Landlords: Critical Participants in the Housing Choice Voucher Program

Landlords: Critical Participants in the Housing Choice Voucher Program

Highlights

• The success of the Housing Choice Voucher program depends on the participation of private-market landlords.
• HUD and the public housing agencies that administer the voucher program can work together to reduce administrative burdens and actively recruit and incentivize landlord participation.
• Local governments can also implement targeted tax incentives and ease regulatory barriers to make the voucher program more attractive to landlords.

The Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program is a federal housing assistance program that helps house 2.2 million low-income households stably and affordably. The HCV program depends on landlord participation to make privately owned units available to voucher holders; therefore, their participation determines the number of available units and their geographic distribution, which in turn affects tenant mobility, healthy housing, fair housing choice, and other HUD goals and strategies. Research shows that many landlords choose not to accept housing vouchers, threatening the purpose and objectives of the HCV program.

Landlords decide whether to participate based on factors such as financial considerations, perceptions about voucher holders, and bureaucratic issues related to the program’s administration. State and local governments and public housing agencies (PHAs) have pursued several strategies to increase landlord participation in the HCV program, including local laws prohibiting discrimination based on source of income as well as various incentives, supports, and streamlined processes. HUD recently completed a seven-site listening tour to elicit feedback from landlords that a task force will consider in making policy recommendations.

The Housing Choice Voucher Program

The HCV program began as the Section 8 Existing Housing Program under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, which issued participating households a rental certificate covering the difference between 25 percent of adjusted family income (later changed to 30%) and the fair market rent. In 1983, an offshoot of the program called the Freestanding Voucher program permitted housing agencies to determine a payment standard other than the Fair Market Rent (FMR) and allowed households to choose units that cost more than the payment standard if they could pay the amount exceeding 30 percent of income plus the certificate. The Section 8 Existing Housing certificate program and the Freestanding Voucher program were merged under the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 and renamed the Housing Choice Voucher program.1

Research shows that many landlords choose not to accept vouchers, even in areas that protect against discrimination based on source of income.

The HCV program is funded by HUD and administered by more than 2,000 local PHAs.2 Households apply for rental assistance through the PHA, which then determines eligibility and allocates vouchers. In general, an eligible household’s income must not exceed 50 percent of the median income of the county or metropolitan area in which the household uses the voucher. PHAs also must designate 75 percent of vouchers to households earning no more than 30 percent of the area median income. Because of the high demand for vouchers, many PHAs have waiting lists, and some PHAs even closed their waiting lists when the number of waiting households grew too large for the PHA to assist within a reasonable period. PHAs can select voucher recipients from their waiting lists according to criteria such as homelessness, severe cost burden, or displacement. Eligible households that receive vouchers rent housing from landlords who agree to accept the vouchers. The rental property is subject to inspection and must meet PHA health and safety standards. The PHA determines a payment standard based on the HUD FMR calculated for the area. Payment standards range between 90 and 110 percent of FMR, although HUD may grant exceptions for localities to set payment standards at up to 120 percent of FMR. Some localities use Small Area FMRs to determine market rates for smaller geographies, which better reflect the rent variation within a metropolitan area. The PHA pays the landlord a subsidy, and the voucher household pays 30 percent of its income for rent and utilities. In addition, the household pays the difference between the subsidy and the rent charged if the rent exceeds the payment standard, although it cannot spend more than 40 percent of its income for rent.3

In 2017, the HCV program assisted approximately 2.2 million households representing more than 5 million people, with an average subsidy per household of $753 per month and an average family contribution of $370 per month.4 Despite the large number of households served by the program, approximately three out of every four households that are eligible for assistance do not receive it.5 In addition, many voucher holders are unable to find an eligible rental unit and a landlord who accepts vouchers within the time required to use the voucher. The most recent national data (from 2000) found that 69 percent of households who received vouchers from large metropolitan PHAs successfully secured a rental unit within the program’s designated timeframe. Success rates vary considerably according to local conditions, however.6 A 2010 study on the Seattle Housing Authority found that approximately 40 percent of voucher holders failed to lease up within 120 days.7

HUD’s Housing Choice Voucher program can better meet its goals to promote tenant choice when landlords in high-opportunity neighborhoods accept vouchers. Photo courtesy of Daro Management Services

