

Residential Security in Multi-Family Housing

Instructor's Guide

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Office of Policy Development and Research



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
The research forming the basis for this workshop was conducted pursuant to Grant #H-2225G between the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and Temple University. Statements and information contained in this workshop are those of the grantee who assumes sole responsibility for its accuracy and completeness.

FOREWORD


This instructor's guide is one of eighteen in a housing-management curriculum developed by HUD in conjunction with Temple University.

The guide reprints all the material in the participant's workbook, but gives more detailed information where necessary and answers the test questions.

Our hope is that with your help, the workshops using this curriculum will advance professionalism in the field of housing management. The lack of professionalism -- that is, the lack of uniform standards which allows people of varying knowledge and abilities to manage HUD-assisted and privately financed housing -- has contributed to some serious problems: high default rates, abandonments, and vandalism. To correct such problems is important. We are glad to have you working with us.



Donna E. Shalala
Assistant Secretary for
Policy Development and Research



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Assistant Secretary for
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PREFACE

Each workbook in this series presents a number of learning objectives targetted to a selected area of management. Successful completion of the learning objectives presented in each workbook provides a series of building blocks to buttress the spectrum of skills required of a housing manager.

In preparing these workbooks, an attempt has been made to incorporate the range of knowledge that housing managers might be required to draw upon. Likewise, an attempt has been made to reflect the present state-of-the-art of housing management. Inevitably, whatever is captured in print reflects a body of knowledge and practice up to the point of publication. Therefore, the students and instructors making use of these workbooks will want to keep alert to new developments that should be integrated into the workbook material. Furthermore, like any attempt to codify knowledge in a particular field, the material presented in these workbooks is open to differences of interpretation and emphasis. We are aware that there may be some techniques and procedures described in these workbooks with which some experts in the field might disagree. The best test of such procedures and techniques will come when they are applied in the field by housing management practitioners. Through this process, the state-of-the-art will continue to be improved. Instructors in the future will undoubtedly want to incorporate such acknowledged improvements into their delivery of the workbook material.

One final point is worth mentioning. An initial impetus for these workbooks was the need to upgrade management skills in HUD-related housing. However, many of the principles presented should be viewed by students and instructors as applicable to multifamily housing management practices in the private sector.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I. INTRODUCTION

Traditionally the connotation of the word "security" has been "insecurity," focusing generally on criminals and crime. However, security concerns itself more than with the effective deterrence of criminal acts, and a security system built simply on deterrence cannot be successful. Security involves more than planning for and developing a system whereby perpetrators of criminal acts are apprehended. Successful security systems plan and develop strategies which address both the individual's right to be free from criminal victimization and his or her psychological need to feel secure.

Criminal victimization involves the actual perpetration of a criminal act against person or property. It can be analyzed, evaluated, and documented because it is objectively measurable (burglaries, murders, assaults, rapes, and acts of vandalism are quantifiable).

The psychological need of the individual to "feel" secure or free from fear for safety or insecurity is much more difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, it is just as important as the more quantifiable aspects of security to the success of a security program.

Taken together, these elements encompass the "two-track" approach to the development of a total security system. Track "A" is concerned with deterring criminal victimization. Track "B" is concerned with creating and maintaining a sense of safety through widespread community involvement in planning and implementing a security program.

This workshop focuses on such a two-track approach to security systems. Module I of the workshop curriculum expands on traditional notions of security. Modules II and III discuss Track "A" and Track "B" of a comprehensive security

system in detail. Module IV explores the concepts behind the notion of "defensible space" - the interrelationships between the layout of physical environment and security. Module V discusses "Turf Reclamation," an approach to security which is based on strengthening a neighborhood's sense of cohesion to enable community members to actively and effectively participate in a security program. Module VI suggests strategies managers can employ in planning and administering security programs. Taken together, these modules provide the skills and knowledge which housing managers need to effectively address security problems.

II. LEARNING OBJECTIVES

Participants will be able to demonstrate orally and/or in writing both theoretical and practical competencies related to security in multi-family housing identified by the following workshop objectives:

Module I

1. Participants will be able to operationally define security.
2. Participants will list the five steps involved in planning and administering a comprehensive security system.
3. Participants will identify ten variables which must be examined in analyzing the facts about security in a community.
4. Participants will define goals, objectives, and tasks as they relate to developing program strategies.
5. Participants will describe "check," "treat," and "cure" security actions and define management's differing role in implementing such actions.
6. Participants will list the five categories of program evaluation.
7. Participants will define the ten major elements of a proposal.

Module II

1. Participants will be able to differentiate between the elements of a traditional definition of security and the elements of a more comprehensive definition.
2. Participants will be able to define and measure criminal victimization.
3. Participants will be able to differentiate between actual criminal victimization and fear of criminal victimization.

Module III

1. Participants will list the three major components of Track "A" of a comprehensive security system.
2. Participants will be able to suggest adequate protective devices for ten of the twenty most vulnerable areas of a multi-family residence.
3. Participants will list the advantages and disadvantages of three technological detection devices.
4. Participants will outline the four major steps involved in obtaining adequate security services from local law enforcement agencies.
5. Participants will describe the three major functions of supplemental security personnel.
6. Participants will describe three alternate strategies for organizing supplemental security personnel.

Module IV

1. Participants will list five types of self-protective measures which residents can take to lessen their vulnerability to crime.
2. Participants will cite four factors which tend to prevent residents from speaking out against crime in their community.
3. Participants will suggest ten community agencies which can assist in a comprehensive security program.

Module V

1. Participants will define the terms "territorial area" and "zone of transition."
2. Participants will suggest three alternate strategies for creating surveillance opportunities.
3. Participants will suggest two ways of controlling public grounds.
4. Participants will suggest four ways of controlling interior public spaces in multi-family dwellings.

Module VI

1. Participants will list the four major elements of the process of turf reclamation.
2. Participants will suggest three relevant objectives for a security program based on the principles of turf reclamation.
3. Participants will suggest four strategies for developing a positive relationship between law enforcement agencies and residents.
4. Participants will suggest five strategies for facilitating mutual assistance among community members.

III. WORKSHOP CONTENT SUMMARY

The material contained in this workshop guide has been organized in modular form around specific topics related to security in multi-family housing. The focus is on those skill and knowledge areas which will enable the housing manager to identify needs, understand and foresee problems, and appropriately modify and adopt practices in order to provide quality management services in the area of security.

Each module contains an introduction and lists objectives, content, methodology, and resources. Modules can be used either separately or in combination to flexibly arrange courses and workshops. Due to the inter-relationship of the material contained in the modules, it is advisable to present them in sequence, either at one workshop, or at sessions that follow one another closely.

Some format suggestions for workshops utilizing the following modules are seen below:

Module I	Planning and Administering a Security Program
Module II	Security Defined
Module III	Hardware (Track "A") Components of a Comprehensive Security System
Module IV	Software (Track "B") Components of a Comprehensive Security System
Module V	Defensible Space
Module VI	Turf Reclamation

Workshop Format I:

Two consecutive one-day sessions

Day I: 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.
Modules I, II, III
Day II: 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.
Modules IV, V, VI

Workshop Format II:

Two one-day sessions, one week apart

Day I: 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.

Modules I, II, III

Day II: 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.

Modules IV, V, VI

Workshop Format III:

Four consecutive half-day sessions

Day I: (9:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.) or (1:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.)

Module I

Day II: (9:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.) or (1:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.)

Modules II and III

Day III: (9:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.) or (1:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.)

Module IV

Day IV: (9:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.) or (1:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.)

Modules V and VI

WORKSHOP FORMAT ALTERNATIVES

FORMAT	DAY	TIME	MODULE NUMBER	CONTENT
I	Day 1	9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.	I, II, III	Planning and Administering a Security Program; Security Defined; Hardware
	Day 2	9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.	IV, V, VI	Software; Defensible Space; Turf Reclamation
II	Day 1	9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.	I, II, III	Planning and Administering a Security Program; Security Defined; Hardware
	Day 2 (one week later)	9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.	IV, V, VI	Software; Defensible Space; Turf Reclamation
III	Day 1	9:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.	I	Planning and Administering a Security Program
	Day 2	1:00 p.m.-5:00 p.m.	II, III	Security Defined; Hardware
	Day 3	each day	IV	Software
	Day 4		V, VI	Defensible Space, Turf Reclamation

IV. METHODOLOGY

The specific instructional methods recommended for this workshop are described following the content outline of each module. These methods include:

1. Short lecture presentations by workshop staff or guest lecturers.
2. Film and slide presentations.
3. Group discussions.
4. Role plays.
5. Case studies.
6. Field visits.

V. RESOURCES

1. Specific bibliographic and audio-visual resources are listed following each curriculum module.
2. Guides to Audio-Visual Resources

Films in the Behavioral Sciences: An Annotated Catalogue, John M. Schneider, Barnett Addis, and Marsha Addis, 2nd Edition, Behavioral Sciences Media Laboratory, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University of Oklahoma Medical Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 73104, August, 1970, \$4.00, 225 pp.

Guides to Educational Media, 3rd Edition, M. I. Rufsvold and C. Guss, Chicago: American Library Association, 1971.

Guide to Government-Loan Film (16 mm), Serina Press, 70 Kennedy Street, Alexandria, Virginia, 22305, 1969, \$4.95, 130 pp.

