

Contract HC-5231

EVALUATION OF THE URBAN INITIATIVES
ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

CHICAGO, IL, CASE STUDY

1984

Prepared for:

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Office of Policy Development and Research

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This report is one in a series that comprises a comprehensive evaluation of the Public Housing Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration. The Final Report provides an integrated analysis of the design, implementation and impact of the entire demonstration, and each of the 15 site-specific case studies analyzes the implementation and impact of the programs at individual participating local housing authorities. The complete set of reports includes:

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Final Report

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program:

Baltimore, MD, Case Study
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PREFACE

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration was created by the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. The program was formally announced in May 1979 and awards were made by the following September. By early 1981, programs in all 39 selected sites were underway; and by mid-1982, all were essentially completed.

As the report notes, the design and implementation of the program were flawed. The demonstration was conceived and developed according to principles which the current Administration has sought to reverse--that influxes of Federal money and direct Federal involvement can provide solutions to local problems.

HUD is currently implementing a series of demonstrations designed to improve the quality of life of public housing residents. These demonstrations stress local autonomy in design and implementation, with communities free to tailor their programs to meet their own unique needs. The demonstrations emphasize the coordination of existing Federal, State, and local resources, rather than the duplication of existing efforts or the funding of new programs. They use existing HUD resources to leverage other public and private funds. And, they require the commitment of all sectors of the local community, with a special emphasis on public/ private partnerships.

The Department believes that the emphasis on local authority which characterizes current Administration policy and provides the basis for operating and planned demonstrations holds much more promise for improving the lives of low-income families than programs that are rigidly structured by the Federal government.

I. CONTEXT

A. The City

Chicago, the third largest city in the United States, is strategically located at the south end of Lake Michigan, at the mouth of the Chicago River. Its central location in North America has made it an air and rail transportation center for the continent. A place of portage in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a trading post during the nineteenth century, Chicago was plotted as a city in 1830. Its location has made it one of the largest farm markets in the United States. It not only has been the center for corn and wheat trade but for meat and food packing as well. Its industry and manufacturing consists of primary metals, and machinery. It has also been a center for the manufacture of agricultural implements and farm equipment. The framework for Chicago's current government was adopted in 1875. Chicago is known as an ethnic and working class community, politically dominated by ward and district leaders. The Democratic political organization has controlled Chicago politics and has had powerful influence both on Illinois and national politics.

The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) is the second largest housing authority in the United States in total size, family program, elderly program, and leasing program. The total population is 114,359, (4.6% of the entire city) including 36,306 non-elderly adults, 19,299 elderly adults, and 85,754 minors. These citizens live in a total of 39,973 apartments in 1,288 buildings, clustered in 102 CHA developments. Sixty-five percent (65%) of the families and 99% of the elderly live in high rise buildings (CHA Proposal, 1979).

Bowley (1978) divides the history of public housing in Chicago into four stages: early years, middle years, high rise years, and 1967 to the present. The early years began with the first projects built by the Public Works Administration and later acquired by the CHA. The projects were made up of low-rise apartments up to four stories, or two-story row-houses. The middle years

lasted from 1947 to 1955 and developments were constructed with considerable variety--low-rise apartments, row houses, and some high-rise buildings. The period from 1957-1968, the high-rise period, was characterized by the almost exclusive construction of high rise "super block" developments. The final period was quiet and only a few scattered site projects have been completed.

B. The Demonstration Sites and the Surrounding Neighborhood

The Robert Taylor Homes is the ultimate and best known super block development. It is the largest single public housing project in the world. Built on 92 acres of land, the buildings themselves occupy 7% of the site. The site is a pathway only two blocks wide but two miles long spreading along State Street on the south side of Chicago. Four thousand three hundred and fifteen (4,315) apartments are contained in 28 sixteen-story elevator buildings. It was completed in 1962. To the north it is bounded by 39th Street, the beginning of the Stateway Gardens development.

Stateway Gardens was completed in 1958 and consists of 1,635 apartments in two 10-story and six 17-story buildings. Also two blocks wide, it extends half a mile long. The project occupies 33.8 acres of land; the buildings 12% of the site.

Visually, the buildings are in a corridor of high rise constructions extending for two and a half miles. The area is isolated by train tracks and expressways to the west and deteriorated residential and small business areas to the east. A shopping center (constructed with similar brick), and several schools and churches share the corridor but provide little relief from the repetitious high-rises interrupted only by worn out areas of grass, parking lots, and cross streets. Combining the two developments and considering them one, as was done in the CHA's Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program (UIACP) proposal, appropriately recognizes the similarity in construction and demographics. Both are in the 2nd District of the Chicago Police Department and

the Chicago Department of Human Services' Near South Neighborhood Service Area. Black citizens comprise 100% of the population of each project. Elderly residents make up 1.4% of the population in Stateway Gardens and 2.1% in Robert Taylor. Ninety-two percent (92%) of the population of the combined projects receive some type of public assistance or pension, 82% of the families are one-parent, and 71% of the population is under the age of 21. Median income residents of Robert Taylor Homes was \$4,415 and for Stateway Gardens, \$3,700. The per capita income was under \$1,000 in each. In the Robert Taylor homes the average number of persons in a household was 4.8, and in Stateway Gardens, 3.7 (CHA Proposal, 1979).

The Robert Taylor/Stateway Gardens complex exists in almost complete geographic isolation. It is surrounded by train tracks, expressways, and dilapidated housing. Although population in the area increased during the 1970's, the housing stock is seriously deteriorated. Current unemployment figures are unavailable but they are substantial. The population of the contiguous areas is 100% black. Commercial facilities have largely abandoned the adjacent areas. Those inside the perimeter of the Robert Taylor/Stateway Gardens complex give the impression of being besieged--heavy bars, extensive vandalism, many youths hanging around, etc. Public transportation to the area is quite good, with a major north-south segment of the elevated train running parallel to the length of the complex and a few blocks away. Bus transportation is also viable. Recreational facilities are limited. Small public parks exist in Robert Taylor and Stateway Gardens, but lack modern recreational facilities. Indoor gymnasium facilities are available for restricted use. A public high school is located directly across the street from Robert Taylor and seven elementary schools are either inside or adjacent to the combined complex.