The Nation’s Rental Units and Landlords

As of 2016, the United States had approximately 47.1 million rental units, of which approximately 44 million were occupied. Most of the nation’s rental stock, 61 percent, is in multifamily buildings, and 39 percent is in single-family units, which includes single-family detached and attached homes as well as mobile homes and recreational vehicles. Individual investors own 74 percent of the nation’s rental properties and 48 percent of the units, and limited liability companies and limited liability partnerships own 15 percent of rental properties and 33 percent of the units, with the remaining 11 percent of properties and 19 percent of units owned by housing cooperatives and nonprofit organizations, real estate corporations and investment, trustee for estate, tenant in common, and general partnerships.8

Because the success of the HCV program depends on the availability of units in the private market, landlords play a pivotal role. Landlord participation determines how many units are available for HCV participants, where those units are located, and how well the program achieves goals such as making units available in high-opportunity neighborhoods and alleviating high concentrations of voucher holders in very low-income neighborhoods. Yet we have limited information about the number and characteristics of the nation’s landlords. Using data from the 2015 Rental Housing Finance Survey and the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income division, HUD estimates that the United States has 10 to 12 million total landlords and only a fraction of them participate in the HCV program. HUD reports that between 2009 and 2016, the number of unique landlords participating in the HCV program declined from 775,000 to 695,000.9 Research on specific locales suggests possible patterns of landlord participation, but those findings may not be generalizable. A study of Illinois landlords participating in the HCV program finds that most rent to only one voucher household, with the average number of HCV leases per landlord highest in central cities and lowest in rural areas.10 Research on the Atlanta area finds that some large investor landlords in distressed neighborhoods prefer voucher tenants for the stable payments and the fact that the possibility of losing a voucher makes tenants responsive to the PHA, whereas others report that the inspection process discourages them from accepting vouchers.11

Landlord Decisionmaking and Treatment of Voucher Holders

With some notable exceptions, little research exists on the role of landlords in the HCV program, limiting stakeholders’ understanding of how landlords decide to participate in the program and how they interact with and treat voucher holders. Two recently released HUD-sponsored studies, Garboden et al.’s “Urban Landlords and the Housing Choice Voucher Program” and Cunningham et al.’s “A Pilot Study of Landlord Acceptance of Housing Choice Vouchers,” attempt to fill some of that knowledge gap. (For more on the methodology and findings of this research, see “HUD-Sponsored Research Sheds New Light on HCV Landlords”.) Garboden et al. find that the decision to accept vouchers is generally motivated by a cost-benefit analysis of renting to voucher holders versus nonvoucher holders, primarily considering financial factors relating to faster occupancy and rent payment. According to Garboden et al., “[T]he costs and benefits to the program are weighed against the hypothetical counterfactual tenant that a landlord might otherwise rent to in the open market.”12 Garboden et al. find that the local market context is a crucial factor in this evaluation. This research also suggests that the size of the landlord’s holdings and administrative capacity can influence the decision to participate.13

Landlords also consider numerous other factors, including nonfinancial ones, when deciding whether to participate in the HCV program. Besides financial concerns, landlords’ perceptions of voucher tenants and anticipated tenant-related issues, as well as their tolerance for dealing with bureaucracy (both of which may also have financial implications), are significant considerations in their decision.14 Some landlords report that they accept vouchers because they feel a duty to help low-income renters. In some cases, landlords discovered that their willingness to accept vouchers increased the demand for their rental units, and they may appreciate the stability of the payment from the PHA.15

Many landlords ultimately choose not to participate in the HCV program. Misperceptions and negative stereotypes about voucher holders contribute to landlords’ reluctance to participate. A landlord’s first experience with a voucher holder often affects their future participation; a good experience with a renter could lead to further participation, whereas a bad one could prompt a landlord to avoid voucher holders.16

Garboden et al. find that negative experiences with the program typically involve some combination of frustration with the bureaucratic elements of the program, costs associated with inspections, and conflicts with tenants that were difficult to address because of the constraints related to the program.17 Landlords might be uncertain about which responsibilities toward tenants belong to them and which belong to the PHA, and they may expect PHAs to be more involved than they are obligated to be.18

