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EVALUATION OF THE URBAN INITIATIVES  
ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

BALTIMORE, MD, CASE STUDY

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This report is one in a series that comprises a comprehensive evaluation of the Public Housing Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration. The Final Report provides an integrated analysis of the design, implementation and impact of the entire demonstration, and each of the 15 site-specific case studies analyzes the implementation and impact of the programs at individual participating local housing authorities. The complete set of reports includes:

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Final Report

Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program:

- Baltimore, MD, Case Study
- Charlotte, NC, Case Study
- Chicago, IL, Case Study
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## PREFACE

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration was created by the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. The program was formally announced in May 1979 and awards were made by the following September. By early 1981, programs in all 39 selected sites were underway; and by mid-1982, all were essentially completed.

As the report notes, the design and implementation of the program were flawed. The demonstration was conceived and developed according to principles which the current Administration has sought to reverse--that influxes of Federal money and direct Federal involvement can provide solutions to local problems.

HUD is currently implementing a series of demonstrations designed to improve the quality of life of public housing residents. These demonstrations stress local autonomy in design and implementation, with communities free to tailor their programs to meet their own unique needs. The demonstrations emphasize the coordination of existing Federal, State, and local resources, rather than the duplication of existing efforts or the funding of new programs. They use existing HUD resources to leverage other public and private funds. And, they require the commitment of all sectors of the local community, with a special emphasis on public/private partnerships.

The Department believes that the emphasis on local authority which characterizes current Administration policy and provides the basis for operating and planned demonstrations holds much more promise for improving the lives of low-income families than programs that are rigidly structured by the Federal government.

## I. CONTEXT

### A. The City

One of the oldest cities in the United States, Baltimore was founded in 1729 by a group of entrepreneurs to serve as a port for the shipment of tobacco from the upper Chesapeake area of Maryland and Virginia. By 1970, it had become the nation's seventh largest city, home to a wide variety of ethnic groups and industries. Despite its diverse economy, Baltimore faced many problems: housing was old, population was declining and economy seemed to be sagging. As measured by a 1976 study, based on 1970 census data, Baltimore ranked fourth among U.S. cities on a composite index of "hardship."<sup>1</sup> In a 1979 study for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the city ranked sixth on a "need" index.<sup>2</sup> Accompanying these problems was a recorded crime rate well above the average for major cities, especially for violent crimes.

After the election of Mayor William Donald Schaefer in 1971, an alliance of political and business leaders was formed to rejuvenate the city. Under the leadership of the city's Housing and Community Development Commissioner Robert Embry (who was selected in 1977 as President Carter's Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Development), the focal point of this effort became a massive urban renewal project located in the Inner Harbor area and comprised of shops, restaurants, hotels, offices and apartments. Accompanied by much laudatory publicity, this area has been presented as proof of Baltimore's renaissance. Only a few blocks from the throngs of predominantly white middle class shoppers, office workers and diners are the public housing projects selected to participate in the anti-crime program.

## B. The Demonstration Sites and the Surrounding Area

In keeping with the long standing policy of the Housing Authority of Baltimore County (HABC) of paying particular attention to the security needs of its high rise buildings, the grant writing team decided to limit its consideration of possible demonstration sites to the four such high rise family projects (Lafayette Courts, George Murphy Homes, Flag House Courts and Lexington Terrace). The prevailing opinion was that Murphy Homes had the most severe crime problem among those four; it was based partly upon this opinion, that HUD had recently allocated approximately \$3 million to be spent there for a Target Project Program (TPP) demonstration effort. Furthermore, the team believed that the crime problem at Murphy Homes was too enormous and complex to be tractable, and since they suspected that HUD would not be willing to fund additional programs there, decided to exclude that project from further consideration. To provide more information upon which to make the selection, the team obtained recorded crime data from the Baltimore Police Department. Upon analyzing these data, the team discovered to their surprise that the highest level of recorded crime per resident was actually at Flag House Courts, not Murphy Homes. Armed with this knowledge, the team began to focus on the possibility of concentrating the anti-crime program at Flag House. It was then realized, however, that the HUD guidelines permitted a much lower maximum award to be given to demonstration programs concentrating on fewer than 1000 units than to those concerned with with more than that number. Therefore, in an attempt to get the highest possible award, the team decided to focus the program on both Flag House and Lafayette Courts, located only two blocks from each other. Interestingly, by the relatively loose standards of "contiguity" applied by HUD, a program focusing on all four projects with high rise buildings would probably have been acceptable.

Flag House Courts, opened in 1955 on a site of 11.3 acres, consists in part of three twelve-story high rise buildings each containing 118 dwelling units. There are also fifteen low rise buildings containing 133 units, either in three-story walkups or in two-story townhouses. The vacancy rates have remained at about one percent in the recent past. In 1981, there were 902 residents in the high-rise buildings, approximately 2.6 per unit. The low rise buildings housed 573 persons, about 4.3 per apartment. Overall, there were 130.5 persons per acre living in the project. Almost 99 percent of the residents were black. The average gross family income was approximately \$4,400. About 57 percent of the residents were under 18; one percent were 65 or older. Approximately 85 percent of the families were receiving public assistance. About 80 percent of the households had only one parent residing there.

Lafayette Courts, which opened for occupancy in 1955, consists in part of six eleven-story high rise buildings containing 109 dwelling units each. These buildings are surrounded by seventeen townhouse buildings containing 162 dwelling units of various sizes. In all, the project encompasses 21.5 acres. The vacancy rates have been approximately one percent for the past several years. In 1981, there were 1967 persons living in the high rise buildings, slightly over three per unit. There were 781 residents of the low rise buildings, slightly less than five per unit. Overall, there were 127.8 persons per acre living in the project. All of the residents were black, with an average gross family income of approximately \$4100. Approximately 58 percent of the residents were under the age of 18; less than one percent were 65 years of age or older. Almost 90 percent of the families were receiving public assistance of some type. Over 80 percent of the project's households contained only one parent.

With the exception of the "Little Italy" community just to the south, most of the area around the two projects is commercial or industrial. In addition to the Inner Harbor project, extensive urban renewal efforts have begun in the last several years, including those in Oldtown, Jonestown, Washington Hill Chapel, Shot Tower Industrial Park, Gay Street, and the East Lombard Street business area. Also in the vicinity are the Johns Hopkins Hospital and the city's main post office, both of which have clientele from this \_\_\_\_\_ the city.

## II. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

HUD's announcement of a competition for funds for anti-crime activities was welcomed by officials of the HABC as an opportunity to extend their efforts to improve security, (especially in the high rise buildings) which they had begun in the early 1970s, under Commissioner Embry's leadership. As a result of several years of experimentation, the high rise buildings were remodeled so that there would be only one means of centralized entry and exit. The doors of these buildings were controlled by an electronic locking mechanism and were to remain closed at all times. A bullet-resistant guard booth was installed at each entrance; through the use of a contractual guard service, a guard was to be in each booth 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Residents were to be admitted only after showing an identification card. Visitors were to gain entrance only after the guard had conferred with the resident by means of an in-house telephone communication system to get the resident's permission for the guest to enter. In addition, the guard could monitor the exits that were not immediately visible by means of television cameras that fed back to monitors in the guard booth. An audio monitoring system allowed the guard to hear activity in the elevators.

Because of concerns about the quality of services provided by the contractual guards, this system had been modified to include Resident Security

Aides in the guard booths alongside the guards. Under this plan, residents of the high rise development were recruited, screened and assigned to six months of classroom instruction and, six months of on-the-job training as security guards.

