it difficult for an outsider like the PSC (or even an insider, for that matter) to coordinate program activities.

Thus the Neighborhood House social services were effectively beyond the control of the PSC, and in fact were operated by separate parts of the Neighborhood bureaucracy. Fragmentation of Anti-Crime efforts plagued the program throughout its life.

B. More and Improved Community Anti-Crime Service Facilities and Physical Redesign

Both planning and implementation of Modernization Activities were professional, thorough, and timely. Needed security modifications were carefully identified, and virtually all planned activities were implemented as planned.

The Seattle modernization component emphasized direct target hardening. Forced entry to most housing units was easy, due to a design flaw in the self-locking windows; the SHA proposed to correct the error by plugging weep holes, while installing peep holes in the front door for good measure. Potential burglars could also gain ready entry by breaking utility room windows, so the SHA proposed to install polycarbonate windows there. Porch lights were dim and frequently vandalized, and youths hung out in unsecured crawl spaces and storage

areas. In response, the SHA proposed to secure the crawl spaces and storage areas with tamper-proof metal grates, and install vandal-proof, bright porch lights.

Some places outside of the homes themselves were identified as potential trouble spots. Basement laundry rooms were constantly vandalized, inaccessible to the disabled, and filled with rats, rubbish and robbers. The wooded perimeter of the projects provided both hiding places for thieves and shortcuts for residents anxious to avoid the long, steep and indirect route provided by public sidewalks. To make matters worse, what paths there were through these areas were cracked and broken, and did not conform to the informal pedestrian traffic patterns. Finally, there were various smaller problems: free-standing garbage cans were often overturned by pets and vandals; a basketball hoop installed near a tot lot caused continuing conflict between teenagers and two year-olds; unit address numbers were too small to be seen by emergency vehicles.

In response to this litany of problems, the SHA proposed a litany of solutions. Laundry rooms were to be relocated to above-ground facilities. Lighting and chain-link fences were proposed for remote perimeter areas. Trees and shrubs were to be trimmed and removed to enhance the changes for sureillance. Experimental garbage racks were to be installed in a few units at each site to see if they deterred can vandals. The basketball hoop was to be taken down. Finally, sheds were to be constructed for storage of tools, bicycles, and yard furniture; the target here was less crime than unsightly clutter.

It took the Modernization Director and the Public Safety Coordinator three months -- until February 1980 -- to agree on a plan that reflected both good design principles and the results of the vulnerability analysis. That done, construction proceeded apace. Installation of some security devices was phased,

first proceeding at Rainier Vista, later at Holly Park. Garbage racks, window weeps, and door peeps were installed at Rainier Vista between August 1980 and January, 1981, and at Holly Park between December, 1980, and June 1981. Similarly, storage sheds and laundry rooms were constructed at Rainier Vista in the spring and at Holly Park in the summer of 1981. Paths were renovated and constructed in both sites, through January and February, 1981. A contractor landscaped, installed lights, and secured basements in both sites in May, 1981, while another installed chain link fencing in June and July. With the installation of new address signs in September, the SHA completed its modernization activities.

C. Increased Tenant Anti-Crime Participation

The SHA proposed to establish three kinds of tenant groups to improve tenant participation in anti-crime efforts:

- Crime Prevention Councils, consisting of tenants, residents of the surrounding neighborhood, local businesspeople, and social service agency representatives, to oversee implementation of Anti-Crime activities.

- Block Clubs in each court of the two projects to promote social cohesion, increase awareness of Anti-Crime programs, and help foster interest in the actions of the Crime Prevention Councils.

- Youth Organizations in each site, to organize social activities, develop youth employment opportunities, and act as advocate for youths with school problems.

Block Watch captains were to receive stipends and reimbursements for expenses; in Holly Park, youth council members were placed in youth employment slots. No funding was available for other residents involved in these activities.

