Policy Briefs

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Confirmations, New Insights, and Future Implications for HOPE VI Mixed-Income Redevelopment

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Abstract

As HUD advances its mission to create strong, sustainable, inclusive communities and high-quality, affordable homes for all, the promotion of mixed-income communities has become a core strategy. Across the United States, local governments and private developers are increasingly turning to mixed-income development as an approach to deconcentrate poverty and revitalize urban neighborhoods. With the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, launched in 2010, the federal government extended its commitment to supporting the mixed-income approach to public housing transformation first implemented through the HOPE VI initiative in the mid-1990s. A comprehensive analysis of mixed-income units produced through the $6 billion HOPE VI program has not yet been undertaken, however. Using HOPE VI grantee quarterly report data from 1993–2014, we analyze the income and tenure mix of housing units that have been produced through the HOPE VI program as follows:

- Examine variations by factors such as age and size of development, region, and developer and describe the evolution of the program over time.
- Examine the factors associated with higher or lower reoccupancy of original residents.
- Examine funding leveraged through the HOPE VI and other grants.
- Review resident participation in community and supportive services.
- Undertake an analysis of the duration of various phases of the initiative, including relocation, demolition, construction, and occupancy.

Based on this descriptive analysis, we propose implications for future implementation and an evaluation of the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative.
Introduction

Since the mid-1990s, mixed-income development has gained increased attention across the United States as an urban revitalization strategy (Chaskin and Joseph, 2015; Joseph, Chaskin, and Webber, 2007). Mixed-income developments attempt to eliminate the isolation that challenges low-income households living in neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty (Wilson, 1987). The term “mixed-income development” indicates the intentional financing, design, and construction of a residential property with the goal of attracting individuals from a broad range of income and socioeconomic levels (Brophy and Smith, 1997). As the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) advances its mission to create strong, sustainable, inclusive communities and quality, affordable homes for all, the promotion of mixed-income communities has become one of the agency’s core strategies.

The HOPE VI program was launched in 1992 as a response to recommendations by the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing on the condition of the U.S. public housing stock (Cisneros and Engdahl, 2009; Joice, 2017; Katz 2009; Vale, 2019). After 1995, the focus of the program became the mixed-income transformation of deteriorating and isolated public housing sites. To date, the HOPE VI program has been the largest and longest running federal public housing transformation initiative, with 260 grants totaling more than $6 billion. The Obama Administration replaced the program with the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative in 2010 (Joice, 2017; Pendall et al., 2015; Pendall and Hendey, 2013).

In general, the HOPE VI program had a mixed record of accomplishment. The national HOPE VI Panel Study by the Urban Institute found positive consequences of the program, such as improved safety, better physical environments, and lower poverty rates (Buron, 2004; Comey, 2004; Popkin et al., 2004; Popkin and Cunningham, 2009; Popkin et al., 2012). At the same time, the panel study also reported that most of the original public housing residents did not return to benefit from the new housing developments. The program has also been criticized for reducing the number of public housing units and for delays in constructing new units (Center for Community Change, 2003; National Housing Law Project, 2002).

Contribution of this Paper

Despite an extensive literature of evaluation reports and articles on various aspects of the HOPE VI program, there has been no comprehensive outcomes analysis of the overall program. Most of the research on the HOPE VI program has analyzed a single site or a selected subset of locations (Buron et al., 2002; Chaskin and Joseph, 2015; Graves, 2011; Popkin et al., 2004; Popkin, Levy and Buron, 2009; Tach, 2009; Vale, 2013; 2019). Addressing the gap in extant literature, this paper provides the results of the descriptive analysis of data extracted from quarterly progress reports from all 260 HOPE VI grants from 1993 through September 2014.¹ The primary research question that motivated our analysis was: What is the tenant income and tenure mix of housing units that have been produced through the HOPE VI program?

¹ Among 260 sites, one site did not produce any units. The site had been planned to produce 100 units but had not produced any as of the end of the reporting period. Thus, for all analysis using unit production information, 259 sites were analyzed, excluding that site.
Although not an evaluation of the program, the tenant income and tenure mix analysis here provides insight into the nature of the mixed-income developments produced with HOPE VI funding and, therefore, the potential influence that those developments had on residents and communities through provision of a mix of subsidized and market-rate housing. Using the data available in HOPE VI grantee reports, we analyze “income mix” based on the mix of unit types (public housing replacement units, units subsidized through the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program, and market-rate units without a subsidy). Our focus is on HOPE VI as a place-based, mixed-income development strategy, and we focus primarily on data available in the revitalization grants. Our extraction and compilation of this data on all HOPE VI projects has enabled us to revisit and reconsider some of the accumulated knowledge and conventional wisdom about the program. Based on our analysis of this comprehensive data on unit production, we frame this paper around three sets of findings. First, based on this new level of detail about HOPE VI grants, what have we been able to confirm that was known or surmised previously? Second, what new information have we been able to uncover with this data and where have we been able to shed new light? Third, what are the implications of these confirmations and insights for future mixed-income research, policy, and practice?

With the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative (CNI), the federal government extended its commitment to supporting the mixed-income approach to public housing transformation, and now more than 100 CNI planning and implementation grants are underway across the United States (HUD, 2015). Although the Trump Administration has continued funding the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, the future direction of public housing policy is quite uncertain. This newly compiled dataset provides an opportunity to take stock of what was accomplished and learned from the country’s longest running public housing transformation initiative. Based on this analysis of HOPE VI grant production, we identify policy implications that may inform the implementation and evaluation of existing Choice Neighborhoods Initiative projects and other future mixed-income development projects. We first summarize some of the existing knowledge from the larger body of literature on the HOPE VI program and then identify some of the key knowledge gaps that will be addressed in this paper.

**Relocation, Demolition, and Construction**

We begin our review of existing knowledge on the HOPE VI program with a look at the relocation of public housing residents away from distressed public housing units, the demolition of those public housing units, and the construction of new public housing, affordable units, and market-rate units.