In conjunction with this enclosure program, the HABC created the permanent positions of Security Coordinator and Security Operations Supervisor. Their responsibilities included:

- o overseeing all security-related matters affecting public housing residents;
- o serving in a liaison capacity with the Baltimore City Police Department, contractual guard companies and companies which supply and repair security equipment;
- o consulting with Housing managers and residents; and
- o providing coordination with the HABC security staff.

When HUD announced in May of 1979 that UIACP proposals would be accepted, the HABC created a team of four persons to write their proposal. A Senior Management Analyst in the Budget Department, who had made clear his interest in the issue of security, was selected to serve on the proposal writing team. Also on the team were the HABC's Modernization Coordinator, its Security Coordinator and the Chairwoman of the Security Subcommittee of the Resident Advisory Board (RAB), a city-wide panel composed of one resident representative from each housing project in the city. (When funds from ADAMHA and OJJDP became available, the Director of HABC's Division of Social Services also became involved.)

The original discussions among the team members focused on the desirability of installing traditional security hardware such as locks, security screens and lights. The Analyst objected, contending that they should propound a more

innovative approach. Returning to his previous goal, he suggested paying for the services of city police officers out of HABC funds to patrol the demonstration projects. With his experience in budgeting, he realized that funds for such a purpose would have to be saved from some other source. His solution: use anti-crime Modernization funds to install an automated access control system, thereby dispensing with the cost of the contractual guards.

The resident representative objected, stating that residents, especially those in the high rise buildings, would not want to have armed Baltimore City police officers, upon whom they did not look with universal favor, patrolling their hallways. The Analyst provided a revised proposal: have city police officers patrol the grounds and employ residents to patrol the hallways. This compromise, although further enhanced by the prospect of Department of Labor (DOL) jobs for youths, was only grudgingly accepted by the resident representative.

The Analyst then met with the Baltimore Police Department's Chief of Planning and Research (P&R) to enlist police support for the concept of subsidizing the employment of their officers. The P&R Chief argued that such a proposal would be far too expensive for the HABC to afford; instead, he suggested that the HABC allocate funds to pay for a pool of officers who would work at the projects on an overtime basis. He was certain that the Police Commissioner would agree to such a plan, since a similar arrangement had recently been made with the Johns Hopkins Hospital.

After modifying the proposal in this way, the Analyst turned his attention to the automatic access control system component. After studying several options, he concluded that the best solution was to install a sophisticated magnetic card reader system at each lobby entrance. Cards would be issued to all registered residents. Upon insertion of such a card in a slot, the outside

door would open automatically. This system would be coupled with a lobby-to-apartment intercommunication network so that when guests arrived they could call to announce their presence to a resident who could then trigger the door open. The vendor of this equipment would be required to provide training to residents and to Authority staff in the use and maintenance of the system. Funds would be provided for 24 hour per day maintenance service.

Because of a concern that uninvited persons might come into the building on the heels of persons authorized to enter, a special "man trap" feature was built in. This feature consisted of two sets of doors, separated by a vestibule. Once the first door had been unlocked, the second door had to be opened within 15 seconds--otherwise the second door would remain locked. In addition, the second door would not open unless the first door was again locked.

A natural spinoff benefit from such a system was that it would allow the guards to leave their stationary positions in the booths and assume other responsibilities. The proposal writing team decided that several of the best of the resident guards should be trained to be Security Liaison Officers (SLOs). These SLOs would receive a six-week minimum standard training course at the Baltimore City Police Academy, paid for with Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds. Accompanying these SLOs would be eight Youth Patrollers (paid with YCCIP funds) and eight Public Service Employees, also trained at the Police Academy. These persons would walk together in pairs and engage in "team policing," with primary responsibility for vertical patrolling of corridors in high rise buildings. In addition, these teams would have secondary responsibilities of developing Operation Identification poster contests, organizing Block and Floor Watch Programs, as well as intervening in family crises and assisting victims.

A second type of "team patrolling" would be carried out by pairs consisting of one off-duty Baltimore City police officer (paid with HABC funds) and one Youth Patroller. These patrols would be primarily responsible for patrol and response to situations occurring in low rise buildings and the areas surrounding them. Also, these teams would respond to assistance calls in high rise buildings.

Serving as the base of operations for these patrol teams would be a multi-purpose center to be called the Tenant Activity Center (TAC), also paid for with anti-crime Modernization funds. Located either in the community building of Lafayette Courts or in a vacant building located between the two projects, this facility would also house the computer associated with the controlled access system as well as desks for police officers, SLOs and Youth Patrollers and radio equipment to maintain contact with them while on patrol. In addition, space for tenant activities would be available. The TAC would also provide office space for a MSW social worker reared and/or dwelling in public housing, assisted by a volunteer minister, to help residents with a wide range of problems.

Also located in the TAC would be an athletic/recreation program (funded by CDBG) which would be similar to, or an extension of, the Larry Middleton Athletic Program which had already been institutionalized in Murphy Homes. This program, directed by the former European heavyweight boxing champion, attempts to develop an enhanced sense of self through competitive sports. To assist the program, three YCCIP youths would be hired to handle athletic equipment, recruit participants and disseminate information.

As an adjunct to the overall security system, four YCCIP youths would be hired to be trained in the maintenance of security hardware, thereby enhancing

the maintenance department's ability to give priority attention to security repairs.

Another aspect of the program would be the development of an apprenticeship training effort for residents of the demonstration projects. Two YCCIP youths would survey the project residents to identify those who were the best candidates for employment and who exhibit interest in developing skills, especially those that are important for the many contractors of the HABC. Pre-training for interested residents would be provided so that they could do work necessary for those contractors. These individuals would then, wherever possible, be hired to do work in HABC projects. Those with the most promise would remain employed until they receive their license.

In addition to committing itself to appointing an Anti-Crime Coordinator, the HABC indicated it was reviewing its admissions policy and would also review its eviction proceedings. Furthermore, the proposal stated that the housing manager, the maintenance supervisor and/or other pertinent staff would receive an abbreviated version of the training provided by the Police Academy for the Security Liaison Officers.

Based largely on the prospect of tenant employment opportunities, approval for the proposal was secured from the Chairwoman of the Resident Advisory Board. The proposal was submitted to HUD in June of 1979. The budget for the proposal contained a total of \$670,030 in Modernization funds: \$600,000 for nine card reader and intercom systems, \$50,030 for refurbishing and outfitting the Tenant Activity Center; and \$20,000 for the training of residents and staff in the use and maintenance of the card reader and intercom systems. An additional \$230,943 was requested in DOL funds to pay for 17 youths (eight as Youth Patrollers, three to work with the recreation program, four to install and maintain security hardware and two to conduct surveys for the apprenticeship training program),

their training, their supervision and administrative costs. From Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds, the HABC requested \$139,027 to pay for the program coordinator, staff for the recreation program, a social worker and training at the Police Academy. Of this CDBG budget, \$3,000 was also designated for Tenant Council Activities, to cover the cost of Operation Identification, poster and slogan contests, a security/tenant activities newsletter and other costs. A total of \$1,040,000 in Federal funds were requested, \$40,000 more than the maximum available for projects of the size selected. In addition, local contributions of \$252,310 were pledged mostly from local CDBG funds, but their exact nature was left unclear.

In July of 1979, the HABC was told that their proposal had been selected among the group of semi-finalists and were invited to attend a meeting for that group in August. Before that meeting, the HABC Executive Director and his Deputy met with the Police Commissioner to further refine the mechanics involved in paying for off-duty police officers. To their surprise, the Commissioner had not been informed by the PSR Chief about the HABC proposal to hire off-duty officers and had absolutely ruled out such a possibility. Sensing their bewilderment, the Commissioner offered another option: if the HABC would hire their own security force, he would pay for their training and secure them commissions as Special Police Officers and permits to carry firearms. No other choice being apparent, the HABC accepted this suggestion.

