Liquidity Needs of the Housing Finance Industry

GNMA Conference on Managing Value and Liquidity in Mortgage Servicing
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June 24, 2016

Notes for the slides can be found at the end of the presentation.
Outline

Key **trends**

**Issue** raised by these trends

Possible broader **implications** identified in the literature

**Questions** we need to answer
Key trend: Rise in nonbank share of mortgage servicing since 2009

Nonbank Share of Unpaid Principal Balance Serviced
Top 30 Servicers

Note: Countrywide loans included in the bank category.
Similar trend showing up for **GNMA servicers**

**Nonbank Share of Unpaid Principal Balance Serviced**

_Ginnie Mae MBS_
Related trend: Nonbank share of originations also increasing

More timely data suggest that the uptrend has continued since 2014
Within the bank category, small banks have increased their share of originations since 2008.

Share of Originations

- Large Bank
- Medium Bank
- Small Bank
- Credit Union
- Affiliated Mortgage Company
- Independent Mortgage Company

Comparison between 2008 and 2014.
Related trend: **Concentration** of mortgage servicing market has reverted to pre-crisis range

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for Top 30 Mortgage Servicers
Nonbanks vs. Banks: What is the Issue?

Recent literature has been highlighting that nonbanks more vulnerable than banks to liquidity shocks.

Servicing tends to be a bigger part of their business.

Profitability of servicing sensitive to changes in costs, interest rates, mortgage defaults (and these risks are hard to hedge).

Funding sources less stable (e.g. reliance on short-term funding markets).

Adverse liquidity shocks could affect their ability to service mortgages as well as their ability to advance P&I payments on delinquent loans to investors as needed.
Possible **Broader Implications** Identified by Literature

Risks to the **consumer**
- Distress among nonbanks could change quality of servicing, supply of mortgage credit

Risks to the **taxpayer**
- GSEs, GNMA exposed if the servicing portfolio of a troubled nonbank cannot be easily sold

Possible amplification of the **business cycle**
- Mortgage defaults could lead to more distress in housing market if they stress originators / servicers

Potential for **financial market spillovers**
Degree of Immediate Risk Informed by Current Household Financial Environment

### Delinquency Rates
- **FHA loans**
- **All loans**

### Household Debt Service Ratio
- Percent of disposable income

### Share of Loans that are Underwater
- Percent

### Unemployment Rate
- Percent
**Questions We Need to Answer**

Is the shift toward nonbanks going to reverse?

How big are the risks?

If a large nonbank were to fail, how fast can its servicing and origination activities be picked up by another institution?

How do the risks change with the macroeconomic environment?

What indicators should we be watching to assess how the risks are changing?

Are there policy changes that could help mitigate the risks?
Notes

**Slide 2:** Source: Inside Mortgage Finance.

**Slide 3:** Source: Data from GNMA.

**Slide 4:** Source: HMDA data and Treasury Calculations. Total Bank includes small banks, large banks, credit unions, and affiliated mortgage companies. Countrywide loans included in the bank category.

**Slide 5:** Calculations based on Inside Mortgage Finance Data

**Slide 6:** Source: HMDA data. Note: A small bank is a bank whose top-holding institution has less than $10 billion in assets. A large bank is a bank whose top-holding institution has more than $250 billion in assets. A medium bank is any bank between the above two thresholds.