Guide to State-Loan Film (16 mm), Serina Press, 70 Kennedy Street, Alexandria, Virginia, 22305, 1969, \$2.95, 56 pp.

Index to 35 mm Educational Filmstrips, 2nd Edition. National Information Center for Educational Media, University of Southern California, University Park, Los Angeles, California, 90007.

Index to 16 mm Educational Films, National Information Center for Educational Media, University of Southern California, University Park, Los Angeles, California, 90007.

Library of Congress Catalog: Motion Pictures and Filmstrips, Washington, D. C., 1953 to date.

VI. EVALUATION

It is recommended that participants be evaluated on their ability to demonstrate competency in each of the knowledge and skill areas outlined in the workshop objectives. Competency can be measured by oral or written examination, by class participation, and/or by completion of assignments.

MODULE SUMMARIES

MODULE I: PLANNING AND ADMINISTERING A SECURITY PROGRAM

OBJECTIVE	CONTENT	METHODOLOGY	RESOURCES
1. Participants will be able to operationally define security.	1. Elements of a comprehensive operational definition.	1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion	1. Workshop staff
2. Participants will list the five steps involved in planning and administering a comprehensive security system.	1. Overall planning framework. 2. Description of steps.	1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion	1. Workshop staff
3. Participants will identify ten variables which must be examined in analyzing the facts about security in a community.	1. Making a preliminary estimate. 2. Obtaining and analyzing facts.	1. Lecture presentation	1. Workshop staff
4. Participants will define goals, objectives, and tasks as they relate to developing program strategies.	1. Definitions 2. Development	1. Lecture presentation 2. Group planning exercise (optional)	1. Workshop staff
5. Participants will describe "check," "treat," and "cure" actions and define management's differing role in implementing such actions.	1. Definition 2. Management's role	1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion	1. Workshop staff
6. Participants will list the five categories of program evaluation.	1. Definition of evaluation.	1. Lecture presentation	1. Workshop staff
7. Participants will define the ten major elements of a proposal.	1. Definition 2. Elements 3. Techniques for developing.	1. Lecture presentation	1. Workshop staff

VII MODULE SUMMARY

MODULE II: SECURITY DEFINED

OBJECTIVE	CONTENT	METHODOLOGY	RESOURCES
<p>1. Participants will be able to differentiate between elements of a traditional definition of security and those of a more comprehensive definition.</p>	<p>1. Definitions</p>	<p>1. Lecture presentation</p>	<p>1. Workshop staff</p>
<p>2. Participants will be able to define and measure criminal victimization.</p>	<p>1. Definition 2. Measuring criteria</p>	<p>1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion</p>	<p>1. Workshop staff</p>
<p>3. Participants will be able to differentiate between actual criminal victimization and fear of criminal victimization.</p>	<p>1. Definitions 2. Distinction</p>	<p>1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion</p>	<p>1. Workshop staff</p>

MODULE III: HARDWARE (TRACK "A") COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

OBJECTIVE	CONTENT	METHODOLOGY	RESOURCES
1. Participants will list the three major components of Track "A" of a comprehensive security system.	1. Elements of the "A" Track	1. Lecture presentation	1. Workshop Staff
2. Participants will be able to suggest adequate protective devices for ten of the twenty most vulnerable areas of a multi-family residence.	1. Vulnerable areas 2. Relevant protective devices	1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion 3. Audio-visual presentation (optional)	1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)
3. Participants will list the advantages and disadvantages of three technological detective devices.	1. Definition of technological detective devices 2. Advantages 3. Disadvantages	1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion 3. Audio-visual presentation (optional)	1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)
4. Participants will outline the four major steps involved in obtaining adequate security services from local law enforcement agencies.	1. Description and discussion of steps involved	1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion 3. Role play	1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)
5. Participants will describe the three major functions of supplemental security personnel.	1. Role of supplemental personnel 2. Scope of functions	1. Lecture presentation	1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)
6. Participants will describe three alternate strategies for organizing supplemental security personnel.	1. Alternate strategies 2. Administering, training, and equipping	1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion 3. Role play	1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)

MODULE IV: SOFTWARE (TRACK "B") COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

OBJECTIVE	CONTENT	METHODOLOGY	RESOURCES
<p>1. Participants will list five types of self-protective measures which residents can take to lessen their vulnerability to crime.</p>	<p>1. Self-protective measures</p>	<p>1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion 3. Audio-visual presentation (optional)</p>	<p>1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)</p>
<p>2. Participants will cite four factors which tend to prevent residents from speaking out against crime in their community.</p>	<p>1. Resident attitudes 2. Resident standards</p>	<p>1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion</p>	<p>1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)</p>
<p>3. Participants will suggest ten community agencies which can assist in a comprehensive security program.</p>	<p>1. Importance of social service support to a comprehensive security program. 2. List and description of agency types and functions. 3. Strategies for coordinating with community agencies.</p>	<p>1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion</p>	<p>1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)</p>

MODULE V: DEFENSIBLE SPACE

OBJECTIVE	CONTENT	METHODOLOGY	RESOURCES
1. Participants will define the terms "territorial area" and "zone of transition."	1. Definitions	1. Lecture 2. Group discussion	1. Workshop staff
2. Participants will suggest three alternate strategies for creating surveillance opportunities.	1. Definition 2. Strategies	1. Lecture 2. Group discussion	1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)
3. Participants will suggest two ways of controlling public grounds.	1. Definition 2. Strategies	1. Lecture 2. Group discussion	1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)
4. Participants will suggest four ways of controlling interior public spaces in multi-family dwellings.	1. Definition 2. Strategies	1. Lecture 2. Group discussion	1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)

MODULE VI: TURF RECLAMATION

OBJECTIVE	CONTENT	METHODOLOGY	RESOURCES
<p>1. Participants will list the four major elements of the process of turf reclamation.</p>	<p>1. Overall concept 2. Elements</p>	<p>1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion</p>	<p>1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)</p>
<p>2. Participants will suggest three relevant objectives for a security program based on the principles of turf reclamation.</p>	<p>1. Program description 2. Goals 3. Objectives 4. Tasks</p>	<p>1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion</p>	<p>1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)</p>
<p>3. Participants will suggest four strategies for developing a positive relationship between law enforcement agencies and residents.</p>	<p>1. Meetings 2. Involvement in social activities 3. Police department community services 4. Clarification of scope of police department function</p>	<p>1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion</p>	<p>1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)</p>
<p>4. Participants will suggest five strategies for facilitating mutual assistance among community members.</p>	<p>1. Increasing concern 2. Working with older community agencies 3. Integrating social activities</p>	<p>1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion</p>	<p>1. Workshop staff 2. Technical Resource (optional)</p>

MODULE I

MODULE I: PLANNING AND ADMINISTERING A SECURITY PROGRAM

A. Introduction

Management's role in security must operate within a comprehensive framework -- one which seeks to address all the problems stemming from crime and vandalism and which takes account of the complex interrelationships between problems and remedies. The residents of public housing have a wide range of security needs. The competent housing manager is both sensitive to this fact and is committed to the success of the social service program within his or her development. A manager needs several skills to implement a successful security program: the ability to accurately determine security needs within a development, the ability to locate and effectively utilize community resources to help meet those needs, the ability to develop program strategies to meet needs which cannot be met by outside resources, the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of the security program, and the ability to obtain funds for the security program.

B. Objectives

1. Participants will be able to operationally define security.
2. Participants will list the five steps involved in planning and administering a comprehensive security system.
3. Participants will identify ten variables which must be examined in analyzing the facts about security in a community.
4. Participants will define goals, objectives, and tasks as they relate to developing program strategies.
5. Participants will describe "check," "treat," and "cure" security actions and define management's differing role in implementing such actions.
6. Participants will list the five categories of program evaluation.
7. Participants will define the ten major elements of a proposal.

C. Content

1. Developing an Operational Definition of Security

Before planning a comprehensive security program to meet resident's security needs, it is important to develop an operational definition of security.

In developing an operational definition of security, management, residents, and other key interests should determine for themselves the scope of their residential security concerns. The following considerations should be taken into account when formulating a working definition:

Types of Offenses - Residential security implies the absence of vandalism, assault, homicide, mail theft, rape/sex offenses, arson, burglary, robbery, automobile theft, purse snatching, and drug abuse.

Location - Managers are generally concerned only with security problems that arise within project boundaries. However, some offenses within the project may not be viewed as security problems, while others beyond project boundaries may be considered residential in nature. Commonly, residential security focuses more on crimes between strangers rather than on crimes between acquaintances. Opinions often vary as to the extent to which crimes of fraud, victimless crimes, minor disturbances of the peace, and parking violations should be treated as security problems. On the other hand, crimes on adjacent or nearby streets may be seen as so closely associated with the residential environment as to merit treatment as security problems of the project itself.

Illegal Access - While protection of the individual dwelling unit against illegal entry is a basic requirement for good security, residents' security cannot be defined solely in such terms. It is often difficult to strictly limit access to common interior and exterior areas.

The Subjective Sense of Security - Fear of crime (or sometimes the absence of such fear) itself constitutes a serious security problem. Such fears must be dealt with, even when the actual danger of becoming a victim of crime is remote.

A good security program will reduce the exaggerated fears of those who act unreasonably fearful and also build a healthy respect for personal safety among those who are inappropriately fearless.