On August 16, the HABC drafted a "corrected copy" of their proposal to HUD substituting the term Special Police Officers for Specially-Trained City Police Officers and assuming the costs of most training (to be paid with local CDBG funds). Perhaps because the corrections were made hurriedly, the budget did not reflect this diminution of funds requested and still sought funds for training

police officers, although that idea had been eliminated. This "corrected copy" was hand-delivered to HUD on August 20 at the meeting for semi-finalists.

At that meeting, the HABC representatives learned that "special grants" from ADAMHA and OJJDP (and possibly other sources) would be available. The HABC staff were also told, for the first time, that HUD had several concerns about the Baltimore proposal. HUD's reviewers requested evidence that the two sites were actually contiguous and wanted more specificity about where the TAC would be located. In addition, they pointed out that the proposed wages for YCCIP youths exceeded the level allowable under DOL regulations for that program. The HABC was also urged to increase the amount of money devoted to the Tenant Imprest Fund. Finally, the reviewers sought assurance that the Modernization work could be done rapidly and requested that social services would be provided by other city agencies.

The most important and trenchant questions raised, however, were about the desirability, effectiveness and cost of the proposed card reader systems. The Director of the UIACP expressed the concern that such a system would tend to "dehumanize" the already disadvantaged public housing residents; he believed it was unlikely that the residents, if given the opportunity to express their opinions, would support such a plan. He also contended that such a system had never been successfully implemented in a public housing environment populated by a large number of children. Finally, especially in view of his other concerns, he believed that \$600,000 was too much money to invest in such a questionable venture. As a compromise, he suggested installing systems only in the six Lafayette Courts high rise buildings. At Flag House he suggested that additional DOL youths could be hired to staff the three guard booths, paid for by the money saved from reducing the YCCIP wages.

In its response, submitted two weeks later, the proposal team demonstrated with a map that the two projects were indeed close together, remained uncommitted as to the location of the TAC, reluctantly agreed to reduce the wages of YCCIP employees, increased the tenant Imprest fund to \$20,000, provided time estimates for its modernization work ranging from 60 to 90 days, increased the amount of social services to be provided and clarified other points. In response to the CDBG program change, all training and local services were now to be paid from local matching funds.

The most fundamental change was that magnetic card reader systems were now only proposed for the six high rise buildings at Lafayette Courts; at Flag House, 13 youths would be hired as Lobby Guards to operate the electrolocks of the existing lobby doors in the high rise buildings. Supervision would be by Security Guard Supervisors or Security Liaison Officers. The estimated cost per system had also been raised from \$66,666.67 to \$83,333.33.

A new addition to the proposal was the replacement of wall-mounted lights by ceiling fixtures in the high rises in both demonstration projects. The official justification for this change was that such ceiling fixtures would greatly reduce the costs of vandalism. In addition to recognizing a legitimate need for such lighting, the proposal team also saw these features as a partial means for compensating Flag House residents, whose project was now proposed to receive much less Modernization funding than Lafayette Courts.

The result of these compensatory changes in the Modernization tasks was that the amount of money requested from that source remained at \$670,030, exactly the amount requested in the original proposal. Of this amount, \$500,000 was budgeted for the six card reader systems; \$20,000 for training and residents and staff in their use; \$50,030 for the Tenant Activity Center; and \$100,000 for installing ceiling features in the nine high rise buildings. As a result of the lowered wages, more youth positions were budgeted although the total amount

requested from DOL remained virtually unchanged, at \$230,675. The amount sought from CDBG funds was reduced to \$60,000 (\$40,000 for the salaries of the Anti-Crime Coordinator and the social worker; \$20,000 for the Tenant Imprest Fund). A total of \$960,705 was requested from Federal funds, slightly less than was included in the original proposal, largely due to the reduced level of funding sought from CDBG monies. A total of \$140,697 in local matching funds were also committed (\$58,000 for training, \$77,540 for staff and the rest for other services). This match was considerably smaller, but much more clearly specified, than that originally proposed.

On September 27, 1979 the HABC was notified that they had been selected to participate in the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. The funds approved (\$670,000 in HUD Physical Security Modernization funds, \$60,000 in Community Development funds, \$230,000 in DOL's YCCIP funds), were almost precisely what had been requested in the revised proposal. In addition, \$20,000 from LEAA's Victim/Witness funds were approved, totally to the surprise of the proposal team, since they had never applied for, nor even been aware of, the availability of such funds. The team quickly decided to use these funds to pay for the senior social worker originally proposed and to use CDBG funds to hire a second social worker, creating a "social service team."

The notification from HUD was an important step toward the beginning of the implementation of the HABC anti-crime program--but it was by no means the final step. In essence, the announcement assured the HABC that the HUD Regional Office had been directed to set aside Modernization funds for the use of the HABC. Before any of that money could actually be spent, a revised Modernization proposal (called a Work Plan) would have to be prepared and submitted to both the HUD Field Office (FO) and to the UIACP Director. The HABC was informed that

a staff member of the UIACP would shortly contact them concerning the nature of the nature of the required revisions. Such central office involvement was a departure from the normal approval process for Modernization work in which all reviews are made only by the FO. In this case, the FO, which had not seen the original application, was expected to perform a technical review of the Work Plan to insure that it contained no statutory violations. The anti-crime staff would then conduct a further, substantive, review to be certain that all work proposed for was within the guidelines of the program.

Pending notification of the revisions that would be required, the search for an Anti-Crime Coordinator who would direct the entire program began. On November 5, the HABC was told that revised Modernization and CDBG-Technical Assistance applications; a vulnerability analysis; the name and resume of the ACC; and the names, addresses and phone numbers of the Anti-Crime Oversight Team had to be submitted by December 15, 1979. Given the urgency of the situation, much of the work required to try to meet this deadline was done by the same Analyst who had served on the proposal writing team, since no ACC had yet been appointed. To obtain more first hand information, the Analyst, the Security Coordinator and a resident visited St. Louis to inspect electronic access control systems there.

On December 14, the HABC submitted the required vulnerability analysis and a list of five of the six members of the proposed Anti-Crime Oversight Team. Missing was the identity of the Anti-Crime Coordinator. Instead, a copy of the job announcement being used in the search was included. The Modernization Work Plan, also submitted on December 14 to both the FO and the UIACP Director, differed from the first revised proposal only in that it included funds to pay for staff time spent on Modernization aspects of the proposal. The Field Office review of this plan raised questions about the eligibility of

certain items, sought more evidence that the tenants were capable of handling an Imprest fund and pointed out that funds were disproportionately distributed between Lafayette Courts and Flag House (the former had approximately 63 percent of the residents but was to receive over 94 percent of the expenditures). When these comments were forwarded to the UIACP office, they were turned over to an environmental psychologist, who had only recently been hired as a member of the program staff and, because of his knowledge of security design issues (gained while working with Oscar Newman popularizer of the concept of "defensible space"), had become the program's Modernization Coordinator.

On December 26, the HABC received another letter from HUD informing them about comments and questions that DOL staff had raised about the YCCIP proposal; responses to these were due by February 1, 1980. Furthermore, two "mini-competitions" among the 39 finalist PHAs were announced to determine which would receive funds from OJJDP and ADAMHA. Applications for these competitions were to be submitted by February 15, 1980. Finally, the HABC was strongly encouraged to apply for funds from the Department of Interior's Urban Park and Recreation Recovery (UPARR) Program. Since there was still no Anti-Crime Coordinator, the Analyst assumed responsibility for preparing all of these materials.