**Demolition of public housing.** In 1992, the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing estimated that nationwide, approximately 86,000 (of 1.3 million, roughly 6.5 percent) public housing units were “severely distressed” (NCSDPH, 1992). Initially, the HOPE VI program focused on revitalization, rather than demolition, of the severely distressed public housing units (Goetz, 2003). The program soon changed priorities, however, instead offering housing vouchers to original residents for housing off-site and demolishing units without the one-for-one replacement requirement (Katz, 2009). HUD shifted to an approach that promoted the economic

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2 The data extraction and compilation were conducted in partnership with a research team at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology led by Dr. Lawrence Vale and Dr. Shomon Shamsuddin, now at Tufts University.
integration of former public housing sites by rebuilding public housing with units available for higher-income residents to prevent the reconcentration of poverty (Turbov, 2006).

**Replacement of public housing units.** The one-for-one replacement requirement required housing authorities to construct one new unit of affordable housing for every unit demolished. With limited public funding for new construction, that requirement had been “the largest obstacle to implementing HOPE VI” (Goetz, 2003: 59). In 1995, that requirement was removed, with the intention to replace subsidized housing units with a combination of new construction or rehabilitated public housing units and Section 8 tenant-based vouchers.

Some critics of this approach disagreed with the approach of replacing physical public housing with some proportion of vouchers that facilitate a move to the private market. For instance, the Center for Community Change (2003), in their report, *A Hope Unseen: Voices From the Other Side of HOPE VI*, argued that any loss of affordable housing was problematic and by privatizing public housing, the HOPE VI program was exacerbating a dire social problem. They stated that, by the program’s close in 2012, 48,643 public housing units “will be gone, forever unavailable to low-income families, particularly extremely low-income families” (Center for Community Change, 2003: 9). They also made the point that construction of other housing on redeveloped sites, including those with Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), do not provide the same level of affordability unless accompanied by other rental subsidies. The LIHTC program generally provides affordability for households earning between 40 and 60 percent of the area median income, whereas public housing typically serves families at or below 30 percent of area median income due to the ongoing annual operating subsidy. In addition, LIHTC units have time limitations on their affordability status, jeopardizing long-term access to affordable units (Khadduri et al., 2012).

**Construction of market-rate units.** Any review of HOPE VI has to acknowledge how the program developed and changed over the course of its two decades of operation. Although some of the first HOPE VI grantees renovated all of the old buildings for reoccupancy by public housing families exclusively, by 1995, HUD had more fully committed to a strategy of deconcentration together with mixed-income and mixed-finance redevelopment across all sites. This dimension of the HOPE VI program, which included the construction of market-rate housing units, also fit within a broader move to elevate the role of public-private partnerships in the provision of affordable housing while expanding the role of public housing agencies in the mixed-finance realm. To make that possible, in 1996, the HUD Office of Public Housing Investments published the mixed-finance rule, which laid out the provisions for the formation of public-private partnerships to leverage public-sector funds with private-sector financing to produce mixed-income housing. Two years later, the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA) added an expanded mixed-finance provision that allowed the use of public funds and operating subsidies for projects to be owned by private developers (Baron, 2009). Together, these steps created the opportunity to leverage private funds to design and implement HOPE VI developments that would be owned and operated by private companies (Wexler, 2001). Mixed-finance development provided a way of generating the capital needed to construct new buildings and renovate existing ones and the operating capital to manage and sustain the brick-and-mortar investments. That move raised critiques among affordable housing advocates that the privatization of public housing was more focused on
benefiting capital interests and higher income city residents than positive outcomes for low-income households (Fraser and Kick, 2007; Katz, 2009; Kleit, 2005, Lees, 2008; Polikoff, 2009).

**Timing of relocation, demolition, and construction.** Increased uncertainty and variation in construction timeframes was one consequence of the privatization of public housing, which meant that redevelopment projects were more dependent on market conditions. Often, demolition and construction had lengthy timeframes in the redevelopment process (Crowley, 2009). The long periods between relocation, construction, and occupancy meant an extended waiting period for residents who hoped to move back to the new developments (Popkin, Levy, and Buron, 2009). Among other factors, such as resident preferences, selection criteria, eligibility, and physical and mental health needs, long construction timeframes likely had an influence on the low return rates among original residents (Popkin, Cunningham, and Burt, 2005).

**Funding**
The trajectory of funding for the HOPE VI program changed considerably over time.

**Decrease in funding over time.** The HOPE VI program was affected by significant funding cuts beginning in 2000. And beginning in 2003, the Bush Administration tried to completely eliminate the HOPE VI program each fiscal year (Polikoff, 2009). Although Congress successfully continued the program, the funding was drastically cut and continued to be reduced through the final award year in 2011. The Obama Administration closed down the program in 2010 and replaced it with the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, with lower overall levels of federal funding than the original HOPE VI program.

**Income and Tenure Mix**
The HOPE VI program made it feasible for public housing, affordable and market-rate housing, and homeownership units to be within the same housing development and set a precedent for this type of mixed-income redevelopment.

**Income mix types.** Although no one accepted definition of mixed-income housing exists, a widely accepted definition focuses on the intentional financing and operations of a development to facilitate a socioeconomic mix of residents (Brophy and Smith, 1997). Income mix in the public housing transformation context is most often categorized into public housing, affordable housing, and market-rate housing (Baron, 2009). Income mix can also be categorized by the percentage of households in a certain income range as it relates to area median income (AMI), with conventional categories being less than 50 percent AMI, 50 to 60 percent AMI, and more than 80 percent AMI. Vale and Shamsuddin (2017: 59) identify four dimensions of income mix that can be considered in planning, implementation, and assessment: “distribution of units by subsidy type (allocation); spatial separation of income mix (proximity); distribution of homeownership versus rental units (tenure); and time limits for subsidies that preserve the income mix (duration).”

**Production of public housing homeownership units.** The HOPE VI program also mixed rental and homeownership units. Some of those homeownership units were set aside for former public
housing residents, as allowed by Section 32 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. With the opportunity to transform public housing sites, some authorities and their development partners returned to this original aspiration and worked to include homeownership for relocated public housing residents into the unit mix (Santiago and Galster, 2004; HUD, 2003). Redeveloped sites could also include unsubsidized homeownership units, including in mixed-income, townhouse-style developments.

Reoccupancy

Although residents were given the opportunity to return to the redeveloped public housing within new mixed-income developments, there were often significant barriers to their return.