In October, 1980, a Community Security Organizer was hired to establish Crime Prevention Councils and Block Watches. Holly Park already had a Block Watch program and Crime Prevention Council, and these were retained by the Organizer despite evidence of disputes between the few residents involved in the program and the many who were not. Though meetings were well attended by block

captains, few residents who were not directly involved attended Watch or Council meetings; those who did were frequently put off by the contentious attitudes of the members. The organizer also attempted to involve tenants from Lower Holly Park, an insular section of the project that contained one-third of the residents, but his efforts were foiled by the extensive relocation in this section required by Modernization. In total, only one new block captain was recruited from Holly Park throughout the program.

The Organizer met with better luck at Rainier Vista. Not linked to an existing structure, he recruited a small nucleus of enthusiastic and committed block captains at an organizing meeting in February, 1981. Although these volunteers were active in marking property and distributing anti-crime information, further recruiting efforts failed. In part, this may have been because the Organizer put most of his effort into establishing a Crime Prevention Council after the summer of 1981, at the behest of Neighborhood House's Deputy Director. Rainier Vista is an isolated project in an entirely residential area, and little progress was made in recruiting business leaders or neighborhood representatives for the Council.

Once recruited and trained by the SPD and CCPP, the block captains did little. Many were willing to help mark property, but were denied entry to the homes of suspicious neighbors. (The Community Service Organizer and a youth aide were responsible for most property marking.) Moreover, some captains were involved in ongoing disputes with the neighbors, and were unable to recruit others to be block captains. The Councils were no more useful: the Holly Park Council was in constant disarray from intramural squabbling, and the Rainier Vista Council never got off the ground.

Youth workers were to be established with the help of OJJDP funding, and two youth workers were hired, one for each site. The worker at Holly Park was a

charismatic political organizer who had worked with Holly Park youth for some years before and was able to recruit youths he knew to have leadership potential. The Rainier Vista worker, in contrast, was an experienced advocate and counselor who had no such familiarity with the site, and her recruitment efforts depended on leaflets, articles in the project newspaper, and contacts made during a house-to-house Teen Survey. As a result, the leaders of the Holly Park council were better known and more widely respected among the youth of the project than their counterparts at Rainier Vista. In addition, youth leaders at Holly Park were paid through the youth employment program, while those at Rainier Vista were not. Despite their enthusiasm, the youth workers were unwilling to compromise their rapport with youths and probably gave their charges too free a rein. Thus unrealistic planning prevented some of the council's projects from ever coming off.

Organizational meetings were held at both sites in January, 1981, and council officers were elected. In Rainier Vista, the youth council ran a successful disco dance but did little else. At Holly Park, the council sponsored a basketball league, dances and skating parties, but was never integrated into the rest of the Anti-Crime program. When youth employment money ran out in August, 1981, the Holly Park youth council disbanded, and Neighborhood House was unable to organize a youth council without the incentive of employment. The program was terminated in October, 1981, and remaining funds returned.

D. Increase Full- and Part-Time Employment of Tenants

The SHA proposed a YCCIP-funded youth employment program that would provide twenty-four youths with minimum wage jobs acting as child care and tutoring assistants; as recreation, community organization, and maintenance aides; and as peer counselors, property markers, and escorts for the elderly.

Neighborhood House would conduct the program, using the training and counseling services of the Seattle Summer Youth Employment Program and public schools. To recruit and supervise the youths, two employment supervisors were to be hired.

Due to delays in approval of the YCCIP budget, supervisors were not hired until August, 1980. This prevented integration of the YCCIP placement with the Summer Youth efforts, as originally planned. The only job slots still available were those least desired by the youths, and turnover was high as a result. Some slots were never filled, and the program was underenrolled until spring, 1981. The American Friends Service Committee offered the youths training in resume preparation and interview skills, while other agencies held workshops on students' rights and birth control. No testing or job-specific training was offered, however. Upon completion of the program in August, 1981, the participants received some placement assistance.

Part way through the program, Neighborhood House found some irregularities in the payroll. One of the youths had continued to submit time sheets for other youths who had left the program. Some young people were enrolled who did not live in the projects, while others were chosen because they were relatives of Neighborhood House employees. The agency responded by firing a supervisor implicated in the scandal.

Participants reported mixed feelings about their experience with the YCCIP program. Although they felt pride in collecting a regular paycheck, and developed better work habits as a result of the employment, many youths expressed frustration at the lack of challenge and accomplishment afforded by these jobs.