The HABC response to DOL clarified several aspects of the jobs proposed to be provided to youths, especially how those youths would be supervised and what their prospects for future employment would be. In addition, the number of persons proposed to be hired was made more specific: three part-time Security Hardware Trainees, three part-time and five full-time Youth Patrollers, nine part-time and nine full-time Lobby Guards, four part-time Employment Surveyors and six part-time Youth Aides (to work with the recreation program).

The Analyst decided to propose that ADAMHA funds be used to pay for a

subcontract with the Good Shepherd Center of the Baltimore Archdiocese to provide intensive family counselling in the homes of troubled adolescents in the two demonstration projects. He saw the OJJDP funds as a possible source of support for the Larry Middleton Athletic Program previously proposed to be funded as part of a local match. In discussions with Middleton prior to drafting the proposal, Middleton suggested locating the program at Flag House, where he had relatives rather than at Lafayette Courts or some site between the projects. Since the Flag House Youth Center was almost never used, and since the Analyst was becoming concerned about the costs and feasibility of operating six card readers at Lafayette, he convinced the HABC to locate the Tenant Activity Center at Flag House as well as to install the new access control systems only in the high rise buildings in that project. This decision was not conveyed to HUD, whose review of the proposed six card reader systems was still underway.

In late February 1980, while the Central Office review was underway, the HABC Analyst, who had already worked nine months on designing Baltimore's program, applied for, and was appointed to, the position of Anti-Crime Coordinator (ACC). This selection created some resentment on the part of the Security Coordinator whose proposal to assume these duties was thereby rejected. The ACC then began a search for a Law Enforcement Coordinator, who would be responsible for all security aspects of the program and a Social Services Coordinator, to oversee all other portions of the program. In April, the first position was filled with a former police officer who also had some social work experience. The latter position was filled by transferring a female senior social worker employed in the HABC's Division of Social Services to the new assignment. Faced with the prospect of funding from several sources, the ACC decided not to apply for UPARR funds.

Meanwhile, at the HUD Central Office, the Modernization Coordinator had reviewed the HABC Work Plan and concluded, as had the UIACP Director, that the entire electronic access control system should be discarded, based on the fact that previous studies of systems of that type had shown that the requisite support for such mechanisms would not be forthcoming from either residents or monitors. When he informed the Baltimore ACC of this decision by telephone, the latter objected to this proposed deletion. Instead, since he was already prepared to eliminate the installation at Lafayette, he proposed conducting a much more limited demonstration of the system at just the three Flag House high rise buildings, using YCCIP youths in the Lafayette guard booths. The Modernization Coordinator, realizing he would have to personally inspect the buildings involved before he could eliminate the system, arranged a site visit in late February, his first to any demonstration site. To lend further support to his position, he brought with him a crime prevention expert from HUD and another environmental psychologist from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.

The visit began with a walking tour of the projects. During this tour, it was discovered that an entire panel of glass was missing in one of the supposedly-controlled entrances to a high rise building. Interviews with residents made it clear that they did not support the installation of an automated system. The Modernization coordinator once again presented the ACC, with the argument that the entire card reader notion should be eliminated. The ACC again argued that such a system deserved to be given a proper test and that, since the HABC proposal incorporated several lessons learned from previous failures, this was the perfect opportunity to conduct one. Receiving no support from the two experts accompanying him, the Modernization coordinator agreed to this, suggesting further that, since the money had already been committed to the

HABC, the remainder of the Modernization funds be used for such "defensible space" improvements as walkways, open spaces and low rise courtyards. To further show his goodwill, the Modernization coordinator volunteered to rewrite the application himself. These changes (plus the addition of \$10,000 for the purchase of a car to be used for surveillance and to facilitate the operation of other components) were made and approved by HUD in April. Ironically, because all the modifications were made by the Central Office, the paperwork that was approved had never been seen, much less signed, by the HABC Executive Director, although he did later affix his signature.

What is equally remarkable is that the changes had never been seen, nor approved, by the Director of the UIACP before HUD's approval was provided. When he discovered that even three card reader systems had been approved he was shocked, thinking that his staff person had canceled the entire idea. He adamantly demanded that the approval be reversed, against the advice of the Modernization specialist and the staff member responsible for monitoring Baltimore that such reversals were not possible. When the ACC was informed of this new attempt to cancel his program, he strenuously objected, saying that the involvement of residents and the HUD Field Office was too great to reverse the process. A meeting was hastily called to bring together the ACC, a Field Office representative and members of the UIACP staff to resolve the issue.

The meeting was marked by rancorous debate, with the UIACP staff being accused of violating a commitment and the ACC being accused of having proposed the entire access control system without consulting with residents, thereby demonstrating his insensitivity to their interests. The ACC explained that the proposal had been written by a team containing a resident and had been approved by the Chairwoman of the Resident Advisory board. The Modernization Coordinator said she had told him during his site visit that she did not want such a system.

A staff member contended that there simply was no evidence of broad support for such a plan. The ACC volunteered to spend \$12,000 to survey the residents to determine their opinions before the systems were actually installed. In the end, this argument prevailed. From February until April, the ACC spent much time on the telephone reading agreements concerning particular items in his proposed budgets. During this period, he was informed that the CDBG awards would be from the Technical Assistance Funds not from Innovative funds as had originally been planned. In Baltimore, unlike in other cities this change did not require major revisions in the proposal.

In April 1980, the HABC was informed that they had been awarded \$230,000 from DOL's YCCIP funds and \$60,000 from CDBG Technical Assistance funds. The only change in the allocation of DOL funds from what had been proposed in February was that the Employment Surveyors positions had been eliminated; these slots had been reassigned as Lobby Guards. Of the CDBG funds, \$40,000 were allocated to the salary of the Law Enforcement Coordinator and the Social Services Coordinator; \$20,000 were to go to a Tenant Imprest Fund to be used for a newsletter, "buddy-buzzer systems," escort services, job preparation training and other purposes. Finally, in July, the HABC received the news that their proposals for Victim/Witness funds (\$20,000), OJJDP funds (\$83,500) and ADAMHA funds (\$47,800) had been approved. Thus, all components of the HABC program were funded (for a total of \$1,111,300) and ready to be implemented.

### III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

#### A. Improved Management of Public Safety by the PHA.

The HABC proposed to hire an Anti-Crime Coordinator (ACC) and to review its admissions and evictions policies. The HABC did indeed designate an

Anti-Crime Coordinator (in February 1980) to oversee the general implementation of the program. This ACC did not report directly to the Executive Director (ED), as HUD had expected, but to the Deputy Director instead. This arrangement did not seem to notably decrease the support available to the ACC as compared to what might have been forthcoming had he had direct access to the ED. Such a structure, in fact, probably provided more attention to the program than the system originally proposed and reduced the bureaucratic resentment which direct access might have produced.

The rest of the anti-crime program structure was managed by the Law Enforcement Coordinator, who was responsible for all security aspects of the program, and the Social Services Coordinator, who was responsible for all activities funded by OJJDP, Victim/Witness and ADAMHA. Such a distribution of responsibilities was, as it was planned, a reasonable one, avoided as it did the excess workload and conflicting job demands encountered by ACCs who attempted to assume both administrative and direct programmatic responsibilities.