Rates of return—challenges to returning. One of the major critiques of the HOPE VI program has been the low rates of return by original residents. Buron and his colleagues (2002) reported that across the country, rates of return to revitalized HOPE VI developments averaged 14 percent (see also Marquis and Ghosh, 2008). The HOPE VI grants included support for relocation services designed to help residents move temporarily and then return to sites once the redevelopment was completed. After redevelopment, however, mixed-income properties often implemented stricter requirements and new screening criteria that included adherence to lease stipulations and other stipulations, such as background checks, credit checks, and drug testing, which hampered reoccupancy efforts (Center for Community Change, 2003; Joseph and Chaskin, 2012). Those requirements, in addition to many other factors—such as limited time and information to make housing decisions, delays of several years in the delivery of replacement units, mismatch of household size to new unit sizes, and apprehensions about the monitoring and social climate in the new developments—contributed to the low return rates (Joseph and Chaskin, 2012; Popkin et al., 2004).

Community and Supportive Services

In addition to the redevelopment of deteriorating public housing, the HOPE VI program sought to provide support for households as they transitioned from high-poverty housing to new developments or alternative housing. To achieve that goal, HUD HOPE VI grants included funding for Community and Supportive Services (CSS) that gave public housing residents the “tools to enable them to improve their life skills and capacities and secure living wage jobs and, when they choose to do so, to relocate to a new neighborhood of their choice” (HUD, 2000: 1). Programming provided through CSS varied greatly across sites; examples of programs included literacy training; job preparation, training, and retention; personal management skills; daycare; youth activities; health services; community policing or security activities; and drug treatment (Naparstek et al., 2000). Research on CSS programs shows that they have not been very effective in achieving measurable outcomes (Center for Community Change, 2003; Holin et al, 2003; Levy and Woolley, 2007; Oakley, Fraser, and Bazuin, 2015; Popkin, Levy, and Buron, 2009).

Data and Methods

Data analyzed in this paper are from HUD’s HOPE VI quarterly grant progress reports from 1993 through the third quarter of 2014. These quarterly reports provide the most comprehensive look
at the unit production and financial information of HOPE VI developments available to date. The quarterly project reporting was used by HUD and by the grantees as an administrative tracking tool rather than a research tool, and the projection numbers were updated over time, as new outcome targets were agreed to between HUD and grantees. The data include information on actual and projected unit production, reoccupancy, funding, and timeframes of redevelopment phases. Separate quarterly and national reports on Community Supportive Services were extracted and compiled for analysis.

Descriptive and comparative analyses of the 260 revitalization grantee reports and Community Supportive Services reports were completed using SPSS statistical software. The raw data were checked for accuracy and discrepancies through extensive searches of electronic and hard-copy reports and peer-reviewed articles on the HOPE VI program. Then data were extracted, cleaned, and categorized by individual site level (n=259), state level (n=41), and award year (n=19), for a comprehensive descriptive analysis.

Findings

We have organized this section as follows. We review major elements of the HOPE VI program: relocation, demolition and construction, funding, return and relocation, and community and supportive services. For each element, we present two types of findings: (1) existing knowledge that we have been able to confirm with our analysis of the full grantee report data and (2) new information and insights that we have been able to glean.

Demolition, Production, and Replacement Housing

We begin by confirming existing knowledge about the replacement of distressed public housing units through the demolition and new construction of public housing, affordable units, and market-rate units within HOPE VI developments. We then explore new knowledge and insights about the income and tenure of units that were planned and built as part of the HOPE VI program.

Existing Knowledge Confirmed

We confirmed that there was a net loss of public housing units replaced by public housing units, affordable units, and market-rate units. Net loss of total housing assistance. Our analysis of redeveloped public housing sites includes consideration of the resulting mix of public housing units and large numbers of units with shallower subsidies, mostly funded with Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, with unsubsidized units (often referred to as “market rate” units, although their affordability may vary). This analysis should be placed in the context of what seems to be an overall net loss of rental assistance—available units that are most affordable to families at the lowest part of the income scale. About 155,000 public housing units were demolished through

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3 Significance testing was not conducted because we analyzed the total population of 260 revitalization grants.
the HOPE VI program, including 56,755 units torn down through Demolition grants\(^4\) and 98,592 units demolished through Revitalization grants that included funding for demolition. Public housing units that were demolished were to be replaced with a combination of new public housing units (either rebuilt on site or at other sites), together with Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers. The program thus aimed to deconcentrate public housing through a combination of strategies.

A precise accounting of the apparent net loss of rental assistance is not possible in this paper based on the data available to the authors. A comparison of the approximately 155,000 total demolished public housing with the total number of replacement units from both public housing and Section 8 vouchers based on the available data, however, suggests a significant shortfall in the net total of rental assistance that was provided as replacement housing assistance. The redeveloped sites included 55,318 public housing units, including both new construction and rehabilitation units, of which the latter would likely not be considered “replacement units” for demolished units. Likewise, a precise number of total Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers provided as replacement units is not available to the authors. A review of existing research conducted by the Urban Institute in 2004 stated,

> An estimated 63,000 to 70,000 of these supplemental vouchers were allocated to replace demolished public housing units between 1995 and 2003. But it is not known how many were for HOPE VI projects and how many were for other public housing demolition.\(^5\)

Although further research on this topic would be needed for more accurate estimates of the total replacement housing assistance provided, this overall context is important to keep in mind when considering the remainder of this paper’s analysis of development, construction, and resulting unit types at the redeveloped sites.

**Redevelopment: Public Housing, Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, and Market-Rate Units**

According to grantee reports, 97,389 units have been produced through the HOPE VI program (85,934 newly constructed units and 11,455 rehabbed units), including 49,949 replacement

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\(^4\) As stated, HOPE VI had two types of grants: Revitalization grants and, later, Demolition grants. There were 285 Demolition grants. Demolition grants were added, in part, to provide funding for new statutorily required demolition requirements for large projects with long-term vacancies. See HUD “List of Demolition Grants” (October 2004) at [https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DSC_9890.PDF](https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DSC_9890.PDF). Projects that received Demolition grants were eligible to apply for Revitalization grants to fund redevelopment. Among the grantees that received Demolition grants, 56 also received Revitalization grants to produce replacement units, and that unit production is thus captured in our analysis here. For statutory demolition requirements, see, for example, the mandatory demolition requirement enacted in 1996 through Section 202 of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 (“to make a further downpayment toward a balanced budget”) (Public Law No: 104–134) at [https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/plaw-104publ134.pdf](https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/plaw-104publ134.pdf).