When the proposal was written, crime was a serious and increasing problem

in the developments. Generally, burglary and robbery were on the decline. Personal crimes--homicide, rape, and assault were dramatically on the increase. Auto theft was increasing in Robert Taylor and decreasing in Stateway Gardens (CHA Proposal, 1979). Generally police and CHA authorities believed that the increase in personal crimes resulted from the serious gang activity afflicting the area. Homicide, rape, assault, and robbery made up close to 50% of the reported index crimes in each of the two developments. Generally crime patterns reflected those of adjoining areas (Police District 2) although the crime rates per 100,000 were consistently higher for those in the complex, and, much higher than rates for the entire city.

II. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

A. Methodology

The data used to describe the policy making, implementation, and program activity stages of the UIACP in Chicago were obtained through observations, interviews, and record analysis conducted by one of the senior staff persons in the Program in Criminal Justice Administration and Policy of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. This staff person visited Chicago monthly during the period from March 1981 to June 1982. In addition he had regular telephone contact with the Anti-crime Coordinator and staff persons of Chicago's Department of Planning. Some record analysis, primarily those records having to do with the ADAMHA and Victim/Witness programs, was conducted by a part-time employee who was hired briefly during late 1981. These data were used by the senior staff person to develop a case study of Chicago's UIACP program which is found in Volume I of A Process Evaluation of the Urban

Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. This chapter is authored by the same person as the basic case study and the materials in this integrated case are excerpted from, or based on, that case study.

B. Policy Making and Program Development

The CHA's Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program had its roots in an earlier anti-crime program in Chicago. That program was the High Impact Program (HIP) conducted in the Cabrini Green development for a three year period beginning in July 1975. Cabrini Green is the third largest, and perhaps most notorious, of Chicago's public housing developments.

Cabrini Green was generally considered by the CHA to be working satisfactorily as a public housing development until the mid and late 1960's. Then, gangs, civil rights unrest, and crime and increasing fear, began to erode the quality of life in the project. The sniper-shooting of two police officers in 1970 was, perhaps, the event that most crystalized the perception of Cabrini Green as a bad place to live in, work in, or pass through. The location of Cabrini Green made it a special problem for the CHA and the city. Located on the north side of the down-town area it is close to both the gold coast business and residential areas, as well as important commercial interests (e.g., Montgomery Ward offices and facilities). It is generally assumed in Chicago that its proximity to these political and economic interests is a powerful spur to maintain it as an orderly and safe place.

These concerns led to the development of the High Impact Program (HIP) in 1975. Four Chicago agencies worked together to plan, implement, and evaluate the program: Chicago Housing Authority, Department of Human Services, Police Department, and Department of Planning. The CHA was to be primarily responsible for implementing physical security elements made up of new security lobbies, limiting access to the lobbies, monitoring of lobbies and elevator cabs, vandal proof mailboxes, electronic surveillance of "safe pathways", and courtyard

fencing. The Department of Planning was co-responsible for the program and provided program planning services, technical and management assistance, program coordination, and monitoring and evaluation. The Department of Human Services provided an array of social programs oriented towards preventing crime, increasing citizen capacity to protect themselves, and offering counselling, referral, advocacy, shelter care, and alternate residences for youths with difficulties. The Chicago Police Department offered a variety of training services to security aides and a regular contingent of 55 police officers who were involved in foot and vertical patrol. These police services made up the major share of the city's matching funds.

The program was formally evaluated by Arthur Young and Company. Generally, the evaluators found the program to be successful. "Verified" crime had been reduced and citizens viewed the development as a more desirable place to live. The report suggested that the greatest contributor to the overall success was the Architectural Security Program, however some of the elements, especially the electronic equipment, made only minor contributions. The social service programs were generally seen as supportive of the structural modifications, but it was generally believed that they would have little effect on their own. The evaluators further noted that the teenage population had declined substantially (34.6% of 16-20 year olds and 17.9% of 11-15 year olds) during the course of the program, which could have influenced the outcome of the program.

When the UIACP was announced by HUD the CHA and Department of Planning believed, with some justification based on the HIP, that HUD was funding a nationwide program which was conceived and tested in Chicago. Chicago saw little reason to depart from the concepts or organizational arrangements which had given it its Cabrini Green success.

It was logical that the next sites for implementation of anti-crime activities should be the Taylor/Stateway complex. The Urban Initiatives

Program had already funded two key HIP elements, lobbies and management outposts, in Robert Taylor Homes. The Anti-Crime monies would allow those two elements to be extended to Stateway Gardens. Also, those funds would provide services to both developments.

The Oversight Committee formed to assist in the development of the proposal consisted of representatives from a wide variety of interests: CHA management, urban initiatives staff, security staff, and administrators for Robert Taylor Homes and Stateway Gardens; Planning Department; Department of Human Services; Department of Public Safety; and tenant representatives of both developments. Later, representatives of the Chicago Alcoholism Treatment Center (CATC) became involved as well. Essentially, however, with the exception of the ADAMHA section, which was drafted by representatives from CATC, staff of the Department of Planning drafted, reviewed, and revised the proposal. Representatives of tenants, the CHA and other committee members reviewed and commented on drafts. Two basic approaches seemed to guide those drafting the proposal. First, programs were to pass through, starting from Cabrini Green to Robert Taylor to Stateway Gardens. Second, the role of tenants in the development of the plans was to be traditional and operate out of their current organizational structure. Although that structure will be discussed in more detail later, the tendency of the organization was to focus on jobs in the program for tenants. This focus on employment is not to be construed to mean that the tenants did not want the lobby modification program. As a matter of fact they did, and almost to the person interviewed, would happily scrap the rest of the program to have the lobbies.