In November of 1981, a consultant was hired to study the HABC's admissions and evictions policies. Preliminary results of this study indicate that approximately five percent of a sample of adults admitted to public housing from mid-1978 to mid-1979 could have been excluded on the basis of having previously committed violent crimes. No other activity in this program area took place, although the ACC argued strongly within the HABC that reductions in the density of the project populations, especially in high rise buildings, should be made.

B. Rehabilitation to House Anti-Crime Activities and Improvement of Physical Design to Make Buildings and Spaces Harder Targets.

The HABC proposed to install electronic card reader systems, develop a Tenant Activity Center, install new lighting, make "defensible space" modifications and purchase a car to facilitate the other parts of the program.

The first public opportunity for responses to be expressed concerning the Modernization proposals was at the initial meeting of the Joint Resident Task Force, composed of the RAB representatives of the two demonstration projects, the local Tenant Council officers of those projects, the housing managers, the Anti-Crime Coordinator, the Law Enforcement Coordinator and the Social Services Coordinator. It was at that May 1980 meeting, that the ACC, whose only previous contact with residents during this process had been with the leadership of the city-level RAB, discovered that the local Tenant Council officers had much stronger reservations about the card reader system than had been expressed by the RAB representatives consulted earlier. The Lafayette residents also expressed some resentment that so little of the program funds were now going to be spent in their project. These objections were finally overcome with the offer of jobs and the prospect of the presence of Special Police. At a later meeting, the residents convinced the ACC to issue cards for the reader system only to residents over 13 years old.

In July of 1980, at the first meeting of the Anti-Crime Oversight Team (ACOT), the ACC learned for the first time of the objections of the police to the card reader system. The police representative present contended that such an arrangement would greatly restrict their mobility and reduce the flow of information they had previously obtained from the stationary guards. The ACC countered these arguments by assuring the police that the command center would have ultimate control of the access control system and, therefore, that police mobility would be assured by operators of that Center, who could also be good sources of information.

All of these objections being addressed, if not totally subdued, the ACC began the search for a contractor to install the access control system. After a lengthy bidding process construction on the card reader systems began in December of 1980. In the spring of 1981, the HABC purchased the vehicle which, according to the final agreement was to be used to conduct surveillance

operations and to facilitate the rapid replacement of cards for the access control system. As requested by the ACC it was initially delivered to the Maintenance Department for inspection. However, when it became evident that the HABC Police Force was in jeopardy, the Maintenance Department retained the vehicle. When this fact was brought to the attention of the Deputy Commissioner, he demanded that the car be assigned to its intended place within the organization. The Maintenance Department, contending that the anti-crime program had no use for a new vehicle, with four wheel drive, air conditioning and other special features, delivered instead an old dilapidated van. Within a matter of weeks, this vehicle was vandalized and sent away to be repaired. Upon its return, it was used only briefly by the anti-crime program before being reclaimed by the Maintenance Department. In the meantime, by the summer of 1981, the Tenant Activity Center was refurbished and various members of the program staff occupied offices there.

In July of 1981, the videocameras, with monitors in the Command Center, went into operation. Finally, in October, 1981, ten months after construction began (considerably longer than the estimated 60-90 days), the automated access system went into full operation. Several problems immediately arose. First, the "man-trap" feature proved unworkable. After gaining entrance to the front door, the residents or guests had to close the front door and, within 15 seconds, open the inner door, or they would be caught in the vestibule in between. After a number of such episodes, the system was altered such that only the front door was controlled automatically. Once access to that door was obtained, the person(s) no longer had to contend with the inner door.

Another problem encountered by the system was the fact that the rear doors, which were not controlled by the electronic system, were susceptible to being

kicked open. In June of 1982, the locks on these doors were replaced by the same kind installed on the entry doors; since that time, no doors have been kicked in.

Perhaps the most difficult problem facing the entire system is the "human factor." The guards in the Command Center are reluctant to challenge persons seeking access without an authorized card. Residents are prone to loan their cards to other people or to hold open doors for persons who have not yet been cleared by the Command Center. Despite the technical improvements made in the system, it is these social problems, the ones initially brought forward by the UIACP Modernization Coordinator, that most often have plagued the operation.

The final Modernization components proposed were the installation of new lighting and the creation of "defensible space." New ceiling mounted lighting fixtures were in fact installed during the summer of 1981; similar lighting was installed in the Lafayette high rises during the fall of 1981. After the new lighting was installed, at a cost of approximately \$270,000, it was discovered that only \$50,000 was left for the "defensible space" improvements. As a result, instead of spending the money for walkways, open spaces and courtyards, it was decided after consultation with the Modernization Coordinator, to invest the money for playground equipment for three play areas, each easily visible from the buildings and segregated by age category. Installation of this equipment is anticipated in the Spring of 1983.

C. More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation.

Resident participation, as ultimately proposed, was to take two forms:

1. Resident Security Guards were, in addition to their other duties, to organize Block/Floor Watch programs and distribute information about Operation I.D. and other crime prevention programs.

2. A \$20,000 Tenant Imprest Fund was to be established for the Tenant Councils for the purpose of financing a newsletter, anti-crime poster and slogan contests, "buddy buzzers," an escort service, films and other purposes.

When the plan for creating an HABC Special Police force was eliminated in the spring of 1981, the job responsibilities of the Resident Security Guards were fundamentally altered. Instead of patrolling, in partnership with the Special Police, the Guards now became responsible for operating the Command Center at Flag House and training and supervising the Resident Security Monitors who came to staff the guard booths at Lafayette. Partly as a result of this significant change in their responsibilities, and partly due to conflicts between the Law Enforcement Coordinator and his assistant (which by the summer of 1981 had become quite enervating) the organization of Block and Floor Watch groups, as well as all other types of resident crime prevention activities, never seriously began.

A Tenant Imprest Fund of \$20,000 was established. Despite the fact that Lafayette Courts housed many more people than Flag House, the money was divided equally, with each Tenant Council receiving \$10,000. The Lafayette Tenant Council initially decided to incorporate, so that they could disperse the funds themselves. When the difficulties of such a step were realized, this plan was dropped. The Council at Flag House, however, decided to allow the HABC to maintain control of their funds. An examination of Tenant Imprest Fund expenditures indicates that approximately forty percent of the funds were spent on dinners and social events for residents. Of the rest, some was spent on the installation of telephones in the Tenant Council offices, some to assist persons who wished to pursue GED or college credits and the rest was used to establish an emergency loan fund for residents in severe need.

The most active form of participation by residents was the Joint Resident Task Force, a group which had never been officially proposed by the HABC. The April 1980 opening of the Law Enforcement Coordinator's office in the Flag House Youth Center was the first evidence that residents had seen that a new program of some sort was beginning. The Vice President of the Flag House Tenant Council suggested that a public meeting be held to explain the nature of the program. At that late April meeting, attended by approximately 40 residents from both projects, strong opposition to the proposal to institute the Larry Middleton Athletic Program was expressed. It was agreed that a Joint Resident Task Force would be created to review that and all other components of the program, acting as a steering committee for the program. As mentioned previously, non-resident membership on this group was made up of the Anti-Crime Coordinator, the Law Enforcement Coordinator, the Social Services Coordinator and the managers for the two demonstration projects. Resident membership was to consist of the two RAB representatives and the Tenant Council officers from the demonstration sites. Evidence of tension between the RAB representatives and the Local Tenant Council officers surfaced early; at Flag House the Council officers would occasionally even fail to notify the RAB representative of meeting dates. At the first Task Force meeting, in May 1980, the resident representatives reiterated the objections to the Larry Middleton program voiced earlier. Faced with this strong opposition, the HABC's Deputy Commissioner decided to eliminate further consideration of that program. Weekly meetings then began at which all components of the program were discussed. It was during such discussions that the residents, concerned that children under 13 would lose their cards for the access system, convinced the ACC to give such cards only to persons over that age. At the June 1980 meeting of the Task Force, the residents and the Law Enforcement Coordinator convinced the ACC that, for safety reasons, YCCIP youths should not be assigned to patrol the projects. Both of these changes were basic to the operation of the program. Thus, although one could question whether or

not the residents on the Task Force were broadly representative of the opinions of all residents, there is no doubt that, at critical decision points, these residents did have an important influence on the details of the program as implemented, if not on their actual design.