\(^5\) For estimates on numbers of replacement vouchers, see Popkin et al., 2004, at [https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/411002-A-Decade-of-HOPE-VI.PDF](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/411002-A-Decade-of-HOPE-VI.PDF). Although assessing the reasons for the apparent shortfall of rental assistance units to replace demolished units is beyond the scope of this paper, one contributing factor may be an inconsistent and uneven implementation over time of HUD’s policy on whether to provide vouchers to replace demolished public housing that were vacant (as opposed to providing vouchers for families in need of relocation assistance). See, for example, HUD Notice PIH 2002-21, “Applications for Housing Choice Vouchers for Relocation or Replacement Housing Related to Demolition or Disposition,” which specifies that replacement vouchers would be provided as replacement for demolished vacant public units (see examples in Section 4 of the Notice). See PIH 2002-21 at [https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DSC_9093.PDF](https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DSC_9093.PDF). Compare with other PIH Notices on the topic in previous and subsequent years.
public housing rental units and 5,369 public housing homeownership units. Of the total units, 55,318 units (56.8 percent) were public housing, 28,979 units (29.8 percent) were LIHTC units (referred to in this paper as “affordable units”), and only 13,092 units (13.4 percent) were unsubsidized, market-rate units. Developments built in the first few years of the HOPE VI program tended to include more rehabilitation of existing public housing units and also tended to replace more of the demolished public housing units with new construction replacement public housing units. As the program progressed, however, more affordable and market-rate units were also built at the redeveloped public housing sites alongside new public housing units. Sites developed later in the HOPE VI program (post-1997) averaged 53.9 percent public housing, 34.9 percent affordable units, and 11.2 percent market-rate units, whereas the sites developed in the earlier years of the program had a higher proportion of public housing units, averaging 67.5 percent public housing, 23.5 percent affordable units, and 9.0 percent market-rate units. Larger sites (≥ 319 units) tended to have a lower proportion of public housing and a higher proportion of market-rate housing than did smaller sites (< 319 units). On average, the larger sites had 56.9 percent public housing units and 12.8 percent market-rate units, whereas the smaller sites had 64.4 percent public housing units and 7.4 percent market-rate units.

**Decrease in production over time.** Starting in 2003, appropriations for the HOPE VI program were dramatically reduced, causing a decrease in demolition and construction of units (see exhibit 1). As a result, HOPE VI program grantees demolished and constructed more units in the first 10 years of the program than in the remainder of the program. Likewise, grantee award cohorts after 2003 did not produce as many units for rent or for sale as did those before 2003 (see exhibit 2).

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6 Although new grants through the HOPE VI program were discontinued in 2010, many existing grantees are still completing the remaining construction and occupancy phases of their grants.

7 The median size of a HOPE VI development is 319 units.
Exhibit 1
Cumulative Redevelopment Progress by HOPE VI Grant Award Year (N=18)

Note: In the award year information for 2011, only 12 units were constructed; that information was excluded.
New Information and Insights

Our descriptive analysis confirmed much of the knowledge on the HOPE VI program, and we identified some new information and insights about the program that have implications for future mixed-income housing development.

Most units were built as ultimately agreed to with HUD. Sites were generally able to meet the construction goals established in their most recent formal agreements with HUD. Because the quarterly reports to which we had access were overwritten with the most recent projection data, we were not able to analyze original site projections in this study. Overall, 88.3 percent of the units projected in the most recent grantee agreements have been produced. Among the 259 sites we analyzed, 66 (25.5 percent) produced fewer than their most recent projections and 193 (74.5 percent) produced the number of units planned.

Relatively more rental units were produced as planned. As described in exhibit 3, a higher percentage of the planned rental units (91.9 percent) was produced than homeownership units.
(72.7% percent). Also, a higher percentage of the projected public housing units (94.7% percent) than affordable units (87.1% percent) and market-rate units (71.8% percent) units was produced.

**Exhibit 3**

Comparison of Projected and Actual Unit Production by HOPE VI Grantees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Projected</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rental</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Housing</td>
<td>53,226</td>
<td>49,949</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordable</td>
<td>26,674</td>
<td>23,899</td>
<td>89.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>9,786</td>
<td>8,530</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90,686</td>
<td>82,378</td>
<td>91.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Homeownership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Housing</td>
<td>5,594</td>
<td>5,369</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordable</td>
<td>6,607</td>
<td>5,080</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>8,459</td>
<td>4,562</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,660</td>
<td>15,011</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Housing</td>
<td>58,820</td>
<td>55,318</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordable</td>
<td>33,281</td>
<td>28,979</td>
<td>87.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>18,245</td>
<td>13,092</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>110,346</td>
<td>97,389</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *“Projected” refers to the most recent projection numbers in the HOPE VI quarterly reports, which have been updated over time as agreements with HUD have been finalized. Figures for public housing units include both new construction and rehabilitation.

Redevelopment activities included a mix of public housing, affordable (LIHTC) units, and unsubsidized (market-rate) housing. Ultimately, the redevelopment side of the HOPE VI program focused on producing a mix of housing units with varying affordability levels, including replacement public housing, with units subsidized by LIHTC with more moderate affordability, and a relatively limited number of market-rate units. Although HOPE VI production resulted in a decrease of physical public housing units, the redevelopments usually did not include a large proportion of truly market-rate, unsubsidized housing; instead they mainly included subsidized housing, replacing 85.5% percent of the original public housing with units that were affordable for low- and moderate-income residents. An important outstanding question is, how much affordability was provided by the non-public housing “affordable” units, and what was the economic status of residents in those units? The data available in the quarterly reports did not enable us to explore that question, and subsequent research would be needed to assess income data, depending on availability, at redeveloped sites.