2. Assessing Security Needs

- a. Making a Preliminary Estimate - At the outset of planning, management should make a preliminary estimate or rough appraisal of problems, constraints, goals, remedial measures, and further planning tasks. The preliminary appraisal should include problem analysis by management staff, policy input from administrative officials, and input from residents.
- b. Obtaining and Analyzing the Facts - The fullest possible investigation should be made of the facts bearing upon security problems, resources, and constraints. Questions which should ordinarily be answered in detail include the following:
 - What is the history of crime in the project?
 - What are the relevant characteristics of offenders and victims?

- What are the probable future trends of crime and vandalism within the project?
- What are the relevant characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood?
- What are the social forces at work in the larger community which impact project security?
- What characteristics of the project's residents contribute to the encouragement or deterrence of crime and vandalism?
- What is the nature and degree of residents' fear of crime?
- What specific physical characteristics of the project's buildings and grounds contribute to the encouragement or deterrence of crime and vandalism?
- What is the nature and quality of police department services to the project and its residents?
- What is the nature and quality of other protective services within the project?
- How do general management policies and practices affect security?
- What is the potential of the residents' organization for assisting with a security program?
- To what extent does management have in-house technical capabilities in security?
- What additional technical assistance is needed and how can it be obtained?
- What are the options for additional hardware and software measures?
- What are the residents' views on various security measures?
- How does security relate to the project's finances?
- To what extent can new security measures be financed from sources other than the regular operating budget?
- What social services are needed in connection with project security?
- How do Federal, State, and local laws and regulations affect project security?

3. Utilizing Community Resources

Once a list of residents' security needs has been developed and prioritized, the next step in implementing a successful security program is to locate resources available in the community at large which can help meet those needs. After such agencies are located, the manager must then establish an effective working relationship and coordinating mechanism with them. (Methods for working with local law enforcement agencies are discussed in Module II; methods for working with supportive social agencies are discussed in Module III).

Most communities have social services available which alleviate problems that cause some residents to become involved in crime. Information about such services is available through the local Health and Welfare Council, supported by the local United Way. The mission of the Health and Welfare Council is to provide information and referral; to promote community planning, coordination and development; and to support and carry out research. As part of the information and referral service, most Health and Welfare Councils publish a Directory of Community Services. This Directory lists all the agencies providing social services to the local community and indexes them according to type of service provided.

The Housing Manager will find it useful to compile such information into a list of social services available which would compliment a security program. Such a list should indicate area of need, resource, services provided, eligibility requirements, and method of contact.

4. Developing Security Program Strategies

Once local law enforcement agencies are effectively being utilized, the manager must then note where gaps in security lie. Such gaps will occur where local law enforcement agencies are unable to meet residents' security needs either because appropriate services do not exist or, as is more often the case, because their service capacity is limited. In such cases the manager will have to develop and implement supplemental security services within the housing development.

There are several steps involved in developing a program strategy for new security services to meet the needs of residents that cannot be met by local law enforcement agencies. Often managers find it helpful to consult with planning specialists in this process. The first step is to establish program priorities. This includes determining priorities among problem areas, formulating hypotheses about probable causes, outlining possible solutions, and deciding on which solutions to implement in each problem area. Throughout this process, the manager should be clear about the facts and values which influence the development of priorities and choice of preferred solutions.

The next step in developing a program strategy is to set overall program goals, and specific objectives and tasks. In moving from goals to objectives to tasks, the program planner becomes increasingly specific about how to implement a program strategy. Each program strategy generally will have several goals. Goals

are general statements of overall program aims. They provide a framework for overall program activity which reflects planning priorities. Each goal in turn should have several objectives. Objectives are specific statements of strategies for solving problems and implementing goals. Objectives should be measurable and tell who is going to do what to whom. Each objective in turn should have several tasks. Tasks are the specific activities which must be performed to meet an objective.

Any comprehensive approach to security requires three types of action:

"Check" - actions which directly deter or control the problem, such as locks and security guards.

"Treat" - actions which address the surface causes of problems, such as diverting youthful energy from vandalism to sports activities.

"Cure" - actions which address the root causes of problems, such as improving economic and educational opportunities.

Comprehensive security actions must be directed to each of these three levels simultaneously, with the goal of decreasing check actions over time, while increasing treat and cure actions. However, check actions tend to be prerequisite to substantial progress at the other two levels.

5. Focusing Management's Role in Security Actions

1. Management's role in "check" actions should focus on direct protective measures which are fundamental requirements of good security and which can be implemented relatively quickly.

2. Management's role in "treat" actions should be of a secondary focus. Outside resources and coordination with other key participants are of more importance in managing treat actions.
 3. Management's role in "cure" actions in most instances will lie in coordinating the efforts of local social service agencies in providing programs such as job training and placement, educational opportunities, family counseling, offender rehabilitation, health care, and help for the emotionally disturbed. However, management can and should take a very strong direct role in one vital "cure" action - improving residents' attitudes and helping them develop enforcement standards. (See materials on turf reclamation). Although "cure" actions require long-term efforts to be successful, they offer the best chance for satisfactorily solving the problems of crime and vandalism.
6. Evaluating Security Programs

After goals, objectives, and tasks are set, and before program strategies are actually implemented, the manager must develop plans for evaluation. Evaluations are done to discover whether and how well objectives are being met. Good evaluations should:

- (1) identify goals/objectives to be evaluated.
- (2) measure the degree of change which results from program activity.
- (3) determine the cause of observed changes, and
- (4) indicate the durability of effects.

Edward A. Suchman has categorized evaluations according to the type of program effects they attempt to measure.

- (1) *Effort* evaluations look at the *quantity and quality of activity*, assessing the input of energy rather than output. They look at what was done and to what extent it was done.
- (2) *Performance* evaluations measure the *results of effort* rather than the effort itself. They look at amounts of service given rather than attempts to serve.
- (3) *Adequacy* evaluations measure *how adequate performance is relative to total need*. Although intensive programs are often highly successful with small numbers of clients, they may be thoroughly inadequate for meeting total need.
- (4) *Efficiency* evaluations look at *cost/benefits* and attempt to determine if there are less costly ways of meeting objectives.
- (5) *Process* evaluations look at the *whys and wherefores* of program success in an attempt to make sense from program results.

For more information about these categories, see Suchman's book, Evaluative Research, (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1967).

A good program evaluation will include all five types. This will insure that the way in which services were provided was the most cost-effective way of providing meaningful services of high quality in an amount adequate to meet total need.

Generally, outside consultants are less biased in evaluating programs. However, they are more costly. Whoever performs the evaluation will need a clear statement of program objectives, and a pre-measure to insure that measured effects were the result of the program being evaluated and not some other factor. The pre-measure/post-measure evaluation measures for intended effects both before and after a service is given and then compares the results.

7. Obtaining Funds for Security Programs

Once program strategies have been fully developed and once plans for evaluation and coordination have been completed, the planning phase of a program is complete. In those cases where funds are not available, a proposal must be written to obtain the necessary program funds. Often it is the manager who is responsible for developing such a proposal.

Although different funding sources have specific requirements for proposals, most proposals generally include the following sections:

- (1) *Introduction* - a background description about the development's history, goals, and objectives.
- (2) *Problem Statement* - a description of the purpose of the proposed program and the problem or problems it will address.
- (3) *Program Goal* - the overall goals the proposed program will effect.
- (4) *Program Objectives* - quantified statements about what the proposed program will accomplish.
- (5) *Documentation of Need* - statistical backup information that indicates that there is a need for the proposed program.
- (6) *Program Strategies* - a description of specific activities and tasks which will be included in the program.
- (7) *Monitoring and Evaluation* - a plan for keeping track of program progress and/or looking at the program at its completion to see if the objectives have been met.
- (8) *Work Schedule* - a time line indicating when major tasks will start and finish.
- (9) *Personnel* - a description of what staff will be needed to operate the program.
- (10) *Budget* - how much money each part of the program will cost. Program costs usually include: direct labor costs, including fringe benefits; overhead or rent; work materials, such as duplication and office supplies; travel; and consultation.

D. Methodology

1. Lecture

- a. Assessing Security Needs
- b. Utilizing Community Resources
- c. Developing Program Strategies
- d. Evaluating Security Programs
- e. Obtaining funds for Security Programs

2. Group Discussion

- a. Elements of an operational definition of comprehensive security.
- b. Applications of security planning to participants' own communities.

3. Planning exercise in which participants plan a security system for a hypothetical community or for their own communities.

E. Resources

Fielding, Byron, "Safety and Security in Multiple Family Complexes: How to achieve it, How to maintain it," Journal of Housing, (June 1971)

Newman, Oscar, Architectural Design for Crime Prevention, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C., 1973.

Hiblett, Jack, "How to Set Up a Building Security Program," College and University Business, (August, 1971), pp. 33-34.

Suchman, Edward A., Evaluative Research, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1967.

F. Film Sources

Architecture and Engineering Division, U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D. C., 20410.
Telephone: 1-202-755-5718.

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), Audio Visual Communications Division, U. S. Department of Justice, 633 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C., 20531.
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National Audio Visual Center, General Services Administration,
Reference Section, Washington, D.C., 20409.
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MODULE II

MODULE II: SECURITY DEFINED

A. Introduction

An effective security program requires the integration of varied approaches to solving security problems. This module expands on traditional notions of security to develop an operational definition. The importance of each element of the comprehensive definition must be understood before security problems in multi-family housing can be effectively addressed.