Public housing agencies can streamline bureaucratic processes and offer financial incentives such as damage loss mitigation and vacancy loss protection to make the Housing Choice Voucher program more attractive to landlords. Photo courtesy of Daro Management Services

Cunningham et al.’s study examines the differential treatment of voucher holders early in the housing search process and finds that landlords often refuse to accept vouchers.19 The widespread refusal of landlords to accept vouchers poses significant challenges to the success of individual HUD-assisted households and to the program as a whole. Some landlords may discourage voucher holders through advertisements explicitly stating that they will not accept vouchers, whereas others may screen out voucher holders who apply.20

Research by Kathleen Moore, fellow at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Institute for Research on Poverty, reinforces these findings. Moore’s research, based on landlord responses to more than 6,000 email inquiries across 14 cities, also finds evidence that landlords refuse to rent to voucher holders. Fewer testers who indicated that they would use vouchers received positive responses than did testers who did not indicate that they would use vouchers, and these results held for every racial category.21 More localized research also demonstrates the significantly limited housing options available to voucher holders. For example, a 2012 survey of landlords in the Austin, Texas MSA found that 91 percent of landlords declined to rent to HCV households and that only 6 percent of all units surveyed were open to HCV households (defined as eligible under the program, not subject to minimum income requirements that would disqualify voucher households, and having a landlord willing to accept a voucher).22 Differential treatment of voucher holders often continues beyond the search process into the period after lease up; specifically, landlords may leverage the punitive powers of the PHA, namely the authority to revoke the voucher, in conflicts with tenants.23

Impacts of Limited Landlord Participation

Landlord participation rates affect the overall availability of rental options as well as the location and quality of available options, thus shaping the extent to which low-income households can access the intended benefits of federal housing assistance. Voucher recipients who successfully lease up spend less money on housing and utilities and can spend more money on food, and receiving a voucher significantly reduces the risk of homelessness. Some voucher holders use the subsidy to improve their housing conditions (such as living in less crowded units or in buildings with fewer code violations) and access low-poverty, amenity-rich neighborhoods.24

Housing Opportunities Made Equal of Virginia’s Move to Opportunity program helps equip voucher households to be responsible tenants and provides a liaison to help landlords, such as those pictured here, navigate the HCV program successfully. Photo courtesy of Housing Opportunities Made Equal of Virginia

Research shows that only about 20 percent of voucher households rent in a low-poverty neighborhood, and voucher households are “somewhat spatially concentrated.”25 Another study finds that voucher households are more economically and racially segregated than an extremely low-income comparison group. Several factors contribute to these spatial patterns beyond simply the willingness of landlords to accept vouchers, but landlords affect these outcomes and can help alter them. Metzger finds that voucher households renting in jurisdictions with laws preventing discrimination based on source of income (SOI) live in less racially segregated areas than do those renting in jurisdictions without such protections.26 Deconcentrating the clusters of HCV renters in high-poverty areas, which Andrew Greenlee of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign notes can lead to stigmatization or isolation, will require broader participation among landlords in low-poverty areas, who historically have participated at lower rates.27

Strategies To Increase Landlords’ Participation

HUD, PHAs, and state and local governments have implemented numerous strategies, including both incentives and disincentives, to increase landlords’ participation in the HCV program.

HUD and PHA programs, policies, and incentives. PHAs can actively recruit landlords through outreach efforts that introduce potential participants to the mechanics of the program and its benefits. Some PHAs employ landlord liaisons to cultivate relationships with landlords and property managers.28 Greenlee notes that, in addition to recruitment, PHAs should focus on retention, including those landlords who take on HCV contracts when they acquire a property but might not wish to renew the contracts and continue to participate in the long term. PHA-led training sessions and continuing education can support landlords and equip them with the necessary skills for success with the voucher program. Some housing agencies have established hotlines for landlords with questions about program requirements or tenant issues. Notably, such recruitment, retention, and support efforts may require additional resources from HUD.29

HUD and partnering PHAs can also ease many of the bureaucratic burdens that landlords cite as reasons not to participate in the program. Improved and expedited inspections and streamlined processes for signing contracts online could encourage wider participation.30 Since fiscal year 2014, HUD has given PHAs the authority to conduct inspections biennially instead of annually, providing regulatory relief for property owners.31 The Housing Opportunity Through Modernization Act of 2016 authorized HUD to allow PHAs the discretion, under certain circumstances, to approve units for lease up before passing an inspection.32 PHAs can also collaborate regionally to make rules more consistent — or more flexible — to ease portability (when tenants move from one PHA’s jurisdiction to another) and ease the burden on landlords who own properties in several jurisdictions and otherwise would need to learn the rules of each PHA.33