The drafted proposal was submitted to the CHA Board of Commissioners on June 14, 1979, approved on June 16, 1979, and submitted to HUD on June 21, 1979. HUD's response recommended, among other suggestions, that: the CHA be more specific about its eviction and tenant screening plans, the CHA

request a waiver to allow modernization funding above the limit allowed, the CHA Director of Security not be named the Program Coordinator, CHA should decrease the supervisor-youth ratio and change the youth jobs, and more local matches for social services and supervision. The CHA responded on August 31, 1979. The response included a more specific plan for eviction and tenant screening, hedged on the alcohol/drug abuse plans, requested the modernization waiver, indicated that the Director of Security would not be the Program Coordinator, essentially met the requirement that the supervisor-youth ratio be reduced, and provided a litany of social service agencies which would be involved in servicing the complex. On September 27, 1979, HUD notified the CHA that Chicago was one of the cities which would be awarded a contract. Additionally, HUD's response requested that the final revisions include more than a mere listing of social agencies and that police personnel and activities be made more specific. Chicago submitted its final draft on February 1, 1980 and, during that month, revised earlier submissions for various program elements. On July 1, 1980, Chicago was notified of its award. That did not end negotiations, however. Considerable disagreement continued to exist between HUD and CHA about the relationship of the Anti-crime Coordinator to the Executive Director of the CHA, the inclusion of drug programs, and the shape of the Victim/Witness and OJJDP programs. These issues were the focus of a meeting between the UIACP Director and the CHA on the eve of the presidential elections. Although the issues were not resolved and funds were held up by HUD for 5 months (the CHA used its own funds during this period to start the program), the ultimate disintegration of the HUD UIACP staff seemed to resolve the issues.

Although the Oversight Committee met once in 1981, immediately preceding the first visit of the evaluators, its last meeting regarding the program was held in November of 1980. Resident leadership roles were confined to those proposed: staff positions, with few exceptions, were filled with residents of

the authority.

III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

A. Improved Management of Public Safety by the PHA

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program was formally initiated in August of 1980 when an Assistant Anti-Crime Coordinator was hired and two staff members from the Planning Department were formally assigned to the program. The Assistant Coordinator had formerly been in middle management (lieutenant) in a private security agency. Her appointment was recommended by the Director of Security and approved by the Local Advisory Council. The two planners were planning professionals who had been on the staff of the Department of Planning and subsequently were assigned to the program to monitor the program, handle all report writing, and provide technical assistance.

The UIACP requirement that the Anti-Crime Coordinator report directly to the Director of the CHA was not adopted. From the beginning, the CHA was to have their security director in charge of the program, and he was.

, The Assistant Anti-Crime Coordinator had her office in the Robert Taylor Homes. From the beginning of her assignment, she had little contact with top management of the CHA. Ostensibly she supervised all of the anti-crime staff; in reality, her power was seriously limited. In spite of her limited authority, the Assistant Anti-Crime Coordinator was successful in coordinating activities with other units, the CPD, and the private security agency providing security services. Her contacts with tenants and other agencies were limited. The reasons for this restricted influence included the nature of the relationship between project managers and residents, the power of tenant leaders, and the basic operating philosophy of the CHA. All of these factors changed dramatically after the reform administration took hold.

The staff from the Department of Planning saw their influence wane over the course of the program. Although the involvement of DP was not to be as direct

in UIACP as it had been in HIP (where it was a real partnership), the mere fact that a mid-management capacity (Anti-Crime Coordinator) had been added to the CHA to administer the program reduced the influence of the planners as soon. Later, the change of administration further reduced their influence. Nevertheless they did provide several key services and were singularly responsible for the development of a park, which although not yet constructed, remains an important ingredient of the overall plan. Moreover, they managed the relationship with HUD and handled all the required paper work - a major task in itself, and served as liaison with the evaluators.

In addition to these general managerial positions, the CHA proposed certain activities to improve management of anti-crime activities. First, it was proposed to provide improved training of security guards. During the first three quarters of the project period, training of the security guards did take place, conducted by staff members of the CPD, Interstate Security, and staff of UIACP. Close monitoring of the activities of the security guards was maintained both by the Director of Security and the Assistant Anti-Crime Coordinator to insure that security activities were conducted as prescribed. However, on December 7, 1981, the contract with Interstate Security Corporation was terminated.

Second, improved tenant selection procedures were proposed. Although planning efforts regarding screening of tenants were initiated during the early stages of the project, more intensive planning and activity was carried out as part of the program of crime reduction developed by the new administration appointed by the mayor.

Finally, it was proposed to publicize anti-crime activities. During the early stages of the program, the materials which were distributed provided general information about the nature of the new program, the services offered, hot-line information, and encouraged tenants to participate in activities and

make use of new services. The new administration, committed to a new anti-crime effort, also distributed materials to tenants. These materials were of a different tone, emphasizing new policies of the CHA and encouraging citizens to cooperate with them. The participatory tone of the early publicity gave way to a more authoritative one.

B. More and Improved Anti-Crime Service Facilities and Physical Redesign

Chicago proposed four elements of physical redesign: access control through the development of lobbies; installation of seven-foot, heavy-stock wrought-iron fences; modernization of elevator cabs; and commercial development of areas surrounding the Taylor/Stateway complex. The last activity was dropped during early developmental stages. The plan was to construct the lobbies at Robert Taylor with Urban Initiatives funds and at Stateway Garden with UIACP funds. Only after the lobbies were completed was work to begin on the fencing. As of the writing of this report, no contracts have been let to begin the work at Robert Taylor and no plans or specifications have been drawn for Stateway Gardens. As planned, work on the fencing _____ new lobbies. In Robert Taylor the specifications were published, bids submitted, bids rejected as being too high (100% over the available funds), the specifications redone, republished, bids received, and again rejected as too high. In Stateway Gardens a bid was received to do preliminary consultation about the lobbies, but was rejected as being too high at \$195,000. As of November 1981, of the \$1,275,000 available for modernization with anti-crime funds, \$28 had been spent.

The elevators present special difficulties in the Taylor/Stateway complex. They are external to the building, and, as such, have unique maintenance

problems. The contract for elevator repair was let to Westinghouse during the first quarter of 1981. Construction began August 3, 1981, and was originally scheduled for completion by the end of October, 1981. That was later extended to the end of December. As of October 1981 the four buildings in which work had begun on August 3 were still uncompleted and work was not scheduled to begin until those four were completed. Complaints were regularly heard about the level of effort made by the contractor, and even security guards were used to check on whether or not work was progressing. As a consequence, the CHA has filed suit against Westinghouse.