Neighborhood House's long standing policy of hiring public housing tenants was expected to increase adult employment opportunities, but most of the agency's anti-crime program staff were already employed by the agency. Thus no

adult tenants received jobs as a result of the anti-crime program. Moreover, Neighborhood House staff measured no increase in use of employment assistance services throughout the duration of the anti-crime program.

E. More and Improved Services to Combat Crime and Assist Victims and Witnesses

As proposed, Neighborhood House would provide emergency services, counseling, advocacy, self-help development, and referrals for two groups of tenants:

- Alcoholics, drug abusers, and other tenants with stress or depression-related problems;

- Victims and witnesses of crime.

In addition, this agency would continue to offer a wide variety of social services for children, adolescents, parents, and the elderly.

A Victim/Witness Advocate was hired in July, 1980. Although she was scheduled to be trained by the City of Seattle's Victim/Witness Assistance and Referral Program (VWARP), most of this agency's staff was on vacation or committed to other activities until September. Since VWARP was also to provide most of the Advocate's caseload through referrals, the untrained Advocate handled few cases that summer. Though she received extensive training in September and October from VWARP, the SPD, and others, she resigned in November due to personal problems unrelated to the anti-crime program. Neighborhood House promptly hired another Advocate, but this woman was alienated at the start from VWARP (who felt cheated by because they had spent so much time training the first Advocate's resignation), and alienated herself from the SPD. The second Advocate's emphasis on crisis intervention, stress counseling, and legal advocacy was consistent with the usual role of Neighborhood as a provider of primary services, rather than information and referrals.

The SHA, SPD, and VWARP all emphasized increased reporting of crimes and referrals to specialized agencies, and the PSC was concerned over the low caseload of the Neighborhood House program. Thus a new Victim/Witness Advocate program began under the direct supervision of the PSC, in April 1981. A third Advocate--a lawyer and social worker--provided community education, information and referral, and developed a comprehensive victim/witness services resource book for citywide distribution. Despite the third Advocate's excellent relationship with VWARP, even this program helped few tenants, for two reasons:

- The Advocate usually identified victims and witnesses in need of service only after they reported the offense to the police, and few crimes were reported in the project sites;

- Tenants may have thought twice about reporting ambiguous situations to an agency that had the authority to relocate and evict them.

The Victim/Witness program continued to operate until September, 1981.

Both Neighborhood House and SHA staff agreed that the Anti-Crime ADAMHA component was the most productive part of the program. This may be attributed almost entirely to the initiative and commitment of the Mental Health Specialist, a former resident and recovering alcoholic. The Specialist developed a large caseload in only nine months by cultivating a good relationship with Neighborhood Health Clinic staff, who referred most of his clients to him, and by focusing on single parent mothers and the elderly as the groups with the greatest motivations to accept mental health treatment.

The Specialist was hired in December, 1980, and set up four offices, two in each site. By January he had trained staff of the Neighborhood Health Clinics to recognize the symptoms of drug and alcohol abuse, set up cooperative agreements with live-in treatment facilities, and begun to accept referrals. Using the absence of a program plan to advantage, he provided widely varying

services: preventive education, casework counseling, referrals of chronic cases to live-in agencies, and development of self-help peer support groups for single parent mothers, drug and alcohol abusers, and the elderly. Services continued until the money ran out in September, 1981.

Although successful in itself, the ADAMHA component was not well-integrated with the other elements of the Anti-Crime program. Many residents would only seek help anonymously, making case coordination impossible. More important, the Specialist considered Anti-Crime Oversight Committee meetings a waste of time, and aligned himself clearly with the Neighborhood Health Clinics, consulting with staff of this agency and attending their staff meetings.

F. Increased Use of Better Trained Police Officers

The SHA proposed no increase in the number or change in the assignment of the city police officers assigned to patrol the project sites, believing that the rolling hills and low density rowhouse construction of the projects made both foot patrols and private security guards impractical. Instead, the Authority opted to try to improve relations between police and tenants. Its proposals to involve the SPD in tenant activities were successfully implemented: the SPD Crime Prevention staff was instrumental in training the Crime Prevention Councils and Block Watches at Rainier Vista, and patrol officers regularly attended meetings of these groups at both sites.