PHAs, through Small Area FMRs or tiered payment standards, can also make participation more financially attractive in higher-cost areas by ensuring that participating landlords can charge rents similar to what they would charge market-rate renters without vouchers.34 Some PHAs have devoted funds to reimburse landlords for costs incurred through renting to voucher holders, such as vacancy or damage, and others have supplemented security deposits.35 On the tenant side, PHAs can extend allowable tenant search times, provide search assistance, and improve their lists of available units to include more units in high-opportunity neighborhoods.36

In an effort to connect more HCV families with units in high-opportunity neighborhoods, Ascend STL’s Mobility Connection program, a partnership with the St. Louis Housing Authority and the Housing Authority of St. Louis County, offers a free listing service for property owners, prescreening of tenants who have received counseling to help them transition to a new home, and staff assistance in completing program paperwork.37 (For more on how PHAs are helping increase landlord participation in the HCV program, see “PHAs Encourage Landlord Participation With Incentives”.)

State and local government incentives. State and local governments can also offer incentives for landlords to participate in the HCV program. Targeted tax incentives are a strategy for deconcentrating poverty by shaping the financial context for landlord decisionmaking. In Virginia, for example, the Communities of Opportunity Program issues tax credits to landlords in low-poverty areas of the Richmond/Petersburg metropolitan area who rent to voucher holders.38 The state of Oregon developed a Housing Choice Landlord Guarantee program that reimburses landlords up to $5,000 for damages caused by an HCV tenant that exceed normal wear and tear; the state of Washington implemented a similar landlord mitigation program.39 At the local level, Los Angeles County’s Homeless Prevention Initiative funded the Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles’ Homeless Incentive Program, which pays holding fees, rental application fees, vacancy loss claims, and damage claims for voucher holders who have been homeless to encourage landlords to accept vouchers for a specific population.40 Local governments that conduct inspections of private rental units could also coordinate or combine inspections with PHAs.41

Legal requirements. At present, federal fair housing laws do not prohibit discrimination against voucher holders based on SOI. Some states and local jurisdictions do have SOI laws, although some do not explicitly protect housing vouchers as an income category, and in some cases state laws may preempt local SOI laws. Research is mixed on the effectiveness of SOI laws. Freeman finds that jurisdictions with SOI antidiscrimination laws have voucher utilization rates that are 4 to 11 percentage points higher than jurisdictions without such laws.42 Finkle and Buron find that voucher holders in jurisdictions with SOI laws are 12 percent more likely to find a unit within the voucher’s time limit than voucher holders in places without such protections.43 Cunningham et al. also find that rates of landlord acceptance were higher in areas with SOI protections, although the researchers caution against drawing definitive conclusions given that the study was not designed to test the effectiveness of SOI protections.44 Moore, however, finds no significant association between SOI laws and landlord responses.45 Some observers point out that prohibitions on SOI discrimination can be difficult to enforce.46 Moore suggests that SOI laws should explicitly include protection for vouchers and adds that steering — referring HCV applicants to units other than the one to which they applied — should also be illegal. Moore also suggests that any income-scaling requirement during screening should calculate the minimum required household income based on the household’s contribution to the rent; for example, if a unit costs $1,000 per month to rent and the landlord requires a monthly income of three times the rent, eligible tenants would need a household income of $900 per month, or three times their $300 contribution to the rent.47

HUD held seven listening sessions with landlords across the country, including one in Salt Lake City, Utah, to solicit input on increasing participation in the HCV program. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

Research. Research, and effective dissemination of that research, can play an important role in increasing landlord participation by identifying effective practices. HUD’s recent reports on landlords and the HCV program have begun to shed light on what had been a largely overlooked aspect of the HCV program, but much more work must be done to understand how and why landlords choose to participate and what effects these factors have on the program and on voucher-assisted households, and HUD can continue to play a leading role in such research. Among the topics that could be considered in future research are how PHAs are using the flexibility afforded by the Moving to Work demonstration to increase landlord participation, how landlords interact with PHA staff and tenants, how changing housing markets influence landlords’ decisions, whether landlord incentive programs improve program outcomes, how SOI laws are enforced, and whether less strict inspection processes result in lower housing quality, among others.48