D. Increased Full and Part Time Employment of Tenants.

Although the hiring of YCCIP youths was the only employment of tenants which was specifically a part of the UIACP, the HABC had other plans to hire residents which could certainly be expected to complement the anti-crime effort. Under the agreement reached with DOL, the HABC was to hire the following youths under DOL's YCCIP program: Three part-time Security Hardware Trainees, three part-time and five full-time Youth Patrollers, nine part-time and thirteen full-time Lobby Guards, six part-time Youth Aides. In addition, when the plans to hire off-duty police officers fell through, the HABC decided to hire residents as Special Police, supported by more residents serving as Security Guards in the guard booths at Lafayette Courts.

In keeping with these plans, ten residents were hired as Security Guards in October 1980 and sent to the Howard County Police Academy for six weeks. By December, these guards were operating out of guard booths at both projects, under the supervision of the Law Enforcement Coordinator and his assistant, a newly-hired police lieutenant.

By February of 1981, it became clear that funding would not be available to hire any additional Special Police beyond the two already hired. At the Joint Resident Task Force, at which this fact was revealed, residents made their disappointment and anger clear, arguing that the ACC had deceived them by not revealing this information much earlier. To compensate for this loss, the ACC announced that the HABC would soon begin releasing the contractual guards and replacing them with resident security monitors. In May of 1981 these monitors, plus a group of newly hired YCCIP youths (nine working full time and seven part

time) were given a brief training course and put to work in the guard booths in the high rise buildings.

When the card reader system was installed, in the September of 1981 the Resident Security Guards were trained to operate this equipment. The Guards were assisted by seven YCCIP youths, working as Assistant Dispatchers, in the operation of the access control system. In addition, two YCCIP youths were selected and trained in the operation and maintenance of the card reader system by the vendor and the HABC engineer. These youths were particularly successful and proved to be valuable assets to the program.

Six YCCIP youths received apprenticeship training by the HABC Maintenance Department, not just concerning the maintenance and repair of security hardware but also in the areas of carpentry, electrical work and plumbing. This aspect of the program proved to be disappointing. When the youths returned to the projects after their training, they found the regular maintenance employees reluctant to work with them. Whether as a result of poor training or for other reasons, during the course of their employment, many of the youths exhibited frequent absences and irresponsible actions

Finally, six YCCIP youths were selected to work with the recreation program funded by OJJDP. These youths worked in conjunction with the two Assistant Youth Directors, one for each project, in the organization and supervision of recreation activities. Almost all of the other staff of this program, operated by the YWCA, were residents of the two projects. Perhaps based on this prior experience, the program staff provided direction and supervision to the youths while also being considerate of their concerns.

E. More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/Witnesses.

Three basic components were proposed by the HABC in this area:

- (1) with OJJDP funds, a program was to be established to provide recreational and tutorial services for youths;

- (2) with ADAMHA funds, two home management specialists would provide intensive family counseling; and
- (3) with Victim/Witness funds, a social worker was to be hired to serve as an advocate for victims and witnesses.

In March of 1980, a senior social worker was transferred from the HABC's Division of Social Services to become the Social Services Coordinator, (SSC) with responsibilities of overseeing all three of these components as well as the activities of the two HABC social workers already assigned to each project. In May, faced with strenuous objections to the Larry Middleton Athletic Program (LMAP), it was decided to advertise for proposals to conduct the OJJDP program. By November, proposals had been submitted. On March 2, 1981, almost one year after the original decision not to use LMAP, a contract was signed with the YWCA to run a recreation and tutorial program. Until September of 1982 this program operated officially under the auspices of the SSC but was in reality largely autonomous. After that time, when Federal funds ran out, the program was reduced in scope and began to function with local funds.

The ADAMHA component, as originally planned, was subcontracted to the Good Shepherd Center, which assigned two home management specialists to the demonstration projects. A total of 69 persons are recorded as having received services of various types from this program. In addition to supervising this subcontract, the SSC coordinated the provision of services from many other local public and private agencies to facilitate this effort.

Besides all her other responsibilities, the SSC also assumed the job of Victim/Witness Coordinator. She, supported by one assistant, received incident reports from the Police Department, made arrangements for the provision of services to those who desired it and coordinated the services of the various agencies providing these services. During the course of the year that this program operated, there is documentation that such services were provided to 42 persons, 38 of whom were victims of crime.

Throughout the implementation period, the SCC was hampered by an extraordinarily heavy and diverse workload and very little support staff to assist in coping with it. Her job was made even more difficult by the fact that her working relationship with the LEC was cool at best. The final blow came in the summer of 1981 when, faced by budget cuts, the Department of Social Work Services removed their social worker from the demonstration projects. As a result, the SSC and her assistant became personally responsible for the provision of services to the over 40 families previously receiving them. At this point, the SSC could pay only minimal attention to any one of her responsibilities.

F. Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers

The HABC's original proposal was to employ off-duty police officers to patrol the grounds of the projects and to hire residents as guards inside the high rise buildings. Youth Patrollers would accompany both the police and the guards. When the Police Commissioner vetoed the idea of allowing the HABC to hire off-duty officers, a new proposal to create an HABC Special Police force was developed. At a meeting on July 25, 1980 it was agreed that the money to pay for such a force could be saved by replacing the contractual guards with Resident Security Monitors, who would be stationed in the high rise guard booths. The money saved by this new system, combined with grants expected from Work Incentive (WIN) funds, would have been enough to operate the Special Police force for a year. By the end of that period, the card reader system would be in operation, saving enough money to sustain the Special Police. Based on this understanding, the ACC was given the authority to begin screening and hiring Special Police and Resident Security Guards. By the end of 1980, two officers and ten guards had been hired.

As the fall and winter of 1980 passed, no Resident Security Monitors had been hired by the HABC's Security Coordinator. Without the savings to be made by the replacement of the contractual guards, it became clear that a Special

Police force could not be afforded. Finally, in February 1981, the ACC revealed to the Joint Resident Task Force that there would be no HABC Police. This removed the key component around which the program was designed. Without the Special Police, it was not considered safe to have Resident Guards. The absence of police would also make the card reader systems more vulnerable to vandalism. Finally, with police dispatchers, the Resident Guards would have to staff the command center. At this point, the Program's nature fundamentally changed from a comprehensive mixture of mobile patrol and enhanced security hardware to a sophisticated target hardening approach.

G. Stronger Linkages With Local Government and Other Agencies

Based upon HUD's request for more specific commitments of local services, a meeting was held on August 30, 1979 with representatives of 16 city agencies to elicit pledges of support and cooperation for the anti-crime program. Most of these pledges were to provide in-kind assistance to the ADAMHA and Victim/Witness components; all evidence suggests that such assistance was readily forthcoming until budget cuts began to take effect. However, with these cuts the provision of services to the demonstration sites was drastically reduced, greatly complicating the operation of the social service aspects of the program.