B. Objectives

1. Participants will be able to differentiate between the elements of a traditional definition of security and the elements of a more comprehensive definition.
2. Participants will be able to define and measure criminal victimization.
3. Participants will be able to differentiate between actual criminal victimization and fear of criminal victimization.

C. Content

1. Traditional Definition

Traditional definitions of security involve systems which concern themselves with apprehending criminals. These systems utilize police and security forces, technological detection devices, and residential protection devices.

2. Comprehensive Definition

A comprehensive definition of security addresses the individual's right to be free from criminal victimization and his or her right to feel secure, in addition to the need for apprehending criminals.

- (a) Criminal victimization is the actual perpetration of a criminal act against person or property. It can be objectively measured through measures of crime rates.
- (b) The psychological need of people to feel secure, although much more difficult to quantify, is just as important to the success of a security program. Such psychological needs must be dealt with extensively in a comprehensive security system.

ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH TO SECURITY

TRACK "A" HARDWARE (checking crime)	TRACK "B" SOFTWARE (creating an atmosphere which deters crime)
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Police Personnel<ul style="list-style-type: none">- security guards- Technological Detection Devices<ul style="list-style-type: none">- walkie-talkie- television surveillance equipment- Hardware<ul style="list-style-type: none">- locks- bolts	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Utilization of Community Personnel<ul style="list-style-type: none">- volunteer- paid- Turf Reclamation<ul style="list-style-type: none">- establishing neighborhood values- setting neighborhood standards- establishing alternatives to negative behavior- creating neighborhood satisfaction- Defensible Space<ul style="list-style-type: none">- ground/structure modification

D. Methodology

1. Lecture presentation to differentiate between traditional and comprehensive definitions of security.
2. Group discussion.
 - a. Factors leading to fear of criminal victimization.
 - b. Reasons why differing approaches to security emerged.
 - c. Pros and cons with the traditional definition.
 - d. The psychological fear of criminal victimization.
3. Visual aids from local libraries and/or police department presentations depicting the types of crime that can take place when security precautions are not in effect.

E. Resources

Revised Curriculum Module for Security in Multi-Family Housing, Center for Social Policy and Community Development, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa., April, 1973.

Fielding, Byron, "Safety and Security in Multiple Family Complexes: How to achieve it, How to maintain it," Journal of Housing, (June, 1971), pp. 277-281.

Post, Richard, "Security Takes More Than Locks and Cops," College and University Business, (August, 1971), pp. 33-4.

F. Film Sources

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MODULE III

MODULE III: HARDWARE (TRACK "A") COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

A. Introduction

Hardware ranges from simple deadlock bolts to elaborate closed-circuit television systems with cameras costing as much as \$18,000 each. Not all hardware is equally effective, and hardware alone cannot offer complete protection against criminal victimization. Hardware is helpful, however, inasmuch as it can prevent crime by keeping criminals out, can discourage crime by making it too difficult or risky, or can be used to call for help once a crime takes place.

B. Objectives

1. Participants will list the three major components of Track "A" of a comprehensive security system.
2. Participants will be able to suggest adequate protective devices for ten of the twenty most vulnerable areas of a multi-family residence.
3. Participants will list the advantages and disadvantages of three technological detection devices.
4. Participants will outline the four major steps involved in obtaining adequate security services from local law enforcement agencies.
5. Participants will describe the three major functions of supplemental security personnel.
6. Participants will describe three alternate strategies for organizing supplemental security personnel.

C. Content

The Two-Track approach toward developing a total security system is a systems approach which aims both at deterring criminal victimization and at creating and maintaining a sense of safety.

To deter criminal victimization, the system must include residential protection devices, technological detection devices, and effective police and security personnel.

1. Protective Devices

Such devices include locks, bolts, lights, grills, and screens. In a housing complex, different areas are vulnerable to different kinds of crime and must be protected with different devices. Core facilities such as the heating plant, cooling system, water system, and electrical system are especially vulnerable to vandalism. Apartment units are prone to burglary and need good unit protective devices. Common areas such as lobbies, halls, and laundry rooms are subject to outside intruders. The following items list how to maximally protect various areas within a housing project.

- (a) Supplies, Meters, Boilers - Meters and supplies should be locked. Keys to those areas should be controlled. Items should be marked for easy identification.
- (b) Roof - Skylights should be secured by tamper-proof grills or bars. Fire exits should open only from the inside and should be equipped with a device which sounds an alarm if opened.
- (c) Basement - Access from the basement should only be to the ground floor. Exits from the basement to the rest of the building should be kept locked from the outside.
- (d) Elevators - Elevators are generally considered to be the hardest area to protect. They should be provided with 24-hour vandal-resistant lighting; a convex mirror in an upper

back corner; an audio-intercom or CCTV, recessed against vandalism; and a heavy plastic shield for indicator lights. In addition, the elevator waiting areas should be fully visible from the lobby or beyond, with no blind corners. A guard should be able to stop the elevator if an intruder pushes in. Finally, if local codes permit, the emergency stop button should be eliminated.

- (e) Stairwells - Stairwells should be provided with 24-hour, vandal-resistant lighting. Entry from the stairwell to the upper halls should be restricted.
- (f) Fire Doors - Fire doors should be equipped with panic hardware, such as a vertical bolt or crash bar inside, and an automatic closing mechanism. An alarm should sound when the door is opened.
- (g) Entry Door - There preferably should be only one entry door. There should also be an intercom system with a buzzer to enable residents to control access to the building. All secondary doors should be as well protected as the main door and monitored in the same way.
- (h) Doors - Doors should be least 1-3/4 inch thick, preferably metal or metal sheathed or at least of solid core wood. Doors should be flush to the wall and be equipped with a wide-angle lens peephole. If doors are made of sliding glass, they should be break resistant and lock from the inside.

- (i) Door Frames - Door frames should be heavy duty, preferably metal; solid; flush with the wall; and have tamper-resistant connectors.
- (j) Door Hinges - Door hinges should be heavy duty and placed on the inside of the door.
- (k) Locks - Locks should be well made one-inch dead latches, with a six-pin brass cylinder. The best lock for security purposes is the double-keyed type which requires a key to lock and unlock both sides. Spring latches are not recommended. Locks should be changed for each new tenant.
- (l) Windows - Windows need locks, preferably of a key type. Ground level windows and windows on fire escapes or over ledges and balconies need security screens, grills, or bars, (removable from the inside).
- (m) Alarms - Alarms can be either local or central (connected to police or other security persons). Alarms are useless unless someone hears and responds to them.
- (n) Lobby - Lobbies should be provided with 24-hour, vandal-resistant lighting. There should be no dark corners or hiding places. Access to the lobby should be controlled and doors should open out.
- (o) Mailboxes - Mailboxes should be constructed of heavy-gauge metal, without perforations. Cylinder locks should be used. Access to mailboxes should be controlled.

- (p) Laundry Rooms/Social Areas - Such areas should be near the lobby, not in basements. They should preferably have some sort of monitoring system. Tokens should be used for laundry machines instead of cash. There should be a separate area for teenage socializing.
- (q) Storage Rooms - Storage areas should contain extra strong locks and doors; access to such areas should be controlled.
- (r) Office - The office should be visible from the lobby. Its safe should be bolted to the floor. Collection windows should be equipped with grills or bars and provided with an alarm. There should be a special locked cabinet for master keys and other valuables.
- (s) Parking Lot - Parking lots need good lighting and some kind of monitoring system. They should be in a highly visible area and access to them should be restricted.
- (t) Fire Escapes - The lowest fire escape ladder should normally be 12 feet from the ground. Fire escapes should be visible from the ground underneath.

2. Technological Detection Devices

- (a) Communication devices, most commonly walkie-talkies, play a key role in any security system. Call boxes are another communications option and are less expensive.
- (b) Vehicles, especially motor scooters, are useful if a project is large or has numerous winding paths and streets.
 - (1) Vehicles, however, decrease personal contact between guards and residents.

(2) Vehicles also discourage guards from patrolling the interiors of high-rises.

(c) Closed-circuit television monitors can be effective but expensive.

3. Municipal Police Personnel

(a) The Role of the Police Department

(1) The primary responsibility for police services in all public housing complexes rests with the local police department.

(2) Maximum reliance on local police avoids wasting resources and conflicts in operations due to fragmentation of the development's security system from police services.

(3) Reliance on other security personnel should be made only when it clearly promises to better provide needed protection for the project and its residents.

(b) The Importance of Deterrence

(1) Although effective as a deterrent, arrests are an inadequate measure of police success. Police Department strategy should also stress deterrence - a strategy which will either discourage attempts at crime or detect and stop them before they can be committed.

(2) A highly visible police presence is necessary for maximum deterrence. Police patrols should not be limited to public streets. Foot patrols should also be encouraged.