The distribution of mix types across the 259 HOPE VI developments demonstrates that affordable housing was a priority across the sites (see exhibit 4). To compare the income mix of HOPE VI projects, we adopted Vale and Shamsuddin’s 2014 four-category typology: Narrow Low-Income, Polarized Bimodal, All But The Poorest, and Broad Continuum. We assigned each HOPE VI development project to one of Vale and Shamsuddin’s income mix categories based on the following criteria: Narrow Low-Income developments have no more than 15% percent market-rate

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units, Polarized Bimodal developments have no more than 15 percent affordable units and thus mainly have units at the high and low ends of the income mix, All But The Poorest developments have no public housing units, and Broad Continuum developments have at least 15 percent of all three unit types (public housing, affordable, and market rate). Most redevelopments had a Narrow Low-Income mix (n=179; 69.1 percent), followed by Broad Continuum (n=66; 25.5 percent) and Polarized Bimodal (n=13; 5.0 percent). Only one site had an All But The Poorest mix. Exhibit 5 shows the differences in average unit production and their proportion by mix type. On average, the Narrow Low-Income developments had 97.8 percent public housing and affordable units, with only 2.2 percent market-rate units. The average proportion of market-rate units was 26.3 percent in the Broad Continuum developments and 33.7 percent in the Polarized Bimodal developments.

Exhibit 4

Income Type Mix in 259 HOPE VI Developments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Mix Type</th>
<th>Public Housing</th>
<th>Affordable</th>
<th>Market Rate</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narrow Low-Income</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>217 (184)</td>
<td>101 (110)</td>
<td>8 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad Continuum</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>195 (103)</td>
<td>158 (122)</td>
<td>140 (112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarized Bimodal</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>283 (173)</td>
<td>37 (54)</td>
<td>179 (223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>214 (167)</td>
<td>112 (115)</td>
<td>51 (99)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SD = standard deviation.

Notes: Only one site had an All But The Poorest mix type and was excluded. In all the tables, n refers to the sample of HOPE VI sites and M refers to the mean number of units at those sites.

**Dominance of mixed-tenure developments.** Although the HOPE VI program produced more rental units than homeownership units, a majority of sites (n=184; 71.0 percent) were mixed tenure, with both rental and homeownership units. Mixed-tenure sites tended to be larger (M=402) than sites
without homeownership units (M=312) and included a higher proportion of affordable and market-rate units (see exhibit 6). Overall, 82,378 units (84.6 percent) of the HOPE VI units produced have been for rental housing, and 15,011 units (15.4 percent) have been designated for homeownership.

Exhibit 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Type</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Housing</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>220 (178)</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>122 (118)</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>60 (111)</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>402 (272)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordable</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>197 (137)</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>87 (104)</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>28 (56)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>312 (196)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>214 (167)</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>112 (115)</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>51 (99)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>376 (255)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SD = standard deviation.

Note: The total percentages in this chart may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

**Public housing homeownership units.** The HOPE VI program had a greater focus on public housing homeownership than many might realize. About 10 percent of the replacement public housing units were designated for homeownership (5,369 units). Among the 259 sites analyzed here, a relatively high number (n=105; 40.5 percent) produced public housing homeownership units. Among those, 34 sites produced 50 or more public housing homeownership units. It is an untold dimension of the HOPE VI program that warrants closer investigation by researchers.

**Variation in timeframes of redevelopment progress.** Timeframes for relocation, demolition, construction, and occupancy ranged from weeks to years (see exhibit 7). We found that the relocation phase took the longest amount of time on average (M=694 days), followed by construction (M=667), demolition (M=516), and occupancy of the developments (M=260). Timeframes for redevelopment varied among sites. On average, as would be expected, larger sites reported more days for each redevelopment phase (M relocation=829, M demolition=611, M construction=706, and M occupancy=293) than smaller sites (M relocation=539, M demolition=400, M construction=620, and M occupancy=218). Among smaller sites, the longest phase was construction, but among larger sites, the longest phase was relocation. Longer timeframes for relocation, construction, and occupancy directly influenced residents who hoped to return to the newly constructed development.

Exhibit 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Min if &gt;0</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relocation</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>694 (623)</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demolition</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>516 (677)</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>667 (336)</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupancy</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>260 (367)</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,939</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SD = standard deviation.

Note: Among the 259 sites, 234 sites provided relocation timeframes, 218 sites provided demolition timeframes, 215 sites provided construction timeframes and 206 sites provided occupancy timeframes.

10 Redevelopment phases are not necessarily sequential; one can start after another ends, but they can also be concurrent and overlapping.
Funding In our descriptive analysis, we confirmed information about HOPE VI program funding and provided insights on private funding leveraged from the HOPE VI program.

Existing Knowledge Confirmed

Funding allocated for the HOPE VI program was successfully expended and decreased over time.

Most budgeted funding was expended. Most (95.3 percent) of the budgeted HOPE VI grant funding was spent (M_HOPE VI budgeted=$24.1M and M_HOPE VI expended=$22.9M). HOPE VI grantees spent 85 percent of total budgeted funds for redevelopment, which includes both federal grants (HOPE VI and other federal agency funds) and money from private sources (M_total budgeted=$76.9M and M_total expended=$65.3M).

Decrease in funding over time. The annual expended HOPE VI funding ranged from $66.2M (in 2009) to $566.1M (in 1993), with an average of $332.7M and a median of $445.9M. Funding expended in the HOPE VI program decreased over time (see exhibit 8). The total funding expended was highest in the 2001 award year and dramatically decreased between 2003 and 2004. The lowest funding was expended in 2009 and remained relatively low through 2010.

Exhibit 8

HOPE VI Total and Expended Funding by Award Year
New Information and Insights

Below, we explore the private funding that was leveraged by the HOPE VI program.

**Leveraging redevelopment funding.** HOPE VI funds were used to leverage significant amounts of other public and private funds. The approximately $6 billion of HOPE VI funds leveraged approximately $11 billion of non-HOPE VI funds to complete redevelopment for a total of approximately $17 billion expended. For every dollar of HOPE VI funds expended, about $1.80 was leveraged for the redevelopment projects.