C. More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation

The tenant organization in the CHA operates at three levels. Each building maintains a Building Council with an elected president. This president represents the building on the Local Advisory Council (LAC), the organization consisting of all building presidents of each LAC are organized into the Central Advisory Council (CAC), the organization which formally represents tenants in their dealings with CHA. LACs work closely with management in each housing development.

The CAC was formally recognized as the agency representing tenants in 1971, when a memorandum of accord was signed. CHA and HUD now provide the CAC \$450,000 a year for operating expenses. In addition, the CHA provides office space and furnishings, as well as two full-time clerical workers (CHA Proposal, 1979).

The role proposed for tenants in the Taylor/Stateway complex was consistent with the above description of the role of tenants in the CHA. Tenants were to receive all staff positions except that of the Assistant Anti-Crime Coordinator, and recruit, screen, and recommend appointment of staff. The LAC was to provide consultation regarding program elements, but final authority was to remain with management. In addition, tenants were to participate in programs and receive

services.

With little exception, the involvement of tenants proceeded as planned. The hiring of tenants was accomplished rapidly and turnover in positions was negligible. Participation in meetings and programs was substantial, especially during the early days of the programs. Many programs with considerable variety in their content were planned and executed during the UIACP. As will be discussed in the section on social services, the amount of social services requested and/or provided were minimal.

D. Increased Full and Part Time Employment of Tenants

Employment was to be provided in two basic ways: staffing program positions with residents and hiring of youth in the DOL program. The former is discussed several times in this case. All staff positions, with the exception of the Assistant Anti-Crime Coordinator, were filled with residents. The DOL Program, was to provide jobs for youth between the ages of 16 and 19. The youth positions were to be tied to the modernization program: youths were to serve as receptionists and security aides in the new lobbies. Although supervisors were to be hired as well, the proposal envisaged the youths working closely with the management aides in each building. The lobbies were never built, so those ideas for their use had to be scrapped.

The positions were advertised in general notices posted in June of 1980. The LAC selected the youths to be hired. Security checks of police records were made by the CHA Director of Security. Those with extensive records were eliminated from the program. Attempts were made to have at least one youth hired from each building in the Taylor/Stateway complex. It was general knowledge that those selected were among the better behaved youths in the complex.

The program was initiated in August of 1980 with 74 youths participating. Three weeks of training were provided, two at the University of Chicago Center

for Continuing Education and one at Robert Taylor. The latter was conducted by the Youth Trainee Supervisors. Staff and youth employees received training in cardio-pulmonary resuscitation procedures from staff of the Chicago Police Department.

The activities of the youths were to be primarily security-related. To a large extent that was accomplished. Youths assisted the elderly, worked with management aides (more so in Stateway than in Taylor), oversaw playground activities (often during school recess periods so that younger children would not be harassed by older youths who, perhaps, had dropped out of school or were truant), conducted security checks, monitored elevators, assisted in the development of workshops and other such activities. One major activity that was completed early in the program was the administration of a fear of crime questionnaire in the Taylor/Stateway complex. The data were analyzed by Department of Planning anti-crime staff and later used for training and anti-crime programs. The work of the youth was evaluated by supervisors and attempts were made to counsel youths with work-related problems. According to program records, special attention was given to absenteeism.

The program was terminated when funds were exhausted in October 1981. According to program records, when the program ended 12 youths found different employment, 10 returned to school and 5 continued GED classes.

E. More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist
Victim/Witnesses

The CHA submitted for Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA), Victim-Witness (VW), and Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) funds. The OJJDP request proposed a traditional youth program which concentrated on youth who might become involved in delinquent behavior and/or who might join, or come under pressure to join, gangs. The activities were to include counselling, recreation, education, and advocacy.

The ADAMHA proposal focused on working with persons and families having trouble with alcohol through counselling, referral, advocacy, and education. The Victim-Witness program was to provide services to victims and witnesses, including assisting them manage the trauma of crime, providing transportation and encouraging them to assist in the prosecution of offenders.

Two of the three programs, ADAMHA and OJJDP, became the source of conflict between CHA and HUD staff. From the beginning, tenant leaders wanted nothing to do with drug programs as part of ADAMHA. The original proposal reflected their concern and CHA decided to work with the Chicago Alcoholic Treatment Center (CATC) to develop the program and the proposal. During the November 1979 meeting between the UIACP Director and HUD officials, the Director pushed for drug programs. Chicago would still have nothing to do with that modification. Post-election events took place at HUD and, although Chicago had to put up the money for the three staff persons for a period of time, HUD ultimately funded the project as Chicago designed it.

A similar scenario developed regarding the OJJDP funds. Chicago proposed working with youth who were considered to be potentially delinquent. HUD proposed working with serious ex-offenders through operation PUSH (Jesse Jackson's program). Tenants would not accept working with serious ex-offenders. CHA found working with PUSH not politically feasible. After some dispute, an award was made. Five months later a HUD consultant visited and again encouraged the CHA to work with serious ex-offenders. The issue was again the subject of dispute between HUD and CHA and was discussed in Curtis' visit of November 1980. Although funds were held up for some time, the resolution of the conflict was similar to the ADAMHA dispute.

The Victim-Witness program was funded with little dispute. Although once the program was funded and operating, HUD consultants pushed for modifications in the program, Chicago officials were willing to oblige and modified the

program.

The most active of the three programs was the OJJDP program. The staff person for that program, the son of a tenant leader, was selected by the LAC, and appointed in late October of 1981. Given that HUD withheld funds, he was seriously limited in the resources he had available for program publicity and development. Program efforts clustered into three areas: Youth Councils, activities, and, "piggy-backing"--that is, involving youth from the Taylor/Stateway complex in a variety of programs sponsored by other agencies. There were six moderately active youth councils which met on a relatively regular basis, occasionally had speakers, conducted fund raising activities, and were involved in other activities. Although the original intent of the program was to develop councils in all of the buildings, program officials felt that lack of program funds seriously constrained their ability to do so. Activities consisted of sports contests and activities, field trips, money raising work activities, movies, and camping. "Piggy-backing" included referrals and involvement in activities of other community agencies: camping, track, education (GED classes), field trips and plays.