(c) Obtaining Police Department Services

Management's ultimate objective should be to obtain all the policing services needed for the property and its residents from the police department. If additional services or changes in existing services are needed, the following steps are recommended:

- (1) Preparation - Demands for additional and/or different services must be justified. Before requesting additional police services, management should be able to demonstrate having made reasonable efforts to remedy security problems through other measures.
- (2) Requesting Additional/Different Services - Management should be forceful in pressing its demands. However, the best initial approach is one of amicable persuasion, with promise of full cooperation on the part of management and the resident organization. In meeting with police officials, management should be represented by executive level personnel. Consultants should be employed if needed.
- (3) Appeals to Other Local Officials - If, because of funding constraints or other reasons, the police cannot or will not satisfy the need for additional or different services, management should make a vigorous appeal to appropriate officials in the local government. While it is highly desirable that management and police cooperate to the fullest, if there is a disagreement, management should press its case. In either event, the support of residents and the wider community can greatly strengthen management's case.

- (4) Continuing Efforts - If adequate police protection cannot be obtained, management may be required to utilize security personnel. Even after such measures are instituted, however, management should continue to try to obtain needed police services with the aim of reducing the need for security personnel.

4. Security Personnel

To the extent that adequate police services cannot be obtained from the local police department, management should consider the use of security personnel.

- (a) Planning for Security Personnel - Management should proceed slowly in establishing a security force. In fact, the need for careful planning increases with the degree of unmet policing needs. A list of basic questions for planning a security force follows:

- (1) What are the total policing needs which cannot be met by the police department?
- (2) What should be the scope of function for security personnel?
- (3) What specific types of security personnel should be used?
- (4) How should security personnel be organized?
- (5) What kind of administration, training and equipment will the security personnel require?
- (6) How will funding considerations affect the choice of options?

- (b) Scope of Security Personnel Function - The fundamental issue in determining the scope of security personnel function is whether

they will be utilized to supplant or to supplement police department services. Some large housing authorities have organized their own security forces with functions and powers tantamount to those of regular police departments, but with jurisdiction limited to specific projects. Such forces handle all policing services, including patrolling, guarding, apprehension, arrest and investigation. Such operations require enabling legislation and/or an agreement with the local governing body, and are suitable only for very large housing operations.

For most projects, large-scale operations of a broad scope are neither feasible nor suitable. Most security personnel are used to supplement the services of the regular police and to provide services which the local police cannot. Security forces discussed in this workshop are of this nature.

Whether a supplemental security force consists of a single nightwatchman or a sizeable force of patrolmen and stationary guards, its emphasis should be on non-forceful deterrence, with the objective of dissuading potential offenders from attempting crimes before they can be committed. Such security forces should rely upon municipal police backup for apprehension and arrest.

While the visibility of a security presence is important, the credibility of security personnel is dependent upon their actual and perceived ability to bring force to bear if necessary. Therefore they must be able to obtain prompt police

department intervention. Security personnel themselves should also have some capacity for using force in emergency situations even if only for self-defense. It is preferable that their use of force be minimal.

(c) Types of Functions of Security Personnel - Security personnel can perform three basic types of operational functions: patrolling, stationary guarding, and monitoring electronic alarm and surveillance systems.

(1) Patrolling-Patrolling makes maximum use of manpower in relatively large areas. Patrolling can range from using a single nightwatchman to using a sizeable 24-hour patrol force. However, patrolling is neither more nor less superior to other operational methods. Generally, it does extend a personal security presence over a widespread area. "Vertical patrolling" in lobbies, elevators, hallways, and fire stairwells is just as important as patrolling exterior public spaces.

(2) Stationary Guarding - Stationary guards, either as doormen or lobby monitors, are often used to provide security at lobby entrances. They may screen entries, perform general surveillance, and provide incidental assistance to residents. The same technique can be applied at other strategic points within buildings and on project grounds. A guard positioned at an outdoor station which commands the main exterior approaches, recreational areas, and parking lots may be more

cost-effective than a number of patrolmen. Protective hardware devices can have a crucial impact on the effectiveness of stationary guards. For example, the presence of unsecured secondary access doors largely defeats the effectiveness of lobby guards.

(3) Monitoring Electronic Alarm and Surveillance Systems -

Monitors of such systems must be able to secure the prompt dispatch of police officers or security patrol personnel to the scene of an emergency. Stationary guards may also double as monitors of surveillance systems.

(d) Ways of Organizing Security Personnel

There are three basic ways of organizing security forces: management-controlled forces, resident patrols, and contracted guard services.

(1) Management Controlled Forces - Such forces are an integral part of management's overall organizational structure. Their members are directly paid by management, which has ultimate authority in hiring, supervising, and firing. The major advantage of such a force is its manageability. Such forces can vary considerably both in scope of function and in type of function.

(2) Resident/Tenant Patrols - In their purest form, such patrols are wholly comprised of volunteer residents of the project. They may work independently or under the auspices of the residents' association. Management sometimes pays for uniforms

and equipment and, in some cases, pays patrol supervisors for their services. The degree of management control will depend largely upon its financial support.

Resident patrols have achieved positive results in a number of instances, both in patrolling and in stationary guard functions. Usually the impetus for establishing a resident patrol comes from residents themselves; however, if management discerns a potential receptivity among residents, it should take the lead in encouraging and guiding resident participation of this type.

Resident security patrols can serve as valuable adjuncts to police or paid security personnel efforts. Nevertheless, they do have potential drawbacks. Lacking effective control, management may find its objectives and strategies in conflict with those of the security patrol.

- (3) Contract Guard Services - These services may be purchased by management from commercial agencies. Since such personnel are employees of the agency, management's basis for supervision is apt to be tenuous, and its only recourse for poor performance may be terminating the contract. It is advisable to thoroughly investigate an agency before contract negotiation.

(e) Administering, Training, and Equipping Security Forces

- (1) Management control over the security force should be strictly maintained, with clearly defined lines of accountability.

- (2) Strong supervision is crucial, particularly for large security forces. This involves analyzing current security conditions and planning operations. The supervisor should assure that personnel stay on the job and perform their assigned tasks. Sanctions for infractions must be invoked firmly, fairly and promptly. Supervisors should inspect and brief patrolmen and guards before each shift and should make frequent spot-checks during each shift.
- (3) Qualifications for supervisors should be especially high with respect to training, experience, and temperment. The ideal supervisor has had professional police training and experience, is able to exercise discipline, has a broad understanding of social dynamics, and shows some degree of sensitivity. The chief supervisor must be able to command respect and work closely with other management personnel, residents, the police department, and local social service agencies. Although such individuals can be expected to command high salaries, it is false economy to seriously compromise these standards.
- (4) Personnel selection standards should be stringent, and applicants should be carefully screened. Security personnel must be able to inspire general confidence and respect, as well as perform the specific tasks assigned to them. Screening should emphasize eliminating applicants who seem emotionally unfit or who seem likely to abuse their authority.

- (5) Employment of residents for security forces has generally brought favorable results. A prime advantage is that residents know the project and other residents and tend to become strongly committed to their jobs. A possible disadvantage is that residents may be subject to undue pressures by their neighbors.
- (6) Performance standards should be clearly defined and thoroughly understood by all security personnel.
- (7) Training is essential for all security personnel. A formal course of some duration is generally recommended. Training should be conducted by qualified professionals and should cover: general management structure and operations; physical and social characteristics of the project; policing techniques and equipment; social aspects of the security guard's role; and the purpose, organization, and specific functions of the security force. Regular police officers, social service professionals, and leaders of the residents' organization, as well as management officers, should participate in training sessions. Special attention should be given to instructions in the proper use of firearms if they are to be issued to security personnel.
- (8) The number of security personnel needed for a particular project is subject to too many variables to permit use of a general formula for manpower estimates. In practice, ratios range from between 160 person hours and 80 person hours per

week for each 1,000 residents. A single lobby guard cannot be expected to provide screening for more than about 200 apartment units.

- (9) Scheduling. Maximizing effectiveness of security personnel requires a thorough analysis of the chronological pattern of the project's security problems. Concentration of services during highest crime hours is the best use of costly security manpower. Characteristics and life styles of residents are important elements to consider, and patterns for elderly projects are apt to differ greatly from those for family projects. In some projects, a special factor is added on days when social security and welfare checks are delivered, bringing an increase in mugging and mail thefts.
- (10) Costs of security personnel are high. Although salary and benefits take the largest part of overall costs, equipment can require substantial expenditures. Salaries will vary according to local wage rates, and the qualifications and the duties expected of workers. To obtain personnel with qualifications which are similar to those of municipal police, relatively high rates of compensation must be paid.
- (11) Uniforms, when worn by patrolmen and stationary guards, achieve a highly visible security presence and instill pride and confidence. Uniforms may be similar to those usually worn by municipal police or may be of a more "civilian"

design if such a design will create a better rapport with the community. In either case, uniforms should be both professional and distinctive. Personnel should be required to maintain their uniforms and the off-duty wearing of uniforms should be prohibited.

- (12) Individual equipment should include reliable two-way communication units, and self-defensive weapons, if desired. Firearms are the most controversial type of equipment. They should be issued only to responsible and well-trained individuals when considered necessary for self-defense.
- (13) Legal considerations should be checked out in advance by management's attorney. State and local laws may impose strict requirements for security personnel, and licensing may be required. Certain types of communications networks are subject to federal regulation. In some cases, management can be held liable for the acts or omissions of security personnel.

D. Methodology

1. Lecture presentations
 - a. The components of the Two-Track Approach.
 - b. The role of Protective Devices.
 - c. The role of Security Personnel.
 - d. Benefits of Resident Patrols in Security Deterrence.
2. Group discussion
 - a. The benefits of protective devices in security deterrence.
 - b. The disadvantages of protective devices.

c. The advantages of security personnel in multi-family housing.

d. The disadvantages of security personnel.