Research can also help address fears and misconceptions that discourage landlords from accepting vouchers. For example, landlords may believe that accepting vouchers will not be lucrative, but participation in the HCV program does not mean that landlords must charge voucher tenants below-market rents. Research on the Milwaukee area finds that landlords charge voucher households between $51 and $68 more than households without vouchers in comparable units and neighborhoods, suggesting that renting to voucher holders does not reduce income for landlords. (These findings, however, also suggest that the HCV program is overpaying these landlords.)49 Similarly, research could help allay landlords’ concerns about crime; Gould Ellen, Lens, and O’Regan find that increased voucher use in a neighborhood does not increase crime rates.50

Finally, research is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of the various programs and policies mentioned above. Moore notes that the experimentation in landlord outreach and incentives that PHAs and local governments are now conducting, as well as the variation in SOI laws and enforcement, offer researchers a tremendous opportunity to learn more about effective strategies.51 As research and experience grows, says Greenlee, sharing best practices among PHAs, local governments, and landlords will be important.52

Listening to Landlords

Recognizing that landlords, whose role in the success of the HCV program is critical, currently underparticipate in the program, HUD has embarked on a campaign to encourage landlords to accept vouchers. In September 2018, HUD launched a series of landlord engagement forums with sessions in seven cities, during which landlords were invited to share their experiences and their ideas for making the program more attractive to those not yet participating and more user friendly for those who are already participating. HUD’s new Landlord Task Force will consolidate input from the forums and make policy recommendations to increase landlord participation in the HCV program, including in the low-poverty neighborhoods where participation rates are currently lowest. With increased landlord participation, the HCV program will offer wider choices and greater opportunities to voucher-assisted households.53