The VW program was initiated shortly after the award was granted. The staff person who was hired was a resident of public housing and was appointed by the LAC. As indicated above, her initial approach was to attempt to build relations with District 2 police. Under criticism for that approach, the staff person backed away from police contact and began to attempt to develop linkages with other agencies. Although attempts were made to establish a volunteer group of residents, no tenants volunteered. Direct work with victims and witnesses remained at an extremely low level throughout the project. Case records indicate that the counsellor had a total caseload of 17 cases. There was no indication that activity levels were higher than records indicated.

Three outreach workers were hired as part of the ADAMHA program. All tenants of Taylor/Stateway Gardens, they were selected by the LAC after initial screening by CHA staff. These workers were to be administratively supervised by the anti-crime coordinator and programmatically by a supervisor from the CATC. Training regarding alcoholism was provided by the CATC and lasted for a month.

Initial activities included contacting relevant social agencies, advertising the program, distributing literature, and meeting with resident leaders to develop support for the program. Activity quickly leveled off, however, and remained low throughout the program. Records indicate that total of 22 clients were seen.

The VW program terminated on 30 September 1981, the ADAMHA program 4 September 1981, and the OJJDP in August of 1982.

F. Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers

Chicago's original proposal to HUD to improve the use of police had two basic elements. The first was to provide specially selected and trained staff to respond to calls for service and patrol the housing developments. The second was a continuation of specialized training offered in the police academy to orient police to working in minority areas. The former was, with the exception of a small request for radios, to be an in-kind contribution from the city of Chicago. The latter was a no-cost continuation of a program Chicago had already developed. HUD requested clarification about whether the special unit would be a new unit or was already in existence. The CHA responded that the new unit would consist of 30 new officers and two sergeants. HUD responded by asking that the officers to be involved be identified. The CHA provided a discussion of the 2nd District, its community relations program, its special housing unit and provided the name of the community relations officer. That seemed to end the matter and HUD accepted the police activities as an in-kind contribution.

There was little evidence, at least until much later in the program (this

will be discussed in the following), that any additional officers or units were assigned to police the Taylor/Stateway complex. Moreover, there was little suggestion that officials in District 2 were aware of that pledge. This does not suggest that the area was in any sense bereft of police: policing of the area was as intensive as this author has seen in the United States.

But changes in the pattern of policing began in Cabrini Green. In March, 1981, 44 patrol officers and a tactical team were assigned to Cabrini Green. The Mayor moved into an apartment in Cabrini Green on April 4 1981. Immediately thereafter CHA, state, and community development funds were tapped to give the police approximately \$1,000,000 to use off-duty police officers to supplement the regular police allocation.

The regularly assigned patrol and tactical units, supplemented with the part time police, created an extremely large force to deal with the problems in Cabrini Green. Some police were used in other public housing developments as well.

Plans were made to have the Mayor live in Robert Taylor and an apartment was prepared for her. A Chicago Alderman developed an office in Robert Taylor. It was clear that a new anti-crime program had been initiated by the Mayor, CHA, and CPD. UIACP was shunted aside. The new program was to be police-centered. Although there were concerns in the CPD and CHA about this new approach, there was surprisingly little resistance. The perception that crime had gotten out of hand was widespread. Even controversial solutions were welcomed.

In October the next step was taken. The month-to-month contract with Interstate Security (which had provided security services since 1956) was terminated and the \$4.5M for security was transferred to the CPD so that police officers could provide security services directly. Tenants at the board meeting of the CHA cheered both the decision to terminate the contract and to increase police services.

The plan was to assign 175 patrol officers, 23 sergeants, and three lieutenants, supervised by one Commander, to a special CPD Chicago Housing Authority police unit. The District 2 housing tactical unit was to be terminated and some of those officers transferred to the new unit. District 2 was to continue to provide regular patrol to the Taylor/Stateway complex, but those services would be augmented by this new unit. The new unit was to be housed in Robert Taylor, in fact, in the space of the UIACP, and provide special services to all public housing sites. The Assistant Anti-Crime Coordinator was to move from her second floor office space to comparable space one floor down and continue her liaison function. Private security was to continue only at a drastically reduced level, supervising vacant apartments and doing some internal security work.

Work began immediately at Robert Taylor for a new parking lot for police vehicles. Likewise, within a matter of weeks, work began to build a new police station on the first and second floors of the designated high rise. On 7 December 1981 the new facilities were completed and the police moved into the facilities. These were complete police facilities, including lock-ups, locker rooms, roll call room, record keeping facilities, steel covers for the windows (to prevent sniping), and offices.

Planning by the police department began immediately to provide shelter care facilities for battered women and for victims or witness who were either being, or fearful of being, intimidated. A space was allocated immediately adjacent to the police facilities, and construction began shortly thereafter. These shelter facilities opened in August of 1982.

By mid-summer 1982, police records indicated that the new unit had made over 3000 arrests, unit officers had not fired their weapons once over a seven month period, and had received only three complaints of brutality (no determinations had been made about the legitimacy of these complaints).

Personnel strength remained at about half the intended level, but the commander remained optimistic that he would receive his entire allocation of personnel.

G. Stronger Linkages With Local Government and Other Agencies

As has been discussed in other sections of this report, the UIACP proposed linkages to three agencies, all governmental: the Department of Planning, the Chicago Alcoholic Treatment Center (CATC), and the Chicago Police Department. Attempts by HUD to encourage participation in House of Umoja-like programs (i.e., PUSH) were strongly rejected by the CHA. Likewise, when Guardian Angels attempted to develop a branch in the Taylor/Stateway complex, staff were restrained from participation or providing assistance. This was congruent with the City of Chicago's longstanding traditions of dealing with quasi-political organizations. Generally, attempts of program staff to link residents of the housing developments to more traditional service agencies tended to be focused around specific cases or events rather than creating institutional arrangements. As the program wound down, such attempts seemed to decrease rather than increase. This author knows of no strong institutional arrangements that developed as a consequence of the program.