3. Role Play Scenarios:

a. Manager asking local authorities for more police protection.

b. Security personnel encountering various resident problem situations.

c. Manager supervising security personnel.

E. Resources

Liechenstein, Michael I., Reducing Crime in Apartment Dwellings: A Methodology for Comparing Security Alternatives, Rand Institute New York, New York, 1971.

Loth, David, "Are You Inviting Burglars?" American Legion Magazine, (July 1969), pp. 16-20.

Moolman, Valerie, Practical Ways to Prevent Burglary and Illegal Entry, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1970.

Newman, Oscar, Architectural Design for Crime Prevention, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C., 1973.

Post, Richard, "Security Takes More Than Locks and Cops," College and University Business, (August 1971), pp. 33-4.

F. Film Sources

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MODULE IV

MODULE IV: SOFTWARE (TRACK "B") COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

A. Introduction

No security program can succeed without the support of a large majority of a community's residents. Their role begins with individual responsibility for self-protection, and for the individual's observance of the law and other community standards. A major dimension of residents' role is the potential of resident organizations to participate in planning and implementing a security program. Management should take the lead in bringing residents into a productive relationship with the police, social agencies, and management itself in the security program. Gradually, residents can assume a greater degree of initiative and responsibility for security with management's continuing support and guidance.

B. Objectives

1. Participants will list five types of self-protective measures which residents can take to lessen their vulnerability to crime.
2. Participants will cite four factors which tend to prevent residents from speaking out against crime in their community.
3. Participants will suggest ten community agencies which can assist in a comprehensive security program.

C. Content

1. Individual Self-Protection

The following types of self-protective measures for residents should be stressed in any security program.

- (a) Informal resident surveillance, linked to a well-understood system which will produce a ready response by the police or security personnel.

- (b) Reporting procedures for reporting crime, vandalism, or suspicious behavior should be clearly understood by the residents. Primary reliance should not be placed upon security personnel or other management staff to respond with force or to relay reports to the police.
- (c) Locking doors is commonly neglected by residents and is a significant security problem.
- (d) Residents' temporary absences render their dwellings highly vulnerable to burglary and vandalism. Residents should take measures to lessen the appearance that they are away. Only management and a few trusted neighbors should be informed of an absence.
- (e) Cash and checks should be kept around only to the extent necessary.
- (f) Admission of strangers calls for extreme caution on the part of residents. When lobby doors are kept locked, residents should not open the door for persons whom they cannot identify as legitimate callers. Peepholes or chain locks should always be used before opening the door of the dwelling unit. Keys to doors should be carefully controlled. When keys are lost, locks should be changed.
- (g) Movement outside, particularly at night, requires due caution, especially for women, the elderly, and the disabled. Such residents should be aware of the locations and times of greatest danger. Arrangements for escorts may be the best solution.

- (h) Confrontation with criminals should be avoided by residents. The safest reaction is usually to yield valuables without a struggle. While self-defense may be warranted in some situations, aggressiveness may provoke bodily harm.
- (i) Identification of property, especially items which are the most attractive targets for theft, facilitates police investigation. Minimally, residents should maintain a list of valuable items, including descriptions and serial numbers.
- (j) Mutual assistance among neighbors can significantly contribute to security. A resident who is home all day can watch the dwellings of working neighbors; younger residents can accompany elderly persons on shopping trips.
- (k) Conduct of guests is the responsibility of resident hosts, who should make sure that guests both understand and observe security procedures and project rules and regulations.
- (l) Supervision of children is the responsibility of individual parents. Parents should make certain that children observe security procedures and project rules and regulations.

2. Resident Attitudes and Standards

To the extent that residents are apathetic about security or are prone to condone or commit crime and vandalism, the foundation of the residential security program is imperiled. Efforts to build a positive security climate among residents, though often the most difficult aspect of a security program, should take high priority.

It is important to build a sense of community among residents. Everything which contributes to community cohesion, even ordinary social

gatherings, is directly related to security. Anonymity is an obstacle to security and one of the prime aims of a security program should be to encourage residents to become acquainted with their neighbors. Positive peer group pressures should be encouraged. Even when only a small number of community-minded residents exist, they can be encouraged to form the cadre of a beginning resident leadership.

- (a) Apathy, often the product of resignation, should be broken by demonstrating that residents' lives can be significantly improved. Such a demonstration in an area other than security may serve as an initial catalyst for developing resident concern and involvement.
- (b) Self-interest is the most powerful motivation for positive resident attitudes and standards. Residents' own interests should be the primary theme of any security education program for residents.
- (c) Fear of crime may be well-founded, but can seriously impair resident participation in a security program. The best approach to dealing with such fear is to impart a clear understanding of what the actual threat is and the degree of caution which is realistically warranted. As various elements of a security program are successfully implemented, residents should be made aware of them to reverse the cycle of fear and build community morale. Both management and the residents' organization should systematically combat inaccurate rumors about crime and vandalism.

(d) Fear of retaliation can significantly hinder resident cooperation, especially in large projects with a high degree of anonymity. Such fear may be well justified. Management must provide effective protection against retaliation. Although residents may be unwilling to report incidents to the police, generally they will report them to management if their anonymity is assured

3. Relations Between Residents and Police/Security Personnel

If and when relations between residents and police or security personnel are poor, a comprehensive security program should work at building mutual respect and cooperation. Residents, management, and police officials should meet to identify the causes of the problem and plan a course of action to resolve it. It is essential that police/security personnel understand residents and their problems and explain their own functions, limitations, and problems to residents.

4. Involving the Resident Organizations

Security should be one of the principle concerns of the resident organization. The resident organization can participate in the following ways:

- (a) Planning the security program.
- (b) Developing and conducting resident education programs.
- (c) Setting standards for resident conduct.
- (d) Developing a potential for volunteer resident services.
- (e) Supporting management efforts to obtain municipal services.

5. Economic Opportunities for Residents

A security program can create economic opportunities for residents, both in the sense of full-time jobs within the program itself, and in the sense of training for advancement into other jobs. Such opportunities can enhance residents' interest in, and commitment to, the security program.

6. Youth Program

Most crime and vandalism is committed by young people between the ages of 15 and 25. An effective security program must give prime attention to this age group. A comprehensive security program should stress:

- (a) Parental responsibility for supervising children.
- (b) Young residents' participation in planning and carrying out a security program.
- (c) Cultivating lines of communication between management and youth.
- (d) Job opportunities for youth.
- (e) Recreational opportunities for youth.
- (f) Programs aimed at controlling drug abuse.
- (g) Cultivating youth leadership to participate in the security program.

7. Occupancy Policies and Procedures

It is both permissible and advisable for management to adopt and enforce policies aimed at excluding those individuals or families who pose a threat of crime or vandalism, either by evicting existing residents or by rejecting applications for admission. Such

policies are legal so long as they do not automatically exclude a particular class of persons, such as welfare recipients or persons with criminal records. Whatever policies are adopted should be clearly explained to applicants and existing residents.

8. Community Assistance in the Comprehensive Security Program

A residential security program should be closely tied to the social service programs of local governmental and non-governmental agencies. Such services can help alleviate some of the conditions which cause security problems. Management should maintain links with appropriate community agencies so that their resources can be brought to bear when project staff identifies a resident need. A staff member should be designated to compile current information on social services, to keep residents informed about those services, and to make individual referrals as needed.

(a) Types of Security Related Social Services

- (1) Drug Abuse Programs
- (2) Alcohol Abuse Programs
- (3) Employment Services
- (4) Recreational and Cultural Programs
- (5) Child Care Services
- (6) Family Counseling Services
- (7) Physical and Mental Health Services
- (8) Offender Rehabilitation Services
- (9) Shopping Assistance Programs
- (10) Special Services for the Elderly
- (11) Educational Programs
- (12) Special Banking Services

- (b) Community Planning and Action Committees
 - (1) Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCCs)
 - (2) Other Community Organizations
 - (3) Associations of Owners and Managers

D. Methodology

1. Lecture

- a. Factors contributing to resident apathy in controlling criminal activity.
- b. Role of management in educating residents in security deterrence.
- c. Factors leading to better relations between residents and security personnel.
- d. Basic components of the software approach.

2. Group Discussion

- a. Factors which may contribute to criminal activity in public housing developments.
- b. The traditional role of management in security.
- c. Factors leading to resident apathy.
- d. Ways of overcoming resident apathy.
- e. Methods for improving the relationship between residents and police.
- f. Roles the community can play in improving security.

3. Interpersonal skills exercises to improve skills in working with residents and with resident organizations.

E. Resources

Giles, John Warren, "The Law Says You Are Responsible for Many Acts of Your Children," New Home Guide, (58), pp. 94, 1974.

Hair, Robert A., and Baker, Sam S., How to Protect Yourself Today, Stein and Day, New York, 1970.

E. Film Sources

Architecture and Engineering Division, U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 20410.
Telephone: 1-202-755-5718.

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), Audio Visual Communications Division, U. S. Department of Justice, 633 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C., 20531.
Telephone: 1-202-376-3663.