The SHA also proposed to conduct a victimization study of the two project sites, collecting demographic data on victims and offenders, recording tenant's complaints about police service, and determining whether patrol officers needed more training in crisis intervention and crisis management. The victimization study was scrapped when the SPD refused to make crime and arrest records available to the Public Safety Coordinator.

G. Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources

The Seattle city government had established a Citywide Crime Prevention Task Force to orchestrate anti-crime efforts sponsored by the SPD, the SHA and various private agencies. Throughout the Anti-Crime program, the SHA used its involvement in this Task Force as a means of exchanging crime prevention information and recruiting the help of other agencies in the Anti-Crime program. The Task Force had no authority to coordinate activities or prevent duplication of effort, however, and so its usefulness was limited.

Although the SPD successfully organized Block Watches in the neighborhoods surrounding the project sites, potential coordination between watches inside and outside the sites was stifled by the conflict between Neighborhood House and the SPD. Few linkages were made between tenants and the outside neighborhood as a result of the Anti-Crime program.

IV. PROGRAM IMPACT

High Point, a Southeast Seattle project that is demographically and economically similar to the demonstration sites, was chosen to be a comparison site. Although no direct Anti-Crime-related activities were conducted at High Point, a number of similar social services were (including CCPP Neighborhood Watch, alcohol and drug abuse counseling, and youth employment). As such, survey results and crime reports by High Point residents roughly approximate what results in the demonstration sites would have been, had the Anti-Crime program not taken place. In addition, information was obtained from residents of the residential neighborhoods immediately surrounding each site, to help put each project's impact data in context.

Surveys were conducted between late May and early August, 1981 to obtain the attitudes and victimization experiences of site and neighborhood residents. Some respondents were administered "long forms", which explored the resident's

awareness of and participation in Anti-Crime activities, a wide variety of attitudes, and victimization experiences. Others received only a "short form", which focused almost exclusively on fear of crime and victimization. The distribution of completed interviews is presented below.

	Long Form	Short Form	Total interviews
Holly Park	60	121	181
neighborhood	0	106	106
Rainier Vista	36	77	113
neighborhood	0	102	102
High Point	69	117	186
neighborhood	0	41	41
TOTAL	165	564	729

The response rate for households in the surrounding neighborhoods, at 30 to 50 percent, is alarmingly low. Although the response rate for public housing tenants is more reasonable, at 70 percent, the number of sampled tenants who did not answer the questionnaire is sufficiently large that it is wise to look for signs of sampling bias.

The most important cause of the low response rate is a very high rate of refusals, due primarily to language difficulties. The project sites and the surrounding neighborhoods are largely populated by Pacific-Asians, many of them recent Indochinese immigrants who do not speak English well. In addition, there is evidence that many interviewers did not make four attempts to reach all of those sampled. (Because the sample sizes were so large, interviewers were forced to allocate their time selectively; the emphasis was on obtaining a large number of interviews for the demonstration and comparison projects, rather than the surrounding neighborhoods.) We conclude:

- Pacific-Asians, especially Vietnamese and Cambodians, are probably underrepresented in the sample;

- People who are easy to reach -- the elderly or unemployed, for example -- are probably oversampled;

- The working poor may well be underrepresented in the sample.

A. Program Awareness

At 75 percent, the proportion of residents who were aware of crime prevention meetings in Rainier Vista and Holly Park was very high. However, this can probably not be attributed to the Anti-Crime program, since 68 percent of the comparison High Point residents knew of crime prevention meetings as well. The high level of awareness probably reflects the results of Seattle's well-known Neighborhood Watch program.

This is borne out more clearly by a direct question asking about awareness of citizen surveillance programs. Sixty-five to 80 percent of residents in the three sites knew of residents who watch each other's apartments, while 45 to 62 percent recognized a program called "Neighborhood Watch." Although these figures are somewhat lower for Holly Park than for either High Point or Ranier Vista, this probably reflects the fact that many new residents had recently been relocated to Lower Holly Park, and is not an effect of the Anti-Crime program.