Contrary to the UIACP proposal, linkages under the Department of Planning and the CATC, although maintained with other components of the CHA, were not sustained with the Anti-Crime Program.

One strong linkage did develop, that between the CHA and CPD, but even that evolved with little reference to UIACP. It did, however, exploit the relationship between the Anti-crime Coordinator, many tenants, the private security agency and the police department. To a large extent, this linkage was a consequence of the Mayor's resolution to reduce crime in public housing--first in Cabrini Green, subsequently in the Taylor/Stateway complex. That commitment, and the specific approach to obtain it, were imposed on the CHA by the Mayor's appointees and influence with the police department. It did not grow out of

the CHA or the UIACP. That does not mean that the former administration did not have a desire to reduce crime. It does mean that crime control as the preeminent administrative concern did not characterize the former administration as it did the latter. Likewise the strategies were different. Evidence is that the approach of HIP (in Cabrini Green) typified the philosophy of the former administration in dealing with crime. That may have started to erode during the UIACP program and resulted in the delays in building modification. Regardless, the latter administration turned to specific forms of policing to address the problem. Interestingly that policing included the provision of victim/witness services and shelter care.

IV. PROGRAM IMPACT

A. Resident Survey Analysis

After examining available data and consulting with CHA and DP staff, it was concluded that no other housing project in Chicago was sufficiently similar to the demonstration sites in terms of physical structure, population characteristics, and the nature of the crime problem to justify selection as a comparison site. Furthermore, because the area surrounding the demonstration site is comprised of highways, railroad tracks, and housing areas that are relatively decimated, it was decided not to conduct interviews in the neighborhood.

Tenants in the demonstration site were interviewed twice: May-July, 1981, and June-July, 1982. Certain residents were administered "long forms," containing a lengthy exploration of a wide variety of attitudinal issues; given the focus on victimization, most respondents were asked to respond to "short forms," dealing almost exclusively with the issues of fear of crime and recent victimization experiences. The distribution of completed interviews is presented below. (For a discussion of "panel" and "independent" samples see

_____.)

	Completed Interviews	
	1981	1982
Chicago:		
-Robert Taylor Homes		
Panel	63	63
Independent	148	71
-Stateway Gardens		
Panel	31	31
Independent	37	35

The first survey was conducted at least nine months after the Assistant Anti-Crime Coordinator, the ADAMHA workers, and the Victim/Witness worker were hired, seven months after the OJJDP worker was hired, and nine months after DOL youth were hired. The second survey was conducted nine months after the ADAMHA program was terminated and seven months after the DOL and Victim/Witness programs were ended. However, the first survey was conducted immediately before the police began some of their new initiatives (July 1981), and six to seven months before the new police station was constructed in Robert Taylor. The wave two survey was conducted a year after police activity increased and six to eight months after the station was constructed and police activities intensified.

Several comments should be made before the findings are presented. First, the Taylor/Stateway complex is enormous. Combined, a total of at least 26,000 residents live in the complex. It would seem extremely unlikely that a program the size of the UIACP could be expected to substantially, or measurably, have an impact on crime. A total of 74 youths were employed, and 39 residents were served in the combined Victim/Witness-ADAMHA program. If we assume that 100 youths were served in the OJJDP program (probably not an unreasonable assumption), 213 residents, only 1% of the population, received direct services. That does not take into account the impact of the anti-crime meetings; however, it would be hard to imagine that more than 1000 residents participated in those meetings--less than 4% of the population. We would expect however that a substantial proportion of residents would be aware of the programs. The time-one survey would give us information about that.

Second, the activities of the Mayor and Chicago Police Department were much more dramatic, substantial, and received far more publicity than UIACP. Given the timing of the two surveys, whatever impact the Mayor's program had should be reflected in them.

In the sections which follow, we will discuss program awareness of and participation in UIACP at the time of the first survey, the impact of the activities of the Mayor and CPD on the attitudes of the residents, and briefly discuss recorded crime.

A. Awareness of and Participation in UIACP

Sixty-eight percent of the residents of Robert Taylor (RT) and 56% of the residents of Stateway Gardens (SG) were aware of crime prevention meetings. Seventeen percent of SG and 12% of RT residents reported being aware of the Victim/Witness program. In RT, 34%, and in SG, 32% of the residents were aware of alcohol/drug abuse programs. Sixty-eight percent of SG residents and 49% of RT residents responded that they were aware of youth employment programs.

Thirty percent of the households in SG and 20% in RT reported being involved in crime prevention meetings. Five percent of the households in both RT and SG indicated they were involved in Victim/Witness activities. Ten percent of SG households and six percent of RT reported participation in alcohol drug abuse programs. Thirty nine percent in SG and 24% in RT reported being involved in youth employment programs.

As anticipated, substantial portions of the populations were aware of the programs. Furthermore, the programs of most activity and visibility, crime prevention meetings and youth employment, were the best known. The pattern is similar in the area of program participation. It is not unlikely that the levels of participation in victim/witness activities, alcohol abuse programs, and youth employment reflect residents' involvement in other community programs (e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous, other employment programs etc.).

B. Changes in Attitudes and Perception

1. Robert Taylor Homes

a. Perceived Change in Local Crime

(1) Repeat Sample

In 1981 residents of Robert Taylor Homes felt that over the past twelve months crime had become (very) slightly more of a problem (mean = 2.72). In 1982, they felt crime had become (very) slightly less of a problem over the previous year's time (mean = 3.22). This represents a significant improvement of 1982 assessment versus the 1981 assessment (p .02).

(2) Independent Sample

There was a marginal improvement in 1982 vs. 1981 in the residents' perceptions of how the severity of crime changed over the past twelve months (p .08). In 1982 residents, on the average, felt it had stayed about the same (mean = 2.93), while in 1981, they were slightly more likely to have said it was more of a problem (mean = 2.66).

b. Perceived Severity of Local Crime Problems - Repeat Sample

(1) Repeat Sample

Residents' perceptions of the severity of local crime problems were significantly lower in 1982 compared with 1981 (p. .04). In 1982 residents felt that crime was "somewhat" of a problem (mean = 2.18), while in 1981 they felt it was slightly more severe (mean = 2.37).