National Audio Visual Center, General Services Administration, Reference Section, Washington, D.C., 20409.
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University of Illinois, Visual Aid Service, 1325 S. Oak, Champaign, Illinois, 61820.
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MODULE V

MODULE V: DEFENSIBLE SPACE

A. Introduction

The concept of defensible space, developed by Oscar Newman, is based upon the premise that physical design characteristics can maximize resident control of behavior and that residents will maintain a greater sense of security if they are better able to define their immediate surroundings as belonging to them for more exclusive use. A residential environment defined under defensible space guidelines clearly defines all areas as public, semi-private or private. This is done by modifying grounds and structures with fences, landscaping, and redirecting the utilization of space.

Provision of defensible space mechanisms is best achieved in a project's inception; however, a variety of techniques can be used to create defensible space in existing residential areas. Defensible space generally emphasizes psychological or "symbolic" barriers.

B. Objectives

1. Participants will define the terms "territorial area" and "zone of transition."
2. Participants will suggest three alternate strategies for creating surveillance opportunities.
3. Participants will suggest two ways of controlling public grounds.
4. Participants will suggest four ways of controlling interior public spaces in multi-family dwellings.

C. Content

1. Creating Territorial Areas - A project's site should be subdivided so that all areas of it are related to particular buildings or clusters of buildings. No area should be unassigned or left "public." Grounds

should be allocated to specific buildings or clusters of buildings. Creating territorial areas can have the effect of assigning responsibility for maintenance and security to certain residents.

2. Defining Zones of Transition

Boundaries can be real or symbolic. Symbolic barriers do not physically prevent intrusion, but indicate to an entrant that he is entering into a restricted space. Such boundaries can occur in moving from the public street to more semi-private lobby to the corridors of each floor in a high-rise. Physical features like low walls, shrubs, and changing surface textures are indicators of transition zones. Because they indicate to an outsider that he is intruding into a private domain, they aid in restricting behavior to that which residents find acceptable.

3. Locating Amenities

Design and location of recreational and open-space areas should follow the needs, capabilities, and expectations of their projected users. When outdoor activities are located in areas adjacent to homes, residents tend to assume a further realm of territory and further responsibility. Children one to five years in age are most comfortable playing in areas immediately adjacent to their buildings. Play areas for children five to twelve years of age should be large enough to accommodate more active play and sufficiently separated from dwellings to reduce noise. They should, however, remain in view of most dwellings. Play areas for twelve to eighteen year olds should not be located immediately adjacent to homes, but should not be located in isolated areas. If they are too distant from dwellings they become neglected, vandalized, or under-used. They are best bordered on three or four

sides by dwelling units. Green areas unencumbered by play facilities are favored by older residents, but are generally sought after by seven to fifteen year olds for use as playgrounds. Such areas should therefore be protected by judicious placement of trees and shrubs. The best guarantee that these areas will be protected is through the provision of sufficient play areas and equipment.

4. Creating Surveillance Opportunities

Surveillance is a major crime deterrent and contributor to the image of a safe environment. By allowing residents to monitor activities in those areas adjacent to their dwellings, surveillance opportunities allow them to feel more secure in those areas and deter potential criminals. Access from public streets to units should be as direct as possible. Residents should also be able to scan an area before entering.

5. Controlling the Grounds

Fencing can be an effective means of limiting access to secondary exits and to vulnerable ground level dwellings. Fencing acts as a control by requiring entry through a single, limited, highly visible area. Even low fences, more symbolic than preventive, can be valuable by making any intrusion into the fenced area highly visible.

6. Controlling Interior Public Space in Multi-family Dwellings

The most vulnerable locations in multi-family buildings are interior public spaces -- lobbies, elevators, stairways and corridors. The reason is that they are open to the public, but lack the surveillance given a public street by police and passersby. Access to those spaces should be limited through the use of a doorman or intercom/door lock system. Lobbies can be made more secure by increasing visibility.

Residents should be able to see what is happening in the lobby from the outside. Hidden nooks and blind curves provide perfect hiding spaces. When such features cannot be removed structurally, the use of mirrors and improved lighting can ease the situation. Mailboxes should be located in highly protected lobby areas. It is generally good to establish a lounge area in lobbies of buildings with high proportions of elderly. Such lounges tend to increase security by creating additional opportunities for surveillance. Fire exits should not permit entry from the outside. Fire doors should exit to areas less convenient or desirable than the area outside the main exit.

D. Methodology

1. Lecture

- a. Characteristics of defensible space.
- b. Methods of improving defensible space in multi-family housing.
- c. Role of residents in establishing natural surveillance.
- d. Disadvantages of relying solely on defensible space.
- e. Advantages of defensible space.

2. Group Discussion

- a. How poor architectural design can foster criminal activity.
- b. The effects of design on how people adapt to their environment.
- c. How design can be improved to improve security.

3. Resource speakers from architectural firms.

4. Audio-visual aids demonstrating the effectiveness of defensible space.

E. Resources

Fried, Marc, and Geicher, Peggy, "Some Sources of Residential Satisfaction in an Urban Slum," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, (Volume 27), 1961, pp. 305-15.

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Newman, Oscar, Defensible Space: Crime prevention through urban design, MacMillan, New York, 1973.

Pawley, Martin, Architecture Versus Housing, Praeger, New York, 1971.

Rainwater, Lee, "Fear and the House-as-Haven in the Lower Class," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, (Volume 22), 1966, pp. 23-37.

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MODULE VI

MODULE VI: TURF RECLAMATION

A. Introduction

Turf reclamation is an approach to security taken in response to a community's feelings of insecurity and fear which result when people give up the control of their neighborhood to others over whom they have little or no social control. This approach emphasizes making consistent and continuous attempts to strengthen a neighborhood's sense of self by organizing community members to actively participate in security programs to regain control of their neighborhood.

B. Objectives

1. Participants will list the four major elements of the process of turf reclamation.
2. Participants will suggest three relevant objectives for a security program based on the principles of turf reclamation.
3. Participants will suggest four strategies for developing a positive relationship between law enforcement agencies and residents.
4. Participants will suggest five strategies for facilitating mutual assistance among community members.

C. Content

1. Establishing Neighborhood Values

Too often, value standards of behavior in neighborhoods are set by a minority of non-law-abiding residents. One reason this occurs is that residents fear retaliation or conflict if they report or speak out against the crimes they see. This fear of taking action alone can be reduced or eliminated if one does not work in isolation from neighbors or friends. Thus, the process of turf reclamation must begin with sharing one's concern with one's neighbor, who more often

than not shares the same feelings but has been reluctant to express them.

2. Setting Community Standards

The next step in the process of "reclaiming one's turf" is a bit more difficult. Residents must agree to take action and to set standards for the neighborhood. The major problem is deciding on whose values to accept. This issue has both class and racial dimensions. Are middle class people going to tell working class people how to act? Are black people going to tell white people how to act? Faced with the necessity of dealing with such issues before articulating what neighborhood standards should be, most people are reluctant to say anything. The process of turf reclamation requires that people talk with their neighbors about what kinds of values they hold and how to respond when common conditions occur. Most people will agree on a number of behaviors which are unacceptable, ranging from physical assaults to breaking bottles in the street. The important point is to decide upon values which most, if not all, neighbors will agree to uphold.

3. Resolving Security Problems

Security in a community is essentially a product of internal resolve. In brief, two important elements are required for a successful grip on community security and safety. One is personnel who have the training and experience to organize a community. The other is an organized community. The community organizer functions to give residents the feeling that the larger social system can work, that they will be protected, that they will be rewarded, and that things can

happen as expected. The key to security lies in its definition. It is not just a problem of locks and bolts; it is intimately related to people and the need to provide acceptable alternatives both to tolerating and to engaging in anti-social behavior.

4. Enacting a Comprehensive Security Program

One strategy for the implementation of turf reclamation as a human alternative to oppressive security techniques is the use of Community Security Organizers (CSOs). A pilot security program based on the premises of turf reclamation has worked successfully in Pittsburgh. Its four principal objectives include:

- (a) To organize residents as a human security system to increase their awareness of community safety problems and to seek their assistance in improving community safety.
- (b) To serve as a liaison and facilitate communication between residents and police.
- (c) To open communications and develop a relationship between residents, the police, and other crime-prevention agencies.
- (d) To mobilize other community resources, thereby encouraging mutual assistance among agencies and building neighborhood identity.

The heart of the pilot program was a group of "Community Security Organizers" (CSOs). Their function was not to guard entrances or to make arrests. Rather they served as a focal point for organizing the community to solve its own security problems. They organized hall captains to be in charge of security on each floor in high-rise

buildings and developed youth patrols to escort women and older adults when needed. They relayed and acted on complaints and kept records of who obeyed rules and who did not. They made themselves visible and accessible, visited around, and encouraged others to do the same. In essence, the CSO's got residents involved.

(a) Goals and Objectives of a Turf Reclamation Program - The immediate goals should be: to get residents concerned about the security problem; to establish a rapport with residents by listening to complaints and acting on valid suggestions; and to formulate preliminary rules and schedules for community facilities.

The mid-term goals should be: to organize meetings among residents; to establish residents' councils; to appoint or elect patrol captains and plan for a patrol organization; to try to find potential leaders among residents; to install proper locks and instruct residents in their use; to hold planning sessions to plan for proper ground use (defensible space) and other improvements; to institute a liaison between management and residents in order to improve the handling of complaints; to acquaint residents with some of the more difficult problems confronting management; to recruit, hire, and train CSOs; to institute standards that can be agreed upon and enforced by residents; to improve the quality of maintenance.