1. Alex F. Schwartz. 2015. Housing Policy in the United States, 3rd ed., New York: Routledge, 227–8.
2. Barbara Sard. 2018. "Housing Choice Voucher Program: Oversight and Review of Legislative Proposals: Testimony of Barbara Sard, Vice President for Housing Policy, Before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 17 April.
3. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. "Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet"  (www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet). Accessed 3 October 2018; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. "Small Area Fair Market Rents"(www.hudexchange.info/programs/public-housing/small-area-fair-market-rents/). Accessed 16 November 2018.
4. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research. "Picture of Subsidized Households" (www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/assthsg.html). Accessed 2 December 2018.
5. National Low Income Housing Coalition. 2018. "Out of Reach: The High Cost of Housing," 6.
6. Meryl Finkel and Larry Buron. 2001. "Study on Section 8 Voucher Success Rates, Volume I: Quantitative Study of Success Rates in Metropolitan Areas," Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
7. Galvez, quoted in: Erin Graves. 2016. "Rooms for Improvement: A Quality Metasynthesis of the Housing Choice Voucher Program," Housing Policy Debate 26:2, 356.
8. Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. 2017. "America’s Rental Housing 2017," 13–4.
9. Todd M. Richardson. 2018. "Landlords," PD&R Edge.
10. Andrew J. Greenlee. 2014. "More Than Meets the Market? Landlord Agency in the Illinois Housing Choice Voucher Program," Housing Policy Debate 24:3, 506.
11. Dan Immergluck and Jonathan Law. 2014. "Investing in Crisis: The Methods, Strategies, and Expectations of Investors in Single-Family Foreclosed Homes in Distressed Neighborhoods," Housing Policy Debate 24:3, 590.
12. Philip M.E. Garboden, Eva Rosen, Meredith Greif, Stefanie DeLuca, and Kathryn Edin. 2018a. "Urban Landlords and the Housing Choice Voucher Program: A Research Report," U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 36.
13. Philip M.E. Garboden, Eva Rosen, Stefanie DeLuca, and Kathryn Edin. 2018b. "Taking Stock: What Drives Landlord Participation in the Housing Choice Voucher Program," Housing Policy Debate 28:6, 9–10.
14. Ibid., 13.
15. Greenlee, 509, 514–5.
16. Ibid., 509.
17. Garboden et al. 2018b, 17.
18. Greenlee, 516.
19. Mary Cunningham, Martha Galvez, Claudia L. Aranda, Rob Santos, Doug Wissoker, Alyse Oneto, Rob Pitingolo, and James Crawford. 2018. "A Pilot Study of Landlord Acceptance of Housing Choice Vouchers," U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, xi.
20. Garboden et al. 2018b, 19.
21. M. Kathleen Moore. 2018. "‘I don’t do vouchers’: Experimental evidence of discrimination against housing voucher recipients across fourteen metro areas," working paper, 1, 24–5.
22. Austin Tenants’ Council. 2012. "Voucher Holders Need Not Apply: An Audit Report on the Refusal of Housing Choice Vouchers by Landlords in the Austin MSA." 
23. Greenlee, 518–9.
24. Ingrid Gould Ellen. 2017. "What Do We Know About Housing Choice Vouchers?" NYU Furman Center and NYU Wagner, 1, 4–5.
25. Kirk McClure, Alex F. Schwartz, and Lydia B. Taghavi. 2014. "Housing Choice Voucher Location Patterns a Decade Later," Housing Policy Debate 25:2, 5.
26. Molly W. Metzger. 2014. "The Reconcentration of Poverty: Patterns of Housing Voucher Use, 2000 to 2008," Housing Policy Debate 24:3, 545.
27. Greenlee, 510.
28. Cunningham et al., 66.
29. Interview with Andrew Greenlee, 19 October 2018.
30. Garboden et al. 2018b, 23.
31. Moore, 4.
32. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2017. "Housing Opportunity Through Modernization Act of 2016 (HOTMA) – Housing Quality Standards (HQS) Implementation Guidance," Notice PIH 2017-20 (HA), 27 October.
33. Interview with Kathleen Moore, 19 October 2018.
34. Cunningham et al., 67.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 68–9.
37. Ascend St. Louis. "Property Owners" (www.ascendstl.org/property-owners/). Accessed 17 October 2018; Ascend St. Louis. "Partners" (www.ascendstl.org/partners/). Accessed 13 November 2018.
38. Virginia Department of Housing and Community Development. "Communities of Opportunity Tax Credit"  (www.dhcd.virginia.gov/index.php/housing-programs-and-assistance/tax-credit-programs/communities-of-opportunity-tax-credit.html). Accessed 17 October 2018.
39. Oregon Housing and Community Services. "Housing Choice Vouchers: Landlord Guarantee Assistance"  (www.oregon.gov/ohcs/Pages/housing-choice-land­lord-guarantee-assistance.aspx). Accessed 17 October 2018; Poverty & Race Research Action Council. 2018. "Expanding Choice: Practical Strategies for Building a Successful Housing Mobility Program — Appendix B: State, Local, and Federal Laws Barring Source-of-Income Discrimination," 80.
40. Community Development Commission/Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles. "Homeless Incentive Program (HIP)" (www.hacola.org/section-8/homeless-programs/hip). Accessed 17 October 2018.
41. Minneapolis Public Housing Authority. 2016. "Analysis of Potential Inspections Coordination between the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority and the Minneapolis Department of Regulatory Services," 1.
42. Lance Freeman. 2011. "The Impact of Source of Income Laws on Voucher Utilization and Locational Outcomes: Assisted Housing Research Cadre Report," U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research.
43. Cited in: Garboden et al. 2018b, 4.
44. Cunningham et al., 66.
45. Moore, 31; Interview with Kathleen Moore.
46. Garboden et al. 2018b, 2.
47. Moore, 33.
48. Interview with Andrew Greenlee; Interview with Kathleen Moore.
49. Matthew Desmond and Kristin L. Perkins. 2016. "Are Landlords Overcharging Housing Voucher Holders?" City and Community 15:2, 137–62.
50. Ingrid Gould Ellen, Michael C. Lens, and Katherine O’Regan. 2012. "American murder mystery revisited: do housing voucher households cause crime?" Housing Policy Debate 22:4, 551–72.
51. Interview with Kathleen Moore.
52. Interview with Andrew Greenlee.
53. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2018. "HUD Launches Campaign to Boost Landlord Acceptance of Housing Vouchers," press release, 20 August.

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