Sites targeting an economic mix of residents consistently leveraged more funding (see exhibit 9). Among the four types of income mix, the Narrow Low-Income developments ($M_{total\ funding}=57.0M$), which have only public housing and affordable units, generally had less funding and were not able to leverage as much in additional funds (Polarized Bimodal: $M_{total\ funding}=78.6M$; Broad Continuum: $M_{total\ funding}=86.9M$). Sites with a market-rate component were able to leverage more funds, and the Broad Continuum developments were able to leverage the most funds because those developments consistently incorporated market-rate units.

### Exhibit 9

Leverage Ratio of Funding by Mix Type in the HOPE VI Program (N=258)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unit Production</th>
<th>HOPE VI Funding</th>
<th>Total Funding</th>
<th>Leverage Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narrow Low-Income</td>
<td>179 326 (212)</td>
<td>$22.5M (11.4M)</td>
<td>$57.0M (36.5M)</td>
<td>1:1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad Continuum</td>
<td>66 492 (285)</td>
<td>$23.9M (94.8M)</td>
<td>$86.9M (50.3M)</td>
<td>1:2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarized Bimodal</td>
<td>13 500 (391)</td>
<td>$27.7M (15.9M)</td>
<td>$78.6M (43.8M)</td>
<td>1:1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>258 377 (255)</td>
<td>$23.1M (11.2M)</td>
<td>$65.7M (42.8M)</td>
<td>1:1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*SD = standard deviation.*

The leverage ratio also varied among the regions designated by HUD (see exhibit 10). Compared with other regions, the Rocky Mountain region showed the highest leverage ratio: About $3 was leveraged for every dollar of HOPE VI funding. This region, however, obtained the smallest amount of HOPE VI funding and constructed the smallest number of units. On the other hand, the Southeast-Caribbean region received the largest amounts of HOPE VI funding and produced the largest number of units with leverage ratio of 1:1.7, close to the overall grantee average (1:1.8).
**Exhibit 10**

Leverage Ratio of HOPE VI Funding by HUD Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of Grants</th>
<th>Unit Production</th>
<th>HOPE VI Funding</th>
<th>Total Funding</th>
<th>Leverage Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocky Mountain</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>$87.8M</td>
<td>$380.4M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6,654</td>
<td>$323.9M</td>
<td>$1.3B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4,060</td>
<td>$346.6M</td>
<td>$1.2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York/New Jersey</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9,308</td>
<td>$586.7M</td>
<td>$1.9B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5,665</td>
<td>$391.5M</td>
<td>$1.2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast-Caribbean</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>31,815</td>
<td>$1.6B</td>
<td>$4.3B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>12,712</td>
<td>$903.4M</td>
<td>$2.5B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>14,389</td>
<td>$1.0B</td>
<td>$2.6B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7,767</td>
<td>$488.2M</td>
<td>$1.2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Plains</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3,279</td>
<td>$179.1M</td>
<td>$420.8M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>97,389</td>
<td>$6.0B</td>
<td>$17.0B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Return and Relocation**

We confirmed that many public housing residents did not return to the newly redeveloped housing, and we now look more closely at the trends in return rates across the HOPE VI developments.

**Existing Knowledge Confirmed**

The rates of return were low across HOPE VI developments.

*Low return rate.* The grantees report data confirmed what has become conventional knowledge about the HOPE VI program: a relatively low percentage of all occupied units within HOPE VI developments were occupied by the original residents returning to the developments. At least two ways are used to explore how original residents have benefited from the redevelopments. One method looks at redeveloped units as the denominator and the other method looks at the original household population as the denominator. Of the 96,476 units that have been produced and occupied, only 19,993 units (20.7 percent) were occupied by the original tenants at each development. That number can be considered the “proportion occupancy by original residents” rate. The more familiar way to consider return rate (the “proportion of original residents that return” rate) is to examine the percentage of original households that have returned to occupy new units available after redevelopment. Of the households originally relocated, across sites an average of only 27.6 percent (with a median of 18.2 percent) returned to the new units. The relatively substantial difference between the average and the median is due to a skew in the distribution toward the lower range. Even among the units designated for public housing residents, a low percentage was occupied by the original residents. Of the 55,318 units that were designated as replacement units for original tenants, only 36.1 percent was occupied by residents of the original development.

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11 This figure may continue to increase over time as remaining units are built in sites that are not yet complete and if more original residents return to those units.
New Information and Insights

We now discuss how the rates of return were low across HOPE VI developments despite the variance in the income mix types in each development. We also found that these rates remained low over time.

Consistently low return rates. Return rates do not change significantly when the 32 100-percent public housing replacement developments are removed from the analysis (the average becomes 26.8 percent and the median becomes 17.5 percent), suggesting, surprisingly, that return rates were relatively low even when the developments did not mix incomes and instead replaced all of the public housing on site. Also, the return rates were almost identical for both larger (M=27.6 percent) and smaller (M=27.5 percent) sites, indicating that the return rates were very low regardless of the size of developments.

Declining return rates over time. As indicated in exhibit 11, the average return rates by award year ranged from 6.3 percent (2009) to 44.7 percent (1993). Return rates mostly declined between 1993 and 2000, with spikes in 2001 and 2004 followed by a sharp drop-off in 2005 and another relatively small peak in 2008. Newer sites have, thus far, experienced lower return rates (21.1 percent) than older sites (33.8 percent), which may be a function of time and a lag in construction and occupancy. The return rate at older sites, however, likely indicates the upper end of the average that can ultimately be expected.
Community and Supportive Services

Some HOPE VI developments also received grants for Community and Supportive Services to support residents through programs and services that focused on helping residents get jobs, access education, improve their health and wellness, and even cover basic needs. We analyzed grantee reports of CSS caseloads pre- and post-revitalization regarding resident enrollment in and completion of services. We then conducted a comparative analysis of the following eight CSS programs by tenure mix, size, and age: employment preparation/placement/retention, job skills training programs, high school or equivalent education, English as a Second Language (ESL) courses, childcare, transportation assistance, counseling programs, and substance abuse programs. We also compared broader enrollment and completion goals data for employment, economic development, and homeownership at each development.

New Information and Insights

We share new information and insights on the use of CSS across HOPE VI developments by residents who remained on site at a development during redevelopment and residents who were relocated and then returned once redevelopment was complete. We compared the use of CSS funds by developments with different types of income mixes. We found that most of the basic goals outlined by developments receiving CSS funds were achieved, but broader goals of program enrollment and completion were not.