The other major commitments were made by the Baltimore Police Department, which had pledged: (1) assignment of a high-ranked police official to the Anti-Crime Oversight Team; (2) Police Academy staff and facilities for training; (3) planning and research services for crime data; (4) Police Community Relations unit services; (5) use of the Crime Prevention Mobile Unit; and (6) Administrative and personnel services for the selection and employment of police officers for patrol of the target projects and area.

Despite the demise of the HABC Special Police Force, the Police Department fundamentally kept these commitments, to the extent that they were called upon to do so. The Department's Chief of Patrol did serve on the Oversight Team: Department personnel and services were provided for the selection of the two Special Police that were actually hired; one of these officers was given entrance level training at the Baltimore Police Academy, the other received advance in-service training there. Planning and research services were provided to the Victim/Witness program as well as directly to the ACC. Although it was agreed in July of 1981 that a member of the Community Relations unit and patrol sergeants from the area would begin regular meetings with residents, such meetings did not occur until January 1982 due largely to bureaucratic delays within the HABC in approving a contract for a consultant to preside at those meetings. Finally, there is no evidence that the Crime Prevention Mobile Unit ever appeared at the demonstration projects.

Overall, it must be said that the extent of linkage provided by city agencies was disappointing, partially due to the internal difficulties faced by the program and to severe budget cutbacks experienced by local government agencies. However, some of the reductions in public services were compensated by the efforts of private groups, especially the East Baltimore Medical Plan.

#### IV. PROGRAM IMPACT

##### A. Resident Survey Analyses

After examining available data and consulting with HABC staff, it was concluded that no other housing project in Baltimore was sufficiently similar to the demonstration sites in terms of physical structure, population characteristics and the nature of the crime problem to justify selection as a comparison site. Furthermore, because most of the area surrounding the demonstration sites is occupied by nonresidential units, it was decided not to conduct interviews in the neighborhood, although recorded crime data were collected and analyzed from that area.

Interviews with residents of the demonstration projects were conducted in July and August of 1981 to ascertain their attitudes and victimization experiences. Certain respondents were administered "long forms," containing a lengthy exploration of a wide variety of attitudinal issues; given the focus on victimization, most respondents were asked to respond to "short forms," dealing almost exclusively with the issues of fear of crime and recent victimization experiences. To avoid reliance on possibly spurious results, only questions to which at least 20 residents responded will be analyzed. The distribution of completed interviews is presented below.

##### Completed Interviews

<u>Project Units</u>	<u>Long Form</u>	<u>Short Form</u>	<u>Total</u>
Flag House Low Rise	19	34	53
Flag House High Rise	40	54	94
Lafayette Courts Low Rise	23	41	64
Lafayette Courts High Rise	<u>73</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>178</u>
	155	234	389

At the time these interviews were conducted, the Anti-Crime Coordinator had been at work for a year and a half, his Law Enforcement and Social Services Coordinators for a somewhat shorter period of time. The Tenant Activity Center had been constructed for some time. Although construction on the card reader systems was nearing completion, operation had not yet begun. Resident Security Guards had been employed for over nine months; Resident Security Monitors and YCCIP youths had been employed only two months. The ADAMHA Program had been in operation for ten months; the Victim/Witness Program for six. The OJJDP Program had begun only a few days before interviewing was initiated.

1. Program Awareness. Since both public meetings and sessions of the Joint Resident Task Force were held at the Tenant Activity Center adjacent to a Flag House Courts high rise building it is not surprising that almost 80 percent of the residents of the Flag House high rise units were aware of such programs. Awareness in the other types of units was considerably lower, ranging from 33 to 41 percent.

Approximately 80 percent of the residents in all four samples were aware of the existence of youth employment programs. Such levels of awareness are not surprising, give the diverse assortment of job opportunities for youth which were made available and the ensuing dissemination.

The fact that between 25 and 34 percent of the respondents said they were aware of alcohol or drug abuse programs is testimony to the fact that in eight months the Social Services Coordinator had done a relatively good job of making the existence of her programs known.

Many fewer persons, however, were aware of the existence of a Victim/Witness program, with almost no one at Lafayette Courts having heard of such an effort. At Flag House six and 12 percent of the residents of the high rise and low rise units respectively were aware of such a program.

2. Program Participation. As could be expected by the fact that crime prevention meetings were held at the Flag House project, residents of those projects were much more likely to indicate they had actually attended such meetings. Over 30 percent of the households participating in the survey were indicated to have had a member who participated; among Lafayette Courts households, approximately ten percent of households were said to have participated.

Approximately 40 percent of the households were indicated to have had a member who had participated in a youth employment program. Although a large number of households did, in fact, have members who participated in such programs, such high levels of reported participation suggest that summer employment programs and other such job programs, not just security-related ones, must have been in the minds of the respondents.

Only approximately five percent of Lafayette Courts households were said to have members who had availed themselves of an alcohol or drug abuse program. Over ten percent of Flag House households, however, were reported to have participated. It is possible that the higher participation at Flag House may be due to the fact that the program offices were located there.

A similar pattern was found with respect to participation in the victim/witness program; no Lafayette households were said to have had participants in such a program while four and 12 percent of Flag House households indicated a member had participated.

3. Fear and Victimization. Residents of both high rise complexes perceived crime to be a quite serious problem, especially at Flag House. Residents of the low rise buildings were not as likely to consider crime to be so serious. Similar results were obtained when respondents were asked how safe they felt in the project. In response, 55 percent of Lafayette Courts high rise

residents and 48 percent of those in the Flag House high rise considered their project to be unsafe. Slightly lower levels of concern were demonstrated by those in the Flag House low rise units and much lower levels among Lafayette low rise residents.

Victimization experiences displayed a pattern similar to that found concerning fear of crime. Almost 13 percent of the households in the Lafayette Courts high rise buildings and 10.9 percent of those in the Flag House high rises were indicated to have been burglarized in the past year. By contrast, almost no burglaries were indicated to have occurred in the low rise households. Similar patterns of frequent victimization among high rise households and infrequent occurrences among households in low rise units were found for robbery, rape, assault and most other crimes.

4. Change. Residents were asked two questions which allowed them to compare current conditions to those that prevailed a year ago. When asked whether the project had become a better or worse place to live, residents of Lafayette Courts, whether they lived in high rise or low rise buildings, indicated that conditions had greatly deteriorated. A similar deterioration was indicated by residents of Flag House high rise buildings. Residents of the low rise buildings at Flag House, however, indicated only a slight worsening of circumstances.

When asked specifically whether crime had become more or less of a problem, residents of high rise buildings at both Flag House and Lafayette Courts suggested that crime had become a considerably greater problem in the previous year. Residents of the low rise units at Lafayette also thought crime had become more of a problem, although not to the extent indicated by high rise residents. Persons living in the Flag House low rise units perceived only a slight worsening of the crime problem.

Based upon the fact that analyses of the implementation process revealed many problems in the operation of the anti-crime program, the fact that the timing of the 1981 resident survey was such as to allow measurement of possible program impacts and, finally, the fact that analysis of these survey data failed to indicate positive program results, it was decided to dispense with a second wave of surveys in 1982. Such a survey would have occurred well after most program elements had ceased to function and thus was judged to add only marginally to the evaluation of the program.

B. Recorded Crime Analysis.

Monthly recorded crime data were collected from the Baltimore Police Department from January 1977 through June 1982 for the two demonstration projects and the area surrounding them. To specify the analysis of these data, the crimes were further categorized as to whether or not they were reported in high rise or in low rise buildings. Average monthly per capita data for personal (murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) and property (burglary, larceny and auto theft) crimes for the four demonstration areas and the city of Baltimore are shown in the figures below. (Per capita figures could not be calculated for the surrounding area since necessary demographic data were not available.)