Long-term goals should include: to establish on-going organizations; to establish an on-going liaison mechanism to direct the focus of security measures; to create an atmosphere of neighborliness; to foster peer support; to establish regularly scheduled

security patrols; to conduct social activities on a continuing basis; to establish security measures for particularly vulnerable areas like mailrooms and elevators; to gain the cooperation of residents in the eviction of disruptive residents; to encourage the cooperation of residents with outside agencies, particularly the police; to complete installation of appropriate hardware.

(b) Implementing Program Goals/Objectives - To organize and educate residents and to encourage them to participate in community safety efforts, the following tasks must be performed:

- (1) Group activities should be organized to give residents a feeling of security and competence. Small successes at the outset of the program will increase resident participation in later stages and build confidence.
- (2) Responsibility should be delegated to individual residents. Benefits gained from the increased protection of personal property will contribute to the confidence of residents in the CSO program.
- (3) The variety of social programs and the involvement of adolescents in security programs should be increased to gain support from heads of households. Participation in community activities will build family cohesion.
- (4) A community in which residents can take pride should be developed to encourage resident participation in programs designed to expand and strengthen neighborhood identity.

- (5) Personal difficulties should be alleviated through the assistance of neighbors, supported by the CSO program.
 - (6) Possibilities of employment within the CSO program should be developed for residents to increase their support of turf building efforts.
 - (7) Residents' councils should be organized to assist in increasing the awareness of fellow residents.
- (c) To develop the liaison capabilities of the CSO between residents and management, the following tasks should be implemented:
- (1) Resident access to management should be improved.
 - (2) Frequent meetings between resident groups and representatives of the housing authority management should be arranged to give residents the opportunity to air complaints, present suggestions, and make management sensitive to the concerns of residents.
 - (3) Resident complaints should be promptly investigated to demonstrate management interest in safety of residents. Rapid management response to any sort of communication from residents will generally improve the resident/management relationship.
 - (4) Those groups who have special security needs should be helped. These include the elderly and families with small children. Management should consider residents' input in policy decisions to gain resident support of those decisions. Input may be made through public hearings, community meetings and resident councils.

- (d) To develop a positive relationship between law enforcement agencies and residents, the following tasks should be implemented:
 - (1) Regular meetings between resident councils and police department representatives should be established to discuss problems of security within the development.
 - (2) Law enforcement personnel should be involved in neighborhood social activities, such as recreational programs for youth.
 - (3) Residents should be made aware of community services offered by the police department.
 - (4) The police department should be represented as only one of the many components of a community-operated security system. This will reduce the tendency of housing development residents to view the police as an oppressive entity.
- (e) To facilitate mutual assistance among community members and to increase the level of communication between these agencies and residents, the following tasks should be implemented:
 - (1) The increased level of concern among public housing residents for the safety of their neighborhood should be made known to the larger community. It may be useful to contact community newspapers to assist in this effort.
 - (2) Other community agencies should be invited to use development facilities, such as playgrounds, recreational rooms and meeting areas, in order to increase community exposure to the activities of residents of the housing development and to

decrease the isolation of the development from the larger community.

- (3) Residents should consult with other community agencies to see how these agencies have dealt with security problems.
- (4) Social activities should include both residents of the development and other community groups.
- (5) Residents should be made aware of the range of services available to them through other agencies.
- (6) Residents and/or CSO's should visit community agencies to become more aware of available services and to utilize them as needed.

D. Methodology

1. Lecture

- a. Elements of turf reclamation.
- b. Goals and objectives of a turf reclamation program.
- c. Implementing a turf reclamation program.
- d. Developing a good relationship between residents and management.
- e. Developing a good relationship between residents and law enforcement officials.

2. Group Discussion

- a. Difficulties in getting residents to organize strategies for organizing around common issues.
- b. Implications of turf reclamation to participants' own communities.

SELF-EVALUATION

1. Match the following items with their definitions:

- | | | |
|---|-------|---|
| a. Traditional definition of security | _____ | Addresses the individual's right to be free from criminal victimization and to feel secure, in addition to the need for apprehending criminals. |
| b. Criminal victimization | | |
| c. Track "A" | _____ | Involves systems which concern themselves with apprehending criminals. |
| d. Comprehensive definition of security | _____ | The actual perpetration of a criminal act against person or property. |
| e. Track "B" | _____ | Police personnel, technological detection devices, hardware. |
| | _____ | Utilization of Community Personnel, Turf Reclamation, Defensible Space. |

2. Match the following vulnerable areas of multi-family housing units with the appropriate protective device.

- | | | |
|------------------------------|-------|---|
| a. Supplies, meters, boilers | _____ | Should be visible from the ground underneath; the lowest ladder should be twelve feet from the ground. |
| b. Skylights | | |
| c. Basement | | |
| d. Elevators | _____ | Individual areas should contain extra strong locks and doors; access should be controlled. |
| e. Stairwells | | |
| f. Fire doors | _____ | Should be constructed of heavy gauge metal without perforations; access should be limited to such areas; should be protected by cylinder locks. |
| g. Entry doors | | |
| h. Doors | | |
| i. Door frames | _____ | Can be either local or central; useless unless someone hears and responds to them. |
| j. Door hinges | | |
| k. Locks | _____ | Should be heavy duty and placed on the inside of the door. |
| l. Windows | | |
| m. Alarms | _____ | Should be equipped with panic hardware and an automatic closing mechanism; an alarm should sound if such doors are opened. |
| n. Lobby | | |
| o. Mailboxes | | |
| p. Laundry rooms | _____ | Should preferably only be one such door. All such secondary doors should be protected and monitored just like the main door. |
| q. Storage rooms | | |
| r. Office | | |
| s. Parking lot | _____ | Should be visible from the lobby; its safe should be bolted to the floor. Collection windows should be equipped with grills or bars and provided with an alarm. |
| t. Fire escapes | _____ | Generally the hardest area to protect - should have vandal resistant lighting, an alarm button, and an audio-intercom. |

- _____ Access to this area should be only to the ground floor. Exits to the rest of the building should be locked from the outside.
- _____ Such items should be locked; keys to such areas should be carefully controlled.
- _____ Should be provided with 24-hour, vandal resistant lighting; entry to such areas from upper halls should be restricted.
- _____ Should be secured by tamper-proof grills or bars.
- _____ Should be heavy duty, preferably metal; solid; flush with the wall; and have tamper-resistant connectors.
- _____ Those on ground level or over ledges, balconies, or fire escapes need security screens, grills or bars which are removable from the inside.
- _____ Should preferably be made of metal, flush to the wall, and equipped with a wide-angle lens peephole.
- _____ Should be changed for each new resident.
- _____ Such areas should have no dark corners or hiding places; access should be monitored.
- _____ Such areas should be near the lobby; tokens should be used for machines instead of coins.
- _____ Should be highly visible, well lit, and not used for teenage socializing.

4. Answer True or False to the following items.

- a. Primary reliance for community surveillance should be made on residents themselves.
- b. Failure of residents to lock their doors is a significant security problem.
- c. Residents should only inform management and a few trusted neighbors of temporary absences.
- d. Residents should not readily accede to the demands of muggers to hand over valuables.
- e. Residents cannot be held accountable for the actions of their guests.
- f. Residents cannot be held accountable for the actions of their children.
- g. To the extent that residents are apathetic about security or are prone to condone or commit crime or vandalism, the very foundation of a residential security program is imperiled.
- h. Apathy about security problems among residents can be broken by demonstrating that residents lives can be improved.
- i. Residents' own self-interest should be the primary theme of any security educational program for residents.
- j. Fear of victimization and of retaliation on the part of residents can seriously impair resident participation in a security program.
- k. Most crime and vandalism is committed by middle-age males.
- l. The social service programs of local community agencies are an important part of any security program in that they can help alleviate some of the conditions which cause security problems.

5. Fill in each blank with one word.

- a. The concept of _____ is based on the premise that physical design characteristics can maximize resident control over behavior.
- b. Creating _____ areas can have the effect of assigning responsibility for maintenance and security for certain areas to particular residents.
- c. Zones of _____, either real or symbolic, do not physically prevent intrusion, but indicate to an entrant that he or she is entering into a restricted space.
- d. Creating opportunities for _____ allows residents to monitor activities in those areas adjacent to their dwellings and thus both feel more secure and deter potential criminals.
- e. _____ can be an effective means of limiting access to vulnerable ground-level dwellings. It acts as a control by requiring entry through a single, limited, highly visible area.

4. a. True
b. True
c. True
d. False - Confrontation with criminals should be avoided; aggressiveness may provoke bodily harm
e. False - Management should hold residents accountable for the actions of their guests
f. False - Management should hold residents accountable for the actions of their children
g. True
h. True
i. True
j. True
k. False - Most crime and vandalism is committed by young people between the ages of 15 and 25
5. a. defensible space
b. territorial
c. transition
d. surveillance
e. fencing
6. a. Turf reclamation
b. minority
c. acceptable/unacceptable
7. a. True
b. False - The first step should be to assess security needs
c. False - The local Health and Welfare Council maintains a comprehensive inventory
d. False - Program goals and objectives should be as specific as possible; objectives should also be measurable
e. True