Overall provision of CSS. CSS served both original public housing residents and new incoming residents between the ages of 19 and 64 who moved to redevelopment sites and original residents who continued to live off site. Of the eight main CSS programs, 249 sites (95.7 percent) provided at least one, and 93 sites (35.8 percent) provided all eight services. Those programs had an average caseload of 1,226 cases and a median of 767 cases.

Low proportion of remaining or returning individuals in CSS caseload. Among former public housing residents served in CSS programs (N=54,453 cases), only 31.8 percent were served while they remained on site (n=5,869; 10.8 percent) or returned after redevelopment (n=11,473; 21.1 percent). The other 68.2 percent who were served were relocated to other public housing (n=13,680; 25.1 percent), to housing not receiving any HUD assistance (n=5,423; 10.0 percent) or to housing using Section 8 vouchers (n=18,008; 33.1 percent).

Comparative analysis of CSS. The number of available services varied by tenure mix and the size and age of the redevelopment. Mixed-tenure sites (M = 1,301) had more residents enrolled in the CSS program than did rental-only sites (M = 1,044). Among the 184 mixed-tenure sites, only 4 sites (2.2 percent) did not provide any of the eight CSS programs (9.3 percent in rental-only sites). Larger sites (M = 1,626) tended to provide more CSS support to residents than did smaller sites (M = 830). Among the 130 larger sites, only 2 sites (1.5 percent) did not provide any of the eight programs (7.0 percent in smaller sites). Finally, on average, older sites (M = 1,415) have provided more CSS support to residents than have newer sites (M = 1,046); however, a slightly higher proportion of older (4.7 percent) than newer (3.8 percent) sites did not provide any of the eight programs.
Most program enrollment goals achieved. Overall, the HOPE VI sites achieved their goals for enrollment in the eight CSS programs (see exhibit 12). On average, employment preparation / placement / retention had the largest number of enrollments, followed by transportation assistance, counseling, job skills training, and childcare. Still, a notable observation is that substance abuse programs, high school or equivalent education, and language courses enrolled the fewest number of residents.

Exhibit 12

Enrollments of Caseloads Receiving HOPE VI CSS Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrollment Programs</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment Preparation/Placement/Retention</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Assistance</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling Programs</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Skills Training Programs</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School or Equivalent Education</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substance Abuse Programs</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English as a Second Language (ESL) Courses</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Mean number of enrollees per HOPE VI site.

Broader enrollment and completion goals not met. In our comparison of the broader enrollment and completion goals for employment, economic development, and homeownership efforts, the data revealed that some of the goals for those areas of focus were achieved but others were not. In the area of employment, despite exceeding the number of projected total new job placements, which includes all types of employment (full time, part time, seasonal, and temporary), the number of participants currently employed and those employed for 6 months were far below their enrollment goals. In economic development, entrepreneurship training exceeded the enrollment goal but fell short on its completion goal. There were also fewer resident-owned businesses and residents employed by those businesses than projected. For homeownership, the average number enrolled in homeownership counseling exceeded the goal; however, the number of residents who completed counseling was lower than the intended goal, and the number of participants who purchased a home was also less than expected.

Discussion

Through a detailed descriptive analysis of production and financing data from 1993 to 2014, this paper confirms previous expectations and findings regarding the HOPE VI program and provides new information and insights. In addition to exploring the income and tenure mix of the units produced, we answered questions about the nature of HOPE VI reoccupancy, timeframes of production stages, financing, and the CSS programs available to residents of HOPE VI developments. Our findings confirm many longstanding concerns about the program, such as the reduction in the overall public housing stock and the low return rates of original residents. We also
uncovered some compelling insights about the program, such as the overall focus on low-income housing production and the extent of the production of public housing homeownership units.

Overall, the main HOPE VI redevelopment housing product was replacement public housing units, complemented by the inclusion of affordable housing units and, in lower proportions, market-rate units. Almost one-half of the redevelopments included no market-rate housing. The vast majority of production was rental, rather than homeownership, units. Even within the properties developed to include homeownership, a substantial number of units were designated for public housing. Sites with rental-only units tended to be smaller than mixed-tenure sites, and included fewer affordable and market-rate units.

Using Vale and Shamsuddin’s (2014) income mix typology, we found that well over two-thirds of the sites have a Narrow Low-Income mix of public and affordable units and about one-fourth have a Broad Continuum mix of public housing, affordable housing, and market-rate units. Our analysis also shows that the majority of HOPE VI projects have focused primarily on producing housing for low-income households, replacing more than one-half of the physical public housing units demolished and building out another one-third of all new units as subsidized affordable units.

Looking at production over time, there was a greater focus on producing a more diverse income mix at developments as the program progressed. The greatest demolition and construction of units occurred in the first 10 years of the HOPE VI program. Starting in 2003, demolition, relocation, and construction leveled off and production of homeownership units dropped sharply.

The data we received included only the most recent agreed-upon projections between the grantees and HUD, thus we were not able to analyze original production projections against actual production. In most cases, grantees met their most recent projected production goals. As would be expected given the timing of the Great Recession and the associated housing market crash, where production goals were not met, it was homeownership units that most often fell short, particularly market-rate homeownership; thus, the intended mix of incomes was not achieved at many sites. This can be interpreted in at least two ways: for those who feared that HOPE VI mixed-income projects would create environments in which public housing residents in particular and low-income households in general were a significant minority, that has not come to pass; on the other hand, to the extent that the success of the mixed-income strategy depended on a broader mix of income and a critical mass of higher income residents, including homeowners, that objective was not widely achieved through the HOPE VI program.

The number of phases and the time it took for each phase of development to begin and end had a major impact on how the HOPE VI program affected residents. The long periods between relocation, construction, and occupancy meant an extended waiting period for those residents who hoped to move back to the new developments and likely contributed to the low return rates.

HOPE VI funds were used to leverage significant amounts of other public and private funding. The $6 billion of expended HOPE VI funds leveraged $11 billion in nonfederal funds—$17 billion expended from all sources. For every dollar of HOPE VI funds, about $1.80 was leveraged. Narrow Low-Income developments, which have only public housing and affordable units, generally had
less funding and were not as able to leverage additional funds as were projects that included market-rate or homeownership units.