The story is the same with most other programs offered under Anti-Crime: 43 to 56 percent were aware of property marking programs; 67 to 77 percemt knew of youth employment programs; 49 to 62 percent knew of alcohol and drug abuse services. None of the differences between sites are particularly likely to be anything other than random fluctuation.

The only Anti-Crime component that was really new to the sites was the Victim/Witness program, and here there is evidence that publicity had an effect. In Holly Park and Rainier Vista, 22 and 25 percent of residents knew of victim/witness services, while at High Point only 9 percent did. Although this difference is substantial, note that far fewer people knew about these services than any of those that Neighborhood House had been offering for years.

B. <u>Program Participation</u>

Just as there was little evidence that Anti-Crime program publicity made people more aware of available social services, there were mostly small differences in participation levels among the three sites. Participation in drug and alcohol abuse programs ran at about 10 to 15 percent in all sites; 17 to 26 percent of households marked their property; only a half dozen residents surveyed took advantage of victim/witness services.

Some substantial differences can be identified, however. Only 15 percent of residents in Holly Park and High Point went to crime prevention meetings, but about 30 percent claim to have attended at Rainier Vista. Although crime prevention workshops and block watch organization meetings were relatively more successful in Rainier Vista than in Holly Park, so large a difference is unexpected. Fifty-five percent said they watched each other's apartments in Rainier Vista and High Point, whereas only 34 percent participated in Holly Park. This is consistent with both the observed aloofness of the Holly Park block captains and the low level of community cohesion in Holly Park. (Note that this figure includes formal participation in Neighborhood Watch, as well as informal agreements among neighbors.) Finally, about 27 percent of Holly Park households had members that participated in youth employment programs, while only 12 percent participated in Rainier Vista. This is unexpected, since the proportion of households with youths eligible for the Anti-Crime jobs program was only slightly higher at Holly Park than at Rainier Vista, and Anti-Crime slots were allocated between the two sites proportional to their eligible population. Thus the deviation probably reflects differences in the administration of the Summer Youth Employment Program, which was under way during the period in which questionnaires were administered.

C. <u>Fear and Victimization</u>

Victimization rates at the two demonstration sites and the comparison site appear to be very high. Residents of the surrounding neighborhoods reported far fewer victimizations, on average. The number of burglaries, robberies and contact larcenies, rapes and assaults, and reports of threats and intimidation for the three projects and their neighborhoods are shown in Table 1.

Residents of Holly Park consistently reported the most victimizations, followed by High Point residents, then Rainier Vista tenants. The consistency of the rates for the surrounding neighborhoods is also remarkable: residents of the Rainier Vista neighborhood report that the most victimizations, while Holly Park and High Point neighborhood residents seem less likely to be victimized. (Some residents may be "victimization prone" -- because they are gas station attendants or liquor store proprietors, like to walk alone at night, or like to make up fictitious crimes to impress interviewers -- and this may account for the extreme consistency of these rates.)

Given the high victimization rates, one might expect that tenants would consider crime to be a big problem. This is in fact true: 37 percent of Holly Park residents consider burglary and robbery a "big problem" or a "very big problem," and 31 percent of them consider "teenagers hanging around or causing trouble" -- the most frequent source of intimidation -- a big or very big problem. Levels of concern at High Point are roughly similar, while fewer than half as many Rainier Vista residents express such a concern for crime. The

D. Recorded Crime

Monthly recorded index crime data were collected from SPD for March, 1979 through December, 1981, for the census tracts in which the two demonstration projects and the comparison project were situated. The address at which each crime was committed was checked, and all crimes that took place on the grounds of the demonstration sites were analyzed separately.

Average monthly personal crimes .(murder, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery) and property crimes (burglary, larceny, auto theft) committed per 10,000 persons for the two demonstration sites and the comparison site are shown below:

	Personal	Property	Total
Rainier Vista	14.4	35.2	39.6
Holly Park	11.1	38.9	50.0
High Point	11.1	50.4	61.5

In contrast to the victimization data, which suggested that Holly Park and High Point were the more violent projects, reported crimes suggest that Rainier Vista is more violent than the others. It may be that crimes committed at Rainier Vista are less frequently committed against tenants than crimes in the other projects; alternatively, Rainier residents may be more likely to report crimes once they have been victimized.