(2) Independent Sample

There was no difference in residents' assessment of the severity of the local crime problem in 1981 vs. 1982. For both years, residents, on the average, felt crime was slightly more than "somewhat" of a problem (1981 mean = 2.33; 1982 mean = 2.24).

c. Perceived Severity of Local Disorders

(1) Repeat Sample

There was no significant difference in residents' assessment of the severity of local disorders in 1982 vs. 1981. In both years, residents felt that there was "somewhat" of a problem with disorder issues (1981 mean = 1.96; 1982 mean = 2.06).

(2) Independent Sample

There was also no difference between 1981 and 1982 in residents' assessments of the severity of local disorder issues. In both years, these were generally viewed as "somewhat" of a problem (1981 mean = 2.10; 1982 mean = 2.15).

d. Fear of Crime

(1) Repeat Sample

There was no difference in the fear of crime of residents in 1981 vs.

1982. In both years residents were, on the average, about equally likely to feel "safe" or "unsafe" (1981 mean = 2.48; 1982 mean = 2.62).

(2) Independent Sample

There was no difference in residents' fear of crime for 1981 vs. 1982. In both years residents, on the average, were as likely to say they felt "safe" as they were to say "unsafe" (1981 mean = 2.55; 1982 mean = 2.64).

e. Household Precautions

(1) Repeat Sample

There was no significant difference in the extent to which residents employed home precaution measures in 1981 vs. 1982. In 1981, about four in ten households (38%) employed (on the average) one home precaution measure. In 1982, a little over half of the households (55%) reported that, on the average, they employed one home precaution measure.

(2) Independent Sample

There was a significant increase between 1981 and 1982 in the percentage of households that employed precautionary measures at home (p. .04). In 1981, about one in five (17%) employed (on the average) one home protection measure. In 1982, this percentage had increased to about two in five households (40%).

f. Other Precautions Taken When Away From Home

(1) Repeat Sample

Between 1981 and 1982 Robert Taylor Homes residents significantly increased the number of precautions they reportedly took when away from home for a few days (p. .001). In 1981, the average number of precautions taken by households was less than one (mean = .73). In 1982, the average number reported per household had more than doubled (mean = 1.95).

(2) Independent Sample

There was also a significant increase in the number of precautions the

average household took when away from home in 1982 vs. 1981. In 1981 an average of less than one of these precautions were employed per household (mean = .60), while in 1982 the average number had almost tripled (mean = 1.68).

g. Perceived Quality of Life

(1) Repeat Sample

When asked whether the Robert Taylor Homes had become a better or worse place to live over the previous twelve months, residents in 1982 were significantly more positive in their response than in 1981 (p. .03). In 1982, residents felt, on the average, the quality of life had very slightly improved (mean = 3.19), while in 1981 they had felt it had very slightly worsened (mean = 2.85).

(2) Independent Sample

There was a marginal improvement in the perceived quality of life in 1982 vs. 1981 (p .12). Residents in 1981 had felt (on the average) that the quality of life at the Robert Taylor Homes had become slightly worse over the previous twelve months (mean = 2.76), while in 1982 they were more likely to feel it had stayed about the same (mean = 3.00).

h. Satisfaction with Neighborhood

(1) Repeat Sample

Despite the above mentioned findings, residents in 1982 were significantly less satisfied with the Robert Taylor Homes as a place to live, than they had been in 1981 (p. .02). In 1981, they were slightly more likely to say they were "somewhat satisfied" than "somewhat dissatisfied" (mean = 2.71), while in 1982 they were slightly more likely to say they were "somewhat dissatisfied" than "somewhat satisfied" (mean = 2.37).

(2) Independent Sample

There was no difference in residents' satisfaction with Robert Taylor Homes as a place to live in 1981 vs. 1982. In both years residents were split, on the average, between being "somewhat satisfied" and "somewhat dissatisfied" (1981 mean = 2.56; 1982 mean = 2.43).

2. Stateway Gardens

a. Perceived Change in Local Crime

(1) Repeat Sample

In 1981, residents of Stateway Gardens felt that the severity of local crime had stayed about the same over the previous twelve months (mean = 3.03). These perceptions in 1982 about the change in the severity of crime were similar to those in 1981 (mean = 2.82). Thus, there was no significant difference in residents' perceptions about the change in severity of crime.

(2) Independent Sample

There was no significant difference in residents' perceptions of the change in severity of crime during the previous twelve months in 1981 vs. 1982. In both years, residents generally felt that the severity had stayed about the same (1981 mean = 3.03; 1982 mean = 2.71).

b. Perceived Severity of Local Crime Problems

(1) Repeat Sample

Stateway Gardens residents perceived a (marginally) significantly more severe crime problem in 1982 than they did in 1981 (p. .13). In 1981, they assessed local crime as "some" problem (mean = 2.08), while in 1982 this assessment was slightly more severe (mean = 2.29).

(2) Independent Sample

Nevertheless, there was no difference in residents' assessments of the severity of local crime in 1981 and 1982. In both years residents, on the average, saw local crime as "somewhat" of a problem (1981 mean = 2.13; 1982 mean = 2.27).

c. Perceived Severity of Local Disorders

(1) Repeat Sample

In 1982, residents perceived (marginally) significantly greater problem with disorder than they did in 1981 (p. .11). In 1981, they assessed

disorders as "some" problem (mean = 1.96), while in 1982 their assessment was slightly more severe (mean = 2.26).

(2) Independent Sample

Similarly there was no difference in the perceived severity of disorder in 1981 and 1982. In both years, they were seen, on the average, as "somewhat" of a problem (1981 mean 2.08; 1982 mean = 2.19).

d. Fear of Crime

(1) Repeat Sample

Between 1981 and 1982 there was no significant difference in residents' fear of crime. In both years residents, on the average, were more likely to say that they felt "safe" rather than "unsafe" (1981 mean = 2.82; 1982 mean = 2.65).