The CSS programs provided services to original residents of the public housing developments and to families who later moved into the revitalized site. We analyzed caseload output data, which included goals and outputs for each service. The services with the highest number of enrollments were employment preparation/placement/retention, transportation assistance, counseling, job skills training, and childcare. Overall, CSS programs met or exceeded most enrollment goals, although, on average, the sites fell short of completion goals for high school or equivalent education. The CSS programs also fell short on employment retention and entrepreneurship support goals.

**Study Limitations**

This study had some important limitations. The findings are drawn from HOPE VI administrative project reports from 1993 to 2014 and include quantitative data on production, financing, and the CSS program and thus provide a numerical documentation of the program. Given the limited information available in the reports, however, we were constrained to basic descriptive and comparative statistical analyses. A text field for qualitative comments was included in the CSS reports, but those data were of limited depth, consistency, and utility. Also, although the reports provide “projected” estimates regarding financing and unit production, those estimates were updated over the course of the program and thus do not provide accurate baseline projections for comparison.

**Implications for Research, Policy, and Practice**

HOPE VI produced predominantly public housing and subsidized rental housing, with less production of market-rate rental and homeownership units than had been intended. Although it produced higher quality replacement public housing in more mixed-income environments, the HOPE VI program substantially decreased the stock of physical public housing units. Furthermore, extended construction and occupancy timeframes and stringent reoccupancy requirements may have prevented many residents from successfully returning to the revitalized housing. HOPE VI funds successfully leveraged substantial levels of private funds for development. Due to the decrease in federal funding over time, however, unit production levels were not sustained over the life of the program. CSS programs generally achieved many of the stated enrollment goals but were limited in the number of residents they could serve and fell short of the stated goals in several important areas, such as high school equivalency achievement. These findings suggest a number of implications for policy and further research.

**Implications for Research**

Given the continued national and local investment in mixed-income redevelopment, a number of research topics could be pursued, either from further data collection and analysis of HOPE VI projects or from research on Choice Neighborhoods grantees and other emerging mixed-income redevelopments.
1. To fully understand the projected versus actual unit production through the HOPE VI program—and thus inform future development efforts and negotiations—an analysis using additional information about original projected goals may be useful.

2. A deeper understanding of the income levels of residents in each band of subsidy would provide far better information about which households are benefiting from the housing and what the income mix continuum looks like in various contexts.

3. Stronger performance measurement and reporting of resident outcomes, such as those that follow, would provide a critical knowledge base on the upward mobility outcomes of residents in diverse mixed-income contexts and on those who did not return:
   a. The results of various levels and combinations of supportive services.
   b. How the outcomes for residents compare across different levels of site income mix, for example, Narrow Low-Income developments compared with Broad Continuum developments.
   c. How the outcomes for residents compare by level of physical integration among different income groups within a development.
   d. How outcomes for original residents who return compare with those of residents who do not return.
   e. How outcomes compare among original residents who return, newcomers to the public housing replacement units, residents of the affordable units, and residents of the market-rate units.
   f. How resident outcomes vary with factors such as the size of the development and the tenure mix at the development.

4. The nature, outcomes, and effect of public housing homeownership programs is an underexamined area, including which residents qualified and participated and their outcomes.

5. The focus here, given the data available, was on the developments and not on the broader neighborhood context. The surrounding neighborhoods, however, are an important dimension to be included in future research both as a context that shapes the strategies and outcomes in specific developments and as a unit of change brought about by the redevelopment. Analyzing how site income mixes vary relative to the characteristics of the neighborhood context would also be interesting.

**Implications for Policy and Practice**

Stepping back, we can draw from our findings to suggest some key areas for continued policy focus and improvement.
1. **Balancing dual priorities: ending segregation and concentrated poverty and increasing affordable housing for the poor.** This is an enduring strategic tension in this arena of housing policy. There are legitimately conflicting policy imperatives here. It would be ideal to be able to produce more high-quality public housing and facilitate access to more vibrant, socioeconomically diverse neighborhoods. No housing policy has yet fully resolved this dual challenge and the major policy approaches—mixed-income redevelopment, housing choice vouchers, and the Rental Assistance Demonstration program—each have operational advantages and important downsides. Policymakers must continue to be as intentional and comprehensive as possible in their efforts to use existing public resources to maximize the provision of housing for the poor while leveraging private-sector resources to generate investment in housing developments and their surrounding neighborhoods. Clarity about the intended balance of these conflicting goals and vigilant accountability will be key.

2. **Managing the market risks of privatization.** The mixed-finance approach to HOPE VI and the intentions of including market-rate rental and homeownership made the redevelopment efforts extremely vulnerable to market conditions. The result—evident in the early phases of the program and then exacerbated by the housing market crash—was extended delays in unit production and, ultimately, substantial shortfalls in the production of market-rate units. Policymakers should consider to what extent the market-rate shortfalls affected program “success” in various local contexts and examine ways to offset the market risk; for example, might smaller redevelopment phases, increased capacity building, and engagement of nonprofit entities and community-based organizations be beneficial?

3. **Increasing return rates.** Clearly a major program shortcoming was the limited proportion of original residents who benefited from the new, higher quality housing and living environments. Although some proportion of the nonreturners possibly used the relocation opportunity for upward mobility to a low-poverty neighborhood, the literature suggests mixed results for those who did not return and for voucher holders in general. The policy implications include increased resources, attention to the relocation support process, and strategies to make return easier, such as smaller redevelopment phases and phased relocation on site or in close proximity.

4. **Program enrollment is not sufficient: Providing the requisite support services for positive outcomes.** The CSS data analyzed here provide a severely limited purview into the details of service provision and results. The program reports clearly show, however, that although the HOPE VI grantees were able to exceed their enrollment goals in many cases—indicating that they had achieved the objectives of linking with local partners and programs that were offering the forms of support needed—evidently those enrollments generally did not turn into sustained engagement or meaningful outcomes for participants. What is the scope, quality, and duration of support needed to help residents affected by a mixed-income redevelopment move toward self-sufficiency?
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