The data indicate that until 1980, when the anti-crime program began, the recorded personal crime rate had been notably higher in the high rise buildings of both Flag House and Lafayette Courts than in the city as a whole. The rate in the Flag House low rise buildings had been slightly higher than in the city. Among the Lafayette Courts low rise units, however, the rate of recorded personal crimes was lower than the city-wide rate. At the Flag House high rise buildings, where the card reader systems began operation in September of 1981, the recorded personal crime rate has declined, with a few minor fluctuations,

consistently since December of 1981. Such a consistent decline has not occurred within the five years for which data were collected. Among the Lafayette Courts low rise buildings, the recorded personal crime rate dropped to a low level in October 1981 and stayed low through June of 1982. Such a consistently low level has occurred periodically in the past and should not be seen as remarkable. At the Lafayette Courts high rise buildings, the recorded personal crime rate rose from October 1981 to March 1982 and has generally remained high since then. Such a pattern, however, is not inconsistent with previous years. Finally, among the low rise buildings of Flag House, the rate fell, beginning in February 1982, back to a normal level after rising to an unusually high peak in 1981. Although they are not represented on the Figure, the number of recorded personal crimes in the area surrounding the demonstration sites has declined considerably since the summer of 1981.

The data concerning recorded property crime rates shows a somewhat different picture. Unlike the data for recorded personal crimes, the city-wide rate of recorded property crimes has consistently been higher than that obtained within any of the demonstration areas. Before the anti-crime program, the highest rate of recorded property crimes had been found among the Lafayette high rise buildings, the lowest among the Lafayette low rise units. Among the high rise buildings at Flag House, the rate has declined, more or less consistently, since December 1981. Not only is this pattern congruent to that indicated by the recorded personal crime rates, it is also generally unprecedented during the previous five years. Among the low rise units at Flag House, the rates in 1982 dropped from 1981 but such a reduction is not inconsistent with a long term decline in the last five years. No notable changes were observed among either the low rise or the high rise units at Lafayette Courts.

In general, then, sizable and sustained declines in both recorded personal and property crime rates have occurred among the Flag House high rise units, a

clear departure from previous patterns. Some changes were observed in the other three project areas, but they were not significant deviations from previous patterns.

#### V. SUMMARY

The Baltimore Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, as originally proposed, was a carefully balanced combination of increased police patrol, enhanced access control and augmented social services. Similar to a house of cards, each element was linked functionally and fiscally to the others. The key to the combination was to be the payment, by the HABC, of off-duty police officers to patrol the grounds of the demonstration projects. In order to save the money necessary to pay for these police officers, the contractual guards working in access control booths would be replaced by an electronic card reader system, allowing the resident guards to leave those booths to patrol the high rise buildings and develop Floor Watch programs. Youths would be hired to patrol with the police and the guards as well as to maintain the card reader system. Finally, to address the underlying causes of crime, various recreation, referral and counseling services were to be instituted.

One by one, the proposed program elements fell victim to adversity. The first component to be removed was off-duty police officers patrolling the projects, a notion absolutely rejected by the Police Commissioner. To replace this missing piece, the creation of an HABC Special Police Force was proposed instead, again to be paid for by replacing the contractual guards with card reader access systems. Without the presence of city police, residents refused to allow their teenagers to patrol the projects.

These systems were the next element to fall, as HUD argued that such equipment was too expensive and too untested to install in all nine high rise buildings on such a broad scale. After much debate, it was finally agreed that only three such systems would be installed. Since such a small demonstration

• project could not be expected to save enough money to pay for the special police, and since even three card reader systems would take months to install, a new money-saving scheme had to be devised.

The solution was to replace the contractual guards in all HABC high rise buildings with residents who would operate the guard booths there. Such a change, if instituted quickly, would have provided enough funds to operate the special police until the new access control systems could be installed. This solution, although agreed upon by all parties involved in the summer of 1980, had not been implemented by early 1981.

As a result, funds were not available for a special police force and the entire notion was eliminated. With its demise, the foundation upon which the interrelated program elements were to be built was removed. Without police dispatchers operating the Command Center of the access control system, the resident guards would have to be assigned that responsibility. Without some police, adult residents refused to engage in patrols. As a result, they assumed stationary positions in the Command Center, one step further removed from the guard booths than had been the contractual guards. With these new responsibilities no serious attempt to organize Floor Watch organizations was made.

The program then came to consist of a long delayed card reader system (of much smaller scope than originally proposed) and the provision of social services. These services became the next element to experience difficulties. The first problem was that the Coordinator of those services was given too many responsibilities and too few staff to be able to carry them out. Next, conflicts arose between this Coordinator and the Law Enforcement Coordinator, hampering the effectiveness of both. The final blow came in the summer of 1981 when, due to budget cuts, the HABC removed its social workers from the demonstration projects, forcing the Social Services Coordinator and her assistant to begin providing in-home counselling, diverting them from their other duties.

In September of 1981, the only remaining hope for the program was put to the test when the card reader systems were installed in three high rise buildings. Major technical problems developed immediately. Residents were trapped within the first and second doors; the police and fire departments could not gain access; rear doors, not controlled by the system, were used as alternative entrances. Eventually these technical problems were solved, only to be superceded by social ones: residents loaned their cards to friends; guards allowed people to gain access without a card and without proof of eligibility.

Finally, in January 1982, most components of the program were terminated, their funds, and many of their staff, completely exhausted. Based upon the generally negative experiences of the implementation process and the fact that the timing of the first resident survey was such as to allow measurement of the impact of most program elements, the evaluators decided against a second wave of resident surveys. The Anti-Crime Coordinator, frustrated by the entire experience, returned to his previous assignment.

It can only then be seen as puzzling, that starting in late 1981, soon after the card readers systems were installed in three high rise buildings, that a decline in recorded crime occurred in the high rise buildings in which the card reader systems were installed. Perhaps this decline was only a temporary aberration; unfortunately, more time will be required to determine if that was the case. Perhaps, on the other hand, despite the serious problems faced by most elements of the program, some actual improvements were in fact achieved by the new access control systems itself. If these systems do, ultimately prove to be effective, this will stand as ironic evidence to all of those, including residents, police and the UIACP Director and staff, who so strongly objected to them.

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
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2. Harold L. Bunce and Norman J. Glickman. The Spatial Dimensions of the Community Development Block Grant Program: Targeting and Urban Impacts. Norman J. Glickman, editor, the Urban Impacts of Federal Policies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1980. Pp. 515-541.

# BALTIMORE

## Flag House Courts Low Rise


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



RECORDED BURGLARIES  
Per 10,000 Occupied Units




# BALTIMORE

## Flag House Courts High Rise


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



RECORDED BURGLARIES  
Per 10,000 Occupied Units




# BALTIMORE

## Lafayette Courts Low Rise


**RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES**  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




**RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES**  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




**RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES**  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



**RECORDED BURGLARIES**  
Per 10,000 Occupied Units




# BALTIMORE

## Lafayette Courts High Rise


**RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES**  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




**RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES**  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)




**RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES**  
Per 10,000 Persons

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)




**RECORDED BURGLARIES**  
Per 10,000 Occupied Units



BALTIMORE  
Flag House/Lafayette Neighborhood


RECORDED PART 1 CRIMES

(Personal and Property Crimes Combined)




RECORDED PERSONAL CRIMES

(Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery)



RECORDED PROPERTY CRIMES

(Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft)



RECORDED BURGLARIES