(2) Independent Sample

There was no difference in residents' fear of crime in 1981 vs. 1982. For both years, residents, on the average, were as likely to express feeling "safe" as "unsafe" (1981 mean = 2.42; 1982 mean = 2.41).

e. Household Precautions

(1) Repeat Sample

Residents, in 1982, reported significantly greater use of home precautions than in 1981 (p. .05). In 1981, about 165 percent of the households employed, on the average, one home precautionary measure, while in 1982 this percentage increased to 50 percent.

(2) Independent Sample

There was no reported change in the extent to which the average household deployed precautionary measures in 1981 and 1982. In both years, less than half the households employed (on the average) one home protection measure (37% in 1981; 46% in 1982).

f. Other Precautions Taken When Away From Home

(1) Repeat Sample

Between 1981 and 1982 Stateway Gardens residents significantly increased the number of precautions they employed at home when away for a few days (p. .001). In 1981, the average number of precautions taken per household was about "one" (mean = .96); in 1982 it had doubled (mean = 2.06).

(2) Independent Sample

Between 1981 and 1982 there was a significant increase in the average

number of precautions taken per household when away (p .001). Between the two years the average number doubled (1981 mean = .91; 1982 mean = 1.87).

g. Perceived Change in Quality of Life

(1) Repeat Sample

When asked whether Stateway Gardens had become a better or worse place to live in the past year, residents expressed similar opinions in 1981 and 1982. In both years, they felt (on the average) that the quality of life had become "(very) slightly worse" (1981 mean = 2.86; 1982 mean = 2.62).

(2) Independent Sample

There was no difference in residents' assessment of the change in quality of life in 1981 vs. 1982. In both years, residents, on the average, felt it has stayed about the same (1981 Mean = 2.91; 1982 mean = 2.84) during the previous twelve months.

h. Satisfaction with Neighborhood

(1) Repeat Sample

Residents, on the average, were significantly more dissatisfied with their project as a place to live in 1982 compared to 1981 ($p = .03$). In 1981, they were about equally likely to feel "satisfied" as they were to feel "dissatisfied" (mean = 2.57), while in 1982 they were more likely to feel "dissatisfied" (mean = 2.11).

(2) Independent Sample

There was, though, a significant worsening in residents' satisfaction with Stateway Gardens as a place to live in 1982 vs. 1981 ($p = .02$). In 1981 residents were more likely to express "some satisfaction" than "some dissatisfaction" (mean = 2.82), while in 1982 the trend was reversed (mean = 2.31).

Perception of Police Services
Combined Independent and Repeat Samples
Robert Taylor Homes

Stateway Gardens

As the responses above indicate, although there seems to be little change in the respondents' approval of police performance, citizens do seem aware of the substantial increase in police personnel resulting from the creation of the new housing unit created in the CPD.

C. Recorded Crime

Figure ___ presents monthly srecorded crime data for Robert Taylor Homes, Stateway Gardens, and the area surrounding them from January 1977 through June 1982. These recorded crime statistics are from the Chicago Police Department and represent "founded" crime statistics. They differ from statistics of the CHA as CHA statistics do not differentiate between "founded" and "unfounded" recorded crime and do not record data for thefts. "Founding" crime statistics represents a process of bureaucratic review of crime reports originally accepted by officers from citizens. Data, in this report, are presented in the 13 periods into which the CPD divides the calender year for administrative purposes.

An examination of these data suggests that recorded crime has dropped in both Robert Taylor and Stateway Gardens during the period (1977-1981). In Robert Taylor, the drop has been steady and, over the period, is in the neighborhood of 20%. The number of murders is the only category that is higher, but that figure is down from the highest figure in 1979. The pattern is different in Stateway Gardens. Recorded crime decreased through 1979, returned to earlier levels in 1980, and dropped by 1/3 in 1981. The only category that was higher in 1981 than 1977 was larceny.

V. CONCLUSION

Two programs were developed in Chicago: the first was UIACP; the second, developed by the Mayor and CPD, was an intensified police program. The UIACP created a management capacity to target anti-crime programs, created internal publicity about crime-control activiites in which citizens could participate, employed tenants, and provided very limited social services. No modernization improvements have as yet been implemented. The police program was initiated with great fanfare and publicity in all of the major news media, was rapidly

implemented, and, although it superceded UIACP, capitalized on the management capacity developed during UIACP.

Unfortunately this author does not believe it is possible to determine whether either program had an impact on crime . Although, generally, it can be said that recorded crime has been declining and reached a four year low in 1981, it is not possible to attribute that decline to either the UIACP or intensified police service with any degree of certainty.

However, it does seem that attitudinal and behavioral items in the survey reflect program activities. Citizens in both Robert Taylor and Stateway Gardens did seem to reflect an awareness of an increase in police presence although their perception of the quality of police service was not well effected. Whether related or not to residents of Robert Taylor, crime was perceived as somewhat of a lesser problem in 1982 than it was in 1981. Additionally, residents in both Robert Taylor and Stateway Gardens increased household and other precautions. It would not be unreasonable to attribute these outcomes to UIACP (substantial numbers of residents indicated they were aware of and had attended crime prevention meetings) and, perhaps, the publicity police activities received. Robert Taylor residents perceived the quality of life as improving, although residents in both Robert Taylor and Stateway Gardens were more dissatisfied with their neighborhoods.


In sum: we cannot say what impact the UIACP or police activities had on crime. Citizens reflected awareness of the crime prevention meetings and the employment programs. They also seemed to be cognizant of the increase in the number of police. In Robert Taylor, they saw crime as less of a problem and their quality of life as improved. Citizens in both sites took more precautions to keep from being victimized. The management capacity developed as part of UIACP remains intact and now serves as a liaison between CHA, residents, and CPD.

CHICAGO

Robert Taylor Homes


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




RECORDED BURGLARIES Per 10,000 Occupied Units



CHICAGO Stateway Gardens


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



RECORDED BURGLARIES Per 10,000 Occupied Units




CHICAGO

Robert Taylor/Stateway Neighborhood


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)



RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



RECORDED BURGLARIES Per 10,000 Occupied Units