Figure 1 represents the number of reported index crimes per 10,000 residents committed each month from 1979 to 1981. (The time series has been smoothed to make trends easier to see.) In all three projects, crimes peaked in the summer and fall of 1979. At Rainier Vista and High Point, the trend has been more or less steadily downward since then, although crimes did begin to increase again in spring, 1981. Whether the consistency between the two is due to a similarly changing demographic structure in the two sites, economic conditions in the surrounding neighborhood, criminal justice system activities, or the weather, we do not know. At Holly Park the trend is much less even, first turning down, then up again. There is no obvious correlation between Anti-Crime program activities and reported crimes at any of the sites.

Because the trends of reported crime differ for the two demonstration sites, and more importantly because the tend in the comparison site shows a

striking decrease in crime, it is most likely that any effect of the Anti-Crime program on recorded crime was very small.

E. <u>Perceptions of Change</u>

Two questions were asked which allowed respondents to compare conditions in 1981 to those which existed a year before. The average resident of Holly Park and Rainier Vista felt her site to be a better place to live than the year before. On average, High Point residents and residents of the surrounding neighborhoods indicated that they felt their neighborhoods had not changed for better or worse over the past year.

More to the point, respondents were also asked whether they believed that crime was more or less of a problem than it had been the year before. In Rainier Vista, the average resident felt that crime was less of a problem; in High Point and the comparison neighborhoods, crime was deemed to be <u>more</u> of a problem than before. (No information was available on residents of Holly Park.) These differences may be due to increased availability of social services or more evidence physical changes due to Modernization, or it may be due to something other than the Anti-Crime program.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Seattle's Anti-Crime program was particularly interesting because efforts were divided between the umbrella social service agency, Neighborhood House, and the Housing Authority itself, while important roles were also layed by two other agencies, the Seattle Police Department and the Community Crime Prevention Program. In general, activities that could be undertaken by one agency without support of the others were successful--the Modernization program is the most striking example of thils. The ADAMHA program relied on the personal contact of the ADAMHA director with the staff of the Neighborhood Health Centers, and ran smoothly as well. On the other hand, activities that required the support of

several agencies (such as the victim/witness program or the training component of the youth employment program) or the organization of a whole community (such as the Block Watch and youth programs) were much less successful. The more cooperation required, the less successful the activity.

Organizational experience in running similar programs also predicted program success. Neighborhood House was experienced in providing services to alcoholics and drug abusers, thus it would not be suprising that they chose an experienced and hard working ADAMHA director: they knew what the job required and who would do it well. In contrast, Neighborhood House had never run a Victim/Witness program before, and had little contact with the city agencies responsible for Victim/Witness advocacy. Thus they select two Victim/Witness directors who antagonized the city agencies and wrecked the program. Experience, of course, worked two ways: although experienced agencies ran more successful programs, they tended to run the same programs they had always run. Note, for example, that the ADAMHA program was geared toward single mothers and the elderly (the focus of earlier Neighborhood House mental health efforts) and not toward the youths responsible for most crime at the sites. The Anti-Crime focus was a misnomer.

In sum, Seattle public housing tenants live in houses that are harder targets for criminals than they were; a few dozen young people have more work experience, and more money in their pockets; for a few months, a few tenants participated in self-help peer support groups. Nevertheless, the community is only marginally better organized than before, it receives no better police and victim/witness services, and neither Neighborhood House, not the SHA, nor the tenant associations are likely to emphasize anti-Crime activities in the future, despite high victimization rates and widespread concern with crime as a problem. Not suprisingly, the Anti-Crime program did not measureably reduce crime rates or lesson tenant concern.

SEATTLE
Rainier Vista

RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
### Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)

RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)

RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
### Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)

RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units

RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)

RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)

RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)

RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units

RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

RECORDED BURGLARIES
Per 10,000 Occupied Units

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981